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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation addresses the tendency among some disability scholars to 
overlook the importance of congenital deformity and disability in the pre-modern West. It 
argues that congenital deformity and disability deviated so greatly from able-bodied 
norms that they have played a pivotal role in the history of Western Civilization. In 
particular, it explores the evolution of two seemingly separate, but ultimately related, 
ideas from classical antiquity through the First World War: (1) the idea that there was 
some type of significance, whether supernatural or natural, to the existence of congenital 
deformity and (2) the idea that the existence of disabled people has resulted in a disability 
problem for western societies because many disabilities can hinder labor productivity to 
such an extent that large numbers of the disabled cannot survive without taking precious 
resources from their more productive, able-bodied counterparts. It also looks at how 
certain categories of disabled people, including, monsters, hunchbacks, cripples, the 
blind, the deaf and dumb, and dwarfs, which signified aesthetic and functional deviations 
from able-bodied norms, often reinforced able-bodied prejudices against the disabled. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ii 
 
DEDICATION 
To my wife, Melinda, and my sons, Brendan and Julian, who sacrificed so much while I 
conducted my research and wrote this dissertation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iii 
 
ACKNOWLEGEMENTS 
There are so many people that have helped to make this dissertation a reality.  
Rachel Fuchs took me under her wing as an undergraduate student nearly twenty years 
ago and taught me how to write. Without her, I never could have succeeded in law school 
or graduate school. Her expertise has likewise been invaluable during the research and 
writing process of my dissertation. She also helped to keep my stress levels low when my 
wife and son had significant health problems during graduate school. Kent Wright has 
also been helping me to improve as a student since I was an undergraduate. While 
researching my dissertation, moreover, he helped me to navigate through many of the 
complex debates of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Hava Tirosh-Samuelson 
broadened my horizons in many ways. Perhaps her most important contribution to my 
intellectual development was showing me how to utilize theory in my work. As fate 
would have it, shortly after reading my dissertation, she was hit by a car, suffering serious 
injuries to her leg and spine. I learned a lot about disability and how people cope with 
serious injuries while talking with her in rehabilitation. Finally, I learned so much about 
medieval history and the history of diseases from Monica Green. Without her guidance, 
my understanding of medicine and science in both the pre-modern and modern world 
would have suffered greatly. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iv 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
CHAPTER 
1. INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………...1 
Organization……………………………………………………………...15 
2. HISTORIOGRAPHY……………………………………………………………22 
The Problem with Disability History…………………………………….22 
 
 Promising Beginnings……………………………………………22 
 
 The “Disability Turn”……………………………………………31 
 
3. METHODOLOGY………………………………………………………………54 
4. THE MONSTERS AND BEGGARS OF CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY…………67 
The Enigma of Congenital Deformity in the Greco-Roman World……..69 
 
Congenital Deformity and the Divine…………………….……..70 
Classical Philosophy and Congenital Deformity………………..79 
Hippocratic Physicians and Congenital Deformity……………..92 
Congenital Deformity and Stigma Associated with Various 
Categories of Disabled People…………………………………...95 
Classical Solutions to the Disability Problem…………………………..118 
Greek Solutions…………………………………………………120 
Roman Solutions………………………………………………..125 
The Disability Problem and Increased Stigma Associated          
with Disability…………………………………………………..131 
Conclusion……………………………………………………………...135 
 v 
 
5. MONSTERS AND BEGGARS FROM LATE ANTIQUITY TO THE             
MID-SEVENTEETH CENTURY……………………………………………...155 
Disability and Ambiguity in both the Hebrew Bible and the            
Christian New Testament……………………………………………….158 
Congenital Deformity and the Christian Tradition……………..………164 
 
Stigma and Discrimination Associated with Various  
Categories of Disabled People……………………………….....177 
Christian Solutions to the Disability Problem……………………….…185 
Christian Charity not a Complete Rupture with Classical  
Antiquity……………………………………………………….185 
Christian Charity and the Disabled…………………………….189 
  Conclusion……………………………………………………………...198 
6. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MONSTERS AND THE EFFICACY OF 
ALMSGIVING REEXAMINED IN THE SEVENTEENTH AND  
EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES……………………….…………………………208 
Congenital Deformity…………………………………………………..212 
 
The Mechanical View of Nature and “the Man Born Blind”…..214 
 
Congenital Deformity and the Problem of Theodicy…..……….217 
 
Congenital Deformity and the Radical Challenge to both the 
Christian and Deist World Views………………………………228 
The Persistence of Religious and Superstitious Beliefs about 
Congenital Deformity…………….…………………………….244 
Stigma and Discrimination Associated with Categories of  
 vi 
 
Disabled People………………………………………………...249 
The State and Private Philanthropists Offer New Solutions to the 
Disability Problem……………………………………………………...260 
  Conclusion……………………………………………………………...281 
7. NEW IDEAS ABOUT MONSTROSITY AND THE SEARCH FOR  
MODERN SOLUTIONS TO THE DISABILITY PROBLEM IN THE  
LONG NINETEENTH CENTURY……………………………………………295 
  The Enigma of Congenital Deformity Finally Solved?...........................296 
Revolutionary Solutions to the Disability Problem…………………….305 
The French Revolution and Disabled Veterans….……………..305 
 
The French Revolution and the Schools for the Deaf and  
Blind…………………………………………………………….312 
The Industrial Revolution and Capitalism……………………...317 
The Medicalization of Disability……………………………….319 
Disability and Total War………………………………………..320 
The Eugenics Movement and the Will to Eradicate the  
Congenitally Deformed……...………………………………….326 
  Conclusion……………………………………………………………...331 
8. THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW TYPE OF DISABILITY DISCOURSE  
IN THE LONG NINETEENTH CENTURY…………………………………..339 
Monsters in the Age of Science………………………………………...339 
Hunchbacks……………………………………………………………..346 
Cripples...……………………………………………………………….361 
 
 vii 
 
Deaf-Mutes and the Blind……………………………………………....375 
 
Dwarfs…………………………………………………………………..383 
 
Conclusion……………………………………………………………...385 
 
9. CONCLUSION………………………………………………………………....393 
BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………………398 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 viii 
 
 
PREFACE 
 This dissertation is a history of disability from classical antiquity through the First 
World War. Some might wonder why, in an age when historians are looking more at 
global history than the history of Western Civilization, I would attempt to write such a 
seemingly ethnocentric history. Disability studies, however, is far too undeveloped to 
permit such a grand historical synthesis. Once enough work has been done on disability 
history in both the East and West, of course, scholars should indeed attempt such a global 
history of disability. One of the purposes of this dissertation, in fact, is to lay the 
groundwork for eventual attempts to compare and contrast the history of disability of the 
West with other areas. 
 The history of disability in other portions of the globe is not the only history of 
disability that I neglect in this dissertation. I have also decided, for the most part, not to 
incorporate the history of mental disability into my history of disability in the West. 
Disability, of course, is a social construction, and the West has socially constructed 
mental disability in a matter that differs so significantly from physical disability that I 
feel that is necessary, at least in the early stages of the disability history movement, to 
examine them separately After scholars conduct enough research on both the history of 
physical disability and the history of mental disability, disability scholars will be better 
able to write a combined history of mental and physical disability. 
 My repeated use of the term “disability” in this preface, as well as throughout my 
dissertation, might bother some disability scholars who continue to follow the social 
model of disability, which, as I discuss in my chapter on historiography, views 
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“impairment” as a physical limitation and “disability” as a socially constructed exclusion 
of disabled people from able-bodied society. Although I admire the social model of 
disability as an effective counter-discursive strategy, the current trend in disability 
studies, at least outside of Britain, is a rejection of the distinction between “impairment” 
and “disability.” For my part, I reject the distinction between “impairment” and 
“disability,” to borrow from Joan Wallach Scott, as unhelpful categories of historical 
analysis.  
 I do, however, make distinctions between “congenital deformity” and “disability.”  
When I refer to “congenital deformity,” I mean birth defects that deviate from aesthetic 
and/or functional norms. I recognize, as did the Union of the Physically Impaired Against 
Segregation (UPIAS) in 1976, that some deviations from able-bodied norms are more 
culturally significant than others. A slight congenital deformity that is only aesthetic in 
nature, for instance, might carry considerably less stigma than a substantial congenital 
deformity involving both aesthetic and functional deviations from able-bodied norms. 
When I use the term “disability,” I mean any congenital or postnatally acquired condition 
that deviates from aesthetic and/or functional norms. These distinctions are important 
because western thinkers have treated the two categories differently.  The existence of 
congenital deformity has long challenged the idea that the natural world is governed by 
order. Indeed, defenders of rational design, as early as classical antiquity, have attempted 
to fit congenital deformity into their world views. Those who would deny that there is 
any rational order to the universe, meanwhile, have looked to congenital deformity when 
arguing that the natural world is governed by chance. At the same time, however, the 
West has long pondered its “disability problem,” characterized by the limited resources 
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of any given society coupled with the limited labor capacity of “disabled people,” i.e., 
those who have either a congenital or postnatally acquired condition that deviates from 
aesthetic/and or functional norms. Because many disabled people have not been able to 
provide adequately for themselves or their families without assistance in the western 
tradition, due in large part to how able-bodied people have socially constructed their 
societies, some cultures have deemed it necessary to limit the absolute numbers of 
disabled people by killing the disabled, generally infants and children with severe 
congenital deformities but sometimes even older people with disabilities. Other cultures 
have adopted more humane approaches, providing the disabled with some kind of 
beneficence, including religious, private, and/or public assistance. 
 I should also point out that I refer to disabled people throughout this dissertation 
by using terms that modern observers often consider offensive, including monstrosity, 
hunchback, cripple, the blind, the deaf and dumb, and dwarfs, even though these 
ostensibly offensive categories continue to proliferate in modern discourse. To 
understand the development of modern disability discourse, it is important to look at how 
these categories have persisted throughout the recorded history of the West, even if it 
makes some people uncomfortable to confront these dehumanizing categories.
 Chapter 1: Introduction 
In the first half of the nineteenth century, Søren Kierkegaard, the hunchback 
philosopher widely considered to be the first existentialist, encouraged his physically 
deformed cousin, Hans Peter Kierkegaard, whom an acquaintance once called “a 
complete cripple,”1 to remember always that the lives of deformed people are every bit as 
important as the lives of others: 
Above all, never forget the duty of loving yourself. Do not let the fact that you 
have in a way been set apart from life, that you have been hindered from taking an 
active part in it, and that in the eyes of the dim-witted and busy world, you are 
superfluous—above all, do not let this deprive you of your notion of yourself, as 
if, in the eyes of all-knowing Governance, your life, if it is lived in inwardness, 
did not have just as much significance and worth as every other person’s.2  
 
Some disability scholars, such as Lennard J. Davis, one of the most important figures in 
disability studies, might point to Kierkegaard’s exhortation to his cousin as evidence of 
an inchoate epiphany in the West that there were substantial differences between disabled 
and able-bodied people, an epiphany that the rise of either the capitalist mode of 
production or the modern nation-state thrust upon western culture, which, for the most 
part, had previously welcomed the disabled into its fold.3 In “Dr. Johnson, Amelia, and 
the Discourse of Disability,” for instance, Davis applies his interpretation of disability 
history to the life of Samuel Johnson, arguing that the manner in which able-bodied 
society interacted with the disabled Johnson demonstrates that much of the stigma and 
discrimination so often associated with disability are essentially modern phenomena.4 
Indeed, Davis contends that the dearth of references by Johnson’s contemporaries to his 
disabilities, and the “casual and literary manner” in which they referred to his physical 
abnormalities when they did broach the subject, suggest that disability was only 
beginning to assume negative connotations.5 According to Davis, we can see in Johnson’s 
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life “traces of both earlier and later formulations of disability. In other words, we can see 
the contradiction of an earlier sense in which disability per se did not exist and of a later 
one in which disability is a modality used to explain a great deal.”6   
Davis has certain post-structuralist ideas about the modern discursivity of 
disability in mind when making these distinctions between disability in the pre-modern 
and modern world. For Davis, “the term disability” is a socially constructed 
“categorization tied to the development of discourses that aim to cure, remediate, or 
catalog variations in bodies.”7 Davis is on solid ground when suggesting that the absence 
of any tendency among pre-modern thinkers to categorize, through modern discursive 
processes, people with various physical defects under a term akin to the modern 
understanding of “disability” highlights the differences between pre-modern and modern 
notions of disability. Davis correctly points out, for example, that people before the 
eighteenth century were more interested in deformity than “disability,” but he goes too 
far in asserting that “only a few writers comment on the subject at all—notably 
Castiglione, Montaigne, and Bacon.”8 He does acknowledge that Castiglione, Montaigne, 
and Bacon all expressed negative attitudes toward people with deformities.9 Castiglione, 
Davis observes, identified a tendency in his own day to associate deformity with evil, 
relying on the following passage from Castiglione to illustrate his point: 
Thus everyone tries hard to conceal his natural defects of mind or body, as we see 
in the case of the blind, lame, the crippled and all those who are maimed and ugly. 
For although these defects can be imputed to Nature, yet no one likes to think he 
has them, since then it seems that Nature herself has caused them deliberately as a 
seal and token of wickedness.10  
 
Putting aside the fact that Castiglione, here, seemingly views various types of deformed 
people as comprising a distinct group because they differ from the able-bodied norm in 
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similar ways, albeit not in accordance with the modern conception of “disability,” 
Castiglione does indeed express negative views about the deformed. Davis likewise notes 
that Montaigne acknowledged the association of deformity with divine purpose.11 Even 
the rationalist Bacon who, according to Davis, “sees deformity ‘not as a sign’ of divine 
intervention or marking of the body, but as a ‘cause’ of personality and behavior,” 
exhibits some negative stereotypes about disabled people, including the idea that 
“deformed people are ambitious, ‘void of natural affection,’ good spies, and advantaged 
in ‘rising’ in court.”12  
William Hay, a hunchback member of Parliament in the eighteenth century, later 
defended himself and other deformed people against Bacon’s claims in Deformity: an 
essay by proclaiming that deformity does not affect a person’s mind in the ways that 
Bacon had assumed.13 Bacon could not hope to understand deformed people, in Hay’s 
view, because “Bodily Deformity is visible to every Eye; but the Effects of it are known 
to very few; intimately known to none but those, who feel them; and they generally are 
not inclined to reveal them.”14 Indeed, in an argument that disability rights advocates 
would later make in the latter half of the twentieth century, Hay suggests that it is not 
deformity that hinders deformed people from leading normal lives but rather the 
prejudices of able-bodied people, contending that “deformed Persons set out in the World 
to a Disadvantage, and they must first surmount the Prejudices of Mankind before they 
can be upon a Par with others.”15  
Davis does recognize that the negative stereotypes that Hay criticizes in Bacon 
might have had the capacity to impact negatively able-bodied society’s view of 
deformity. Davis maintains, for instance, that “Shakespeare, clearly holding to all these 
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opinions [of Castiglione, Montaigne, and Bacon], depicts Richard III as a crooked-
backed, limping sexual villain,” who endeavors to become a villain because his deformed 
body has prevented him from becoming a lover.16 Yet Davis errs in arguing that such 
negative attitudes about disabled people had little impact in the pre-modern world 
because “mentions of deformity [were] sporadic” prior to the eighteenth century.17 
The problems with this interpretation of disability history become readily 
apparent when examining Davis’ argument that Johnson’s life marked a transition to a 
period where disability was becoming increasingly important to eighteenth-century 
observers. Indeed, if Davis had looked at the generation that directly preceded Johnson’s 
more closely, he likely would have discovered that Alexander Pope’s enemies, as I 
discuss in chapter 6, were virtually obsessed with Pope’s many deformities. Indeed, the 
hunchback Pope, who, incidentally, wrote in a 1739 letter that Johnson “has an Infirmity 
of the convulsive kind, that attacks him sometimes, so as to make Him a sad Spectacle,” 
was the subject of repeated public attacks on account of his deformities.18 John Dennis, 
for instance, begins his Reflections Critical and Satyrical, Upon a Late Rhapsody, Call’d 
An Essay on Criticism by ridiculing Pope’s deformities, proclaiming, “As there is no 
Creature so venomous, there is nothing so stupid and impotent as a hunch-back’d 
Toad.”19 Pope, however, was not the first disabled Englishman to suffer public ridicule 
on account of his disabilities. According to Roger Lund, the able-bodied contemporaries 
of the First Earl of Shaftesbury, mockingly called him “‘Count Tapsky’” because he was 
not only crippled with gout and ague but also outfitted with a silver tap (inserted in 1668) 
to drain a suppurating liver cyst.”20  
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Davis’ assertion that Johnson’s contemporaries did not pay much attention to his 
disabilities because the people of his day were only beginning to become aware of 
differences between able-bodied and disabled people, then, does not seem tenable in light 
of the very public and protracted ridicule of Pope on account of his disabilities, which 
began when Johnson was a toddler, not to mention the earlier ridicule of the Frist Earl of 
Shaftesbury. Indeed, there may have been other reasons why Shaftesbury’s and Pope’s 
enemies consciously employed the power of stigma associated with disability in their 
attempts to ridicule and marginalize them, while few of Johnson’s contemporaries 
referred to his disabilities. It may simply have been the First Earl of Shaftesbury’s 
political ambitions, particularly his prominent role among the Whigs, that made his 
disabilities easy targets for his political enemies.21 Pope’s sour disposition and proclivity 
for engaging in satirical attacks against his own enemies, meanwhile, may have made his 
disabilities polemical targets. After all, even Voltaire, one of Pope’s close friends, called 
him “un peu malin” (a little malicious).22 It is quite possible that Pope so enraged his 
enemies that they lashed out in a manner that they knew would hurt Pope the most. As I 
demonstrate in chapter 8, The Corsair, a Danish tabloid, subjected Kierkegaard to similar 
public humiliation because of Kierkegaard’s irascible disposition. Johnson, by contrast, 
although of a morose disposition that perhaps equaled Pope’s and Kierkegaard’s, did not 
engender such enduring bitterness, which perhaps explains why he was not the target of 
similar attacks.23 Johnson’s contemporaries may also have concluded that it was simply 
impolite to mention his disabilities in public just as Joseph Denis Odevaere evidently 
considered it polite to obscure Lord Byron’s club-foot in his painting Lord Byron on his 
Death-bed (1826). 
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One of the primary purposes of this dissertation, then, is to refute Davis’ tendency 
of discounting the importance of ideas about deformity and disability in the pre-modern 
world. I argue, instead, that the evolution of ideas about congenital deformity and 
disability from classical antiquity through World War I has played a significant role in 
the history of the West. In particular, I look at the evolution of two seemingly separate, 
but ultimately related, ideas: (1) the idea that there was some type of significance, 
whether supernatural or natural, to the existence of congenital deformity and (2) the idea 
that the existence of disabled people has resulted in a disability problem for western 
societies because many disabilities can hinder labor productivity to such an extent that 
large numbers of the disabled cannot survive without taking precious resources from their 
more productive, able-bodied counterparts. To address the significance of congenital 
deformity in the western tradition, I look at what various thinkers have written about 
congenital deformity. To address the disability problem, I explore not only what people 
in the past wrote about the problem but also those measures that able-bodied 
communities adopted to ameliorate the problem. My approach is not entirely new. In 
1982, Henri-Jacques Stiker, a French historian, published the seminal work in disability 
history, Corps infirmes et sociétés, an English translation of which appeared in 1997 
under the title A History of Disability. In that work, Stiker identifies a “long polemic on 
monstrosity” in the western tradition. At the same time, Stiker contends, the West had to 
address “what was being done for those who, even if not monstrous, were nonetheless 
referred to monstrosity by their disability. .  . .”24 He further notes that, at least during the 
seventeenth century, “there were attempts to resolve both questions at once, the problem 
of monstrosity and that of the disabled.”25  
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The connection between both the problem of monstrosity and the disability 
problem might not always be readily apparent to modern observers. Stiker himself 
expresses trepidation in connecting the two ideas, wondering whether the problem of 
monstrosity and the problem of disability are “two incommensurable quantities.”26 Yet 
despite difficulties in ascertaining the precise ways in which westerners viewed the 
problem of congenital deformity and the problem of disability as related in periods other 
than the seventeenth century, there have been periods when the connection has been 
unmistakable. In the middle of the eighteenth century, for example, as Marjolein 
Degenaar has observed, “theoretical interest in the deaf and blind was combined with a 
humanitarian interest which led to philanthropists such as l’abbé de L’Épée and Valentin 
Haüy being able to put through social reforms, including provision of care and education 
for deaf mutes and the blind.”27 There was undoubtedly a strong connection between the 
problem of monstrosity and the problem of disability, moreover, during the latter half of 
the nineteenth century. Beginning with Empedocles in the fifth century B.C.E., some of 
the most important thinkers in the western tradition had pondered what secrets the 
existence of congenital deformity might reveal about the nature of things. When Charles 
Darwin finally unveiled his theory of natural selection in 1859, one of his most important 
underlying assumptions, as I discuss in chapter 7, was that people with severe congenital 
deformities, often called monsters or monstrosities both before and after Darwin, were 
simply people with mutations indicative of progressive processes that have resulted in the 
evolution of species. As anyone familiar with disability history might expect, it did not 
take long for his contemporaries to use that knowledge, along with advances in medicine 
and techniques long used in animal husbandry and horticulture, to address the disability 
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problem. Indeed, Darwin’s own half-cousin, Sir Francis Galton, was instrumental in 
creating the eugenics movement, which, in part, attempted to eradicate certain types of 
undesirable disabled people from the gene pool. Disability scholars, of course, understand 
well that the advent of the eugenics movement had a profound effect on how able-bodied 
people viewed disability. Sharon L. Snyder and David L. Mitchell, for example, argue 
that it is possible to trace negative attitudes “to the eugenics era, when disability began to 
be construed as an undesirable deviation from normative existence,” even if they are too 
quick to discount negative stereotypes about disability in the pre-modern West.28 
Disability scholars, however, have yet to explore how the evolution of ideas about 
congenital deformity from classical antiquity to the nineteenth century contributed to the 
birth of the eugenics movement itself.   
In any event, as Darwin was explaining how chance and monstrosity fit into his 
theory of natural selection and eugenicists were attempting to use that knowledge to 
improve the gene pool, the West was simultaneously looking for other ways of dealing 
with the disability problem. These efforts included medical intervention and increased 
involvement by the state in providing assistance directly to the disabled. The ways in 
which able-bodied people viewed congenital deformity and disability were thus in the 
midst of rapid change during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as were the 
ways in which able-bodied society was addressing its disability problem.  
Exploring these changes and how disabled people have reacted to them, and 
continue to react to them, of course, would become an important aspect of the disability 
rights movement, including disability studies, which arose during the 1960s and 1970s. If 
I were to explore only the evolution of ideas about disability, however, my work would 
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completely fail to take into consideration one of the most crucial developments in the 
brief history of disability studies. When Davis published his groundbreaking Enforcing 
Normalcy: Disability, Deafness, and the Body in 1995, while the nascent disability 
studies movement was searching not only for a way to conceptualize disability but also 
for a voice in academia and beyond, Davis succeeded in demonstrating to disability 
scholars the important implications of post-structuralist theory, particularly the theories 
of Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida. The implications of these post-structural 
theories, particularly the Foucauldian understanding of disability history, have become so 
important to the disability studies movement in recent years that they have become 
virtually impossible to ignore. In Enforcing Normalcy, Davis explains his view of the 
Foucauldian interpretation of disability history, arguing that “[p]reindustrial societies 
tended to treat people with impairments as part of the social fabric, although admittedly 
not kindly, while postindustrial societies, instituting ‘kindness,’ ended up segregating and 
ostracizing such individuals through the discursivity of disability.”29 Much of my 
dissertation, particularly the final four chapters, builds upon this Foucauldian view of 
disability history. I am not as quick as Davis, however, to view disabled people as part of 
the social fabric in the preindustrial world or to conclude that efforts to institute 
“kindness” were always behind the segregation and ostracism of disabled people in 
postindustrial societies, particularly with respect to the eugenics movement. Indeed, I 
argue that disabled people were not as integrated into preindustrial societies as Davis 
assumes and that much of the treatment of disabled people in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries was anything but kind.    
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Developments in linguistics from Ferdinand de Saussure to Derrida, although not 
as influential within disability studies as the Foucauldian understanding of history, are 
likewise important when attempting to theorize disability. As Frederic Jameson explains 
in Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, one of the most important 
developments of Saussurean structural linguistics is “the proposition that meaning is not a 
one-to-one relationship between signifier and signified, between the materiality of 
language, between a word or name, and its referent or concept.”30 Accordingly, meaning 
after Saussure, “is generated by the movement from signifier to signifier. What we 
generically call the signified—the meaning or conceptual content of an utterance—is now 
rather to be seen as a meaning-effect, as that objective mirage of signification generated 
and projected by the relationship of signifiers among themselves.”31 Derrida, of course, 
went beyond Saussure in exploring, and deconstructing, binary oppositions, 
demonstrating that there can be no obvious line of demarcation that separates one from 
the other. The result is that after Saussure and Derrida, despite the often justifiable 
reluctance of many scholars to utilize deconstruction in their own work, it is no longer 
possible to understand any signifier of disability, either in the present or in the past, 
without reference to the myriad signifiers that express not only aesthetic and functional 
norms but also deviations from those norms.32 In addition, many signifiers that seemingly 
have nothing to do with disability, especially signifiers denoting deviations from male, 
heterosexual norms, can reinforce negative attitudes regarding disability because, as 
Rosemarie Garland-Thomson has noted, the West “has long conflated femaleness and 
disability, understanding both as defective departures from a valued standard.”33 Davis 
proposes an even more expansive view of the relationship between the term disability and 
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other categories, arguing that “disability is part of a continuum that includes differences 
in gender, as well as bodily features indicative of race, sexual preference, and even of 
class.”34 
Once again, it was Davis who led the way in demonstrating the precise ways in 
which Derridean insights into language, combined with Foucauldian insights about power 
and knowledge, might provide a deeper understanding of disability history. In Enforcing 
Normalcy, Davis seemingly acknowledges some utility in examining binary oppositions 
when attempting to conceptualize disability but argues against “the routine assumptions 
made about the ‘clear’ polarities of deafness and hearing, of disabled and abled.”35 He 
points out, moreover, that “binarism,” whether “straight/gay, male/female, rich/poor,” 
forms “part of an ideology of containment and a politics of power and fear.”36 Davis 
echoes, here, the work of Stiker, who likewise sees the politics of power and fear in “the 
existence of these multiple diminutions or insufficiencies: mal-formation, dis-ability, de-
bility, im-potence,” even though he does not examine those historical categories in any 
detail.37 According to Stiker, all such words, “curiously negative (negating what?), evoke 
a fear. At its lowest level . . . this fear produces an almost visceral reaction to the 
disruption that has been caused. We organize the world  . . . for a kind of average person, 
designated normal.”38 Because disabled people cannot exist in that world comfortably, 
Stiker argues, disabled people threaten to “modify or remake” that world.”39 For Stiker, 
being confronted with disability thus “creates a disorganization that is both concrete and 
social. But from this vantage point we perceive yet another disorganization, much deeper 
and more painful: the disorganization of our acquired understandings, of our established 
values.”40 
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Davis, like Stiker, recognizes that modern, discursive categories which distinguish 
the disabled from the able-bodied have played an integral role in shaping our 
understanding of the world. “While many progressive intellectuals have stepped forward 
to decry racism, sexism, and class bias,” he posits, “it has not occurred to most of them 
that the very foundations on which their information systems are built, their very 
practices of reading and writing, seeing, thinking, and moving are themselves laden with 
assumptions about hearing, deafness, blindness, normalcy, paraplegia, and ability and 
disability in general.”41 To demonstrate the extent to which disability impacts information 
systems, he points out that “our language is peppered with words and phrases like ‘lame,’ 
‘blind,’ ‘deaf and dumb,’ ‘deaf, dumb, and blind,’ ‘idiotic,’ and so on that carry with 
them moral and ethical implications.”42 Davis is not only referring here to the use of such 
words as signifiers of actual disabled people, but also to the metaphorical use of 
language, whereby we use words associated with disability to express the inadequacies of 
someone or something.43  
I take Davis’ argument one step further, agreeing with Stiker that the categories 
which Davis sees as so important for modern information systems likewise played a 
pivotal role in the construction and evolution of ideas about disability from classical 
antiquity through World War I.44 Indeed, when pre-modern and early modern thinkers 
addressed the significance of congenital deformity and/or the disability problem, their 
ideas were influenced by similar, though not identical, forms of stigma and 
discrimination associated with many of the categories that Davis sees as so influential to 
the development of modern information systems. Accordingly, this dissertation examines 
not only the idea that there was some type of significance to congenital deformity and the 
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idea that there was a disability problem, but also the categorization of disabled people as 
monsters, dwarfs, hunchbacks, cripples/the lame, the blind, and the deaf and dumb in 
order to demonstrate that the evolution of ideas about disability, particularly ideas about 
congenital deformity, could not have been value-free. Indeed, negative depictions of 
congenitally deformed people, expressed through the same types of categories identified 
by Davis, have abounded since the beginnings of Western Civilization, subtly influencing 
how able-bodied people have viewed the congenitally deformed and disabled. I do argue, 
however, that there were important changes during the long nineteenth century that 
modified the western understanding of those categories. The emerging disability 
discourse of the long nineteenth century, I contend, continued to utilize the pre-modern 
and early modern categories for disabled people but did so in slightly different ways that 
reflected the new Darwinian understanding of congenital deformity and new, modern 
approaches to the disability problem. I should note, however, that my intention in 
exploring these categories is not to analyze every single known text in the western 
tradition that ever used those categories in a disparaging manner. Such a compilation 
would take hundreds, if not thousands, of pages. My aim is to demonstrate only how 
those categories have contributed to the stigma and discrimination associated with 
disability by exploring what are, in my estimation, some the more influential and 
interesting texts in the western tradition. 
Davis warns disability scholars that those unfamiliar with disability studies may 
reject the notion that negative biases about disability, many of which are perpetuated by 
the categories that Davis has identified, inevitably creep into the ways in which human 
beings perceive their world. Davis notes, for example, that although it has indeed 
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“become a mark of commonplace courtesy and intellectual rigor to note occasions when 
racism, sexism, or class bias creep into discourse,” there remains “a strange and really 
unaccountable silence when the issue of disability is raised (or, more to the point, never 
raised); the silence is stranger, too, since much of left criticism has devoted itself to the 
issue of the body, of the social construction of sexuality and gender.”45 Although some 
scholars, including Susan Wendell, Barbara Fawcett, Bonnie Smith, Sumi Colligan, and 
Robert McRuer, have attempted to bridge the gap between gender studies, queer studies, 
and disability studies, many of Davis’s criticisms remain as valid today as when he made 
them in 1995.46 One can only hope that as more disability scholars build upon the work 
of Davis, we can convince those scholars outside of disability studies about the 
importance of disability bias and those categories that have played such an important role 
in perpetuating that bias throughout the recorded history of the West. 
Returning to the question of whether the hunchback Kierkegaard believed that he 
was witnessing the development of a new type of disability discourse that marginalized 
people like him and his crippled cousin, then, is far more complex than many disability 
scholars might assume. There is no question that developments from classical antiquity to 
the aftermath of World War I altered able-bodied society’s views about disability in 
significant ways. Cultural representations of disability from the French Revolution 
through World War I, as I discuss in chapter 8, often differed greatly from earlier 
representations. The various categories for disabled people, along with the stigma and 
discrimination associated with them, did not disappear during this period, even as the 
western world experienced a wide array of rapid changes. Indeed, able-bodied society 
continued to marginalize disabled people by referring to them as monsters, dwarfs, 
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hunchbacks, cripples/the lame, the blind, and the deaf and dumb. Yet the advent of 
modernity did alter the precise ways in which able-bodied people understood and 
employed those ancient categories. In addition, able-bodied society increasingly placed 
disabled people in new categories such as degenerates, patients, and welfare recipients. 
The story of this dissertation, then, is how the evolution of ideas about disability from 
classical antiquity through World War I contributed to the advent of modern disability 
discourse, against which, beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, the disability rights 
movement would launch a counter-discursive assault. 
Organization 
After discussing disability historiography in chapter 2 and my methodology in 
chapter 3, I begin my fourth chapter by exploring the significance of congenital deformity 
and the disability problem in classical antiquity. Some Greeks and Romans attributed 
congenital deformity to supernatural forces. Philosophers, however, often rejected 
supernatural reasons for congenital deformity, generally contending that monstrous births 
were mere accidents that deviated from the ordinary rationality of nature. Yet some 
philosophers rejected the idea that there was any such rationality in the natural world, 
arguing instead that chance produced natural phenomena, including congenital deformity. 
Empedocles, a Presocratic with a wide range of interests, for example, attributed 
congenital deformity to spontaneous generation and chance. According to Empedocles, 
body parts spring from the earth through spontaneous generation and randomly attach to 
other body parts. Eventually, he posited, the random combination of body parts results in 
complete organisms able to survive and reproduce, while imperfect monstrosities are 
unable to propagate their kind. Epicureans, including Lucretius, who adopted the 
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atomism of Leucippus and Democritus, likewise attributed congenital deformity to 
chance. Hippocratic authors, by contrast, criticized both superstitious explanations for 
illnesses, diseases, and congenital deformities as well as the wild speculations of 
philosophers such as Empedocles who attempted to ascertain the origins of human 
beings. Despite this wide range of views with respect to the significance of congenital 
deformity, there was always a tremendous amount of stigma and discrimination that 
accompanied categories for disabled people in classical antiquity. In the second part of 
chapter 4, I explore classical solutions to the disability problem, which ranged from 
mandatory infanticide to begging and state-sponsored disability pension systems.     
The fifth chapter looks at the significance of congenital deformity and the 
disability problem from the reigns of Constantine’s immediate successors to the middle 
of the seventeenth century. Before addressing those two ideas, however, I follow Stiker in 
examining what the Hebrew Bible and Christian scriptures reveal about disabled people 
in the Judeo-Christian tradition, agreeing with Stiker that those texts have been 
particularly important for Christian ideas about disability, which, of course, highly 
influenced the western understanding of disability from late antiquity to the middle of the 
seventeenth century. I then explore Saint Augustine’s and Saint Isidore of Seville’s view 
that deformity was part of God’s plan for the natural world as well as a means of 
communicating with mortals. In addressing the disability problem in what essentially 
amounts to the Christian tradition, I once again follow Stiker, who has observed that 
Latin Christendom primarily addressed its disability problem by creating a system that 
relied on both begging and institutional care.47 According to Zina Weygand, moreover, 
Louis IX, more commonly called Saint Louis, paved the way for greater state 
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involvement in providing aid directly to disabled people as a means of addressing the 
disability problem when he founded the Quinz-Vignts, the legendary hospice for the 
blind, in 1256. 
The sixth chapter examines congenital deformity and the disability problem from 
the middle of the seventeenth century to the French Revolution, a period that 
encompasses both the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment. For purposes of 
discussions about the significance of congenital deformity, there were three major 
inquires during this time period. First, a number of thinkers looked at congenital 
deformity when exploring the emerging mechanistic world view, which envisioned 
nature as a machine created by God. Descartes, for example, used the example of the man 
born blind to understand the sense of sight and light.48 Second, philosophers and poets 
such as Leibniz, Pope, and Voltaire, influenced by the mechanistic world view, explored 
the significance of congenital deformity when addressing the problem of theodicy, i.e., 
why God permits evil to exist if He is both perfectly good and omnipotent. Third, some 
radical philosophers of the Enlightenment looked to Epicurus, Lucretius, Spinoza, and 
Hobbes to challenge the Christian and Deist understanding of nature and deformity. 
Epicurean ideas would prove to be a particularly perplexing problem for Christians and 
Deists. Radicals reexamined the old Epicurean belief that matter in motion, governed by 
chance, was responsible for the diversity of the natural world, including congenital 
deformity. Radicals such as La Mettrie, Diderot, and Maupertuis, for instance, relied, in 
part, on Epicurean materialism to challenge the idea that nature was the product of 
design. In his famous Letter on the Blind, Diderot offered a proto-evolutionary 
explanation of congenital deformity, based on Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura, as well as a 
 18 
 
fictional account of the blind mathematician Nicholas Saunderson to mount a powerful 
challenge both to the traditional Christian view of nature as well as the idea of design. In 
addition, Diderot relied on the materialism of Lucretius to offer his views on the problem 
of theodicy, suggesting that an enlightened person with a serious disability could never 
believe in a natural world governed by design. The French authorities, of course, 
recognizing the potential danger in Diderot’s arguments, famously arrested and 
imprisoned him.  
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, meanwhile, a growing number 
of westerners were coming to the realization that the traditional Christian system of 
almsgiving and institutional care was not adequately dealing with the disability problem. 
After the devastation wrought by the Thirty Years’ War, Louis XIV constructed the Hôtel 
des Invalides not only to provide meaningful assistance to disabled veterans in need but 
also to protect the countryside from marauding veterans who, because of their military 
training, could terrorize civilians in spite of their disabilities. Eighteenth-century 
philanthropists such as Abbé Charles-Michel de L’Epée and Valentin Haüy, moreover, 
concluded that the best way to address the disability problem with respect to the deaf and 
dumb and the blind was to educate them. 
The seventh chapter looks at the significance of congenital deformity and the 
disability problem from the French Revolution through World War I. It examines how 
Charles Darwin’s theory of natural selection finally offered a materialist explanation for 
the nature of things, one  that viewed congenital deformities as mutations indicative of 
progressive processes that have resulted in the evolution of species. It further looks at 
how others employed the Darwinian understanding of nature to address the disability 
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problem. Indeed, Sir Francis Galton, Darwin’s own half-cousin, used insights gleaned 
from Darwin’s works to found the eugenics movement, which, in part, attempted to 
combine Darwin’s ideas about mutations and the evolution of species with techniques 
perfected in animal husbandry and horticulture to decrease the number of burdensome 
people with congenital deformities who, by their very existence, weakened the strength of 
their nation. Other developments during the nineteenth century, including the French 
Revolution, the Industrial Revolution, the growth of capitalism, the increasing power of 
the medical profession, the rise of the modern nation-state, and the unprecedented 
industrial slaughter of World War I, likewise added new dimensions to the disability 
problem. In general, both doctors and the state would assume an increasing amount of 
control over the daily lives of people with disabilities, even if religious charity and 
private philanthropy continued to play a significant role in providing aid to the disabled. 
It was not until the birth of the disabled rights movement in the 1960s and 1970s that 
disabled people would begin to regain some of their autonomy lost to the medical 
profession and the state during this period. 
The eighth chapter examines how able-bodied people during the long nineteenth 
century continued to use pre-modern and early modern categories for disabled people, 
albeit often in new ways that recognized the swift changes from the French Revolution 
through World War I. Indeed, deformed and disabled people still had to endure the 
stigma and discrimination associated with categories such as monsters, hunchbacks, 
cripples, the blind, the deaf and dumb, and dwarfs, even as able-bodied observers 
explored new conceptions of deformity and disability. The result was a hybrid disability 
 20 
 
discourse that juxtaposed pre-modern and early modern ideas about disability with the 
nascent, modern understanding of disability. 
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Chapter 2: Historiography 
The Problem with Disability History 
Promising Beginnings: The Rise of Disability History Alongside the Histories of other 
Marginalized Groups 
 
Before the 1960s, historians of the West focused primarily on high politics and 
high culture, banishing marginalized groups to the penumbras of the historical 
metanarrative. Three developments during the 1960s and 1970s, however, opened the 
way for marginalized groups to explore finally their own histories in an academic setting. 
First, in 1963, E.P. Thompson’s The Making of the English Working Class, steeped in the 
Marxist tradition that lauded the virtues of the working class and excoriated the 
bourgeoisie that oppressed it, virtually invented social history by introducing a new 
generation of historians to “history from below.”1 This new generation adopted 
Thompson’s approach with alacrity, creating a new zeitgeist of historical inquiry by 
seeking to uncover the forgotten lives of ordinary people belonging to marginalized 
groups. To a large extent, these efforts proved to be successful, as the new practice of 
social history lifted “from obscurity the lives of those who had been swept to the 
sidelines in the metahistory of progress.”2    
Second, the linguistic turn, the origins of which lay in the works of several 
linguists and philosophers, including Ludwig Wittgenstein, Ferdinand de Saussure, 
Roland Barthes, Claude Lévi-Strauss, and Clifford Geertz, demonstrated to scholars that 
language creates considerable obstacles in attempting to reconstruct the past.3 Whereas 
scholars were once convinced that they could study languages of the past, read texts in 
those languages, and then make concrete truth claims based on what they perceived to be 
objective readings of those texts, scholars after the linguistic turn became increasingly 
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aware that language did not operate in such a simple manner. Indeed, scholars became 
less convinced of the universal character of language and hence of our ability to decipher 
it. The problem was particularly strong with respect to historical inquiry, a process that 
necessarily requires historians to amalgamate historical “facts” with not only their own 
understanding of language but also their preconceived notions of history.  
The linguistic turn itself, of course, was not responsible for the notion that 
historical facts were problematic. David Hume, after all, pointed out in 1757 that a 
“historical fact, while it passes by oral tradition from eye-witnesses and contemporaries, 
is disguised in every successive narration, and may at last retain but very small, if any, 
resemblance of the original truth, on which it was founded.”4 In 1938, before the 
linguistic turn revolutionized historical research, Jean-Paul Sartre likewise explored the 
problem of language and truth claims in Nausea, a novel purporting to be a diary from 
the fictional Antoine Roqeuntin, a historian writing a biography of Marquis de Rollebon. 
After trying desperately to prove events in Marquis de Rollebon’s life, Roquentin realizes 
that a historian can never truly prove anything because writing history is more about 
constructing fictional narratives than representing the past as it actually occurred:       
Well, yes [Marquis de Rollebon] could have done all that, but it is not proved: I 
am beginning to believe that nothing can ever be proved.  These are honest 
hypotheses which take the facts into account: but I sense so definitely that they 
come from me, and that they are simply a way of unifying my own knowledge. 
Not a glimmer comes from Rollebon’s side. Slow, lazy, sulky, the facts adapt 
themselves to the rigour of the order I wish to give them; but it remains outside of 
them. I have the feeling of doing a work of pure imagination. And I am certain 
that the characters in a novel would have a more genuine appearance. . . .5 
 
Hans-Georg Gadamer, relying heavily on Martin Heidegger’s reworking of the 
hermeneutic circle, moreover, demonstrated convincingly that all historians have 
prejudices or prejudgments that invariably permeate their historical accounts. According 
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to Gadamer, we are all offspring of traditions—whether cultural, religious, economic, 
etc.—and we should not pretend that we can somehow stand aloof from them. Instead, 
through a conversation with texts, we can fuse together our present historical 
consciousness with the horizons of the past to create a fusion of horizons. This fusion 
amounts to “one great horizon that moves from within and, beyond the frontiers of the 
present, embraces the historical depths of our self-consciousness.”6 As Gadamer 
proclaimed, “[o]ur past, and that other past towards which our historical consciousness is 
directed, help to shape this moving horizon out of which human life always lives, and 
which determines it as tradition.”7  
The linguistic turn, however, unquestionably heightened historians’ awareness of 
the problem of language and truth claims in the latter half of the twentieth century. 
Hayden White’s Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe 
(1973), for instance, examined the precise ways in which nineteenth-century historians 
used their imaginations to construct historical narratives, analyzing how those historians 
employed a variety of different tropes, which effectively injected their own imaginations 
into the histories that they thought were objective. By the 1980s, few historians were 
brazen enough to proclaim that it was a simple task to produce objective historical 
narratives.  
This nascent understanding of language vis-à-vis history provided post-Thompson 
historians with exciting new tools for examining the ways in which the metanarrative has 
excluded certain groups. More importantly, as historians learned how language has 
contributed to the further marginalization of historically disadvantaged groups, they were 
better able to launch effective attacks on the inadequacies of the metanarrative. Indeed, 
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by unveiling, in meticulous detail, how a myriad of unfounded assumptions had led to 
fundamental misunderstandings with respect to the operation of language, historians of 
marginalized groups were able to demonstrate specific ways in which improper 
conceptions of language had resulted in a flawed metanarrative.  
The final development was the proliferation of Foucault’s arguments regarding 
knowledge and power, which, of course, were inextricably intertwined with the linguistic 
turn. Foucault showed historians that there was no single “truth” that history could reveal 
but rather only a multiplicity of “truths.” Foucault, in a sense, inverted the old adage 
“knowledge is power” when delineating his concept of power-knowledge, demonstrating 
that power creates knowledge by determining “the conditions in which particular 
knowledge-forms (‘epistemes, as he called them’) come into being and find sustenance.”8 
For Foucauldians, then, historical knowledge or historical “truth,” invariably reflects 
power relationships in any given society. This is not so say, of course, that Foucault was 
the first relativist. As White recognized in Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in 
Nineteenth-Century Europe, the skeptics of antiquity were likewise proud proponents of 
relativism. Yet the ingenious way in which Foucault described relativism in the context 
of power relationships catapulted relativism into the debate over history, power, and 
knowledge. Joan Wallach Scott, for example, has argued that a proper understanding of 
the processes through which we create knowledge—and thus history—strengthens the 
feminist assault on male-dominated hierarchies by promoting a different political agenda, 
one that rejects the traditional power relationships between the sexes. And indeed, as 
Scott has unabashedly proclaimed, her ultimate goal as a historian “is one I share with 
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other feminists and it is avowedly political: to point out and change inequalities between 
women and men.”9 
This flurry of challenges to the traditional metanarrative, then, produced new 
ways of writing history as well as new ways of thinking about history, including the 
nascent field of disability history. So little work has been done on disability 
historiography, however, that it is virtually impossible to understand disability 
historiography without reference to the historiography of other marginalized groups. 
Although some disability scholars might consider this as yet another example of the 
troubled state of disability studies, proof that disability history lags far behind other types 
of history even with respect to a consciousness of its own past, it is, in fact, a remarkable 
opportunity. Indeed, disability historiographers, in the very first analyses of disability 
historiography, are able to compare disability historiography to the historiographies of 
other marginalized groups to determine what similarities and differences there may be. 
Women’s history, along with its progeny, gender history, as well as the history of 
homosexuality are perhaps the best models for understanding disability historiography. 
For obvious reasons, the relationship between the normal body and the deviant body is 
one of the most salient features of disability history. Women’s history, gender history, 
and the history of homosexuality likewise recognize the importance of the body, 
including the deviant body. This shared interest in the body, in fact, has resulted in at 
least some shared theoretical and methodological commonalities, which perhaps explain 
the growing interest in disability studies among both gender scholars and gay and lesbian 
scholars. In 2004, for example, Bonnie Smith co-edited and wrote the introduction of 
Gendering Disability, which contains seventeen essays that explore the relationship 
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between gender and disability. Robert McRuer’s Crip Theory: Cultural Signs of 
Queerness and Disability, as the name suggests, builds on queer theory to gain a better 
understanding of disability studies. Sumi Colligan’s essay in Gendering Disability, “Why 
the Intersexed Shouldn’t Be Fixed: Insights from Queer Theory and Disability Studies,” 
goes even further, demonstrating the interrelatedness of gender theory, queer theory, and 
disability theory.10 In 2011, Kim Q. Hall edited Feminist Disability Studies, which further 
demonstrates the close relationship between disability studies and gender and queer 
studies.11 Accordingly, examining the ways in which disability history has mirrored 
women’s history, gender history, and the history of homosexuality as well as the ways in 
which it has differed from them can reveal a great deal about the past and future 
trajectories of disability historiography. 
Women’s history, as Natalie Zemon Davis has pointed out, did not begin in the 
1960s and 1970s. Rather, “[i]n one form it goes back to Plutarch, who composed little 
biographies of virtuous women, intended to show that the female sex could and should 
profit by education.”12 According to Davis, this type of history resurfaced with Boccaccio 
in the fourteenth century with accounts of “Women Worthies,” which, Davis contends, 
continued to be an important component of women’s history in the 1970s.13 But in the 
decade after E.P. Thompson, women historians went beyond the study of such prominent 
women, commencing the women’s history movement. Alice Kessler-Harris, a pioneer of 
women’s history, recently discussed the emergence of the field in the late 1960s and early 
1970s: 
When I entered the profession in the late 1960s, there was no such field as 
“women's history,” and only a few enterprising souls were willing to explore the 
arena. I was part of that lucky generation of scholars positioned to open up 
 28 
 
professional organizations, to place women in their governing bodies, to ensure 
that their programs and journals provided outlets for the history of women.14   
 
By the early 1970s, she observes, “historians of women linked such issues of equity to 
increasing interest in the history of women — and the field of women's history was 
born.”15 In the early days of the movement, feminist historians were primarily concerned 
with uncovering the history of women and thus demonstrated relatively little concern 
with all-encompassing theoretical frameworks that would help historians understand the 
historical data that they were uncovering.16 By the mid-1980s, however, they began to 
construct theoretical frameworks with which to understand better the history of women. 
The most important theoretical shift was the move away from “women’s history” to the 
study of “gender history.”17 In her introduction to Gender and the Politics of History, for 
example, Scott explains how Foucauldian notions of power-knowledge enabled feminists 
to define “sex” as biological differences and to define “gender” as “knowledge about 
sexual difference” and “the social organization of sexual difference.”18 What is so 
important about this development for the understanding of disability historiography is 
that historians of women benefited from years of research about the history of women 
before attempting to tackle difficult theoretical frameworks. Accordingly, when scholars 
did shift their focus from women to gender, they did so with access to a wide array of 
historical accounts of both “Women Worthies” and ordinary women. 
 The history of homosexuality, like women’s history, may have had its equivalent 
to “Worthies.” Historians, after all, have often discussed the homosexuality of such 
figures as Sappho, Hadrian, and Oscar Wilde. The history of homosexuality as a distinct 
field of study, however, did not originate until the 1970s and 1980s. When it did, it 
followed in the footsteps of women’s history by uncovering the history of homosexuality 
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without relying on theoretical frameworks. Indeed, there is very little theory in the two 
seminal works on the history of homosexuality, K.J. Dover’s Greek Homosexuality 
(1978) and John Boswell’s Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality: Gay 
People in Western Europe from the Beginning of the Christian Era to the Fourteenth 
Century (1980). Boswell, in fact, expressly argued that historians of marginalized groups 
should avoid the use of theory in a historical context until there is ample historical data 
upon which to base those theories. According to Boswell, from the historian’s 
perspective, 
general theories are of little value unless rooted in and supported by specific 
studies of particular cases, and since there are so few of these at present to 
substantiate ideas regarding intolerance, it has seemed more useful to provide data 
for eventual synthetic analysis by others than to embark prematurely on the 
analysis itself. This approach has the egregious disadvantage of producing in 
effect, an elaborate description of a single piece of an unassembled puzzle, but 
given the extreme difficulty of even identifying, much less assembling, all the 
other pieces, it appears to be the most constructive effort possible at present. It 
has, moreover, the compensating advantage of allowing the data assembled to be 
employed within any larger theoretical framework, historical or scientific, current 
or subsequent, since there is little built-in theoretical bias.19 
 
Boswell, of course, did adopt somewhat of a theoretical framework in distinguishing 
between people who are gay and people who engage in homosexual behavior.20 Boswell 
used the adjective “gay” to refer “to persons who are conscious of erotic inclination 
toward their own gender as a distinguishing characteristic” and “homosexual” to refer to 
“all sexual phenomena between persons of the same gender, whether the result of 
conscious preference, subliminal desire, or circumstantial exigency.”21 Boswell, however, 
consciously rejected the use of Foucauldian notions of sexuality and other all-
encompassing theories that, in his mind, likely would have distorted his historical data. 
Foucault himself recognized the importance of Boswell’s approach, explaining that 
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“‘Boswell’s book has provided me with a guide for what to look for in the meaning 
people attached to their sexual behavior.’”22    
Disability history likewise had its “Worthies,” including Homer, Aesop, 
Agesilaus II, Claudius, Didymus, John Milton, Alexander Pope, Georges Couthon, 
Kierkegaard, Lord Byron, Helen Keller, and others. When the disability rights movement 
itself came into existence between the 1960s and 1970s, then, disability history could 
have followed the same course as women’s history and the history of homosexuality.23 
Indeed, the early disability historians could have attempted to uncover the history of 
disability before tackling complex theories. In 1982, Stiker succeeded in doing just that 
when he published A History of Disability. Although Stiker utilized some theory and was 
familiar with Foucault, he generally restricted his efforts to the uncovering of disability 
history without attempting to fit his historical data into any overarching theoretical 
framework. With little theoretical bias woven into his narrative, Stiker examined the 
history of disability from classical antiquity and the Bible to later attempts to rehabilitate 
disabled people in the modern world. As David T. Mitchell recognizes in the forward to 
the 1997 edition, “unlike Foucault, Stiker works against a view of history as a series of 
ruptures or breaks in the construction of disability. Instead, he argues for a continuum of 
effects in which one epoch’s beliefs continue to inform the practices of succeeding 
generations.”24 Stiker, however, does see some ruptures in disability history. As I explain 
in chapter 5, Stiker views the vitae of Zotikos as a major rupture between disability in 
classical antiquity and the Christian view of disability. 
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The “Disability Turn”: A Successful Counter-Discursive Strategy, but a Wrong Turn for 
Disability History 
 
Although Stiker’s book might have inspired disability historians to undertake 
similar efforts to uncover the history of disability relatively free from theoretical bias, at 
least two developments diverted disability history from that course. First, for reasons that 
escape even Stiker, French historians seemed relatively uninterested in disability history 
in the 1980s and 1990s.25 This lack of interest among French historians left Anglo-
American historians as the primary progenitors of western disability history for quite 
some time. Second, developments in the Anglo-American disability movement that had 
been brewing since the 1960s produced a generation of disability scholars who were far 
more concerned with creating a theoretical framework for understanding disability than 
emulating Stiker’s approach of uncovering disability history relatively free from 
theoretical constraints. In particular, disability activists and scholars adopted a counter-
discursive strategy against the able-bodied establishment in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, 
which culminated in what I call the “disability turn,” a fundamental transformation in the 
concept of “disability.”   
Prior to the 1960s and 1970s, able-bodied doctors, healthcare providers, medical 
sociologists, lawyers, and educators, among others, subscribed to the medical model of 
disability, which “employs objective, clear-cut, standardized measures and, as the name 
suggests, uses experts such as physicians, to provide defining characteristics, causes, 
prognoses, and methods of treatment.”26 In the 1960s, disability activists and scholars, 
primarily from England, began to question the medical model’s definition of disability. In 
1966, for example, twelve disability activists and scholars, all of whom had some type of 
physical disability, contributed to Stigma: The Experience of Disability.27 While the 
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anthology’s authors did not, for the most part, directly challenge the medical model, they 
did attempt to inculcate the importance of examining stigma and discrimination when 
attempting to understand the experience of disability. Over time, however, disability 
activists and scholars became increasingly frustrated that their efforts had failed to 
captivate the attention of the medical, legal, educational, and academic establishments. 
Indeed, instead of acknowledging stigma and discrimination as important aspects of the 
experience of disability, able-bodied people in positions of power stubbornly clung to 
their medical model of disability, as if they somehow understood the experience of 
disability better than disabled people themselves.  
In 1972, Paul Hunt, editor of Stigma: The Experience of Disability, with the help 
of Vic Finkelstein, a disabled activist and scholar from South Africa exiled to the United 
Kingdom because of his opposition to Apartheid, and others, formed the Union of the 
Physically Impaired Against Segregation (UPIAS) to assert the interests of the disabled. 
In 1976, in a counter-discursive stratagem of sheer brilliance that in some ways resembles 
the feminist distinction between sex and gender, UPIAS issued a Statement of 
Fundamental Principles, which reiterated the importance of stigma and discrimination by 
rejecting the medical model’s definition of disability out of hand.28 What the medical 
model defined as “disability,” UPIAS argued, was better understood as “impairment,” 
while “disability” was the stigma and discrimination that accompanies impairment: 
In our view, it is society which disables physically impaired people. Disability is 
something imposed on top of our impairments by the way we are unnecessarily 
isolated and excluded from full participation in society.  To understand this it is 
necessary to grasp the distinction between the physical impairment and the social 
situation, called “disability”, of people with such impairment. Thus we define 
impairment as lacking part of or all of a limb, or having a defective limb, 
organism or mechanism of the body: and disability as the disadvantage or 
restriction of activity caused by a contemporary social organisation of activity 
 33 
 
caused by a contemporary social organisation which takes no or little account of 
people who have physical impairments and thus excludes them in the mainstream 
of social activities. Physical disability is therefore a particular form of social 
oppression. . . . 
 
It is clear that our social organisation does not discriminate equally against all 
physical impairments and hence there arises the appearance of degrees of 
exclusion (degrees of disability). For example people having mild visual 
impairments (wearing glasses) are doubtless not more impoverished than their 
visually unimpaired peers. Our social organisation does not exclude people using 
glasses to the same extent that it excludes people who are blind, or deaf, or cannot 
speak, or who have brain damage, or who use wheelchairs. Nevertheless it is the 
same society which disables people whatever their type, or degree of physical 
impairment, and therefore there is a single cause within in the organisation of 
society that is responsible for the creation of disability of physically impaired 
people. . . .29 
 
The substantive argument behind the Statement of Fundamental Principles, of course, 
had not deviated greatly from the work of disability activists and scholars in the 1960s 
and early 1970s.  UPIAS continued to acknowledge, as had previous disability activists 
and scholars, that there was some merit to the medical model’s definition of disability, 
namely the incontrovertible fact that serious physical conditions can profoundly impact a 
person’s life irrespective of the ways in which society treats that person. Indeed, UPIAS 
was merely reiterating the longstanding argument that any disability model that 
disregards the ways in which society stigmatizes and discriminates against disabled 
people cannot possibly hope to define “disability.”  
It was the counter-discursive strategy devised by UPIAS to reformulate the 
argument, far more than substance of the argument itself, which would alter the meaning 
of “disability.” By redefining, on the one hand, the word “disability” to denote stigma 
and discrimination and, on the other, the term “physical impairment” to denote physical 
conditions, emphasizing, of course, the importance of the former over the latter, UPIAS’s 
approach presented disability activists and scholars with an opportunity to force the 
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proponents of the medical model to take notice and defend their own definition of 
disability. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, disability activists and scholars increasingly 
used UPIAS’s distinction between “disability” and “physical impairment” as a counter-
discursive tool in the battle to assert their independence from those whom they 
considered their able-bodied overlords. 
 The most important disabled person to embrace UPIAS’s model of disability was 
Michael Oliver, perhaps the single most influential disability scholar in the brief history 
of the disability studies movement. In his 1983 book, Social Work with Disabled People, 
Oliver lent further academic credibility to UPIAS’s distinction between “disability” and 
“impairment” by promulgating his social model of disability.30 Oliver, like UPIAS, 
attempted to “switch away from focusing on the physical limitations of particular 
individuals to the way the physical and social environments impose limitations on certain 
groups or categories of people.”31 According to Oliver, the medical model is an improper 
“individual model” because it first “locates the ‘problem’ of disability within the 
individual” and second “sees the causes of this problem as stemming from the functional 
limitations or psychological losses which are assumed to arise from disability.”32 Oliver’s 
social model, by contrast, was the creation of disabled people themselves, reflecting their 
recognition that disability is much more than an individual’s experience with impairment. 
Indeed, as Oliver has explained, the “genesis, development and articulation of the social 
model of disability by disabled people themselves is a rejection of all of [the 
fundamentals of the individual model].”33 
Within a relatively short period of time, Oliver’s social model of disability 
became so popular among disabled people that the able-bodied establishment had no 
 35 
 
choice but finally to enter into a dialogue regarding the experience of disability.34 This 
does not mean, of course, that able-bodied society completely abandoned its former 
views about disability to embrace enthusiastically the social model. Indeed, as Leslie 
Pickering Francis has demonstrated, disability policy debates about what justice requires 
of able-bodied society with respect to disability continue to focus on both the medical 
model, which views disability as an undesirable impairment in need of treatment, and the 
social model, which emphasizes societal exclusion.35 The counter-discursive power of the 
social model, however, has proved resilient enough that ethical and policy debates about 
disability and justice rarely rely on the medical model of disability to the exclusion of the 
social model.36        
The prolonged struggle with the able-bodied establishment over the meaning of 
disability has had an equally important impact on the formation of disability identity. 
Indeed, in the process of asserting disability rights via the social model of disability, a 
new consciousness of disability arose among some people with disabilities, one that 
recognized the rhetorical and political power of amalgamating under the rubric 
“disability.” Before long, it was possible, for the first time, to discuss seriously the 
emergence of a nascent “disabled” community and a “disabled” culture, although some 
groups, particularly the deaf, attempted to distance themselves from any association with 
disability.37 As Davis points out in Enforcing Normalcy, however, it is not yet possible 
“to capitalize disabled.”38 Indeed, although “[t]o be culturally Deaf is a reality, to be 
culturally Disabled is at this point perhaps only a Utopian wish that is gaining ground.”39 
It is this turn of events, then, that I call the disability turn, one of those rare instances in 
human history in which a marginalized group has succeeded in manipulating the 
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language of those in power to subvert—through the application of a conscious, counter-
discursive strategy—the very power that language should have protected.   
As is so often the case with such revolutionary developments, however, there 
were some unfortunate, yet perhaps inevitable and necessary, consequences—inevitable 
and necessary not in a teleological sense but rather in the sense that it may have been 
impossible to force the able-bodied establishment into a discourse about stigma and 
discrimination without them. By delving into a theoretical framework of what constituted 
disability at the very beginning of the disability studies movement, disability activists and 
scholars had opened Pandora’s Box; as disability activists and scholars waged counter-
discursive warfare over the meaning of disability, they naturally looked to theories that 
could explain, historically, how able-bodied people had distorted the true experience of 
disability. Rather than simply attempting to uncover the neglected history of disability 
and disabled people as historians of women and homosexuality had done, disability 
scholars sought to explain how and why this distortion occurred. In particular, they 
attempted to explain that what able-bodied people considered the “traditional” 
discrimination of disabled people was nothing of the sort. In essence, they waged a bitter 
struggle against the potential dangers of adherence to tradition that Heidegger identified 
in Being and Time:   
Tradition takes what has come down to us and delivers it over to self-confidence; 
it blocks our access to those primordial “sources” from which the categories and 
concepts handed down to us have been in part quite genuinely drawn. Indeed, it 
makes us forget that they have had such an origin, and makes us suppose that the 
necessity of going back to the sources is something which we need not even 
understand.40 
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In particular, disability scholars battled against what they perceived to be the prevailing 
notion among able-bodied people that the systematic exclusion of the disabled from 
society was justified because such exclusion was the result of human nature and thus had 
always existed. Disabled people, of course, were understandably furious at the notion of 
being deprived of so many rights in accordance with tradition. Just as Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr., once famously declared that “[i]t is revolting to have no better 
reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV,”41 so too is 
it disheartening for a group of people to find themselves excluded from society on the 
basis of mindless adherence to tradition.    
Unfortunately, however, disability scholars sometimes put the proverbial cart 
before the horse in their attempts to overcome traditional conceptions of disability. 
Although they should have followed Stiker’s lead in uncovering the history of disabled 
people before submerging themselves in complex theoretical frameworks, theory often 
guided their historical inquiries from the outset. Such theoretically driven historical 
inquiries are problematic because, as Boswell noted in the context of homosexuality, the 
application of theory can predetermine the result of any inquiry, historical or otherwise. 
“Every inquiry is a seeking [Suchen],” Heidegger reminds us, and “[e]very seeking gets 
guided beforehand by what is sought.”42 Accordingly, when historians consciously 
employ theory in any historical inquiry so as to prove that theory or disprove another, 
rather than simply explore the past free from excessive theoretical bias, they invariably 
increase the risk of substantially distorting their historical accounts. I am not arguing, of 
course, that it is ever truly possible for historians to overcome the problem of injecting 
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bias into our historical accounts, but the dogmatic application of theory unduly 
exacerbates the already considerable problem of historical bias.    
The first scholars to apply theory to disability history were not disability 
historians but those scholars and activists in Britain, including Oliver and Finkelstein, 
who helped effect the disability turn in the first place. Oliver and Finkelstein, perhaps 
familiar with the Marxist revolution in history that occurred in the 1960s and 1970s, 
seemingly applied some Marxist concepts to disability history. Finkelstein, for example, 
argued in Attitudes and Disabled People (1980) that disability was the direct result of 
capitalism.43 Oliver agreed, contending that “the dominant social perception of disabled 
people as ‘dependent’ stems not from their inability to work because of their physical 
limitations but because of the way in which work is organized in a modern industrial 
society.”44 These scholars, who virtually created the field of disability studies as we know 
it today, continued to wield enormous influence within the disability movement for many 
years. This was especially true with respect to Oliver as the progenitor of the social 
model of disability. Davis, for instance, has noted the importance of Oliver’s ideas 
regarding capitalism and impairment, explaining that “[m]any historians, including 
Michael Oliver . . . see a profound change in conceptions of normalcy and the body when 
industrialization made the standardized body necessary for both the factory line and its 
products while relegating the ‘abnormal body’ to the welfare rolls.”45 Irina Metzler, 
moreover, relies on Oliver’s social model of disability to distinguish between disabled 
people in medieval Europe and disabled people in the modern world.46  
After Marxism’s influence over history began to wane in the late-1980s and early-
1990s, disability scholars increasingly began to embrace Foucault and to question the 
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social model of disability, setting the stage for the application of today’s influential 
theory—Foucault’s notions of power-knowledge and bio-power—to disability history 
with the unfortunate effect, at times, of reinforcing the notion that the stigmatization of 
disability is a modern phenomenon.47 This is not to assert, of course, that the concepts of 
power-knowledge and bio-power are irrelevant. Just as capitalism no doubt had profound 
implications for disabled people, so too can a proper interpretation of both power-
knowledge and bio-power augment our historical analyses. Unfortunately, however, 
many disability historians who apply Foucauldian concepts, like adherents to the social 
model of disability who have blamed capitalism and industrialization for negative 
attitudes about the disabled, are too quick to attribute the stigma and discrimination 
associated with disability to Foucauldian concepts of the modern disciplines and bio-
power with little more than a cursory examination of disability before the rise of the 
“great confinement” and the birth of the modern nation-state.48  
The transition from the social model of disability to a Foucauldian understanding 
of disability is evident in the work of Lennard Davis. In “Dr. Johnson, Amelia, and the 
Discourse of Disability,” Davis notes that “[c]ontemporary theoreticians of disability 
distinguish between an impairment and a disability. An impairment is a physical fact, but 
a disability is a social construction.”49 Davis, however, builds on the social model of 
disability to emphasize what he has called a “constructionist model” which, as Edward 
Wheatley has observed, highlights the artificiality of the process through which people 
with impairments become disabled.”50 Foucault, of course, is critically important for 
Davis’ “constructionist model.” Indeed, in explaining the importance of social 
constructions with respect to disability, Davis demonstrates his reliance on Foucault, 
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contending that “[t]he term disability is a categorization tied to the development of 
discourses that aim to cure, remediate, or catalog variations in bodies.”51   
Shelley Tremain, perhaps the most important Foucauldian scholar in the disability 
movement, has further attempted to fashion a Foucauldian understanding of disability. 
She cogently defines bio-power as “the strategic tendency of relatively recent forms of 
power/knowledge to work toward an increasingly comprehensive management of life: 
both the life of the individual and the life of the species.”52 Tremain, moreover, argues 
that over the “past two centuries, in particular, a vast apparatus, erected to secure the 
well-being of the general population, has caused the contemporary disabled subject to 
emerge into discourse and social existence.”53 This apparatus, Tremain contends, has 
“created, classified, and codified, managed, and controlled social anomalies through 
which some people have been divided from others and objectivized as (for instance) 
physically impaired, insane, handicapped, mentally ill, retarded, and deaf.”54 For 
Tremain, then, the “division, classification, and ordering around a norm,”—in this case 
the able-bodied norm—has, as John Rajchman has argued, “become the means through 
which to identify subjects and to make them identify themselves in order to make them 
governable.”55 
Tremain’s application of Foucault to disability history itself is not problematic. 
She is careful to explain that bio-power created “the contemporary disabled subject,” 
apparently concluding, as Foucault surely would have as well, that disabled people must 
have experienced stigma and discrimination before the eighteenth century. For Tremain, 
then, although the ways in which society stigmatized and discriminated against the 
disabled changed from pre-modern to modern times, bio-power did not create stigma and 
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discrimination. But some disability scholars who apply Foucault to disability history 
have, at times, underestimated the extent to which stigma and discrimination 
accompanied disability in the pre-modern world. We have already seen how Davis, 
applying a Foucauldian understanding of history, has sometimes too readily found in pre-
modern societies a willingness to embrace the disabled even though he admits that able-
bodied people in preindustrial societies did not treat disabled people “kindly.”56 In my 
view, however, Davis is perfectly capable of making the case that “disability, as we know 
the concept, is really a socially driven relation to the body that became relatively 
organized in the eighteenth  and nineteenth centuries,” without going so far as to 
conclude that able-bodied people in preindustrial societies welcomed the disabled into the 
“social fabric.”57 Davis’ Foucauldian understanding of history likewise appears to be 
behind his claim that, based on lexicographical evidence, “it is possible to date the 
coming into consciousness in English of an idea of ‘the norm’ over the period 1840-
1860.”58 According to Davis, “the word ‘normal’ as ‘constituting, conforming to, not 
deviating or different from, the common type or standard, regular usual,’ only enters the 
English language around 1840.”59 Before the advent of the norm, Davis argues, pre-
modern languages differentiated between deviant, deformed bodies by viewing them as 
grotesque rather than disabled. “The grotesque,” according to Davis, “permeated culture 
and signified a common humanity, whereas the disabled body, a later concept, was 
formulated as by definition excluded from culture, society, the norm.”60 I agree that 
industrial societies did indeed exclude disabled people by fashioning a new 
understanding of disability that distinguished the deformed and the disabled from the 
able-bodied norm. Yet able-bodied people in preindustrial societies likewise segregated 
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and ostracized the disabled by creating a pre-modern disability discourse centered around 
(1) the idea that there was something significant about the existence of congenital 
deformity, (2) the idea that there was a disability problem, and (3) the pervasiveness of 
categories such as monsters, dwarfs, hunchbacks, cripples/the lame, the blind, and the 
deaf and dumb.   
When the ancient Greeks and Romans referred to people with serious congenital 
deformities as monsters, for instance, they were expressing strong prejudices against 
congenital deformity and the congenitally deformed. Indeed, by calling a human infant a 
“monster” so as to explain how he or she deviated from an ordinary, able-bodied infant, 
the Greeks and Romans were not using the term “monster” as a value-free label to 
describe congenitally deformed people. “Monster,” after all, comes about as close as 
possible to forming a binary opposition with “human”; to be a monster is to be something 
other than a human being. As Aristotle proclaims in Generation of Animals, “[m]ales take 
after their father more than their mother, females after their mother. Some take after none 
of their kindred, although they take after a human being at any rate; others do not take 
after a human being at all in their appearance, but have gone so far that they resemble a 
monster (terati). . . .”61  When Aristotle contends just a few lines later, then, that women 
are a type of “monster” because they deviate from the male norm, he is most certainly 
expressing the view of able-bodied, Greek males that both women and congenitally 
deformed people are inferior to the able-bodied, male standard.62   
“Cripple,” moreover, differentiated a person who had ambulatory difficulties from 
people who ambulated normally long before the transition to the capitalist mode of 
production or the rise of the modern nation-state. The same is true for terms such as 
 43 
 
hunchbacks, dwarfs, the blind, and the deaf and dumb, all of which have denoted some 
stigmatized deviation from aesthetic or functional norms throughout the recorded history 
of the West. Contrary to Davis’ assertions, then, English never needed the word “norm” 
to be in a lexicon for English speakers to express deviations from aesthetic and functional 
norms and thus to stigmatize disability because nearly every word that denotes physical 
disability, in nearly every language and in nearly every time period, rests upon some 
hierarchical understanding of normal and abnormal bodies. Indeed, as Scott has noted, 
“hierarchy and power are inherent” in the construction of language.63  
In any event, Foucault himself never argued that the stigma and discrimination 
associated with disability suddenly came into existence with the advent of 
industrialization or the modern disciplines. In Discipline and Punish, for example, 
Foucault argues that “[a]ll mechanisms of power which, even today, are disposed around 
the abnormal individual, to brand him and to alter him, are composed of those two forms 
from which they distantly derive.”64 For Foucault, the first form was the ritualistic 
exclusion of lepers from the able-bodied, clean community, which Foucault identifies as 
the “binary division between one set of people and another” that would, “to a certain 
extent,” provide “the model for and general form of the great Confinement.”65 The 
second form, associated with how Europeans reacted to the plague in the seventeenth 
century, was the “tactical partitioning in which individual differentiations were the 
constricting effects of a power that multiplied, articulated and subdivided itself.”66 
According to Foucault, then, authorities who exercised “individual control function” 
generally did so according to a “double mode; that of binary division and branding 
(mad/sane; dangerous/harmless; normal/abnormal); and that of coercive assignment, of 
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differential distribution (who he is; where he must be; how he is to be characterized; how 
he is to be recognized; how a constant surveillance is to be exercised over him in an 
individual way, etc.).”67   
“Treat ‘lepers’ as ‘plague victims,’ project the subtle segmentations of discipline 
onto the confused space of internment, combine it with methods of analytical distribution 
proper to power, individualize the excluded, but use procedures of individualization to 
mark exclusion—this,” according to Foucault, “is what was operated regularly by 
disciplinary power from the beginning of the of the nineteenth century in the psychiatric 
asylum the penitentiary, the reformatory, the approved school, and to some extent, the 
hospital.”68 For Foucault, then, “[t]he constant division between the normal and the 
abnormal, to which every individual is subjected, brings us back to our own time, by 
applying the binary branding and exile of the leper to quite different objects. . . .”69 
Indeed, “the existence of a whole set of techniques and institutions for measuring, 
supervising and correcting the abnormal brings into play the disciplinary mechanisms to 
which the fear of the plague gave rise.”70  
Foucault thus does not suggest in Discipline and Punish that lepers in the pre-
modern world were free from stigma and discrimination. Instead, Foucault considers their 
separation from able-bodied society to be indicative of a great binary division separating 
one type of human being from another. Disability scholars should be careful, of course, 
when relying on Foucault’s historical accounts. Because Foucault was not a historian, he 
exaggerates the extent to which medieval Europe separated lepers from able-bodied 
society. Disability historian Herbert C. Covey, for instance, has noted that although some 
communities “passed laws to restrict the personal freedoms of people with leprosy, 
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including mobility,” laws differed by locality.71  Relying on Jacques Le Goff, moreover, 
Covey explains that in medieval France lepers had the same legal rights as “healthy 
people except in Normandy and Beauvaisis.”72 He also observes that “many medieval 
people with leprosy resisted efforts to place them in hospitals because of the decayed and 
deplorable conditions they found in these facilities.”73 He thus seemingly agrees with 
R.M. Clay who long ago characterized the contacts of lepers “with the outside world as, a 
various ‘. . . mixture of strictness and laxity.’”74  
Yet there remains a great deal of merit to Foucault’s claim that medieval 
Europeans considered lepers to be outside the realm of normal human existence even if 
we do not go so far as to consider lepers/humans to be a great binary division. The 
common practice of referring to the congenitally deformed as “monsters,” along with the 
intermittent practice of killing such infants, which, we shall see, continued to occur even 
into the seventeenth century, likewise created something akin to a binary division 
between people with serious congenital deformities and normal, able-bodied human 
beings, even if that binary division was never absolute. In addition, the proliferation of 
other categories such as dwarfs, hunchbacks, cripples/the lame, the blind, and the deaf 
and dumb tended to reinforce the notion that congenitally deformed people were inferior 
to the able-bodied. To be sure, the modern world changed substantially the ways in which 
able-bodied people categorized, disciplined, and segregated disabled people from their 
able-bodied counterparts. Yet modernity simply did not give rise to the strong stigma and 
discrimination accompanying deformity and disability in the West.   
In my view, then, the Foucauldian view of disability and disability history is not 
necessarily incorrect. Indeed, the Foucauldian understanding of the discursivity of 
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disability can provide meaningful insights into disability history. Snyder and Mitchell, 
moreover, make an important point about the discursivity of disability when arguing that 
it is possible to trace at least some negative attitudes “to the eugenics era, when disability 
began to be construed as an undesirable deviation from normative existence.”75 I simply 
urge scholars such as Davis, Snyder, and Mitchell not to discount the stigma and 
discrimination that accompanied disability in the pre-modern and early modern world.  
In any event, although Stiker recognized that able-bodied westerners have always 
stigmatized disability, subsequent disability historians, whether because they embraced 
the social model of disability or Foucauldian notions of disability, were relatively 
uninterested in disability in the pre-modern world. In 2003, in “Why We Need Another 
‘Other,’” which Wheatley has rightly recognized as an important work on disability 
historiography, Catherine Kudlick surveyed over 100 articles and books on disability 
history, mentioning only three books and three articles that addressed disability history in 
the pre-modern West.76 Since the publication of Kudlick’s article, some additional works 
on pre-modern disability have emerged. Combined with the existing works identified by 
Kudlick, there is finally sufficient historical evidence with which to begin a proper 
exploration of disability in the pre-modern world.  
There are two important works on disability in classical antiquity. The first, 
Robert Garland’s 1995 The Eye of the Beholder: Deformity and Disability in the Greco-
Roman World, explores at great length the stigmatization and discrimination of disabled 
people in classical antiquity. Topics that Garland covers include the killing of 
congenitally deformed infants, the extent to which the disabled lived half-lives, and the 
derision of disabled people.77 The second, Martha Rose’s The Staff of Oedipus: 
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Transforming Disability in Ancient Greece, relies on Garland in arguing that, “[g]iven the 
Greek philosophical ideal of symmetry and balance, it is not surprising that physical 
deformity usually resulted in negative aesthetic evaluation.”78 She rightly cautions 
disability scholars, however, not to assume that disabled people in ancient Greece 
experienced the same types of stigmatization and discrimination that disabled people 
encounter in the modern world.79 Rose’s call to proceed with caution when exploring 
negative attitudes about disability in the pre-modern world has influenced a number of 
influential disability scholars. Yet Rose has sometimes presented an overly idyllic picture 
of disability in ancient Greece that has contributed to the idea that the stigma and 
discrimination associated with deformity and disability are essentially modern 
phenomena. David L. Braddock and Susan L. Parish, for instance, cite Rose in claiming 
that “the scant documentary records from ancient Greece indicates that deformity was not 
perceived as absolutely negative by the Greeks but that this perspective was developed by 
historians during the nineteenth century, who applied contemporary contempt for people 
with disabilities to their assessment of the ancient world.”80 Lennard Davis, moreover, 
has cited Rose in maintaining that it is simply a myth that “people with disabilities are 
better off in the twentieth century than in the past.”81 
A handful of scholars have likewise explored negative attitudes toward disability 
in the Judeo-Christian tradition. According to Rabbi Judith Z. Abrams, Temple priests 
needed to be physically perfect because they mediated “between heaven and earth, 
between holy and profane.”82 Accordingly, deformed or disabled priests, solely on 
account of their physical imperfections, could not perform priestly functions in the 
Temple.83 Wheatley, who has explored blindness in medieval Europe, argues that 
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although disability scholars who are now attempting to recover the history of disability in 
the Middle Ages are limited by a lack of “detailed historical sources,” some “peculiar 
aspects of medieval law and customs . . . made the full integration of blind people in 
medieval European societies problematic at best.”84 Mark P. O’Tool has agreed that the 
blind struggled to find acceptance among the sighted, observing that medieval French 
farce perpetuated the “image of quarrelsome and sexually grotesque blind beggars. . . .”85 
Zina Weygand, moreover, has noted that The Boy and the Blind Man, “one of the first 
examples of profane theater in French,” negatively depicts its blind character “as a 
hypocrite who feigns piety in order to better collect alms” and becomes “rich by public 
charity.”86 The blind man slowly demonstrates to his valet that he is “a drunkard and a 
glutton,” who is “coarse, cynical, and debauched.”87 Ultimately, the valet takes the blind 
man’s possessions, saying to him: “‘Shame on you! . . . To me, you are nothing but a 
piece of shit. You’re deceptive and envious . . . If you don’t like it, come and get me!’”88 
Weygand does point out, however, that such negative depictions existed simultaneously 
with a strong tradition of providing alms and institutional aid to blind people.89 Metzler, 
meanwhile, has noted that the decretals promulgated by Pope Gregory IX, prohibited 
people from serving in the higher orders solely on account of their physical deformities, 
mutilations, and serious blemishes.90 Yet she wisely follows Rose in cautioning against 
applying our own biases about disability to our historical research, contending that “[t]he 
passage from Leviticus relating to the prohibition on ‘blemished’ men becoming priests 
has always been over-emphasised, in that there has been an assumption by scholars that 
this prohibition against disabled people was always strictly adhered to throughout the 
Middle Ages.”91 She points out, for example, that “[t]he Apostolic Constitutions, dated to 
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the fourth and fifth centuries, include a passage requiring that bishops must not be 
prevented from holding their office because of physical impairment or deformity.”92 
Finally, Julie Crawford, in Marvelous Protestantism: Monstrous Births in Post-
Reformation England, notes how Protestants later used examples of monstrosity to attack 
Catholicism.93  
In “Why We Need Another ‘Other,’” meanwhile, Kudlick herself traces negative 
stereotypes about disability to Aristotle and the classical idea of the “perfect human 
body.”94 She further notes that “[t]he specter of disability . . . came through in religious 
writings and eventually would underpin scientific notions of progress and evolution’s 
‘survival of the fittest.’”95 Although there has been more research on disability in the pre-
modern world since the appearance of Kudlick’s article, disability historians have yet to 
explore how this research challenges the underlying assumption among many works of 
disability history that the stigma and discrimination associated with disability are modern 
phenomena. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
 Because disability studies is still in its infancy, disability historians do not have a 
plethora of sources from which to draw when attempting to understand disability in the 
past. Indeed, the role of the disability historian in this early stage of disability history is to 
uncover as many primary sources as possible, while simultaneously acknowledging that a 
lack of sources invariably detracts from our ability to explore every facet of disability 
history. We must also recognize the paucity of extant sources in which disabled people 
themselves provide first-hand accounts of their lives. When a historical text mentions 
disability, it is far more common for the author of that text to be able-bodied than 
disabled. This inevitably leaves disability historians in the unenviable position of sifting 
through texts riddled with able-bodied prejudices to determine what life was like for 
disabled people in the past. Disability scholars, then, must pay particular attention to 
those texts in which disabled authors discuss their thoughts on the existence of congenital 
deformity or the experience of disability.  
 While attempting to uncover more primary sources that are relevant to disability 
studies, disability historians must also grapple with various theories, particularly 
Marxism and post-structuralist notions of power and language. Indeed, even if it would 
have been preferable for disability historians to conduct historical inquiries without 
getting bogged down in attempting to prove how historical evidence proves or disproves 
certain theories, a methodology that Boswell favored when attempting to uncover the 
history of homosexuality, such historical accounts would likely be ignored by most 
disability scholars today. Marxist ideas about labor and disability in the capitalist mode of 
production and, especially, the post-structuralist understanding of language and power are 
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so pervasive in disability studies that it has essentially become a requirement for all 
disability historians to explain, at least briefly, how their arguments relate to such 
theories.  
This dissertation rejects any understanding of disability history, whether grounded 
in Marxism or any other theoretical framework, that views the capitalist mode of 
production as creating the idea that disabled bodies hindered labor productivity to such 
an extent that the needs of able-bodied society were better served by offering some type 
of assistance to disabled people, whether public assistance or private charity, rather than 
abandoning them to fend for themselves among able-bodied laborers. Such arguments, 
bordering on the economic determinism of vulgar Marxism, have no place in today’s 
disability history. As I demonstrate in chapters 4, 5, and 6, able-bodied people in the pre-
modern and early modern West had understood long before the rise of capitalism that 
many types of disability so severely restricted the labor capacity of some disabled people 
that many of them required some form of assistance. I also reject any argument that 
attributes the capitalist mode of production to the advent of negative stereotypes about 
disability. This dissertation likewise rejects the dogmatic application of Foucauldian 
notions of the discursivity of disability to the history of disability. Indeed, while Lennard 
Davis and others are correct in asserting that the long nineteenth century witnessed the 
genesis of a new type of disability discourse, the rapidly changing world of the long 
nineteenth century did not create categories for disabled people infused with able-bodied 
prejudices against the disabled. Instead, categories such as monsters, hunchbacks, 
cripples, the blind, the deaf and dumb, and dwarfs have proliferated in the West since the 
beginning of recorded history, continuously reinforcing the notion that the congenitally 
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deformed and the disabled are inferior to their able-bodied counterparts. The new 
disability discourse of the long nineteenth century, then, was a hybrid comprised of old 
prejudices associated with the pre-modern and early modern categories of disability and 
the new notions of disability associated with a variety of developments during the long 
nineteenth century, including the French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution, the 
growth of capitalism, the increasing power of the medical profession, the rise of the 
modern nation-state, Darwinism, the advent of the eugenics movement, and attempts to 
reintegrate disabled veterans back into able-bodied society after World War I 
 This dissertation, including my methodology in uncovering primary sources and 
interpreting secondary sources, like the works of other disabled scholars, is largely the 
product of my life as a disabled person.1 I became paralyzed in a go cart accident when I 
was eleven years old and discovered that the world had changed. People no longer looked 
at me or talked to me as they had just months before my accident. After missing 
substantial portions of sixth, seventh, ninth, and tenth grades because of complications 
from my paralysis and the death of my mother, I decided to set two disability-related 
goals. First, I decided to attempt to break the wheelchair 100m world record and to medal 
at the Paralympics (T53 class). Second, I set out to write a history of disability that would 
address some of the issues that I had pondered ever since I had spent several weeks in 
ICU and several additional weeks in rehabilitation. I eventually became a Paralympic 
medalist and world record holder in the 100m, which exposed me to disabled people 
around the world and how their own communities often viewed them as pariahs. Over the 
years, I watched in perplexed consternation as countless able-bodied people belittled my 
congenitally deformed friends in the international wheelchair racing community. Some 
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even attributed my friends’ deformities to divine wrath. I simply could not understand 
how people could say such horrible things to people who were trying to make the most of 
their physical limitations, particularly in the modern age. My hope, however, was that my 
historical research might give me some clues as to how people who were unquestionably 
good people in other aspects of their lives could become so hostile and condescending 
when confronted with congenital deformity and disability.    
Because elite wheelchair racing requires a great deal of travel, I had plenty of 
time alone on airplanes and in hotel rooms to conduct the initial phases of my research. 
As I read works widely considered to be important in the western canon, I created a 
running list of references, both historical and contemporary, to disability. When I had the 
chance in between races and school, I researched those people, religious discussions, 
philosophical debates, events, and texts that I believed could expand my understanding of 
disability.  By the time I had finished law school in 2004, ten years after I had set my first 
world record at the world championships in Berlin, Germany, I had collected hundreds of 
pages of notes.  
As I attempted to make sense of everything that I had compiled about disability in 
the West, I realized the importance of the idea that there was some type of significance, 
whether supernatural or natural, to the existence of congenital deformity. I further 
recognized that able-bodied society had concluded that the existence of disabled people 
created a disability problem because their labor productivity was generally far lower than 
that of able-bodied laborers. In the mid-1990s, when reading about the eugenics 
movement in Rachel Fuchs’ undergraduate class about modern France, I further 
discovered that ideas about congenital deformity became inextricably intertwined with 
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the disability problem during the nineteenth century. When it ultimately came time to 
write my dissertation, then, I decided to explore the evolution of ideas about congenital 
deformity and the disability problem from classical antiquity through World War I, while 
still paying particular attention to the stigma and discrimination associated with pre-
modern and early modern categories of disability. 
Before writing my dissertation, I studied the major theoretical debates in the 
disability studies movement. It was this research that convinced me that many disability 
scholars had been too quick to apply theory dogmatically in their initial accounts of 
disability history. Once I felt that I had a firm grasp of disability theory, I began my 
research about the history of disability and ideas, research informed by years of my 
earlier research about disability and history in a more general sense. Throughout the 
researching and writing process, my methodology remained relatively constant. I began 
my research for each chapter by attempting to find secondary sources that discussed 
disability. Because disability scholars understandably tend to pay closer attention to 
examples of disability in historical texts than scholars unfamiliar with disability history, 
my initial research focused on works by disability historians. I did, of course, read a 
number of authors who were not involved in disability studies in any way, but the simple 
fact of the matter is that mainstream scholars have often overlooked disability. As I read 
works by some of the more influential disability historians, I noted many of the important 
issues that have interested them. I also took note of primary sources that they used to 
uncover various beliefs about disability and disabled people in the past. I then went to 
many of the original sources themselves to determine how those texts portrayed 
disability. These primary sources, combined with my own research that I had been 
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conducting since my undergraduate days in the 1990s, when Martha Rose, now a 
prominent disability scholar, first helped me with my inquiries into disability in classical 
antiquity while she was still in graduate school, provided me with enough texts to begin.  
Although I obviously did not have time to uncover every text ever written in the 
western tradition about disability, I did feel that my methodology provided me with an 
adequate amount of primary and secondary sources with which to address the evolution 
of ideas about disability. I recognize that this project likely would have been easier if I 
had waited an additional twenty to thirty years to begin. Indeed, over the next few 
decades, disability historians will no doubt uncover countless primary documents and 
produce a number of important books and articles that increase our understanding of 
disability in the past. My hope, however, is that I have been able to uncover and to 
analyze enough primary and secondary sources to aid the next generation of disability 
historians in their efforts.  
My starting point for the fourth chapter, which looks at ideas about disability in 
classical antiquity, was Garland’s The Eye of the Beholder: Deformity and Disability in 
the Graeco-Roman World, Rose’s The Staff of Oedipus: Transforming Disability in 
Ancient Greece, and Stiker’s A History of Disability. Garland, Rose, and Stiker look at 
several important classical works that mention disability. Their discussions of disability 
in classical antiquity provided me with a strong foundation on which to build my own 
argument. I found additional sources primarily by using Lindell and Scott’s A Greek-
English Lexicon and the Oxford Latin Dictionary. Under entries for each word, the 
lexicon and dictionary directs the reader to various historical texts which contain that 
word. By looking up Greek and Latin words that describe certain types of disabilities, I 
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was thus able to find several classical sources that discussed disability without having to 
read every text from classical antiquity.  
In the fifth chapter, I build upon Stiker’s A History of Disability to explore ideas 
about disability from the late antiquity to the middle of the seventeenth century. Because 
it would be too complicated to look at the evolution of both Christian and Jewish ideas 
about disability during this period, I follow Stiker in looking at the history of disability 
and Judaism primarily to determine its impact on the development of Christian ideas 
about disability. In any case, I do not have the expertise to add anything meaningful to 
Abrams’ informative Judaism and Disability: Portrayals in Ancient Texts from the 
Tanach through the Bavli.2 In addition to my reliance on Stiker and Abrams, I base many 
of my arguments in this chapter on Andrew Crislip’s From Monastery to Hospital: 
Christian Monasticism and the Transformation of Health Care in Late Antiquity, Irina 
Metzler’s Disability in Medieval Europe: Thinking About Physical Impairment During 
the High Middle Ages, c. 1100-1400, Edward Wheatley’s Stumbling Blocks Before the 
Blind: Medieval Constructions of a Disability, Zina Weygand’s The Blind in French 
Society from the Middle Ages to the Century of Louis Braille, and Colin Barnes’ Disabled 
People in Britain and Discrimination: A Case for Anti-Discrimination Legislation.3 I also 
found Lorraine Daston’s and Katharine Park’s Wonders and the Order of Nature 1150-
1150 particularly helpful for finding primary sources about congenital deformity and 
nature.4 The most important primary sources for this chapter were Augustine’s and 
Isidore of Seville’s highly influential observations about congenital deformity. 
The starting point for the sixth chapter, which explores ideas about disability from 
the middle of the seventeenth century to the French Revolution, was Diderot’s Letter on 
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the Blind. I was familiar with Diderot’s letter, of course, because it is one of the most 
important texts for disability historians, particularly historians of blindness. In that letter, 
Diderot discusses Descartes, Molyneux’s problem, and the problem of theodicy. In 
addition, Diderot provides an Epicurean account of the development of living organisms. 
As I read Diderot’s letter, I recognized that if Descartes, Molyneux, and Diderot all 
recognized that exploring congenital deformity might reveal something important about 
nature, then other seventeenth- and eighteenth-century thinkers must also have delved 
into the significance of congenital deformity. To learn about which seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century authors might have mentioned deformity in their works, I consulted 
Daston’s and Park’s Wonders and the Order of Nature 1150-1150, Henry Fairfield 
Osborn’s From the Greeks to Darwin: An Outline of the Development of the Evolution 
Idea, Peter J. Bowler’s Evolution: The History of an Idea, and Marjolein Degenaar’s 
Molyneux’s Problem: Three Centuries of Discussion on the Perception of Forms 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996).5 Somewhat to my surprise, I learned 
during my research that Alexander Pope, the hunchback poet, played an important role in 
discussions about the significance of deformity in the eighteenth century. Pope, then, is 
one of the rare examples of a disabled person who engaged with able-bodied people 
about the significance of disability. Before I started looking at Pope’s poems and letters, 
however, I read Maynard Mack’s Alexander Pope: A Life and “‘The Least Thing like a 
Man in England’: Some Effects of Pope’s Physical Disability on His Life and Literary 
Career,” in Collected in Himself, and Helen Deutsch’s Resemblance and Disgrace: 
Alexander Pope and the Deformation of Culture to gain a better understanding of Pope 
and his works.6 I consulted a variety of works about the disability problem during the 
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seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, including Anne Muratori-Philip’ Les Grandes 
Heures des Invalides, Isser Woloch’s The French Veteran from the Revolution to the 
Restoration, C.G.T. Dean’s The Royal Hospital Chelsea, Dan Cruickshank’s The Royal 
Hospital Chelsea: The Place and the People, Gordon Phillips’ The Blind in British 
Society: Charity, State and Community, c. 1780-1930, Anne T. Quartararo’s Deaf Identity 
and Social Images in Nineteenth-Century France, and Weygand’s The Blind in French 
Society from the Middle Ages to the Century of Louis Braille.7 
I began my research for the seventh chapter, which looks at ideas about disability 
during the long nineteenth century by examining Elof Axel Carlson’s Mutation: The 
History of an Idea From Darwin to Genomics, Osborn’s From the Greeks to Darwin: An 
Outline of the Development of the Evolution Idea, and Bowler’s Evolution: The History 
of an Idea.8 I then looked at the writings of Erasmus Darwin, Charles Darwin, and Sir 
Francis Galton to determine if they considered the existence of congenital deformity to be 
important. Once I recognized that they did indeed view the existence of congenital 
deformity to be an essential topic of inquiry when attempting to unlock the secrets of the 
nature of things, I sought out to determine the extent to which ideas about congenital 
deformity became particularly germane to the disability problem during the nineteenth 
century. I began my research into the connection between ideas about congenital 
deformity and the disability problem by looking closely at the works of Sir Francis 
Galton and Daniel J. Kevles’ In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses of Human 
Heredity. I relied on Quartararo’s Deaf Identity and Social Images in Nineteenth-Century 
France and Weygand’s The Blind in French Society from the Middle Ages to the Century 
of Louis Braille to gain a better understanding of sensory disabilities and the disability 
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problem. For disabled veterans during this period, I looked to Woloch’s The French 
Veteran from the Revolution to the Restoration, Robert Weldon Whalen’s Bitter Wounds: 
German Victims of the Great War, 1914-1939, James M. Diehl’s The Thanks of the 
Fatherland: German Veterans after the Second World War, and Deborah Cohen’s The 
War Come Home.9 I used Robert Drake’s “Welfare States and Disabled People” and Greg 
Eghigian’s Making Security Social: Disability, Insurance, and the Birth of the Social 
Entitlement State in Germany when looking at the growth of the state’s role in 
administering aid directly to disabled people. 
I use a variety of primary documents to argue in the eighth chapter that disability 
discourse in the long nineteenth century reflects the evolution of ideas about congenital 
deformity and the disability problem. I have tried, when possible, to rely on works that 
are well known within disability studies. I follow Davis, for example, in using Émile Zola 
and Gustave Flaubert to demonstrate the growing fear of degeneration and the increasing 
role of doctors in the lives of disabled people.10 I use Sir Frederick Treves’ memoir, The 
Elephant Man and Other Reminiscences, because it is a first-hand account of how the 
circus freak Joseph Merrick, better known as the Elephant Man, became a hospital 
patient. I use All Quiet on the Western Front because it contains so many important 
discussions of disability and modern warfare. I do find one work, Lord Byron’s 
Deformed Transformed, particularly illuminating in this chapter because it is the product 
of a brilliant poet with a clubfoot. Indeed, Byron’s Deformed Transformed is a literary 
depiction of the types of stigma and discrimination that Kierkegaard, a real hunchback, as 
well as Lord Byron himself, experienced in their interactions with the able-bodied world 
during the nineteenth century.   
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I recognize that many disability scholars in the United States and even in Europe 
are not historians and thus are not always proficient in multiple languages. I have thus 
attempted to use readily available English translations. There were times, however, when 
I did not have access to an English translation or when there was no English translation 
available. In those circumstances, translations are my own unless otherwise noted. I did 
have to make an exception for Greek and Latin texts, concluding that I would generally 
have to use my own translations because the translations from the Loeb Classical Library, 
which most disability scholars use when exploring disability in antiquity, are too archaic 
to be of much use, particularly since language is such an important component of 
disability studies. Loeb translations, moreover, often use a variety of different translations 
for various terms associated with disability. Arthur S. Way, for instance, translates teras 
in Euripides’ Phoenician Maidens as “portent” rather than “monster.”11 Philip H. 
Wicksteed and Francis M Cornford translate things “produced contrary to nature” as 
“unnatural monstrosities.”12 H. Rackham, meanwhile, translates “ostenta monstra 
portenta prodigia” in Cicero’s De Natura Deorum as “‘apparition,’ ‘warning,’ ‘portent,’ 
‘prodigy,’” while William Armistead Falconer translates “ostenta, portenta, monstra, 
prodigia,” in Cicero’s De Divinatione as “‘manifestations,’ ‘portents,’ ‘intimations,’ and 
‘prodigies.’”13 While such translations may not be problematic for those proficient in 
Greek and Latin, they can be hopelessly confusing to disability scholars attempting to 
ascertain the precise ways in which people in classical antiquity used language to 
distinguish the congenitally deformed from able-bodied people.14 Accordingly, unless 
otherwise noted, Greek and Latin translations are my own. To make it easier for non-
classicists to find the primary sources upon which I rely, I have used citation forms 
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familiar to both non-classicists and classicists alike, the latter of which I enclose in 
parentheses after I provide the Loeb page number.  
____________________________________ 
1
 Lennard Davis, for example, felt it necessary in the preface to Enforcing Normalcy to explain “the status 
of at least some portion of my own body.” Indeed, he recognizes in that work that there are some people 
within the disability studies movement who would prefer that able-bodied people stay away from disability 
studies, a ridiculous notion that he is right to reject. Yet neither Davis nor I can escape our own life 
circumstances or pretend that they did not influence our views of disability. Although Davis himself is not 
disabled, he explains that he is intimately familiar with disability because his parents are deaf. Indeed, 
Davis explains that he “grew up in a Deaf world, in a Deaf culture, and with a Deaf sensibility.” Davis, 
Enforcing Normalcy, xvi-xvii.  In any event, just as both men and women have a place in gender studies, 
despite its obvious connection to feminism, so too are both disabled and able-bodied perspectives critically 
important for any serious attempt to understand disability. See ibid., xvi-xix. Swain and Cameron likewise 
understand the importance of identity politics in the disability studies movement. See Swain and Cameron, 
“Unless Otherwise Stated: Discourses of Labeling and Identity in Coming out,” in Disability Discourse, 
69-77. 
2
 See Abrams, Judaism and Disability. For more on disability and Judaism, see Bonnie L. Gracer. “What 
the Rabbis Heard: Deafness in the Mishnah,” Disability StudiesQuarterly 23:2 (2003): 192-205. 
3
 Stiker, A History of Disability; Irina Metzler, Disability in Medieval Europe; Andrew T. Crislip, From 
Monastery to Hospital: Christian Monasticism and the Transformation of Health Care in Late Antiquity 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005); Wheatley, Stumbling Blocks Before the Blind; Weygand, 
The Blind in French Society ; Colin Barnes, Disabled People in Britain and Discrimination: A Case for 
Anti-Discrimination Legislation (London: Hurst & Co., 1991), 12-4. 
4
 See Lorraine Daston and Katharine Park, Wonders and the Order of Nature 1150-1150 (New York: Zone 
Books, 2001). 
5
 See Daston and Park, Wonders and the Order of Nature; Henry Fairfield Osborn, From the Greeks to 
Darwin: An Outline of the Development of the Evolution Idea (London: The Macmillan Co., 1913); Peter J. 
Bowler, Evolution: The History of an Idea, revised ed. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); 
Marjolein Degenaar, Molyneux’s Problem: Three Centuries of Discussion on the Perception of Forms 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996). 
6
 Maynard Mack, Alexander Pope, A Life (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), “‘The Least Thing 
like a Man in England’: Some Effects of Pope’s Physical Disability on His Life and Literary Career,” in 
Collected in Himself (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1982), 372-92. 
7
 Anne Muratori-Philip, Les Grandes Heures des Invalides (Paris: Perrin, 1989); Isser Woloch, The French 
Veteran from the Revolution to the Restoration (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 
1979); C.G.T. Dean, The Royal Hospital Chelsea (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1950); Dan Cruickshank, 
The Royal Hospital Chelsea:  The Place and the People (London: Third Millennium Publishing, 2003); 
Gordon Phillips, The Blind in British Society: Charity, State and Community, c. 1780-1930 (Hampshire: 
Ashgate, 2004); Anne T. Quartararo, Deaf Identity and Social Images in Nineteenth-Century France 
(Washington D.C.: Gallaudet University Press, 2008); and Weygand, The Blind in French Society.   
8
 Elof Axel Carlson, Mutation: The History of an Idea From Darwin to Genomics (New York: Cold Spring 
Harbor Laboratory Press, 2011); Osborn, From the Greeks to Darwin; and Bowler, Evolution: The History 
of an Idea. 
9
 James M. Diehl, The Thanks of the Fatherland: German Veterans after the Second World War  (Chapel 
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1993); Robert Weldon Whalen, Bitter Wounds: German 
Victims of the Great War, 1914-1939 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); Deborah Cohen, The War 
Come Home (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).  
10
 See Davis, “Constructing Normalcy,” 12-3. 
11
 Euripides, Phoenician Maidens, vol. 3, trans., Arthur S. Way (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1988 [1912]), 412-3 (E.Ph. 806). 
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12
 Aristotle, Physics, vol. 4, trans., Philip Wicksteed and Francis M. Cornford (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1996 [1929]), 160-1 (Arist.Ph.2.197b.34-36). 
13
 See Cicero, De Natura Deorum, Academica, vol. 19, trans., H. Rackham (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1994 [1933]), 128-9; Cicero, De Divinatione, vol. 20, trans., William Armistead Falconer 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996 [1923]), 324-5 (Cic.N.D.2.7; Cic.Div.1.93). 
14
 John Boswell has likewise found the Loeb Classical Library problematic for “accounts of gay sexuality.” 
See Boswell, Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality, 19-21. 
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Chapter 4: The Monsters and Beggars of Classical Antiquity 
 Any attempt to reduce disability discourse in classical antiquity to one dominant 
idea or theme is destined to end in disappointment. The Greeks and Romans, like people 
in the modern world, evinced remarkably complex and often contradictory notions about 
disability and people with disabilities. In his posthumous The Idea of Nature, R.G. 
Collingwood identified “three periods of constructive cosmological thinking; three 
periods that is to say, when the idea of nature has come into focus of thought, become the 
subject of intense and protracted reflection, and consequently acquired new 
characteristics which in their turn have given a new aspect to the detailed science of 
nature that has been based upon it.”1 The Greeks, Collingwood explained, ushered in the 
first period by fashioning an understanding of natural science “based on the principle that 
the world of nature is saturated or permeated by mind,” which was “the source of that 
regularity or orderliness whose presence made a science of nature possible.”2 They 
perceived nature to be in a constant state of motion and “therefore alive.”3 Yet because 
motion appeared to be “orderly and regular,” they argued that “the world of nature is not 
only alive but intelligent; not only a vast animal with a ‘soul’ or life of its own, but a 
rational animal with a ‘mind’ of its own.”4 The Greeks, moreover, believed that 
observable changes in nature were cyclical, i.e., “[a] change from state α to state β . . . is 
always one part of a process which completes itself by a return from state β to state α.”5   
Not all Greeks and Romans, however, agreed with these general observations 
about the natural world. Indeed, both the Presocratic Empedocles and the Epicureans 
attributed the diversity of the natural world to chance rather than rationality. The idea that 
chance governed nature was certainly a minority position in the Greek and Roman world, 
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as it was when the Epicurean tradition once again began to assert itself during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, perhaps most notably in the works of Pierre 
Gessendi and Diderot.6 Yet it was this minority tradition that would influence the 
materialism of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and even nineteenth centuries until “it was 
finally destroyed by the new theory of matter which grew up in the late nineteenth 
century.”7   
The various Greek ideas about nature, as one might expect, produced different 
views about the significance of the existence of deformity. Greeks and Romans with 
more superstitious proclivities looked not to nature to understand congenital deformity 
but rather to the gods, viewing congenital deformities as manifestations of divine will. 
Others, whether they believed in nature as a rational organism or in nature governed by 
chance, viewed congenital deformities as naturally recurring anomalies devoid of 
supernatural significance. One thing, however, remained constant throughout the classical 
period: people with congenital deformities and disabilities experienced widespread 
stigma and discrimination because they exhibited physical and aesthetic deviations from 
the able-bodied norm. In a world that prized the ideal body and ideal health, 
extraordinary deviations from those ideals routinely inspired negative reactions, and 
sometimes even outright odium, among the able-bodied population.8 The Greeks and 
Romans routinely used a variety of different categories to separate congenitally deformed 
and disabled people from their able-bodied counterparts. Some people in classical 
antiquity even used terminology associated with disability to disparage slight deviations 
from the ideal physical body. Celsus, a Roman thinker well acquainted with Hippocratic 
medicine, for example, claimed that thin people were less healthy than those with ideal 
 69 
 
bodies and that thinness was thus a type of infirmity.9 Some disabled people, of course, 
were able to navigate through this morass of contempt to attain remarkable levels of 
prestige and power. Agesilaus, after all, became king of Sparta despite a congenital 
deformity that rendered him lame in one leg, and Claudius succeeded Caligula as 
emperor of Rome even though his own family had long attempted to limit his 
involvement in public affairs on account of his many congenital deformities. Yet there is 
no question that the congenital deformities of Agesilaus and Claudius presented 
significant obstacles to their political ambitions. The often fragmentary evidence dealing 
with the lives of ordinary disabled people demonstrates that they, too, encountered 
negative stereotypes that continuously threatened to relegate them to the penumbras of 
society.   
When it came to addressing the idea that there was a disability problem, the 
Greeks and Romans likewise held widely divergent views. The Spartans, Romans, and 
even some influential Athenians, for instance, supported, in theory at least, the killing of 
congenitally deformed infants, while Athens created a pension system for disabled 
people, including people with congenital deformities, who were not able financially to 
support themselves or their families. The Romans, meanwhile, concluded that the best 
way to deal with disabled people within their midst was through begging and almsgiving. 
The Enigma of Congenital Deformity in the Greco-Roman World 
 Views regarding the causes of congenital deformity varied greatly in classical 
antiquity. Many people considered congenital deformity to be some type of message from 
the gods. As Robert Garland has observed, a society that “has no tradition of scientific 
inquiry or one in which that tradition operates at the outskirts of the popular 
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consciousness will tend to view [congenital deformity] as an example of the capacity of 
the divine to violate natural law.”10 One of the most common manifestations of such a 
capacity was divine punishment. Not everyone in classical antiquity, however, attributed 
congenital deformity to an ongoing process of divine intervention into the nature of 
things. Some Greeks and Romans looked instead to the natural world to explain 
congenital deformity. Yet the modern dichotomy between religious and scientific 
explanations of the universe did not exist in Greco-Roman thought. Although some 
Greeks and Romans, particularly the Epicureans, did evince materialistic tendencies, few 
classical thinkers who explored natural phenomena in general, and congenital deformity 
in particular, completely rejected religious explanations of the natural world.11 
Hippocratic physicians, meanwhile, argued that efforts to understand what human beings 
are by looking at how they evolved could contribute little to a proper understanding of 
nature, maintaining that physicians can learn more about the natural world through 
clinical experience than through philosophical speculation. 
Congenital Deformity and the Divine 
 The idea that the gods punished mortals for their transgressions, of course, was 
common in classical antiquity. In the Odyssey, for instance, Nestor tells Telemachus that 
many Argives were destined to suffer on their return to Greece after the Trojan War 
because “Zeus planned in his heart a baneful return home for the Argives, since not all of 
them were thoughtful or righteous.”12 A few moments later, Nestor reiterates Zeus’ desire 
to punish the Argives, explaining that “Zeus was [sending] an evil calamity against us.”13 
The gods likewise punished Appius Claudius Caecus, the famous consul and censor who 
not only was responsible for the construction of the Appian Way but also the person who 
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convinced the Romans to continue the war against Pyrrhus of Epirus despite his peerless 
generalship.14 Appius’ punishment occurred after the Potitian clan, under the authority of 
Appius, taught religious secrets to “public slaves.” The gods indicated their displeasure 
by eradicating the clan and striking Appius with blindness.15   
One of the most horrific punishments that the gods could inflict on mortals was to 
make them produce congenitally deformed children whom the Greeks called terata 
(monsters) almost certainly because severely deformed infants, before the advent of 
modern genetics, seemed to resemble mythological monsters.16 Hesiod himself suggests 
in his Works and Days that when men are righteous, their “women bear children like 
those who begot them,”17 which, Garland notes, became a common euphemism for 
“whole-bodied” in later periods.18 The obvious implication of Hesiod’s claim, even in his 
own day, was that the gods sometimes punish the unrighteous by making them bear 
deformed children. In Against Ctesiphon, a speech delivered in 330 B.C.E., ostensibly as 
a prosecution against Ctesiphon but in reality an attack on Aeschines’ rival, 
Demosthenes,19 Aeschines suggests that the Athenians had equated congenitally 
deformed people with divine wrath since at least the sixth century B.C.E. In that speech, 
Aeschines admonishes the Athenians to be mindful of an oath taken during the time of 
Solon, who was eponymous archon in 594/3: 
“If anyone,” it says, “transgresses this [oath], whether city, or private person, or 
tribe, let him be under a curse,” it says, “of Apollo and of Artemis and of Leto and 
of Athena Pronaea.” And it imprecates upon them that the earth not bear them 
fruit, that their wives produce children not like those who produced them, but 
monsters (terata) . . .” 20  
 
When the Greeks used the word teras to refer to congenitally deformed people, 
they were not simply using colorful, value-free language to identify people with 
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deformities. Instead, they were overtly comparing abnormal, congenitally deformed 
bodies to the frightening, inhuman abominations of Greek mythology. Some of the most 
illustrious works in the Greek literary tradition, after all, depicted terata as terrifying 
blights on human existence. The Iliad, one of the most famous pieces of ancient Greek 
literature—so famous that Alexander the Great slept with a copy of it, along with a 
dagger, under his pillow—refers to the Gorgon’s head as “the monster [teras] of aegis-
bearing Zeus.”21 The Homeric Hymn to Pythian Apollo praises Apollo for killing the 
“great, well-fed she-dragon, a savage monster [teras], who has done many wicked things 
to men upon the earth.”22 Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound calls Typhon a “destructive 
hundred-headed monster [teras].”23 Sophocles’ The Women of Trachis refers to Cerberus 
as “the three-headed dog of Hades under the earth, an irresistible monster [teras].”24 
Euripides’ Phoenician Maidens, meanwhile, labels the Sphinx a “mountain-haunting 
monster [teras].”25  
Greeks with superstitious inclinations further believed that there was a reason for 
the existence of infants with severe congenital deformities, even when their deformities 
were not some type of divine punishment. Indeed, many Greeks firmly believed that the 
gods routinely created congenitally deformed people to be signs or portents for their able-
bodied counterparts. The connection between terata (monsters) and divination was so 
strong, in fact, that the Greeks often used variations of teras (monster) to denote a sign or 
portent even when that sign or portent was neither a mythological monster nor a 
congenitally deformed person. In the Iliad, for example, Calchas uses teras when 
referring to a serpent sent by Zeus, apparently ordinary in appearance yet portentous in its 
actions.26 “All-wise Zeus,” Calchas proclaims, “made the great teras (portentous 
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monster) appear to us. . . .”27 Calchas then interprets the sign, explaining that Zeus made 
the teras, which killed eight sparrow chicks and their mother in front of the Achaeans, in 
order to inform the Achaeans that they would not prevail in the war against Troy until the 
tenth year.28 In the Odyssey, Nestor explains to Telemachus how the Achaeans, frustrated 
by their inability to return home after the sack of Troy, asked “the god to show [them] a 
teras (sign).”29 The chorus in Aeschylus’ Agamemnon uses the verb terazdein (to 
interpret monsters/portents/signs) when describing how Calchas interpreted two birds 
eating a pregnant hare as a prophecy about Agamemnon and Menelaus: “The trustworthy 
prophet of the army . . ., interpreting the portent (terazdōn), spoke. . . .”30 Xenophon 
notes in his Memorabilia, moreover, that the gods “give warnings through terata (signs) 
sent to the Hellenes.”31  
The connection between congenital deformity and divinity was equally obvious to 
the Romans, who referred to both people and animals with severe congenital deformities 
as monstra, prodigia, ostenta, and portenta, all of which suggested supernatural 
causation.32 According to Cicero, deformed people and animals, along with other types of 
phenomena, “are called ostenta, portenta, monstra, and prodigia” because “they make 
something known (ostendunt), indicate a future event (portendunt), show the way 
(monstrant), and predict (praedicunt).”33 Saint Augustine, as discussed in the next 
chapter, later proffered a similar etymology of monstra, ostenta, portenta, and prodigia. 
He explains in the City of God, for instance, that monstra comes from the verb monstrare 
(“to show”) “because [monsters] show something by a sign.”34 And although human 
beings might not understand precisely what such phenomena were supposed to show or 
to predict, many Romans appear to have been relatively certain that the gods, for 
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whatever reason, were responsible for creating them. Cicero, for example, although 
skeptical of divination, explains in De Haruspicum Responsis that the discord then 
driving Romans into a “frenzy” had been the subject of a warning in the form of “recent 
prodigies [prodigiis] by the immortal gods.”35 In the dialogue De Divinatione, Cicero, 
moreover, alludes to the purported divine nature of ostenta when explaining that the 
Etruscan soothsayers were adept at interpreting the meaning of both humans and 
livestock deformed “from conception and the act of procreation.”36  
Roman literary figures were just as accustomed as their Greek counterparts to 
depict monsters and prodigies as terrifying, inhuman beasts who acted as both harbingers 
and instruments of human destruction. Virgil notes how the lame god Vulcan had 
produced the horrid Cacus, explaining that “Vulcan was father to this monster.”37 Ovid 
describes the dreadful, three-headed monster Geryon as “the threefold prodigy.”38 The 
Romans considered mythological monsters and prodigies to be so dangerous that they 
often demonized criminals, political opponents, and unpopular historical figures by 
comparing them to monsters and prodigies. In the dialogue Mendici Debilitati, the elder 
Seneca’s Albuci Sili calls an able-bodied man who mutilated children under his control 
so as to make them more efficient beggars a “strange monster,” suggesting that such 
shameful exploitation was an unnatural abomination among the Romans.39 In 49 B.C.E., 
Cicero wrote a letter to his friend Atticus, calling Julius Caesar a teras, the Greek word 
for monster, while Caesar was marching on Brundisium to confront Pompey: “But this 
monster [teras] is terrifyingly sleepless, swift, and assiduous. I am utterly unable to know 
what the future will bring.”40 For Cicero, referring to Caesar as a despicable despot could 
not adequately express his fear and hatred of the man who threatened the Republic. Only 
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a word such as teras, which completely denied Caesar’s humanity by comparing him to a 
mythological monster, would suffice. After Catiline had left Rome, moreover, Cicero 
proclaimed that “now, no destruction of our walls will be devised from within these very 
walls by that monstrosity and prodigy [a monstro atque prodigio].”41 On another 
occasion, Cicero defended Sextus Rocius against charges that he had murdered his father 
by calling such a crime so “atrocious” and “unusual” that “any time it is heard of it is 
treated like a portent [portenti] or prodigy [prodigii].”42 Cicero likewise vilified two 
additional opponents by calling them “two oppressive prodigies.”43 Tacitus embraced this 
tradition, seemingly blaming Vitellius’ unsavory character for his ignominious end by 
proclaiming that “Vitellius himself was a manifestation of future events [ostentum] 
surpassing all others.”44 
Accordingly, when Greeks or Romans used words such as teras, monstrum, 
prodigium, portentum, or ostentum to refer to an actual person with a severe congenital 
deformity, they were invoking a visceral fear and trembling otherwise reserved for 
mythological monsters or people that had committed such heinous crimes that they could 
scarcely be considered human. The implication of this disability discourse was that 
people with severe congenital deformities, people with bodies that resembled 
mythological monsters, were likewise less than human and even something to be feared. 
It is impossible, of course, to determine the extent to which this aspect of disability 
discourse adversely impacted the lives of people with congenital deformities, but such a 
dehumanizing use of language must have contributed to the stigma and discrimination 
that congenitally deformed people experienced in their daily lives. 
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The dehumanization and fear of congenitally deformed people is plainly evident 
in the Life of Aesop, which repeatedly uses the word teras to demonstrate the extent to 
which Aesop’s purported contemporaries rejected his humanity. When the philosopher 
Xanthus brings Aesop to his house after buying him from a slave-dealer, Xanthus tells 
Aesop to wait outside while he goes in to tell his wife that he has bought a deformed 
slave: “Aesop, my wife is without blemish. Wait in front of the house-door until I explain 
the situation to her, so that she does not demand that her dowry be returned to her and 
flee the moment that she sees your rotten body.”45 When Xanthus’ wife eventually does 
see Aesop, she proves her husband correct, believing that he has purchased the deformed 
slave as a way of getting her to leave him on her own accord so that he can find another 
wife.46 While Xanthus is inside telling his wife about Aesop, a young female slave comes 
outside to see the new slave that Xanthus has purchased. When she sees Aesop’s 
deformities, she reiterates Xanthus’ command to stay outside, calling him a monster: 
“Stay where you are. Or else you will enter and they will all flee upon seeing such a 
monster [teras].”47 Croesus, king of the Lydians, likewise calls Aesop a teras after Aesop 
thwarts his plans of receiving tribute from the Samians. Croesus, in return, orders the 
Samians to hand Aesop over to him. Although Aesop convinces them that it would be 
unwise to deliver him to Croesus, he decides freely to meet with the king. Once there, 
Croesus witnesses Aesop’s deformities and laments that such a person could thwart his 
plans: “And the king, seeing Aesop, was vexed and said, ‘Look who prevented me from 
subjugating a city, and did not permit me to receive my payment. And it would not be so 
difficult to deal with if it were a man rather than a riddle and monster [teras] of men.”48 
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The Greeks appear to have extended their fears about congenital deformity to 
people with physical conditions that seemed to have some particular connection to the 
gods. According to Theophrastus, for example, upon “seeing a madman or epileptic, [the 
superstitious man], in a shivering-fit, spits at his chest,” a ritual by which the Greeks 
attempted to protect themselves against bad omens.49 Because superstitious people, in 
Theophrastus’ view, would not look for the natural causes of mental illness or epilepsy, 
the sacred disease, they would naturally tremble when pondering the impending doom 
that a “madman” or epileptic might presage. While a lack of sources makes it nearly 
impossible to know how much discrimination and stigma actual people with mental 
illness or epilepsy experienced in their daily lives, they probably would not have been 
welcome dinner guests at the home of a person who shared the beliefs of Theophrastus’ 
“superstitious man.”         
Romans were particularly averse to people whom they considered monsters and 
prodigies, often conflating their congenital deformities with the horrible events that they 
supposedly foretold, particularly during times of crisis.50 Romans especially feared 
hermaphroditic prodigies, deciding during the upheavals of the late third century B.C.E. 
that the able-bodied community would benefit from ritually sacrificing them. In 207 
B.C.E., during the Second Punic War, after the people had recently averted disasters 
foretold by a series of prodigies, a woman in Frusino gave birth to a terrifying 
hermaphrodite. “Their minds having been freed from religion,” Livy observed, “the 
report of the birth of an infant at Frusino equaling the size of a four year old once again 
agitated the people, not so much because it was remarkable in size [but because], in the 
same way as at Sinuessa two years before, it was uncertain whether the infant was born 
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male or female.”51 The diviners from Etruria declared that it was a “loathsome and 
disgusting prodigy,” which should be “banished from Roman land, far away from contact 
with land,” and “drowned in the open sea.”52 The Romans heeded the superstitious 
warning, putting “the still-living infant into a coffin, conveyed it out to sea, and threw it 
into the water.”53 During the Gallic Revolt seven years later, which, Garland notes, “sent 
shock waves through the Roman psyche,”54 the Romans discovered more prodigies:  
At this time, ill-omened [and disgusting] births of creatures [animalium] were 
reported in very many places: among the Sabines, an infant was born and it was 
uncertain whether it was male or female, and another of ambiguous sex, this one 
sixteen years old, was likewise discovered; at Frusino a lamb with a pig’s head 
was born, at Sinuessa a pig with a human head, and in Lucania, on the public 
land, a foal with five feet.”55 
 
According to Livy, although the Romans considered “all of these loathsome and 
deformed creatures” to be unnatural, “above all, the half-males [semimares] were 
abhorred and thrown into the sea” in accordance with the ritual sacrifice of the 
Hermaphroditic prodigy seven years earlier.56   
 The Romans were likewise averse to deformed and disabled priests. According to 
one side of the controversy in the elder Seneca’s Metellus Caecatus, “a priest with an 
impaired body ought to be avoided as though a thing of ill omen.”57 Many Romans, after 
all, considered a deformity or disability to be a “sign of disapproval even in animals 
offered [to the gods]; how much more in priests? After a person becomes a priest, it is 
more important that any infirmity be observed; for a priest is not made infirm without the 
anger of the gods.”58 Indeed, as many Romans would no doubt agree, “it is obvious that 
the gods are not favorably inclined to a priest whom they do not preserve intact. . . .”59    
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Classical Philosophy and Congenital Deformity: Natural Explanations 
Despite these widespread beliefs about the connection between the gods and 
congenital deformity, many philosophers, both Greek and Roman, attempted to fashion 
more nuanced explanations for such aberrations of nature. A lack of sources for the early 
Greek period makes it difficult to determine exactly when Greek philosophers first began 
to explore congenital deformity in an attempt to make sense of natural phenomena 
without resorting to superstition, but the tradition likely began with the Presocratic 
philosophers.60 As M.R. Wright has observed, the Presocratics endeavored, “from 
different viewpoints, to find a rational and comprehensive explanation of the world which 
adapted or discounted theological tradition.”61 Empedocles, a Presocratic philosopher 
who, according to Diogenes Laertius, was also a poet, physician, and orator, 62 emulated 
his Presocratic predecessors in attempting to explain the origins of life, but he took the 
ingenious step of injecting congenital deformity into the debate. It is impossible to know 
everything that Empedocles believed about congenital deformity because there are so few 
extent fragments of his work. In 1981, for example, Wright estimated that the extent 450 
lines and ten phrases of Empedocles comprised a mere sixteen to twenty percent of what 
he actually wrote.63 To make matters worse, scholars cannot agree whether Empedocles 
wrote two poems or one, first, because some ancient commentators referred to two 
separate poems while others did not and, second, because there is considerable 
disagreement whether the seemingly contradictory fragments could have come from one 
poem.64 The traditional view is that Empedocles wrote one poem called either Physics or 
On Nature, which explored natural phenomena, and another called the Kartharmoi 
(Purifications), which exhibited a religious motif.65 Some scholars, such as Catherine 
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Osborne and Brad Inwood, have challenged that view, arguing that it is more likely that 
Empedocles wrote only one poem, which expressed not merely reconcilable but unitary 
views with respect to natural phenomena and religion.66  
Whatever the case, it is possible to reconstruct some of Empedocles’ most 
important ideas about deformity. At the heart of Empedocles’ understanding of the 
cosmos was his dualistic conception of Love and Strife, two contradictory forces of 
nature striving against each other in an endless cycle. The function of Love, Empedocles 
believed, was to bring unity to the universe, while the role of Strife was to unravel that 
potential unity. Long ago, when Strife had the upper hand, there was no life as we know 
it until the earth began to produce life forms via spontaneous generation. At that time, 
Empedocles proclaims, “Many heads without necks sprouted up on the earth. Bare arms 
lacking shoulders wandered, and eyes deprived of foreheads strayed alone.”67 When Love 
began to bring those disparate body parts together, it did so by chance rather than by 
design, thus creating numerous types of terata. As Empedocles surmises, “[m]any 
double-faced and double-breasted beings were produced; oxen with the face of a man 
and, contrariwise, human-shaped yet ox-headed creatures sprang up, [along with others] 
mixed [with parts] from men and [with parts] female by nature, furnished with dark-
colored limbs.”68  Most of these terata, of course, would not have been able to survive for 
long because they lacked the vital organs and requisite limbs to sustain themselves. 
Eventually, however, chance led to the formation of “whole-natured outlines, which 
“sprang from the earth.”69 These nearly complete beings were certainly more viable than 
their more seriously deformed predecessors, but “they did not yet exhibit any lovely 
bodily frame of limbs, nor voice nor . . . a limb native to man [i.e., a phallus].”70  
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Although the extant fragments do not inform us precisely what Empedocles 
thought happened next, he apparently believed that chance—as the stage in which Love 
predominates was approaching its apogee—fitted these beings with the last few organs 
needed to become truly “whole.” One of the most important factors in the development of 
living beings, Empedocles believed, was chance’s bestowal not only of the means to 
reproduce offspring but also the desire. In an important fragment upon which Lucretius 
would later expand, Empedocles observes that “upon him also comes, through sight, 
desire to have intercourse.”71 Empedocles recognizes here that reproduction entails more 
than simply possessing sexual organs. Indeed, what sexually attracts one person to one 
another is not merely the knowledge that both people possess sexual organs, which can 
provide for mutual pleasure through intercourse; rather, at least for the sighted, physical 
appearance is often an important factor in whether one person is sexually attracted to 
another.72 As Plutarch would later remark in Table-Talk (Symposiakōn biblia), “sight is 
responsible (endidōsin) for the origin of love.”73 Empedocles may even have believed 
that the desire for sexual intercourse was such an important development that it 
contributed to the extinction of hybrid terata, i.e., beings comprised of both human and 
animal body parts.74 After all, if physical appearance is one of the most important factors 
in selecting a mate, and living beings tend to be more comfortable around their own kind, 
it follows that Empedocles’ emerging species would seek to procreate with other “whole-
natured” beings of the same species rather than with unsightly amalgamations of different 
species. Empedocles thus may have relegated the hybrid terata of mythology primarily to 
a previous stage in the development of living beings based on an understanding of sexual 
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desire that comes remarkably close to anticipating some concepts of modern evolutionary 
psychology.75   
What we cannot know for certain is whether Empedocles pondered the existence 
of actual terata during his own lifetime when discussing the role of deformity and chance 
in the development of living beings. Garland points to a passage from Aristotle’s Physics 
to suggest that Empedocles’ thought “may conceivably have derived part of its 
inspiration from the experience of mutant forms.”76  In that passage, Aristotle observes 
that “[w]herever . . . all things resulted as they would have if there had been a purpose, 
these creatures, having been made fit by chance, survived; but those who did not [come 
together] in this way, perished and still perish, just as Empedocles says about oxen with a 
man’s face.”77 If we accept Aristotle’s interpretation, then, Empedocles was well aware 
that terata continued to come into existence in his own day, although it is unclear 
whether Empedocles believed that such terata sprang directly from the earth through 
spontaneous generation or were the products of sexual reproduction.78  
Scholars have long noted the obvious similarities between Empedocles’ ideas and 
Charles Darwin’s theory of natural selection. In 1913, for example, Henry Fairfield 
Osborn surmised that Empedocles “may justly be called the father of the Evolution 
idea.”79 More recently, Garland has argued that Empedocles’ terata were “relegated to 
the margins of contemporary zoology by a principle akin to that of Darwin’s theory of 
natural selection.”80 As Wright has pointed out, however, “[i]t is an exaggeration to read 
Darwinism back into [Empedocles]” because in Empedocles “we do not find an 
understanding of selection and mutation with divergence of parts of the species from the 
original stock, or new functions and organs developing out of old ones, with the passing 
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on of heritable variations. . . .”81 Yet Osborn and Garland are certainly correct that 
Empedocles contributed to the development of the evolution idea because he believed 
that (1) chance, rather than a rational mind or design, is responsible for the development 
of living beings and (2) more advanced beings gradually replace those beings less suited 
for survival and reproduction, at least until Strife unravels the work of Love.82      
Both Plato and Aristotle rejected Empedocles’ idea that chance could have 
brought about the amazingly complex diversity of the earth’s biota, arguing instead that 
the natural world is the product of rationality. In the Timaeus, Plato famously argued that 
the gods, themselves created by the Demiurge, took a direct role in creating the physical 
forms of human beings.83 Rational purpose is likewise evident in Aristotle’s four causes: 
(1) the material cause; (2) the formal cause; (3) the efficient cause; (4) and the final 
cause.84 These four causes, however, did not preclude accidental, monstrous births.85 For 
Aristotle, “all the imperfections of Nature” were the result of “the struggle between 
material and formal causes.”86 In particular, Aristotle argued that there was “a resistance 
of matter to form.”87 Monstrous births, then, did not happen for a “reason” but were 
simply accidents, even if they ultimately originated from an efficient cause and were an 
integral component of a system permeated by rationality. In Physics, Aristotle alludes to 
these views when distinguishing between tychē (fortune) and automaton (accident), 
surmising that “the accident (automaton), in accordance with the word itself, occurs ‘by 
itself’ (auto) for ‘no reason’ (maten).”88 He then goes on to conclude that 
“[d]istinguishing between accident and fortune is best in instances where things are 
produced [contrary to nature]; for whenever something is produced contrary to nature 
(para physin, e.g.., a teras), we assert that it was produced not from fortune but rather 
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from accident.”89 To his credit, Aristotle did not believe that it was acceptable to scorn 
congenitally deformed people simply because they were accidents of birth. In 
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle contends that “no one would reproach a man blind by 
nature [i.e., a man born blind] or from a sickness or from a blow, but rather would have 
pity on him.”90 Aristotle contends, however, that people would rightly blame a person 
whose foolishness resulted in blindness or another type of deformity.91 
The Epicureans dismissed both the Platonic and the Aristotelian notions of nature, 
arguing that natural phenomena, including congenital deformity, were indeed the product 
of chance. Epicurus, who was a young man when Aristotle died, built on the atomism of 
Leucippus and Democritus to construct a materialist system that denied divine causation 
for natural phenomena. The Epicurean system was far more materialist than Empedocles’ 
view of nature, but Epicurus and Empedocles apparently had somewhat compatible views 
with respect to congenital deformity. In a passage from De Rerum Natura that would 
later form the basis of Denis Diderot’s materialist assault on design in his Letter on the 
Blind for the Use of Those Who See (1749), Lucretius, the Roman poet and follower of 
Epicurus, integrates Empedocles’ view of congenital deformity into the Epicurean 
system.92 The Epicurean concept of motion likely made Lucretius receptive to 
Empedocles’ ideas about congenital deformity. Epicurus himself proclaims in his Letter 
to Herodotus, preserved in book ten of Diogenes Laertius’ Lives of the Eminent 
Philosophers, that “atoms are continuously in motion.”93 Lucretius later elaborated on the 
implications of matter in perpetual motion, arguing that “the passage of time changes the 
nature of the entire world, and one physical state of things must proceed to another, and 
nothing at all remains unchanged: all things move, nature changes all things and drives 
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them together to turn them into something else.”94 After explaining the Epicurean 
concept of matter and change in his famed poem, Lucretius adopts many of Empedocles’ 
ideas about congenital deformity.  According to Lucretius,  
[t]he earth then attempted also to create many portents [portenta], having come 
into being with extraordinary physical appearance and limbs: the hermaphrodite 
[androgynem], in between the two extremes and yet neither, far removed in 
function at both ends; some bereft of feet, others, in turn, deprived of hands; some 
were mute and even lacked a mouth, others were found to be blind without a face; 
some were bound together with their limbs completely adhering to their bodies, so 
that they were neither able to do anything at all nor able to go anywhere, neither 
able to avoid evil nor able to take what might be needed.95 
 
Such deformities, Lucretius contends, prevented these monsters (monstra) from thriving 
and procreating, thus precluding them from producing a new race of people: 
And [the earth] was creating the rest of the monsters (monstra) and portents 
(portenta) of this race to no avail; because nature deterred their growth, they 
could not reach the blossoming of youth nor find food nor join in sexual 
intercourse. We see that it is necessary for creatures to have many things come 
together simultaneously, so that they might, by producing offspring, forge the 
succession of generations: first, there must be food; next, it is necessary that the 
reproductive seeds can pass through the sexual organs by which they might flow 
out from the relaxed body; and [finally] so that a female might be joined sexually 
with males, it is necessary for each to have what is required to exchange mutual 
physical delights with one another.96  
 
Lucretius proceeds to apply these Empedoclean concepts to the extinction of certain types 
of animals, who, because of the ways in which nature fashioned them, were unable to 
reproduce in sufficient quantities to propagate their kind.97    
Although Epicurean ideas would influence how some philosophers and naturalists 
viewed nature during the seventeenth, eighteenth, and even nineteenth centuries, many 
people in classical antiquity rejected Lucretius’ ideas about nature, chance, and 
congenital deformity. Cicero, after all, admired Lucretius’ poetic genius but believed, like 
Plato and Aristotle, that the natural world was indicative of rationality rather than chance. 
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In De Natura Deorum, Cicero argues that chance could no sooner produce the 
complexities of the natural world than it would be possible to recreate the Annales of 
Quintus Ennius by scattering an innumerable amount of the twenty-one letters of the 
Latin language onto the ground.98 Cicero, however, did agree with the Epicureans in two 
ways. First, he too viewed congenital deformity as a natural rather than supernatural 
phenomenon, believing that it was foolish to equate congenital deformity with divination. 
In the dialogue De Divinatione, for example, Cicero contends that there is no reason to 
fear “portentous births, whether from an animal or human,” because there is “is one 
reason for all [portents]: whatever comes into existence, of whatever sort it is, necessarily 
must have its cause in nature.”99 According to Cicero, “even if something exists contrary 
to normal experience, it nevertheless cannot exist contrary to nature.”100 As one might 
expect for a dialogue on divination, Cicero returns to the existence of portentous births a 
short time later, arguing that there is no connection between portents and the purported 
mystical properties of heavenly bodies because the efforts of congenitally deformed 
people themselves, surgeons, and even the mere passage of time often correct congenital 
deformity.101 To drive his point home, Cicero points to the example of Demosthenes, who 
famously managed to overcome his speech impediment—the inability to pronounce the 
letter rho—to become one of the greatest orators of classical antiquity.102 If heavenly 
bodies actually had the power to afflict some people with birth defects, Cicero reasons, 
neither the passage of time nor human effort could make such unfortunate people 
whole.103 Second, Cicero agreed with Lucretius that learned inquiries into congenital 
deformity could help to unravel the mysteries of the natural and supernatural world. In 
yet another passage of De Divinatione, Cicero envisions a type of experiment to 
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determine the efficacy of divination, wondering (1) whether there was any actual diviner 
who, although blind like Tiresias, could distinguish between black and white or (2) 
whether there was a diviner who, although deaf, could distinguish between various words 
or tones.104 If such a blind or deaf person could be found, Cicero suggests, it would prove 
that divination is real.105   
Plutarch, a Roman citizen and one and of the most famous Platonists in classical 
antiquity, later entered the intellectual fray, siding with Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero over 
Empedocles, Epicurus, and Lucretius. Plutarch did not come to this conclusion lightly; 
rather, he went to great lengths to understand the ideas of his intellectual opponents. He 
was particularly familiar with Empedoclean views about chance and congenital 
deformity, quoting Empedocles throughout his works,106 apparently writing a ten-volume 
work on Empedocles,107 and even discussing the monsters (terasmasin) of Empedocles in 
his Reply to Colotes.108 Plutarch was also well aware of the Epicurean view of nature, 
criticizing the natural philosophy of the Epicureans in his own work.109 It is hardly 
surprising, then, that Plutarch, in addressing the concept of chance, felt it necessary to 
respond to those people in classical antiquity who, like Empedocles and the Epicureans, 
contended that chance was responsible for natural phenomena. Nor is it surprising, given 
that congenital deformity provided the perfect means of testing hypotheses about the 
natural world, that Plutarch referred both to blindness and deafness when attempting to 
prove that the natural world was indicative of a rational mind, just as Cicero had done 
when exploring the validity of divination. 
 In On Chance (Peri tychēs), Plutarch contends that nature gave humans superior 
intelligence so that they would not be helpless against the physically superior attributes of 
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animals.110 Plutarch then launches a preemptive rebuttal to the inevitable criticisms that 
the proponents of chance would direct at his argument by asking rhetorically, “[W]hat is 
to be discovered or learned by mankind if all things are accomplished by chance?”111 He 
then proceeds to construct an elaborate metaphor for blindness and deafness to argue 
against the notion that chance plays a more important role in human affairs than wisdom. 
Human beings, Plutarch maintains, generally “rebuke” the idea of chance because to 
attribute everything in our world to chance would render us nothing more than “blind 
men stumbling against it.”112 “How would we not be destined to be so,” continues 
Plutarch, “when, cutting out prudence as it were our own eyes, we take a blind guide for 
our lives?”113 Plutarch next begins to apply his metaphor to the idea of rational design by 
telling his readers to “suppose that one of us were to say that the business of seeing is 
chance, and not sight nor [the use of] ‘light-bringing eyes,’ as Plato says, and that the 
business of hearing is chance, and not the ability to apprehend impressions in the air 
which are borne through to the brain.”114 If that were the case, Plutarch concedes, “it 
would be well, as it seems, to be cautious of sense-perception.”115 Plutarch, however, 
quickly dismisses such conclusions with respect to chance and the senses, proclaiming 
that “nature conveyed to us sight, hearing, taste, smell, and the rest of our body and our 
abilities to be the servants of prudence and wisdom.”116 Plutarch concludes his metaphor-
based argument by elaborating on Epicharmus’ claim that “‘mind has sight and mind has 
hearing,’ and ‘all else is deaf (kōpha) and blind (typhla).’”117 According to Plutarch, if 
nature had not given sight and hearing to human beings, and “man” thus “had neither 
mind nor reason (ei mē noyn mēde logon ho anthropos eschen), he would not be different 
in life from wild beasts.”118   
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Plutarch’s repeated use of his metaphor for blindness and deafness to argue in 
favor of rational design provides one of the more ironic moments in the history of 
disability. Although Plutarch employs his metaphor for blindness and deafness to suggest 
that the reciprocity between the senses and knowledge is so strong that it could not have 
arisen through chance, he fails to identify two important implications with regard to the 
existence of blindness and deafness. First, whereas Cicero had explored blindness and 
deafness when addressing the question of whether there could be any truth to the claims 
of soothsayers, Plutarch does not examine what the existence of blindness and deafness 
might reveal about the natural mechanisms responsible for sight and hearing, let alone 
other aspects of the natural world. Second, he seems unaware that Epicureans or 
likeminded materialists could make a strong argument that blindness and deafness 
undermine the philosophical underpinnings of the idea of rational design because that 
idea could not explain why, if our senses are the result of rationality, some people are 
born without one or more of them for no apparent reason.    
The reasons why Plutarch did not delve more deeply into the implications of 
congenital blindness and deafness are not readily apparent. Plutarch, like Plato and 
Aristotle, believed that although infants born with severe congenital deformities were 
accidents of birth produced “contrary to nature,” they were nevertheless part of an 
ordered system. In a dialogue in Table-Talk, for instance, Plutarch’s Diogenianus argues 
that “in a way, even things contrary to nature are contained within nature.”119 Plutarch, 
moreover, recognized that philosophers and physicians could learn a great deal about 
nature by attempting to reconcile the apparent order of the universe with congenital 
deformity, the antithesis of that order. Indeed, in the same dialogue in Table-Talk, 
 90 
 
Diogenianus attempts to answer the question whether new diseases can suddenly come 
into existence by comparing them to monstrosities.120 “The writers of myths,” 
Diogenianus contends, attributing congenital deformity to astrological forces as Ptolemy 
would later do in Tetrabiblos, “are experts in [how things contrary to nature are actually 
contained within nature]; for all in all they say that unnatural and monstrous (terastia) 
living beings were produced during the battle of the gods and giants, when the moon was 
diverted from its course and did not rise in the same quarter as it is [otherwise] 
accustomed to do in accordance with the qualities with which it has been endowed.”121 
But those who argue that nature has the capacity to create new diseases, Diogenianus 
continues, “maintain that nature produces new diseases as if producing terata, without 
imagining a cause, either plausible or implausible, of this complete change, declaring, 
instead, that some ailment that is stronger and worse than ordinary manifestations of 
existing diseases is a completely novel and different type of disease.”122 Plutarch, then, 
understood well that exploring congenital deformity could provide valuable insights into 
how nature operates. 
Although it is impossible to understand why Plutarch did not delve further into 
the significance of congenital deformity, the time would come when thinkers during the 
eighteenth century, particularly Diderot and La Mettrie, would point to congenital 
deformity in challenging the mechanistic world view that originated in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. Diderot, as discussed in chapter 6, would demonstrate the irony in 
Plutarch’s use of blindness and deafness to prove his position with respect to matter and 
rationality, constructing a fictional account of the blind mathematician Nicholas 
Saunderson in his Letter on the Blind to impugn both the Christian and Deist views of 
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congenital deformity. Diderot, as well as the French authorities who imprisoned him for 
writing the Letter on the Blind, recognized that the existence of blindness and deafness 
could provide radical, materialist opponents of religion and even the idea of design with 
strong ammunition in their polemical war against what they considered to be outdated 
superstitions. If Plutarch had foreseen that materialists would use blindness and deafness 
in this manner, perhaps he would have used a different metaphor. 
Some modern observers might assume that both Greek and Roman philosophers 
would have been less likely than the superstitious masses to stigmatize congenital 
deformity. Yet some of the most brilliant minds in classical antiquity relied on their 
understanding of natural philosophy to reject the humanity of congenitally deformed 
people. In Plato’s Cratylus, for example, Socrates argues, 
It appears to me, at any rate, that it is right to call a lion’s offspring a lion and a 
horse’s offspring a horse. I am not speaking about some monster [teras], as for 
instance something that is born of a horse that is not a horse . . . . If, contrary to 
nature, a horse produces a calf, the natural offspring of a cow, it is called not a 
colt but a calf, nor, in my estimation, should any offspring born of a human that is 
not human itself be called a human. . . .123 
 
Shortly thereafter, Socrates further explains his ideas regarding “natural” and “unnatural” 
births, arguing that “a king will usually be born from a king, a good man from a good 
man, and a handsome man from a handsome man, and thus in all things; the offspring of 
each stock will be of the same stock, unless it is a monster [teras] that is born. . . .”124 In 
Generation of Animals, Aristotle likewise recognizes the inhumanity of congenitally 
deformed people, noting that  “sometimes [the offspring has deviated from its parents and 
ancestors] to such an extent that, ultimately, it does not even appear that a human being 
has been born but rather an animal only; indeed, they are called monsters [terata].”125  In 
Pro Murena, while Cicero does not go so far as to reject entirely the humanity of 
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congenitally deformed people, he does evince a belief that deformed people are 
aesthetically inferior to ordinary human beings. In that work, he criticizes Cato for his 
literal interpretation of Zeno’s teachings, including his claims that “wise men alone are 
handsome, even if they are as deformed as possible [distortissimi], rich, even if 
completely destitute, kings, even if reduced to slavery.”126 The implication of Cicero’s 
criticisms with respect to deformity is that it would be ridiculous to consider a deformed 
man handsome, no matter how much wisdom he possessed, because a deformed man is 
the antithesis of a handsome man, just as a destitute man is the opposite of a rich man and 
a slave is the opposite of a king.  
Hippocratic Physicians and Congenital Deformity: Critical of Superstition and 
Philosophy 
 
Hippocratic physicians added further complexity to ideas about congenital 
deformity in classical antiquity. The Hippocratic physicians followed philosophers in 
criticizing superstition in their attempts to advance the practice of medicine, but were 
likewise critical of philosophers. In fact, the Hippocratics waged a two-front, polemical 
war against both the superstitions of the masses and what they considered to be the wild 
speculations of philosophers.127 The most famous example of the Hippocratic struggle 
against superstition was On the Sacred Disease, which attacked the widely held belief 
among the Greeks that epilepsy was a “sacred disease” because of its seemingly 
inexplicable symptoms. In that text, the Hippocratic author attributes the sacred disease to 
nature, contending that although its “origin, like other diseases, is in accordance with 
heredity,” laypeople “consider it to be something divine because of their inexperience 
and its marvelous quality.” 128 According to the author, however, if the disease is “to be 
deemed divine because it is marvelous, there are many sacred diseases and not one, for I 
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will demonstrate that other diseases are no less marvelous and portentous/monstrous 
(teratōdea)” even though “no one considers them to be ‘sacred.’”129 “It seems to me,” the 
author surmises, “that those men who first made this disease ‘sacred’ were like the 
charlatans, purifiers, begging priests, and quacks of our day, those who pretend with 
vehemence to be religious and to know something to a greater extent.”130 Because these 
men could not offer effective remedies for the disease, they “wrapped themselves in a 
cloak of the divine and held the divine in front of themselves as a means of protection,” 
proclaiming that the disease was sacred.131   
Despite the author’s repeated attacks on superstition in On the Sacred Disease, it 
is important to recognize that neither he nor other Hippocratic physicians and writers 
rejected all religious modes of thought.132 The author of On the Sacred Disease, for 
instance, apparently did believe that something divine was ultimately responsible for the 
natural causes of disease. He argues that although “this disease called sacred comes into 
being from the same causes as the rest, from what comes to and goes away from [the 
body], from cold and sunshine, and from shifting winds which are never still,” such 
causes are themselves “divine.”133 In fact, one of author’s most poignant attacks on the 
charlatans who, in his view, tricked people into believing that the “sacred disease” had a 
divine cause is that their impious acts advanced the idea that “there are no gods.”134 The 
author, then, apparently believed that diseases were not contingent upon the will of some 
deity but rather an integral part of an ordered system of nature that was itself the product 
of the divine.135 The author of Decorum goes even further in connecting the gods to the 
medical art, contending that “most knowledge about the gods is woven into the mind by 
medicine.”136 The author then goes on to suggest, in language similar to the famous 
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observation of sixteenth-century surgeon Ambroise Paré that “I cared for him; God cured 
him,” that although “physicians may be the means, the gods are the cause, of cures in 
medicine and surgery. The gods confer this honor on medicine, and medical men must 
realize that the gods are their masters.”137   
Hippocratic physicians likewise rejected philosophical debates about the origins 
of human beings, concluding that such speculation could not provide meaningful insights 
into nature.138 In On Ancient Medicine, the Hippocratic author observes that “some 
physicians and philosophers say that it is not possible for someone who does not know 
what man is to know medicine.”139 The author rejects such an approach, contending that 
inquiries into the origin of human beings is the domain of philosophers, who, “like 
Empedocles or others, have written about nature and what man is from the beginning, 
both how he first came into being and from what he was put together.”140 He concludes 
that “however much philosophers or physicians have said or written about nature [is] as 
little a concern to the medical art as to painting” and that “there is no clear knowledge 
about nature from any source other than medicine.”141 These Hippocratic ideas proved to 
be so enduring in classical antiquity that many medical writers and physicians continued 
to proclaim for centuries that experience rather than speculation was the proper domain 
of medicine. According to Celsus, for instance, the Empirici argued that experience rather 
than rational, philosophical inquiry was the proper basis of medicine.142 Galen, likewise 
an admirer of Hippocrates, asserted that physicians were better equipped than 
philosophers to understand nature, criticizing the philosopher Asclepiades for having the 
audacity to argue with physicians about the function of the kidneys and bladder even 
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though it was unlikely that Asclepiades had ever observed someone suffering from 
kidney or bladder disease attempt to pass a stone.143  
 Hippocratic authors did, however, write about congenital deformity in accordance 
with their understanding of the medical art. The author of On the Sacred Disease 
suggests that the “sacred disease” is a congenital deformity stemming from an improper 
“purging” of the embryo’s brain.144 He likewise explains how, according to the 
Hippocratic understanding of humors, “some become hunchbacked (kuphoi)” when what 
is supposed to be purged from the brain in utero flows into the heart instead.145 In Airs 
Waters Places, the author discusses what he believed to be an example of the heritability 
of acquired deformity. Although it was once the custom of the Longheads, he claims, to 
lengthen the heads of their children, their deformities eventually “became natural (tēn 
physin egeneto).”146 It goes without saying that the Longheads would not suddenly have 
considered such deformities undesirable had they actually become congenital as the 
author claimed. Indeed, the author perspicaciously recognizes, as Garland would in the 
twentieth century when writing about disability in the classical world, that beauty is in 
the “eye of the beholder,” pointing out that the Longheads “deemed those with the 
longest heads to be the most noble.”147   
Congenital Deformity and Stigma Associated with Various Categories of Disabled 
People 
 
 Even if beauty was in the eye of the beholder, however, it was normal, able-
bodied Greeks and Romans who created the standard of beauty in the classical world. 
Accordingly, even people whose congenital deformities were not severe enough to be 
classified as monsters experienced considerable stigma and discrimination. Indeed, the 
Greeks and Romans constructed a variety of categories to denote people with disabilities, 
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many of which were congenital deformities. The dwarfs of classical antiquity perhaps 
best illustrate how these categories stigmatized those people with congenital deformities 
not necessarily serious enough to thrust them into the category of monsters. Aristotle, in 
fact, constructed a human/dwarf binary opposition to distinguish between humans and 
animals. For Aristotle, dwarfs were such a significant deviation from the natural human 
form that he defined all animals other than human beings as dwarfs.148  “As compared 
with man,” Aristotle proclaims in On Parts of Animals, “all other animals are 
dwarfish.”149 Aristotle even considered human children to be dwarfs because their bodies 
and limbs have not yet grown to their full potential.150 Aristotle’s human/dwarf binary 
opposition, like most binary oppositions, was not a value-neutral classification but rather 
one that rested on the idea that dwarfs were inferior to ordinary human beings. Indeed, 
Aristotle further asserts in On Parts of Animals that “all animals are more foolish than 
men” because they are dwarfish, reasoning that even with respect to human beings, 
“children, as compared to men, and dwarfs in the prime of life as compared to the natural 
form of others, lack intellect, even if they have some other extraordinary ability.”151   
Negative attitudes towards dwarfs were not only a component of natural 
philosophy but also colloquial discourse. The size of dwarf genitalia, for instance, 
fascinated natural philosophers and ordinary people alike. In History of Animals, 
Aristotle notes that both small mules and dwarfs have disproportionately large 
genitalia.152 The popularity of phallic dwarfs, statues of dwarfs with abnormally large 
penises, suggests that dwarf genitalia were just as intriguing to ordinary people not well 
versed in natural philosophy.153 Colloquial discourse likewise agreed with natural 
philosophers that dwarfs and extremely small people were inferior to people of normal 
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stature. According to Plutarch, the Spartan ephors reportedly “fined Archidamus for 
marrying a little woman,” because they believed that someone of her size would produce 
“not kings but tiny kings.”154 The imperial family of Rome also viewed dwarfs, along 
with other congenitally deformed people, as inferior. Not every emperor, however, 
interacted with dwarfs in the same way. Augustus preferred the company of “small boys” 
to deformed jesters because he “abhorred dwarfs, the deformed, and everything of the 
same sort as playthings of nature and ill omen.”155 Tiberius, by contrast, apparently saw 
nothing wrong with dwarf jesters. Tiberius, in fact, may have valued the opinion of such 
a jester. On one occasion, “a dwarf standing by a table among the jesters suddenly and 
loudly” asked Tiberius “why Paconius, charged with high treason,” was still alive.156 
Tiberius immediately rebuked the dwarf for his impudence but ordered the senate a few 
days later to expedite its decision about the appropriate punishment for Paconius.157    
Two other groups that constituted important categories in the disability discourse 
of classical antiquity were the deaf and dumb and the blind. Deafness and blindness, 
which the western world has traditionally viewed as related because each disability 
affects the senses,158 were particularly devastating to the Greeks, whose language and 
philosophy expressly equated hearing, speech, and sight with knowledge. In Being and 
Time, Heidegger famously recognized the importance of the ability to speak, which 
ordinarily would have required at least some limited capacity to hear in classical 
antiquity,159 for both the Greeks and their intellectual and cultural progeny when defining 
Dasein, “man’s Being,” as the “zōon logon echon” (animal having speech).160 The ability 
to speak was so important in classical antiquity that the anonymous author of the Life of 
Aesop considers the speechlessness of the seriously deformed Aesop to be his most 
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debilitating disability.161 In Cicero’s De Rerum Deorum, moreover, Balbus suggests that 
those people in classical antiquity familiar with Greek philosophy differentiated between 
gods and human beings, on the one hand, and animals, on the other, because the latter 
were dumb, unintelligent, and irrational.162   
Yet as both Epicharmus’ assertion that “‘mind has sight and mind has hearing,’ 
and ‘all else is deaf (kōpha) and blind (typhla)’” as well as Plutarch’s favorable recitation 
of it in Moralia suggest, sight was also inextricably intertwined with the Greek 
conception of knowledge, without which there could be no meaningful speech.163 The 
confrontation between Oedipus and the blind seer Tiresias in Sophocles’ Oedipus 
Tyrannus (Oedipus Rex), in fact, demonstrates that the Greeks viewed sight, hearing, and 
knowledge as related phenomena. After Tiresias informs Oedipus that it was he who 
killed Laius, Oedipus responds by calling Tiresias blind in his “ears, mind, and eyes.”164 
For Oedipus, sight is such an integral component of knowledge that a person can be 
“blind” with respect to both the ears and the mind. In fact, the Greek language itself 
suggested that there was a close connection between sight and knowledge. When a Greek 
said “I know” (oida), for example, he or she was literally saying “I have seen.”165 
Accordingly, most Greeks would have considered not only deafness and speechlessness 
but also blindness to be major impediments to the acquisition of knowledge, which the 
Greeks considered indispensable to living a normal, human existence.  
The Romans likewise equated hearing and speech with knowledge. In book five 
of De Rerum Natura, Lucretius discusses both deafness and dumbness when addressing 
the issue of whether one human being, supernaturally possessing the gift of language, 
could have taught language to other humans or whether language must have developed 
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incrementally over time with contributions from countless humans. Lucretius concludes 
that it would have been impossible for one person to have bestowed language on all of 
humankind because people with absolutely no ability to use various sounds as simple 
signifiers would not have been able to comprehend the hypothetical progenitor of 
language. According to Lucretius, “it is not easy to teach the deaf by any method or to 
attempt to persuade them to do what needs to be done.”166 Lucretius, of course, did not 
believe that there ever was a time when human beings did not possess at least a limited 
capacity to use sounds to communicate with one another. For Lucretius, the fact that even 
“dumb animals” are able to use different sounds to express simple emotions makes it 
almost a certainty that early human beings would have employed simple sounds for 
rudimentary communication.167 “If various emotions drive animals to utter various 
sounds,” Lucretius proclaims, “how much more likely is it that mortal men in the past 
would have been able to put identifying signs on different things through this or that 
sound!”168 In any event, Lucretius’ comparisons of hypothetical, speechless people to the 
deaf and dumb suggests that he did not believe that deaf and dumb people could 
realistically hope to possess ordinary, human knowledge, and thus that they could not 
experience normal, human existence. 
Negative stereotypes about deafness, dumbness, and blindness in classical 
antiquity, of course, extended beyond questions of epistemology. The most well-known, 
negative portrayal of deafness in antiquity is Herodotus’ depiction of Croesus’ deaf and 
dumb son as an unnatural prodigy whom his father could never accept.169 According to 
Herodotus, Croesus had two sons, his prized Atys and a deaf and dumb son whom 
Herodotus does not even name. Herodotus calls the anonymous son “malformed 
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(diephtharto), for he was deaf and dumb,” and claims that Croesus did not value him 
simply because of his disability.170 Croesus even told his able-bodied son Atys that he 
was his only son because “I do not consider the other one, malformed with respect to the 
sense of hearing, to be my son.”171 Yet it is difficult to tell exactly what Herodotus 
intends Croesus to mean by this seemingly harsh statement about his anonymous son. 
Indeed, Herodotus later suggests that Croesus might not have been such a coldhearted 
father to his disabled son, recounting how Croesus, before his defeat at the hands of the 
Persians, had reportedly “done everything for him,” including sending him to Delphi in 
an apparent attempt to find a cure.172   
Able-bodied society stigmatized blindness, meanwhile, by associating it with 
divine punishment even when a particular person’s blindness was not congenital. As 
Garland has demonstrated, the Greek tradition found examples of blindness as divine 
punishment in the works of both Homer and Hesiod, the two most influential poets of the 
early Greek period.173 In the Iliad, Homer explains how the muses became so enraged at 
the bard Thamyris for boasting that he could best them in a singing contest that they 
“maimed him [in the eyes] and, moreover, deprived him of his divine-sounding art of 
singing, and made him forget utterly the art of playing the cithara.”174 Not every Greek 
agreed that the blindness of Thamyris was the result of divine wrath. Pausanias stated his 
belief that Thamyris, like Homer himself, became blind after suffering from some type of 
disease.175 According to Apollodorus, Hesiod attributed the blindness of Tiresias to 
divine wrath. In Hesiod, Apollodorus observes, Tiresias found himself caught between 
Hera and Zeus in the midst of one of their legendary arguments, this time over whether 
men or women receive more pleasure during sexual intercourse. Zeus, the notorious 
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philanderer, predictably argued that intercourse is more pleasurable for women, while 
Hera vehemently disagreed. Tiresias, who had once been turned into a woman and thus 
had experienced intercourse as both a man and a woman, proclaimed that women receive 
greater pleasure. Hera was so furious with Tiresias for supporting Zeus that she struck 
him with blindness.176 The Greeks fashioned a host of other explanations for Tiresias’ 
blindness, as Apollodorus notes, but the common denominator of these myths was the 
idea that Tiresias’ blindness was the result of some type of transgression against the 
gods.177       
It is exceedingly difficult to assess the impact of these well-known incidents of 
blindness as divine punishment on classical disability discourse. Homer’s and Hesiod’s 
accounts may have contributed to the tradition that Stesichorus, the renowned Greek lyric 
poet, became blind after composing unflattering poetry about Helen.178 Their accounts 
may also have contributed to the notion that some blind people were inferior to sighted 
people, both morally and intellectually, because they were somehow responsible for their 
own wretched conditions. In Aristophanes’ Ecclesiazusae, for instance, Chremes tells 
Blepyrus about the time when the “blear-eyed Neocleides” attempted to speak before his 
fellow Athenians about how best to preserve the State. When Neocleides attempted to 
speak, Chremes explains, the people mocked him, shouting, “What a scandal that this 
man, who has not saved his eyesight for himself, would dare to speak in the assembly 
about the question of preserving the State.179 Neocleides, likely well inured to such abuse, 
ignored their taunts and proceeded to speak. Aristophanes, however, never gives his 
audience the opportunity to hear Neocleides’ advice. Instead, Blepyrus interjects, 
contending that, had he been present, he would have mocked Neocleides by telling him to 
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rub an ointment on his eyes every night, which was probably a contemporary treatment 
for people with certain afflictions of the eye.180 The Homeric and Hesiodic tradition, 
however, may have had a limited impact on Aristophanes’ prejudices against the blind. 
Neocleides may simply be a comical representation of Athenian prejudices about the 
diminished intelligence of blind people. Aristophanes’ characterization of Neocleides as a 
blind fool is so pronounced, after all, that Benjamin Bickley Rogers’ translation rightly 
refers to Neocleides as an “oaf” on more than one occasion.181 Yet it remains a distinct 
possibility that the Homeric and Hesiodic tradition of blaming the blind for their own 
misfortunes could have reinforced the type of negative stereotypes about blindness and 
intelligence that permeate Aristophanes’ Ecclesiazusae. 
The Homeric and Hesiodic precedents of blindness as manifestations of divine 
wrath may also have helped, paradoxically, to lay the foundation for the idea in classical 
antiquity that some blind people possessed extraordinary powers of divination and 
uncanny intelligence. According to Apollodorus’ rendition of Hesiod, for example, Zeus 
compensated Tiresias for his blindness by endowing him with unprecedented prophetic 
powers. In book eleven of the Odyssey, although Homer does not broach the subject of 
the cause of Tiresias’ blindness, Tiresias retains his remarkable divination abilities even 
in death. When Odysseus travels to the underworld, Tiresias informs Odysseus that he 
and his comrades may be able to return home one day even though Poseidon is angry at 
Odysseus for having blinded his son Polyphemus.182 Later poets, of course, built upon 
this tradition, incorporating the blind Tiresias into their works. The most famous is 
undoubtedly Sophocles’ Oedipus Tyrannus, in which Tiresias appears to inform Oedipus 
of the horrible fate that awaits him.183 Tiresias also demonstrates his extraordinary 
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powers of divination in Eurpides’ Bacchae, in which he warns Pentheus against 
blaspheming the new god Dionysius.184   
   Examples of actual blind people, of course, almost certainly contributed to the 
idea in classical antiquity that some blind people possessed marvelous intellectual 
capabilities. The Greeks and Romans, after all, believed that Homer was blind.185 Homer 
was so ubiquitous in classical antiquity, moreover, that he served as a constant reminder 
to the Greeks and Romans that some blind people could possess prodigious minds.186 Dio 
Chrysostom’s Callistratus, for example, quips that both Homer and Homer’s blindness 
were so famous in classical antiquity that “all these [poets] are blind, and they do not 
believe that it is possible to become a poet otherwise.”187 Diderot, meanwhile, later 
maintained that Tiresias himself was a historical figure who had exhibited uncanny 
intelligence: “For what was Tiresias, who had penetrated the secrets of the gods, but a 
blind philosopher whose memory has been handed down to us by fable?”188 Homer and 
Tiresias, assuming that Diderot was correct in his assessment of the renowned Greek 
seer, were not the only blind people in classical antiquity to impress the sighted. We have 
already seen that Appius Claudius Caecus was famous throughout the Roman world for 
having saved the Romans from entering into an ignominious peace agreement with 
Pyrrhus of Epirus.189 In his Tusculanae Disputationes, moreover, Cicero discusses the 
mental abilities of his blind friend and mentor, the Stoic Diodotus, who lived with Cicero 
for “many years.”190 Cicero expresses his amazement that Diodotus, a precursor to 
Nicholas Saunderson, the blind mathematician who became the fourth Lucasian Chair of 
Mathematics at Cambridge in 1711, was so intelligent that he was able to teach geometry 
to sighted students.191 It may have been his friendship with Diodotus that led Cicero to 
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defend the capabilities of the deaf and blind in book five of the dialogue Tusculanae 
Disputationes, just as Diderot’s friendship with the blind man of Puisaux enabled Diderot 
to explain the intellectual capabilities of educated blind people in his Letter on the Blind. 
In Tusculanae Disputationes, when Cicero points to Epicurus’ belief that the “wise man 
is always happy,” his interlocutor responds, “Even if he will be deprived of the senses of 
sight and hearing?”192 Cicero, setting aside his usual dislike of Epicurean ideas, responds 
that even deaf and blind people can be virtuous and happy because there are so many 
things that deaf and blind people can accomplish in spite of their disabilities.193 Yet 
Cicero does acknowledge that a deaf and blind person who also suffered from unbearable 
pain might be happier dead than alive.194 For Cicero, then, deafness and blindness were 
apparently afflictions that the deaf and blind could overcome to some extent, provided 
that fortune did not heap additional calamities upon them. 
Notwithstanding anomalies such as Diodotus, it is doubtful that able-bodied 
people in classical antiquity considered most ordinary blind people to have powers of 
divination or extraordinary intelligence. Indeed, as both the elder Seneca’s and the 
younger Seneca’s discussions about blindness demonstrate, blindness not only could 
disqualify a person from holding the priesthood but also accentuate a person’s mental 
shortcomings. In Seneca the Elder’s controversy, Metellus Caecatus, the priest Metellus 
loses his sight while saving the Palladium from a fire, which raises the question of 
whether the prohibition on disabled people acting as priests should disqualify him from 
remaining in the priesthood. If the Romans had considered all instances of blindness to be 
a direct link to the gods, there likely would have been no controversy at all because 
Metellus’ contemporaries would have seen his blindness as enhancing his ability to act as 
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an intermediary between the gods and mortals rather than question whether his disability 
was proof of divine disfavor.195 In one of his many epistles, meanwhile, Seneca the 
Younger demonstrates how an already mentally deficient person could seem even more 
stupid if she were to become blind. In that epistle, Seneca compares ordinary human 
ignorance to the example of his wife’s buffoon, whose blindness unquestionably 
exacerbates her stupidity. After expressing his displeasure with the Roman practice of 
keeping such prodigies as a means of entertainment, Seneca explains how the buffoon 
was unable to understand what had happened to her when she suddenly lost her sight.  
She was so moronic, Seneca claims, that she did not even “know that she was blind.”196 
Instead, she repeatedly asked for a new living arrangement because she believed that her 
home had become “shrouded in darkness.”197       
Two other prominent categories for disabled people in classical antiquity were 
hunchbacks and the lame, two distinct disabilities often viewed as related in the western 
tradition because people with kyphosis—the modern name for the condition that results 
in a humped back—can also be lame.198 Among the Greeks, the two figures that best 
exemplified able-bodied prejudices against hunchbacks suffering from concomitant 
lameness were Thersites, who chastises Agamemnon for dishonoring Achilles in book 
two of the Iliad, and the renowned Aesop, both of whom, according to Greek tradition, 
exhibited a number of unsightly deformities in addition to their hunchbacks and feeble 
legs. The literary depictions of Thersites and Aesop demonstrate that able-bodied people 
considered those afflicted with such serious deformities to be aesthetically inferior. 
According to Homer, Thersites was the “ugliest man who came beneath Ilium” because 
he “dragged one foot, being lame (chōlos) in one leg. His shoulders were hunched (kurtō) 
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and they were gathered around his chest. His head above was pointed (phoxos), and 
straggly, woolly hair sprouted therefrom.”199 The Life of Aesop characterizes Aesop in a 
similar manner, describing him as “a loathsome thing to see, unsound with regard to 
being a servant, pot-bellied, sugarloaf-headed, snub-nosed, swarthy, dwarfish, bandy-
legged, short-armed, squint-eyed, large-mouthed, [and] a portentous failure [of 
nature].”200   
It is difficult to determine whether Thersites’ deformities play any role in 
Odysseus’ decision to upbraid Thersites and to strike his back and shoulders with a staff 
for criticizing Agamemnon.201 Homer never gives any indication whatsoever that 
Odysseus is motivated by a disdain for the deformed. Indeed, when Odysseus defends 
Agamemnon and beats Thersites, he does not, as one might expect, mock his deformities. 
Instead, the object of Odysseus’ ire is merely the audacious insubordination that Thersites 
displays in speaking against Agamemnon. Although Thersites was unquestionably an 
ugly deviation from the able-bodied norm, Homer may have felt that it was unnecessary 
to mock his deformities in order to inflict emotional pain on him, even in the midst of a 
vehement disagreement.202 Still, however, Homer may well have foreseen that his 
audience would conclude that Thersites’ ugliness had exacerbated Odysseus’ anger over 
Thersites insubordination. There is no such ambiguity in the Life of Aesop, in which 
Aesop must endure numerous taunts because of his deformities. When Aesop attempts to 
help Xanthus interpret an omen, for example, the Samians reveal that they do not 
consider the deformed slave to be a normal human being, mocking him and repeatedly 
comparing him to various animals:  
And the Samians, seeing Aesop, laughed scornfully at him and exclaimed, “Bring 
another diviner so that this omen can be solved. This is a monster [teras] of 
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appearance! He is a frog, a hedgehog, or a wine-jar having a protruding hump, or 
a senior centurion of monkeys, or a molded flask, or the arsenal of a cook, or a 
dog in a wicker-basket.”203 
 
The author of the Life of Aesop, however, allows Aesop to retain his dignity in the face of 
those taunts. Indeed, Aesop repeatedly outwits those who mock him, demonstrating, at 
the very least, that the author of the Life of Aesop, as well as his readers, must have 
realized that congenital deformity alone does not diminish a person’s acumen. 
The literary depictions of Thersites and Aesop raise the interesting question of 
whether the ridicule that they endure makes them ridiculous figures. Gotthold Ephraim 
Lessing, the famed eighteenth-century philosopher and literary critic, brilliantly analyzes 
the relationship between the ridicule of the deformed and the ridiculous vis-à-vis 
Thersites and Aesop in Laocoon: An Essay upon the Limits of Painting and Poetry, one 
of the most important discussions of the two hunchbacks in the western corpus. For 
Lessing, the ridicule that permeates Homer’s account of Thersites corresponds to his 
ridiculousness, while the even more vicious ridicule in the Life of Aesop does nothing to 
detract from Aesop’s wisdom.204 Lessing views both Thersites and Aesop as ugly, of 
course, concluding that hunchbacks are “extreme” examples of ugliness.205 Yet for 
Lessing, Thersites is both ugly and ridiculous, while Aesop is merely ugly.206 Thersites is 
ridiculous, Lessing contends, because of “the ugliness of his person corresponding with 
that of his character, and both contrasting with the idea he entertains of his own 
importance, together with the harmlessness, except to himself, of his malicious 
tongue.”207 The “wise and virtuous Aesop,” by contrast, was never a ridiculous figure on 
account of his hunchback and revolting ugliness, even if various antagonists in the Life of 
Aesop ridiculed him.208 The Life of Aesop, in fact, leaves the reader with the distinct 
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impression that it is Aesop’s adversaries—those with perfect bodies but doltish and 
malicious minds—who are ridiculous because Aesop bests them at every turn.  
Different renderings of Thersites, Lessing rightly observes, could have detracted 
from the ridiculous. If, for example, Thersites’ able-bodied superiors had inflicted a 
particularly savage punishment on him, then he would cease to be ridiculous. If 
Agamemnon or Odysseus had responded to Thersites by killing him, “then we should 
cease to laugh at him.”209 Quintus Smyrnaeus’ Posthomerica, in which Achilles 
mercilessly kills Thersites after he slanders Achilles’ love for Penthesilea whom Achilles 
has just slain, and the earlier version of the tale that appears in Apollodorus’Epitome, are 
perhaps the best examples of Thersites as a pitiful rather than ridiculous figure.210 The 
“angry, murderous Achilles” of Posthomerica, Lessing proclaims, “becomes more an 
object of hate to me than the tricky, snarling Thersites” and the “shout of delight raised 
by the Greeks offends me.”211 Indeed, Lessing identifies more with Diomedes, who 
quickly draws his sword to defend his fallen kinsman, because “Thersites as a man is of 
my kin also.”212 According to Lessing, Thersites also could have lost his ridiculousness if 
he had succeeded in causing his fellow soldiers to rebel against their commanders, 
causing the destruction of the fleet and his fellow Achaeans. “Although harmless ugliness 
may be ridiculous,” Lessing observes, “hurtful ugliness is always horrible.”213   
The Greeks likewise stigmatized and discriminated against figures whose only 
disability was lameness. The most famous cripple in classical antiquity, the god 
Hephaestus, struggled to find acceptance among the able-bodied Olympians. As Zeus and 
Hera are about to come to blows in book one of the Iliad, for example, Hephaestus 
alleviates the tension merely by serving nectar to the gods because the sight of the lame 
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god laboring to serve the other gods is evidently such a comical sight that the gods cannot 
help but laugh. As Homer explains, “unquenchable laughter erupted among the blessed 
gods, as they saw Hephaestus bustling about through the hall.”214 In book eight of the 
Odyssey, the blind bard Demodocus reveals how poorly Hephaestus coped with being 
mocked by his fellow gods when he tells the story of how Hephaestus snared both his 
wife Aphrodite and her lover Apollo after catching them in flagrante delicto. Hephaestus, 
Demodocus explains, blamed the affair on his disability, lamenting that “Aphrodite, 
daughter of Zeus, always deems me unworthy because I lame (chōlon), and she loves 
destructive Ares because he is both handsome and swift-footed, whereas I was born 
halting (ēpedanos).”215 Hephaestus, overcome with sorrow and frustration at his sorry lot 
in life, then complains that “there is not anyone responsible [for my deformity] other than 
my two parents; would that they had never given birth to me.”216 In the Homeric Hymn to 
Pythian Apollo, moreover, Hera reveals that she, too, would have preferred not to have 
given birth to a deformed son. Hera laments the fact that Zeus was able to father Athena 
by himself, while Hera could produce only the cripple Hephaestus parthenogenesously. 
After rebuking Zeus for dishonoring her and their marriage, she explains how she tried to 
discard Hephaestus by throwing him into the sea. If Hera ever felt any sorrow for 
attempting to kill her son, she never shows it. In fact, she criticizes Thetis for rescuing 
Hephaestus, proclaiming that she would have preferred Thetis to have “offered another 
type of help to the gods.”217   
Crippled mortals likewise experienced considerable stigma and discrimination, 
even when they came from wealthy and powerful families. The lame Medon, the 
legendary first archon of Athens, faced opposition from his own family when he 
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attempted to secure his archonship. After the death of Codrus, the last king of Athens, his 
two eldest sons, Medon and Neileus, both sought the archonship. According to Pausanias, 
“Neileus asserted that he would not endure having Medon rule over him because Medon 
was lame in one of his feet.”218 The brothers thus decided “to refer the matter to the 
oracle at Delphi, and the Pythian priestess gave the Athenian kingdom to Medon.”219 
After Medon prevailed, Neileus did indeed refuse to allow his lame brother to rule over 
him, leaving Athens with the rest of his brothers to establish their own colony.220  
Several centuries later, the club-footed Agesilaus had to overcome similar 
prejudices in order to become king of Sparta. When Agesilaus was a child, few Spartans 
would have feared that they might one day have a lame king. Because Agesilaus’ older 
brother, Agis, was the rightful heir to the kingdom, as Plutarch notes in his Life of 
Agesilaus, “it was thought that Agesilaus would live as a private person.”221 Agesilaus’ 
family thus decided that he should receive the traditional Spartan education alongside 
other Spartan youths, notwithstanding his disability. As he received his education, some 
able-bodied Spartans began to realize that Agesilaus’ lameness would not prevent him 
from being a successful king. According to Plutarch, “the beauty of Agesilaus’ body, in 
the bloom of youth, concealed his maimed legs, and he bore this misfortune so easily and 
cheerfully, being the first to jest and mock himself, that he did more than a little to 
ameliorate his condition.”222 In fact, Plutarch claims that because Agesilaus “renounced 
no toil or undertaking on account of his lameness,” his disability “made his ambition 
more conspicuous.”223   
When Agis died, Sparta had to decide whether to bestow the kingdom on 
Leotychides, Agis’ son, or Agesilaus. Leotychides was confident that he would prevail 
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because, under Spartan law, the kingship should have gone to the son of the king.224 Agis, 
however, had long known that his wife, Timaea, had had an affair with Alcibiades and 
that Leotychides was not his legitimate heir.225 According to Xenophon, Agesilaus 
defended his own right to the kingship by reminding Leotychides that Agis had last had 
sexual intercourse with Timaea ten months before his birth, the night of a memorable 
earthquake.226  To make matters worse, Timaea secretly called her son Alcibiades, the 
name of his biological father, when they were in the company of her confidants.227 
Alcibiades, moreover, reportedly used to boast that he had seduced Timaea “so that his 
offspring would be kings of the Lacedaemonians.”228 As Plutarch explains in his Life of 
Lysander, Agis refused to accept Leotychides as his heir for many years, no doubt furious 
at Timaea for her betrayal.229 While Agis lay dying, however, Leotychides begged him to 
relent, and Agis, “having been moved by the entreaties of the young man himself as well 
as friends,” finally acknowledged Leotychides as his heir.230 Agis realized, of course, that 
many Spartans would continue to consider Leotychides a bastard and thus asked those 
present to spread word of his decision.231 
As the day approached when Sparta would have to decide whether to give the 
kingdom to a bastard or a cripple, the most eminent people in the kingdom chose sides. 
Lysander, the powerful Spartan general who had finally brought an end to the 
Peloponnesian War and had dismantled the Athenian democracy after having defeated 
the Athenians at sea, supported Agesilaus, his former lover, on the grounds that it was 
better to have a disabled king than an illegitimate king.232Meanwhile, the soothsayer 
Diopeithes, “filled with ancient powers of divination and thought to be remarkably wise 
about matters of religion,” supported Leotychides.233 Diopeithes “proclaimed that 
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customary law did not permit a lame man to become king of Lacedaemon, and read aloud 
the following oracle in the trial” to determine which of the two should be king: “beware 
now, Sparta, although you are boastful, lest you, swift of foot, bring forth a lame 
kingdom; for long will unexpected diseases and rolling waves of man-destroying war 
afflict you.”234  
Initially, it appeared that Diopeithes had proven himself to be a successful 
kingmaker, as “many Spartans, submitting to the oracle, were turned into supporters of 
Leotychides.”235 Yet Lysander, as capable as any Shakespearean devil of citing oracles 
for his purpose, deftly turned the cryptic warning against Leotychides, arguing that “it 
made no difference to the god [Apollo] if someone who stumbled because of his foot 
became king.”236 An able-bodied king, after all, could become lame through injury, and it 
was simply ridiculous to think that the gods would punish warlike Sparta for having an 
injured king.237 When the oracle had warned against allowing the “kingdom to become 
lame,” Lysander argued, Apollo was instructing the Spartans not to make Leotychides 
king because he “was neither lawfully begotten nor even a descendent of Heracles.”238 
Agesilaus and Lysander ultimately prevailed despite Spartan apprehensions about 
submitting to the rule of a lame king.239     
When even the lame sons of archons and kings experienced substantial stigma and 
discrimination on account of their disabilities, it is understandable that able-bodied 
Greeks would exclude ordinary lame people from performing certain functions in society. 
By the late fifth century B.C.E., for instance, Athenian law prohibited the disabled, 
including cripples, from holding an archonship, even though the first archon of Athens 
had been lame in one foot.240 In Lysias’ speech in defense of the lame man’s pension, the 
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lame man argues that if the Council were to determine that his lameness did not qualify 
him to be among the adunatoi (incapables or disabled ones), then he would be eligible to 
be archon. Indeed, if the Council refuses to classify him as disabled, he argues, “what 
hinders me from drawing lots to be one of the nine archons? . . . For surely, after this sum 
that has been granted to me has been taken away by you because I am able-bodied, the 
lawgivers will not hinder me from drawing lots because I am disabled.”241 It is 
impossible, of course, to know for certain why the Athenians withheld the archonships 
from cripples when Medon himself was lame. It is possible that the stigma associated 
with lameness, not to mention other disabilities, was so great that the Athenians 
overlooked their legendary ancestor when concluding that a lame man could not perform 
the functions of archon. 
There might not have been a Roman equivalent to Thersites or Aesop—legendary 
figures who were both hunchbacks and lame—but there were some intriguing parallels 
between the lives of hunchbacks and cripples in Greece and Rome. Clesippus, who, 
according to Pliny the Elder, was “a hunchback and repulsive in appearance in other 
ways as well” endured the same type of derision that permeates the Life of Aesop.  Like 
Aesop, Clesippus was a slave whom able-bodied people mocked because of his 
hunchback. When the wealthy Gegania purchased him, she threw a dinner-party where 
she paraded Clessipus, “having been stripped naked for the sake of mockery,” before her 
guests.242 At some point, Gegania, like the wife of Aesop’s master Xanthus, became 
sexually attracted to Clesippus and took him into her bed. Gegania appears not to have 
treated Clessippus as a bizarre sexual plaything but rather as a loving companion. She 
had such a strong bond with Clesippus, in fact, that she included him in her will, which 
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made Clesippus “outstandingly rich” when she died.243 Clesippus’ newfound riches, 
however, could not shield him from the disdain of some able-bodied people. Pliny, for 
instance, castigates Gegania for the “shamelessness of her lust” and claims that the tomb 
that Clesippus erected for his departed lover “kept alive the memory of shameful 
Gegania.”244   
Rome also had its own equivalent to Medon and Agesilaus, the crippled Claudius 
who managed to overcome Roman prejudices against disabled people to become 
emperor. Born with what was probably some type of neurological disorder that resulted 
in a limp and speech difficulties, Claudius learned at an early age that many able-bodied 
people would never consider him to be their equal. 245 Indeed, Claudius’ own family 
scorned him because of his congenital deformities. According to Suetonius, his mother 
“habitually called him a portent of a man, not fully developed by nature, but only 
begun.”246 His grandmother “always had the utmost contempt for him, speaking to him 
only rarely. . . .”247  His family was so ashamed of Claudius, in fact, that they attempted 
to conceal his deformities when he appeared in public. When, for example, he and his 
brother, the famed Germanicus, presided over the gladiatorial games in memory of their 
father, Claudius appeared “wearing a cloak because of the condition of his body.”248 In 
addition, “on the day that he received the toga of manhood, he was brought in a litter to 
the Capitol around midnight without the customary ceremony.”249   
Claudius understandably bristled over such ignominious treatment and became 
increasingly dejected as his family deprived him of the opportunity to hold public office. 
When he reached the age of maturity, Suetonius explains, “he was considered unfit for 
public and private duties.” 250 Indeed, even after he had reached the age of majority, his 
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family forced him to live for quite some time “under the tutelage of a guardian,” a 
patronizing existence about which Claudius complained in one of his short books.251 It is 
hardly a surprise, then, that when Claudius’ sister heard a rumor that he would “someday 
be emperor, she openly and loudly attempted to avert such an unfavorable and 
underserved fortune from befalling the Roman people by offering an utterance of entreaty 
to the gods.”252 
Over time, however, Claudius demonstrated enough ability that some members of 
his family had to reconsider whether he was fit for public office. In a series of three 
letters to Claudius’ grandmother, Augustus discusses the issue at some length. “Now each 
of us agrees,” writes Augustus, “that we must decide once and for all what plan we 
should follow with respect to [Claudius]. For if he is sound in mind and body, which is to 
say sound in all respects, why should we doubt that he should be advanced through the 
same junctures and steps through which his brother was advanced?”253 Augustus then 
reveals that one of his primary concerns in coming to a resolution was to protect his 
family, including Claudius himself, from the jeers of the public who, in Augustus’ 
estimation, would think that it was ridiculous to allow a congenitally deformed man to 
participate in public life. “But if we recognize that he is inferior and disabled with respect 
to the soundness of both his body and mind,” Augustus maintains, “the material for 
deriding both him and us must not be provided to men accustomed to mocking and 
sneering at such things.”254   
Augustus does not decide in the exchange of letters how best to deal with the 
situation which, in his words, had left his family “always fluctuating between hope and 
fear.”255 He does, however, write that although he was not against Claudius being in 
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charge of “the dining-room of the priests at the games of Mars,” provided that he listened 
to the advice of his family in order to avoid doing anything that would make it possible 
for him “to be seen or to be derided,” he disapproved of Claudius sitting near Augustus 
and the rest of the family at the games of the Circus out of fear that his deformities would 
be too visible.256 Augustus and his family ultimately decided to keep Claudius from 
holding any meaningful public position, permitting him to hold only “the office of the 
augural priesthood.”257 After the death of Augustus, Claudius’ uncle, emperor Tiberius, 
likewise excluded Claudius from holding public office.258 As might have been expected, 
Claudius eventually gave up hope of ever attaining a meaningful public position and 
“surrendered to idleness.”259  
Yet Claudius was astute enough to maintain the support of large segments of the 
public despite his deformities and unhappy retreat into a life of drinking and gambling. 
According to Suetonius, even after Claudius began to drink and gamble excessively, he 
“never lacked either help from individuals or respect from the public.”260 The equestrian 
order twice made him its patron, and its members were accustomed “to rising to their feet 
as a show of respect and to taking off their cloaks when he appeared at public shows.”261 
The senate likewise paid its respect to Claudius, appointing him to be a member of the 
cult of Augustus, a position that was ordinarily assigned by lot.262 After Tiberius’s death, 
emperor Caligula, Claudius’ nephew, attempted to benefit from Claudius’ popularity and 
finally gave Claudius an opportunity to participate in public affairs, allowing him to serve 
alongside him as consul for two months.263 Claudius again held the consulship four years 
later. Just as Caligula had hoped, Claudius’ entrance into public affairs was popular with 
the people. When Claudius “sometimes presided at public shows in place of Caligula, the 
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people shouted, ‘Good fortune’ not only ‘to the uncle of the emperor’ but also ‘to the 
brother of Germanicus!’”264   
Claudius’ consulships and popularity with the people, however, could never 
remove the stigma of living as a congenitally deformed man in an able-bodied society. 
The emperor’s uncle and brother of Germanicus thus “continued to live on beset by 
insults.”265  Like Hephaestus, Claudius was particularly vulnerable to insults while dining 
with his able-bodied associates. According to Suetonius, Claudius endured two separate 
types of ridicule during dinner. First, “if he arrived at dinner a little after the proper time, 
he was not received unless he walked feebly (aegre) around the entire dining-room.”266 
Suetonius does not explain exactly how this amounted to an insult, but he likely intended 
his readers to infer that the able-bodied people present in the dining-room would mock 
Caudius’ limping gait, just as the able-bodied Olympians laughed as Hephaestus bustled 
about the dining hall to serve them nectar.267 There would be no reason, after all, to force 
Claudius to limp around the entire dining-room unless his able-bodied associates 
considered the forced trek to be not only ridiculous but humiliating to Claudius.268 
Second, “whenever he fell asleep after a meal, which almost always used to happen to 
him, he was bombarded with stones of olives and dates, and occasionally he was 
awakened by jesters with a stick or a whip, as if it were a sport.”269 It was also 
commonplace for “slippers to be put on his hands as he snored so that he might rub 
himself with them after having been suddenly awoken.”270 
After the assassination of Caligula, few would have considered Claudius to have 
had any chance of becoming emperor. Yet Claudius benefited from his two greatest 
strengths—his popularity with the public and his intelligence—in his meteoric rise to 
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power. On the night of the assassination, so the story goes, a soldier found Claudius 
hiding behind a curtain and proclaimed him to be emperor.271 If Claudius had not been so 
popular with the public, he might have been killed along with Caligula. His popularity 
alone, however, would not have been enough to enable him to take action against 
Caligula’s assassins while, at the same time, securing his hold on power. Only a shrewd, 
intelligent politician could have navigated through that political morass, and Claudius 
was without question such a politician. Even before Caligula had given Claudius an 
opportunity to gain practical experience in political affairs, Augustus had recognized 
Claudius’ intellectual capabilities, marveling in his letters to Claudius’ grandmother that 
a person so awkward in everyday conversation could so thoroughly transform himself 
into an accomplished orator when declaiming on weighty topics.272 Augustus apparently 
did not understand that the way that the imperial family treated Claudius on account of 
his deformities would almost certainly have resulted in his awkward personality in social 
gatherings. In any event, Claudius masterfully used his intellect and political savvy to 
convince both the senate and the army to submit to the rule of a deformed emperor, at 
least until his own assassination at the hands of his wife.273 
Classical Solutions to the Disability Problem: Infanticide, Public Assistance, and 
Begging 
 
 Just as there was no dominant view about the causes of congenital deformity in 
classical antiquity, there was no dominant approach to solving what able-bodied society 
considered to be the disability problem. Attempts to address the disability problem in 
classical antiquity, of course, often differed significantly from modern approaches. While 
most people today would turn to doctors to find treatments and cures for disabilities, 
medicine had not yet advanced enough to offer meaningful treatments, let alone cures, for 
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most chronic disabilities.274 The Hippocratic author of On Joints, for example, did offer 
some advice about treating hunchbacks but acknowledged that there was little hope of 
actually “curing” severe cases.275As Nicholas Vlahogiannis has observed, this left divine 
intervention and magic as the only viable options when seeking a cure for a particular 
affliction.276 Indeed, if the gods could afflict mortals with certain disabilities, it followed 
that the gods could miraculously cure them.277  
The Greeks originally attributed healing powers to Apollo and later to his son 
Asklepios.278 The Hippocratic Oath begins with an invocation to both Apollo and 
Asklepios,279 and temples of Asklepios were popular throughout the Greek-speaking 
world.280 In Aristophanes’ Plutus, for instance, the visually impaired Neocleides and a 
host of others wait outside the Temple of Aesclepius in search of a cure for their 
disabilities and illnesses.281 But healing powers were not the sole domain of Apollo and 
his progeny.282 According to the Life of Aesop, which prominent Aesop scholar B.E. 
Perry once described as a “naïve, popular, and anonymous book, composed for the 
entertainment and edification of the common people rather than for educated men, and 
making little or no pretense to historical accuracy or literary elegance,”283 Isis cures 
Aesop of his speechlessness for showing pious kindness to one of her priestesses.284 The 
Romans likewise believed that the gods, including Asklepios, whom they called 
Aesculapius, could cure portentous afflictions, whether in the form of disabilities or 
pestilence.285 During a pestilence so severe that the Romans began to consider it a 
portent, Livy recorded that the soothsayers attempted to use the Sibylline Books to 
determine “what end or what remedy was provided by the gods for this evil,” ultimately 
concluding that “Aesculapius had to be summoned from Epidaurus to Rome.”286 
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Although the consuls could not take immediate action because they were “occupied with 
war,” the Romans did observe “a one-day supplication to Aesculapius” in an effort to 
alleviate their sufferings.  
Yet despite the importance of miracles in classical antiquity, there is little 
evidence that either the Greeks or the Romans viewed such miraculous healing as a 
potential solution to a societal disability problem. Classical discussions of miraculous 
healing, for instance, are silent about the capacity of healing shrines to lessen the burden 
of caring for disabled members of the community. Instead, both the Greeks and Romans 
sought various solutions to the disability problem that differed from culture to culture.  
Greek Solutions: Infanticide and Athenian Public Assistance 
Some Greeks believed that society could substantially lessen its burden of having 
to care for the disabled by killing seriously deformed infants. Although widespread 
infanticide could not alleviate the burden of caring for those who became disabled later in 
life through disease, military injuries, or accidents, a society that practiced infanticide 
against seriously deformed infants could better allocate its limited resources to those 
whom it deemed productive members of the community.287 Sparta famously chose this 
approach by adopting the legendary law code of Lycurgus, which ordered the Spartans to 
kill their congenitally deformed infants by flinging them into a deep chasm. According to 
Plutarch’s Life of Lycurgus, the law code required a Spartan father to bring his infant 
before “the elders of the tribes who, acting as judges, observed the infant.”288 If the infant 
was “well formed and strong,” it could take its place among other well-born Spartans.289 
“If it was ill born and deformed,” Plutarch notes, “it was sent off to what is called the 
Apothetae, an abyss-like place near Mount Taÿgetus,” in the belief that “it was good 
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neither for the infant itself nor the state” to rear an infant “not well born from the very 
beginning for good health and bodily strength.”290 Martha Rose, however, has rightly 
cautioned scholars not to assume that infanticide was as common as our ancient sources 
seem to suggest.291 Indeed, the reign of the club-footed, Spartan king Agesilaus suggests 
one of two things about the practice of Spartan infanticide. First, the Spartans may not 
have considered all deformities equally deleterious to the state. Instead, they may have 
interpreted the law code to mandate the killing only of infants with serious congenital 
deformities, not relatively minor deformities such as club-foot. Second, as king of Sparta, 
Agesilaus’ father, Archidamus, may have been able to protect his son from the mandate 
to kill congenitally deformed infants. In any event, that mandate remained one of the 
most draconian methods of dealing with the disability problem in classical antiquity. 
Some of Athens’ most accomplished philosophers advocated for the Spartan 
model of killing deformed infants. In the Theaetetus, Plato’s Socrates supports the 
practice of exposing infants “not worthy of rearing.”292 Aristotle, meanwhile, supported a 
mandate to kill deformed offspring, proclaiming in Politics that “concerning exposure 
and the rearing of children born, let there be a law that not one deformed child be 
reared.”293 Plato and Aristotle, however, seemingly recognized that there was some 
opposition in Athens to such practices. In the Theaetetus, for instance, Socrates wonders 
if Theaetetus believes that “it is necessary to rear your offspring and not expose it” and 
asks him whether he will “bear to see it examined, and not be exceedingly angry if even 
your first-born is taken away from you.”294 As Garland has pointed out, Socrates’ 
questioning of Theaetetus may reflect the hesitation of Athenian parents to expose their 
first-born.295 Garland further observes that “[t]he fact that Aristotle found it necessary to 
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recommend that there should be a law” to  prohibit the rearing of deformed children 
“demonstrates that some parents were inclined, albeit deplorably in his view, to rear 
them.”296 
Athens thus had to devise a means of dealing with a disability problem 
exacerbated by its refusal to mandate the killing of congenitally deformed infants. 
Disabled people likely relied on informal networks that facilitated begging regardless of 
the city-state in which they dwelled.297 Athens, however, took the additional step of 
providing public assistance to some disabled people.298 Solon himself may have 
established the precedent of providing aid to the disabled. Heraclides, Plutarch explains 
in his Life of Solon, claimed that Solon had secured public assistance for Thersippus, a 
soldier who had been “maimed.”299 Heraclides further observed that Peisistratus had later 
issued a general decree based on Solon’s specific one, ordering that “those maimed in 
war be maintained at the public expense.”300 At some point, the Athenians enacted a 
similar law that provided public assistance for disabled civilians who did not have 
sufficient financial means to support themselves or their families.301 It is impossible to 
know for certain whether the law for disabled civilians was an expansion of Solon’s and 
Peisistratus’ decrees for maimed soldiers, but Garland seems to be on solid ground when 
suggesting that there may have been some connection between the two related types of 
public assistance.302 Indeed, even if the public assistance law for disabled civilians was 
not a direct expansion of Solon’s and Peisistratus’ decrees, Athenian lawmakers may 
have been aware that they were doing for disabled civilians what Athens had already 
done for disabled veterans. 
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 Uncertainties about the Athenian public assistance law for disabled civilians 
extend beyond what jurists today would call its legislative history. The particulars of the 
law itself remain obscured by three somewhat contradictory texts written between the late 
fifth century B.C.E. and the first half of the third century B.C.E. The famed orator Lysias 
wrote the first, a speech, sometime around 403 B.C.E. in defense of a disabled man 
accused of wrongfully receiving public assistance.303 Lysias acted as the disabled man’s 
speechwriter, using his formidable skills to construct an argument that would give the 
disabled man his best chance of swaying the Athenian Council to permit him to keep his 
pension. According to the speech that the disabled man himself would have delivered 
before the Council, there was a two-part eligibility test under Athenian law: a person (1) 
had to be classified as adunatos (incapable or disabled) and (2) had to be relatively poor. 
This two-part test is plainly evident when the disabled man, in addressing the accusations 
against him, notes, “The accuser says that I receive my small, fixed sum of money from 
the city unjustly; for he says that I am able-bodied (tō sōmati dynasthai) and not one of 
the incapables (adunatoi) and that I am skilled enough in a craft that I can live without 
this grant.”304 I thus disagree with Rose who contends that what qualified someone to be 
among the adunatoi was being disabled or having “very little wealth.”305 The disabled 
man then goes on to argue that not only his use of “two canes” but also the fact that he 
sometimes mounts horses to facilitate travel demonstrate that he is indeed an 
incapable.306 He further contends that his inability to purchase his own mule, which 
forces him to borrow other people’s horses when he needs to travel somewhere, is proof 
that his craft is not lucrative enough to disqualify him from receiving his grant.307 The 
law that emerges from the speech, then, appears to be one that provided supplemental 
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income to people classified among the incapables if they were not fortunate enough to 
practice a craft that would permit them to live without public assistance. 
The Constitution of Athens, written by Aristotle or one of his followers in the 
330s,308 provided a grant, which by this time was two obols per day, to incapables who 
were not able to perform any work whatsoever. According to The Constitution of Athens, 
“the Council examines the incapables (tous adunatous); for there is a law which requires 
the Council (1) to examine those who have acquired less than three minae and have been 
incapacitated with respect to the body to such an extent that they are unable to do any 
work at all and (2) to give each of them two obols per day for food at the public 
expense.”309 In the third century, Philochorus referred to the same provision of Athenian 
law, which at that time granted five obols per day, likewise defining the incapables as 
those “who have been smitten in some part of the body to such an extent that they are 
unable to do any work.”310    
Because one of the primary functions of historians is to try to document changes 
over time, it might be tempting for some historians to question whether an amendment to 
Athenian law was responsible for the obvious discrepancies between the three different 
descriptions of the law’s eligibility requirements, namely Lysias’ suggestion that disabled 
people could receive a pension even if they were able to perform some work as opposed 
to the law as described by The Constitution of Athens and Philochorus, which provides 
assistance only to disabled people completely unable to work. Without the discovery of 
additional sources from the fourth century B.C.E., however, it is perhaps impossible to 
resolve such a question. Although it is possible that the Athenians amended their public 
assistance law during the fourth century B.C.E. to prohibit disabled people who could 
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perform some work from receiving a pension, scholars should be wary of too readily 
accepting everything in Lysias’ speech at face value. Just as few people today would 
consider a lawyer’s remarks about a particular law in the context of representing his or 
her client to be an accurate portrayal of that law, so too should scholars recognize that 
Lysias may have taken some liberties with the law when representing the disabled 
pensioner. Lysias, for example, may have been attempting to bypass the technicalities of 
the law’s eligibility requirements by appealing to the Council’s pity for the disabled 
despite no precedent of the Council actually disregarding those requirements. The 
disabled man does, in fact, refer in the speech to the Council’s tendency to “show the 
utmost pity” even “to those having no misfortune.”311 It is equally possible, however, that 
the Council may have traditionally disregarded the technical provisions of the law in 
pursuit of providing aid to those who truly needed it. Indeed, while a de jure 
interpretation of the law in Lysias’ day may well have required the Council to withhold 
public assistance from incapables who were able to perform some work, the de facto 
execution of the law may have been grounded in the concept of what jurists today call 
equity. If that were the case, then Lysias may simply have been following ordinary 
protocol by appealing to the Council’s pity. The only thing that we can know for certain 
is that the Athenians considered public assistance to the disabled to be so important that 
they provided a “treasurer for [the incapables] appointed by lot.”312  
Roman Solutions: Infanticide and Private Charity 
The Romans, like the Greeks, dealt with the disability problem, in part, by 
experimenting with infanticide. According to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, although 
Romulus forbade Roman parents to kill their children under the age of three in an effort 
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to increase the size and power of Rome, he made an exception for “any child that was 
maimed or a monster (teras) from the moment of birth.”313 Romulus reportedly did 
specify, however, that parents could not kill a congenitally deformed infant or a disabled 
child until they showed the child “to five men who lived nearest to them and gained their 
approval.”314 Garland has rightly pointed out that it is “highly questionable” whether such 
a law actually existed, noting that Dionysius’ observation “is based on no known source, 
was written seven centuries after the event it describes, and is not supported by any other 
author.”315 Nevertheless, it remains a distinct possibility that Roman infanticide laws of 
later periods grew out of earlier infanticide laws like the one described by Dionysius.     
 In any event, around the middle of the fifth century, the Romans went far beyond 
the purported policy of Romulus by enacting Table IV of the Twelve Tables, which 
mandated the killing of congenitally deformed infants.316 It is unclear, however, how 
widespread the killing of congenitally deformed infants was in the Roman world. The 
Romans, after all, may have disregarded the mandate of the Twelve Tables to give fathers 
some discretion in determining whether to kill their congenitally deformed infants. As 
John Boswell points out in The Kindness of Strangers, the existence of Roman statutes or 
decrees “does not mean that they are enforced, or even taken seriously. . . .”317 In De 
Legibus, Cicero suggests that some Romans actually did kill their congenitally deformed 
infants in accordance with that infanticide provision, comparing the law establishing “the 
power of the tribunes of the plebeians” to physical deformity, proclaiming that a period 
of civil unrest ushered in by the tribunes “had been killed quickly, just as the Twelve 
Tables establishes for deformed infants.”318 By the time that Seneca the Elder began to 
write his Controversiae in the first half of the first century C.E., it appears that many 
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Romans did indeed kill their congenitally deformed infants. In that dialogue, Clodius 
Turrinus claims that “many fathers customarily expose useless (inutiles) offspring,” 
explaining that  “a certain number of them are born right from the start mutilated in some 
part of the body, weak, and unfit for having any hope, whose parents throw them out 
more than expose them.”319 Seneca the Younger, son of Seneca the Elder, suggests in De 
Ira that his generation of Romans continued to kill congenitally deformed infants with 
alacrity, explaining that “portentous offspring we annihilate, even if they are free; if they 
have been born weak and monstrous, we drown them.”320 If Phlegon of Tralles’ account 
of a monstrous birth is accurate, moreover, the Romans continued to kill infants with 
severe congenital deformities during the reign of Trajan. “In Rome,” Phlegon claims, “a 
certain woman brought forth a two-headed baby, which on the advice of the sacrificing 
priests was cast into the River Tiber.”321 
Notwithstanding these important observations about infanticide, a lack of 
additional sources makes it difficult to draw concrete conclusions about the killing of 
congenitally deformed infants in Roman history from one generation to the next. It does 
appear that the Romans, at some point, backed away from the draconian mandate of 
Table IV of the Twelve Tables but continued to permit fathers to kill their congenitally 
deformed infants if they determined that the family would be better off without a 
deformed family member.322 As Boswell has suggested, moreover, Roman families 
almost certainly abandoned their children at times instead of killing them.323 Beyond that, 
however, we can only speculate about the evolution of the Roman practice of killing and 
abandoning congenitally deformed infants.324 
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A lack of sources likewise makes it difficult to uncover Roman efforts to extend 
charity to disabled people. Garland has rightly observed that there is “very little evidence 
to suggest that the disabled received any public welfare in the Roman world.”325 There is 
evidence, however, that some Romans grappled with both practical and moral issues 
associated with extending charity to disabled people as a means of dealing with the 
disability problem. Perhaps the best discussion of these issues is the elder Seneca’s 
debate over what Garland has called a “hypothetical” law, which would have provided a 
one-time payment to blind men.326 The debate begins with a recitation of the law, which 
provides, “Let a blind man receive one thousand denarii from the public.”327 It then 
discusses the underlying facts of the hypothetical controversy as if the controversy had 
actually occurred. Ten young men, Seneca explains, squandered their financial resources 
and decided to draw lots to determine which one would be blinded by the others. The 
unlucky young man was then supposed to distribute equal shares to his associates. After 
they drew lots and blinded the unfortunate young man against his will, however, they 
learned that the state would not reward such behavior.328 
 Once he establishes the facts of the case, Seneca turns to the ultimate question of 
whether such a law providing assistance to blind people in all cases would be bad public 
policy or a moral imperative. The primary reason that such a law could be bad public 
policy, Seneca argues, is the possibility that it could encourage people to blind 
themselves or others in an attempt to receive the payment. Seneca warns that the young 
blind man will not be “the only one who pursues alms, but the first” and contends that “it 
is more advantageous to the Republic for one blind man to be spurned than for nine men 
to be blinded.”329 “What a law; if it blinds men,” Seneca concludes, “it should be 
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repealed.”330 Even while discussing the drawbacks of the law, however, Seneca felt that it 
was necessary to discuss what he seemingly believed was the moral imperative of helping 
disabled people who were honest and deserving of aid.331 Although Seneca reminds his 
readers that “the Republic consoles infirmity—it does not purchase it,” he proclaims, “I 
shall feed the man who is being fed because of his infirmity; I shall not feed the man who 
becomes infirm because he needs alms to eat.”332  When he turns to presenting the other 
side of the argument, Seneca comes even closer to suggesting that society has a moral 
obligation to help the disabled who are too poor to support themselves. He acknowledges 
that the young man should pursue some type of legal remedy against his former 
associates, particularly because they diabolically arranged the lots to ensure that fate 
would “choose” him to be blinded. But Seneca remains concerned that the young man 
will have no means of sustenance while pursuing such a remedy unless he receives some 
kind of assistance. Seneca thus declares, “We shall see [whether the young man can 
prevail in a legal dispute against his former associates]; first, let him have something by 
which he might live.”333 According to this side of the controversy, even though the young 
man was clearly complicit in the plot to bilk the state of a thousand denarii, he is still a 
blind man in dire need of assistance.  
Although Seneca never resolves the controversy, the two opposing positions that 
he takes during the debate illustrate what a quandary the disability problem posed for 
Romans. If the state had provided public assistance to the disabled, there obviously 
would have been some opportunists who would have attempted fraudulently to abuse the 
system. Just as many opponents of welfare programs in the modern world undermine 
support for aid to the poor and disabled by pointing to examples of fraud, Seneca 
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recognized that Roman fears of fraud and abuse would present a significant obstacle for 
anyone in favor of allocating public resources to the disabled unconditionally. If the 
Romans had created a public assistance program for the disabled, then, they likely would 
have felt the need to create a bureaucracy to determine who was truly eligible and who 
was attempting to receive a pension fraudulently.   
The Romans attempted to deal with the problem, instead, by relying on a system 
of begging and private charity that amounted to a reconciliation of Seneca’s two different 
positions. That system could potentially prevent fraud by relying on the supervision of 
the local networks that facilitated begging while still providing aid to disabled people 
who could not survive without it. That such a system existed is evident in Seneca’s 
controversy, Mendici Debilitati, a dialogue that discusses the case of a man who 
mutilated abandoned children so that he could profit from their misfortune. Everyone in 
the dialogue assumes that he has reduced the children to a life of begging because they 
apparently associate disabled people—or at least disabled children—with begging. 
Cestius Pius, for example, says that none of the mutilated children whom he is 
representing have asked him to plead their case; “for what do wretched people know to 
ask for except alms?”334 In addition, Triarius seems to suggest that wealthy Romans feel, 
or at least should feel, a moral obligation to provide alms to poor disabled people when 
he says, “You have learned from experience, I think, that we are not cruel; yet every one 
of us, on every occasion that we offered alms to these wretched children, prayed for their 
deaths.”335 
Some Romans, however, may have recognized that state intervention, at least 
under extraordinary circumstances, was necessary to deal with the disability problem. 
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Severus Alexander, for example, had to find something to do with a large contingent of 
disabled people left over from the court of Elagabalus, his eccentric predecessor. Once 
Severus Alexander came to power, he decided to give the disabled entertainers—“male 
and female dwarfs” and “fools”—to the people.336 Yet there still remained a large number 
of disabled people whom Severus Alexander considered useless, apparently because they 
lacked entertainment value. He wanted to rid his court of such a motley contingent by 
dispersing them back into society but recognized that no single community could absorb 
so many disabled beggars without enduring substantial economic hardship. As 
Lampridius would later explain, Severus Alexander sent those disabled people who 
needed alms to separate communities “so that no single community would be burdened 
by this sort of beggar.”337 He thus used the power of the state to enable the Empire as a 
whole to absorb the costs of reintegrating the disabled people of Elagabalus’ court back 
into society rather than burdening one or two local communities with administering alms 
to them.   
The Disability Problem and Increased Stigma Associated with Disability 
Debates that focused on finding solutions to the disability problem, as one might 
expect, contributed to the stigma and discrimination associated with disability. Cultures 
that viewed infanticide as a means of dealing with the disability problem obviously 
stigmatized and discriminated against congenitally deformed people in a particularly 
dangerous way. Although the primary impetus for Sparta’s mandate to kill deformed 
infants as well as the similar requirement under Table IV of the Twelve Tables was 
almost certainly a desire to protect the state’s limited resources from people with serious 
congenital deformities, some Spartans and Romans justified what we today would 
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consider the inhumane killing of defenseless children by suggesting that infanticide was 
in the best interest of congenitally deformed infants themselves. Plutarch, after all, 
observes in his Life of Lycurgus that the Spartans killed deformed children because they 
believed that “it was good neither for the infant itself nor the state” to rear an infant “not 
well born from the very beginning for good health and bodily strength.”338 Seneca the 
Elder likewise indicates that some Romans would have considered the killing of 
congenitally deformed infants to benefit the infants themselves. In the controversy 
Mendici Debilitati, Seneca’s Albucius Silus refers to the group of children mutilated by 
the man who exploited their disabilities for his own gain and asks, “Are they not more 
unfortunate to survive in this way than if they had perished?” He  answers his own 
rhetorical question by saying that it would have been better for them to have perished 
and, to drive the point home, tells his associates to “[a]sk the fathers which they would 
have preferred.”339 Triarius agrees that it would have better for the children to have 
perished.340  Porcius Latro likewise proclaims that “nothing was more wretched [for the 
children] than to be reared. . . .”341 Seneca the Younger, however, supports the killing of 
congenitally deformed infants in De Ira only because such killings would protect the 
community. According to Seneca, when Romans killed deformed infants, there was no 
“no anger there, but rather a pitiful treatment [for Rome].”342  
Cultures that routinely killed their congenitally deformed infants, such as Sparta 
and Rome, likewise stigmatized deformed people by making the mere existence of an 
adult with a severe congenital deformity an oddity. When Pliny the Elder, the Roman 
natural philosopher, discusses portenta in book eleven of his Natural History, for 
example, he seems to suggest that it was rare to raise a child with a severe congenital 
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deformity. Pliny first points out that “extra limbs are useless to animals, just as a sixth 
finger always is to a human being.”343 He then intimates that at least some people in the 
ancient world considered it a waste of time to rear a person with serious congenital 
deformities, explaining that “[i]n Egypt, it was agreed upon to rear a portent (portentum), 
a human being with a pair eyes situated in the back part of the head, but he could not see 
with them.”344 It is somewhat difficult to interpret this passage because Pliny is 
discussing a congenitally deformed child born in Egypt rather than in Greece or Rome, 
even though he did not specify whether the child was born to Egyptian, Greek, or Roman 
parents. Pliny, however, likely believed that his readers would have found something 
novel in the decision to rear such a wretched child. 
 Even debates about attempts to provide public assistance or private charity to 
disabled people could increase the amount of stigma and discrimination that they 
experienced by reinforcing the negative stereotype that disabled people were weak and 
helpless.345 To some extent, this may have been an unavoidable corollary of any attempt 
to provide public assistance or private charity to the disabled. Indeed, if disabled people 
were physically capable of doing everything that an able-bodied person could do, then 
there would be little reason to count them among the deserving poor or to provide public 
assistance or private charity to them in the first place.346 Nevertheless, discussions of 
disability that constantly highlight the weakness and helplessness of disabled people 
naturally reinforce the idea that they are, to some extent, incapable of living normal 
lives.347    
Lysias’ speech in defense of the disabled Athenian’s pension is indicative of how 
public assistance can reinforce the idea that disabled people are weak and helpless. In that 
 134 
 
speech, the disabled man attempts to convince the Council to renew his pension, in part, 
by reminding them that disabled people are weak and deserving of pity, despite the fact 
that both Garland and Rose have argued that the disabled pensioner makes no appeals to 
pity.348 The pensioner questions, for instance, why his accuser would begrudge him his 
pension when other people “pity” him,349 argues that Athens created the pension to help 
disabled people like him because “the divine power has deprived us of the greatest 
things,”350 calls his disability “a misfortune” (symphora),351 and says that “he has been 
deprived of the most beautiful and greatest things on account of [that] misfortune.”352 
Even when the disabled man attacks his accuser, he appeals to the Council’s compassion 
for disabled people. The disabled man, for example, excoriates his accuser for acting 
“savagely to people who are pitied even by their enemies.”353 He concludes his speech, 
moreover, by pleading with the Council to renew his pension so that “this man will learn 
in the future not to plot against those who are weaker than him, but to seek an advantage 
[only] over those who are equal to him.”354  
Lysias and his disabled pensioner apparently believed, then, that the Council 
would be most likely to renew the man’s pension if it believed that his disability had left 
him weaker and more vulnerable than able-bodied people. It is easy to see how this type 
of legal strategy would increase the amount of stigma and discrimination that disabled 
Athenians experienced. Any public assistance system that requires disabled people to 
express publicly their own inferiority in order to receive their pensions necessarily 
reinforces negative stereotypes about disability. This demeaning strategy may even have 
contributed to the prohibition on disabled archons. Indeed, it is hardly surprising that the 
same Council that required disabled people to prove their inferiority in order to receive 
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their disability pensions would prohibit those supposedly inferior disabled people from 
becoming archons. 
The elder Seneca’s Mendici Debilitati demonstrates how a system of private 
charity likewise can reinforce the idea that disabled people are weak and deserving of 
pity. In that dialogue, Porcius Latro says that the cruel man who mutilated children and 
then made them beg for him did so because able-bodied people would be more likely to 
feel pity for disabled beggars. As Porcius Latro explains, “the cruelty of that man yielded 
him more income because all of us, except that man, are compassionate.”355 Triarius also 
discusses the pity that his able-bodied companions feel for the children, implying that a 
number of the people participating in the dialogue had “offered alms to these wretched 
children,” even as they “prayed for their deaths.”356 Cestius Pius even suggests that 
disabled beggars can do little except beg, asking rhetorically, “what do wretched people 
know to ask for except alms?”357 The discourse surrounding almsgiving to the disabled in 
Rome thus perpetuated the notion that such wretched beggars were incapable of living 
ordinary lives. As Seneca’s Clodius Turrinus proclaims, “it is a loathsome thing to have 
beggars in one’s company, to be fed by beggars, to live among the crippled.”358 
Conclusion 
 Ideas about disability in classical antiquity thus reflected a variety of different 
world views. Most people in the Greco-Roman world likely attributed supernatural 
significance to the existence of congenital deformity. The most common terms for people 
with severe congenital deformity, after all, were teras, monstrum, prodigium, portentum, 
and ostentum, all of which signified some type of divine significance. These ideas would 
endure in the Christian tradition in large part because Augustine, one of the most 
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important Christian thinkers to address congenital deformity, agreed that there was divine 
significance to monstrosity. Classical philosophers, of course, tended to reject 
supernatural explanations for congenital deformity, looking at congenital deformity when 
attempting to understand the natural world. Yet philosophers themselves did not agree 
about the nature of things. Two important underlying assumptions about nature often 
determined how philosophers viewed congenital deformity. The majority view was that 
nature was a rational, living organism that sometimes produced beings contrary to nature. 
There was, however, a strong minority view, advanced most notably by both the 
Presocratic Empedocles and the Epicureans, which rejected the idea that the natural 
world was the product of rational design, arguing instead that matter, motion, and chance 
have driven the development of living beings. This debate, whether the natural world was 
the product of rational design or chance, would resurface during the eighteenth century, 
as Deists and materialists likewise pondered the existence of congenital deformity when 
presenting their views on design and chance. Hippocratic physicians, meanwhile, rejected 
the speculations of philosophers, contending that clinical experience was the best source 
of knowledge about the natural world.  One thing, however, remained relatively constant 
throughout classical antiquity: various categories for disabled people, including monsters, 
dwarfs, the deaf and dumb and the blind, hunchbacks, and cripples, all of which could 
reflect deviations from both aesthetic and functional norms, perpetuated the stigma and 
discrimination associated with disability, particularly congenital deformity. Accordingly, 
when the Greeks or Romans discussed the significance of congenital deformity in 
attempting to unlock the secrets of nature, they often did so under the influence of 
pervasive negative stereotypes about disabled people.  
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 These categories almost certainly influenced debates with respect to the idea that 
there was a disability problem as well, particularly the draconian infanticide policies of 
Sparta and the Twelve Tables of Rome. Yet the disability problem obviously went 
beyond the mere hierarchical construction of language. Disability in the classical world, 
in no small part due to the ways in which the Greeks and Romans socially constructed 
their societies, could drastically hinder labor productivity. Both the Spartans and Romans, 
then, were not without their reasons for mandating the killing of infants with severe 
congenital deformities. Whether those reasons had any ethical justification, however, is a 
different matter. Yet not everyone in classical antiquity believed in addressing the 
disability problem through infanticide. The Athenians refused to mandate the killing of 
the congenitally deformed and even created a disability pension system for disabled 
people who were sufficiently disabled and sufficiently poor. Some disabled people 
throughout the Greco-Roman world, moreover, likely survived through begging. Both the 
killing of monstrosities and charitable undertakings to assist disabled people continued 
with the coming of Christian hegemony, even if Christian elites condemned infanticide 
and inculcated the importance of almsgiving to a greater degree than we ordinarily see in 
classical antiquity.  
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Chapter 5: Monsters and Beggars from Late Antiquity to the Mid-Seventeenth Century 
Ideas about disability from the late antiquity to the middle of seventeenth century 
differed from ideas about disability in classical antiquity, in large part, because of the 
hegemony of Christianity. As Edward Wheatley argues in Stumbling Blocks Before the 
Blind, “[t]here were no clear models of disability in Greece and Rome before the advent 
of Christianity.”1 The hegemony of orthodox Christianity during the Middle Ages, then, 
acted as a relatively uniform system of beliefs that had important implications for the idea 
that there was something significant about the existence of congenital deformity and the 
idea that there was a disability problem. Scholars agree that Saint Augustine was the most 
important early Christian thinker to address the significance of congenital deformity.2 
Saint Isidore of Seville, building on the ideas of Augustine, offered further observations 
about monstrosities that would resonate with Christians. Their ideas, in fact, would 
continue to have a lasting impact on how Christians would view deformity well into the 
sixteenth century, when Ambroise Paré and Montaigne explored congenital deformity in 
a manner that often harkened back to those of Augustine and Isidore. Indeed, the ideas of 
Augustine, Isidore, Paré, and Montaigne, although at times similar to ideas about 
congenital deformity in classical antiquity, unmistakably reflect the dominant Christian 
world view. Yet classical ideas about congenital deformity, particularly the ideas of 
Aristotle, continued to proliferate in medieval Europe. Albertus Magnus’ work on 
Aristotle, of course, was extremely influential throughout the High and later Middle 
Ages.3 As Sarah Alison Miller has explained, moreover, Pseudo-Albertus Magnus and a 
commentator on his text, De Secretis Mulierum (“On the Secrets of Women”), which 
Monica Green has called “‘one of the most influential documents in the history of 
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medieval scientific attitudes toward women,’” both drew upon Aristotle when discussing 
women and monstrosity.4 Pesudo-Albertus, Miller notes, pointed to Aristotle’s claim in 
Physics that “there are errors in nature as well as art,” while one commentator drew from 
Generation of Animals to assert that a “woman is not human [homo], but a monster in 
nature.”5 Other Christian thinkers such as Thomas of Cantimpré, Vincent of Beauvais, 
and Bartholomaeus Anglicus, despite what Daston and Park call their “Augustinan 
allegiances,” looked, in part, to the ideas of Galen and Aristotle to understand the natural 
world.6 Thomas Aquinas, the scholastic pupil of Albertus Magnus, meanwhile, accounted 
for the birth of a six-fingered child by pointing to Aristotle’s notion of accidental births.7 
The Reformation, meanwhile, added further complexities to conceptions about congenital 
deformity, as both Catholics and Protestants waged a polemical battle over the 
significance of monstrous births.8 One thing, however, did not change as Christians 
explored the significance of congenital deformity: able-bodied expressions of contempt 
for monsters and other types of congenitally deformed people continued to abound in the 
West. 
  Christians searched for ways to address the disability problem that would 
comport with their understanding of disability. According to Andrew Crislip, the 
disability problem was plainly evident during the life of Basil of Caesarea during the 
fourth century, when some family networks proved unable or unwilling to care for the 
disabled “usually owing to the financial burden of unproductive members.”9 In Europe, 
Henri Jacques-Stiker has shown, Christians would deal with their own disability problem 
by creating a system of charity that relied on almsgiving and institutional care.10 Crislip, 
too, notes that the Byzantines would eventually address their disability problem, in part, 
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through institutional aid, constructing the hospital of St. Paul in Constantinople, which 
accommodated, among others, the “blind, crippled, aged, and disabled.”11 The intentions 
of these apparent benefactors, however, may not have been entirely focused on the well-
being of disabled people. Wheatley, for example has cautioned scholars not to assume 
that the Christian system of charity was an entirely benevolent one. According to 
Wheatley, the religious model of disability that developed during the Middle Ages was as 
much about social control as charity. Indeed, Wheatley has noted that there was a 
substantial amount of “control that the church retained over some people with disabilities 
through charity based on both almsgiving to individuals and institutional foundations for 
groups.”12 Wheatley argues, for instance, that “people with disabilities had to make 
themselves worthy to receive the benevolence of others in order for that benevolence to 
strengthen the Christian community.”13 Wheatley does point out, however, that this 
system of charity could not have encompassed the entire experience of disability during 
this period because some disabled people would have been able to survive without 
assistance.14  
In some respects, western scholars today may feel somewhat familiar with 
disability and the Christian tradition. For centuries, after all, the Catholic Church was 
able to dominate religious discussions about disability in Latin Christendom, 
admonishing the faithful to show compassion to the disabled and creating a system of 
charity that relied both on begging and institutional care to help the disabled poor during 
this period.15 Yet, as Stiker has demonstrated, ideas about disability in the Christian 
tradition are more complex than one might expect. To address this complexity and thus to 
understand better the Christian view of disability, he begins A History of Disability by 
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examining the Bible, particularly the Old Testament.16 Stiker’s approach, as he himself 
acknowledges, does little to uncover the actual history of Jewish people with disabilities, 
but it does provide some insights into Jewish ideas about disability.17 In addition, Biblical 
ideas about disability are important, Stiker has recognized, because Christians in Europe 
combined many of those ideas with what remained from classical antiquity to fashion a 
variety of incongruent views about disability that existed simultaneously in the minds of 
Europeans for centuries.18 Accordingly, this chapter adopts Stiker’s approach of 
examining disability in the Hebrew Bible and Christian New Testament before moving 
on to address disability and the Christian tradition in later periods.19 
Disability and Ambiguity in both the Hebrew Bible and the Christian New 
Testament 
 
 Both Stiker and Rabbi Judith Z. Abrams have noted the ambiguity with respect to 
disability in both the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament.20 Some negative views about 
disability have been conspicuous in the Judeo-Christian tradition. Most scholars, 
including Stiker and Abrams, point to prohibitions in Leviticus against disabled priests 
officiating in the Temple, based on the idea that certain types of disabled people are 
physically unfit to act as intermediaries between human beings and God solely on 
account of their disabilities, as evidence of negative attitudes about disability in the 
Judeo-Christian tradition.21 In Leviticus, God instructs Moses to tell Aaron that He will 
not permit Aaron’s disabled descendants to serve as priests: 
No one of your offspring throughout their generations who has a blemish 
may approach to offer the food of his God. For no one who has a blemish 
shall draw near, one who is blind or lame, or one who has a mutilated face 
or a limb too long, or one who has a broken foot or a broken hand, or a 
hunchback, or a dwarf, or a man with a blemish in his eyes or an itching 
disease or scabs or crushed testicles. No descendent of Aaron the priest 
who has a blemish shall come near to offer the Lord’s offerings by fire; 
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since he has a blemish, he shall not come near to offer the food of his God. 
He may eat the food of his God…But he shall not come near the curtain or 
approach the alter, because he has a blemish, that he may not profane my 
sanctuaries.22 
 
Physical imperfections were so undesirable to the Israelites that Leviticus even requires 
an animal sacrifice to “be perfect; there shall be no blemish in it. Anything blind, or 
injured, or maimed, or having a discharge or an itch or scabs—these you shall not offer to 
the Lord or put any of them on the altar as offerings by fire to the Lord.”23 Rabbinic 
Judaism later expanded on the Torah’s proscriptions. The Mishnah, Abrams explains, 
concludes that there “are more [disqualifications] for a person [than these, namely] a 
wedge-shaped head or a turnip-shaped head or a mallet-shaped head or a sunken head or 
[the head] flat behind, or a hunchback. Rabbi Yehudah declares [the humpbacked priest] 
qualified, but the sages disqualify [him].”24 According to Abrams, moreover, “the 
tannaitic midrash on Leviticus, Sifra,” identifies “several additional visible blemishes and 
three ‘non-visible’ ones: persons with speaking and hearing disabilities, persons with 
mental disabilities, and persons who are intoxicated.”25 These three “non-visible” 
blemishes, Abrams observes, reflect the notion that allowing people with mental 
deficiencies to officiate in the Temple would “pollute the cult with ritual impurity.”26 The 
deaf and dumb in Rabbinic Judaism, then, like the deaf and dumb in classical antiquity, 
were believed to have diminished mental capacities because of their disabilities. 
Medieval Christians likewise barred disabled people from performing certain clerical 
functions. The decretals issued by Pope Gregory IX in 1234, Irina Metzler has observed, 
prohibited disabled people from serving in the higher orders solely on account of their 
physical deformities, mutilations, and serious blemishes.27     
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There are other places in the Hebrew Bible where able-bodied people likewise 
suggest that disabled people are physically unfit to perform certain functions in an able-
bodied society. When David marches against the stronghold of the Jebusites, the 
inhabitants of Jerusalem, for example, they taunt him, saying, “You will not come in 
here, even the blind and lame will turn you back. . . .”28 This taunt says as much about the 
Jebusites’ view of the blind and lame as it does about David. David would prove to be so 
powerless, the Jebusites gleefully proclaim, that even its weakest inhabitants, those 
unable to perform the ordinary functions of soldiers, would be able to repel him. David 
responds by encouraging his followers to “get up the water shaft to attack the lame and 
the blind, those whom David hates. Therefore it is said, ‘The blind and the lame shall not 
come into the house.’”29 David, it seems, reacts to the Jebusites’ intolerable affront to his 
able-bodied manhood and honor by hating the blind and lame, who themselves appear to 
have been the targets of the Jebusites’ derision and scorn. Yet David clearly could not 
have forbidden all blind and lame people from coming into his house because 
Mephibosheth, who “was lame in both feet,” later eats at David’s table “like one of 
David’s sons.”30  
Perhaps the most deleterious negative stereotype about disability in the Judeo-
Christian tradition, however, is the notion that congenital deformity and even non-
congenital disabilities, like other types of affliction, can be the result of divine will, often 
in the form of divine wrath and punishment.31 One of the most well-known examples of 
physical affliction comes from Deuteronomy, which warns that 
[t]he Lord will afflict you with the boils of Egypt, with ulcers, scurvy, and itch, of 
which you cannot be healed. The Lord will afflict you with madness, blindness, 
and confusion of mind; you shall grope about at noon as blind people grope in 
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darkness, but you shall be unable to find your way; and you shall be continually 
abused and robbed, without anyone to help.32 
 
Another well-known example of physical affliction as divine punishment is the penalty 
that David must pay, or rather his infant son must pay, for his affair with Bathsheba and 
its aftermath.33 Instead of punishing David for his own sins, God strikes David’s infant 
son with a grievous illness.34 The infant, the true victim of God’s justice some might 
argue, languishes in agony for seven days until he finally succumbs.35    
Although such divine justice might seem extreme to many modern observers, 
such punishment was acceptable under Jewish law. Jewish scriptures repeatedly stress 
that God punishes children for the transgressions of their parents, even to the third and 
fourth generations.36 The Hebrew Bible, however, is not always consistent with respect to 
such punishment. Jeremiah, for example, who was born either in 627 B.C.E. or became a 
prophet on that date, dying sometime after 587,37 upheld the ancient tradition of 
intergenerational punishment, pointing out that God repays “the guilt of the parents into 
the laps of their children after them.”38 Yet his contemporary Ezekiel, who was a prophet 
from 593 to roughly 563 B.C.E., proclaims that “[t]he person who sins shall die. A child 
shall not suffer for the iniquity of a parent, nor a parent suffer for the iniquity of a child; 
the righteousness of the righteous shall be his own, and the wickedness of the wicked 
shall be his own.”39 The disciples of Jesus later raise the question when they encounter a 
blind beggar, asking, “Rabbi, who sinned, this man or his parents, that he was born 
blind?”40 Jesus responds, “Neither this man nor his parents sinned; he was born blind so 
that God’s works might be revealed in him.”41 According to Jesus, then, God was indeed 
the cause of the man’s blindness, but God did not make him blind so as to punish him.   
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Despite the omnipotence of God in the Judeo-Christian tradition, believers have 
not always attributed illnesses and disabilities, directly at any rate, to the will of God. It is 
Satan rather than God, after all, who afflicts Job with loathsome sores from head to toe.42 
While God does retain ultimate power over Job, telling Satan that he is forbidden to take 
Job’s life,43 Job’s illness demonstrates the tremendous power that Satan enjoys over 
human health. In Luke, moreover, demons and spirits are responsible for some physical 
disabilities. Shortly after instructing his disciples how to pray, for example, Jesus 
encounters a person who has become mute after being possessed by a mute demon. When 
Jesus casts out the demon, the person is able to speak before an amazed crowd.44 Luke 
later describes a spirit (pneuma) who had crippled a woman for 18 years.45 Although the 
afflicted woman “was bent over and was quite unable to stand up straight,” Jesus heals 
her by laying his “hands on her.”46 These examples from Job and Luke had the potential 
to teach an important lesson to the faithful. Indeed, they demonstrate that although Satan, 
demons, and spirits can afflict people with illnesses and disabilities, God maintains 
ultimate control and can heal the afflicted, either personally or through intermediaries, 
whenever He desires.    
 Altruistic views about disability and disabled people existed alongside the 
negative stereotypes. Whereas disability in the Judeo-Christian tradition has sometimes 
been associated with divine wrath, there has long been a recognition that even righteous 
people can suffer physical misfortune. The Book of Job develops this theme in detail. At 
the beginning of Job, the author states that Job was a “blameless and upright” man, “one 
who feared God and turned away from evil.”47 God echoes the author’s observation, 
telling Satan that there “is no one like [Job] on the earth, a blameless and upright man 
 163 
 
who fears God and turns away from evil.”48 Despite Job’s righteousness, Satan gains 
God’s permission to strike Job with a terrible affliction.49 The association between 
wickedness and physical affliction was so strong among Job’s contemporaries, however, 
that his detractors repeatedly attribute his affliction to his unrighteousness.50 The Book of 
Job, of course, is not the only book to acknowledge that even righteous people can suffer 
misfortune. The author of Ecclesiastes, after all, proclaims that “there are righteous 
people who are treated according to the conduct of the wicked, and there are wicked 
people who are treated according to the conduct of the righteous.”51 In the Christian 
scriptures, meanwhile, as we have seen, Jesus informs his disciples that God did not 
make a beggar blind to punish him but rather “so that God’s works might be revealed in 
him.”52    
 Another altruistic aspect of the Judeo-Christian tradition is the divine exhortation 
to show kindness and even to provide alms to the disabled. Leviticus, for example, 
presents the following well-known command to the faithful: “You shall not revile the 
deaf or put a stumbling block before the blind.”53 Deuteronomy further provides that 
anyone who misleads a blind person on the road shall be cursed.54 Job, moreover, defends 
his righteousness by explaining how he helped the poor, orphans, the blind, and the 
lame.55 These examples suggest that despite the existence of negative stereotypes about 
disability in Jewish culture, able-bodied people demonstrated considerable compassion 
for disabled people in need. Christian scriptures likewise exhibit kindness to disabled 
people, particularly with respect to divine healing. When Bartimaeus of Timaeus, a blind 
beggar, begs Jesus to make him see again as Jesus and his followers are leaving Jericho, 
Jesus responds, “Go; your faith has made you well.”56 Even such apparently innocuous 
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examples of divine healing, however, could have negative connotations for disabled 
people who were not fortunate enough to receive divine healing. If God does indeed heal 
the righteous, after all, some people might conclude that those who fail to recover from 
their afflictions are unrighteous in the eyes of God. One ill psalmist, for instance, 
recognizing that lingering illnesses are indicative of unrighteousness, prays for healing so 
that he might vindicate his righteousness.57   
Ideas about disability in both the Hebrew Bible and Christian New Testament 
were thus a synthesis of both negative stereotypes and altruistic compassion that enabled 
both Jews and Christians to interpret illnesses, congenital deformities, and non-congenital 
disabilities, in a variety of different ways under a variety of different circumstances.  The 
Qumran, as Stiker and Abrams have noted, appear to have excluded “the disabled of all 
kinds” from the community.58 According to both Stiker and Abrams, however, it is 
difficult to determine how other Jewish communities treated people with disabilities.59 
The coming of Christian hegemony did little to change the able-bodied view of disability. 
Christians, like Jews, continued to harbor some negative opinions about the disabled 
while, at the same time, admonishing the faithful to provide them with alms. What likely 
mattered to Jews and Christians was not so much how to understand and synthesize all of 
the theological complexities and contradictions of scriptural examples of disability, if 
they were even aware of those contradictions, but how to apply them equitably in 
accordance with their own religious beliefs when the topic of disability was at hand.60 
Congenital Deformity and the Christian Tradition: Monsters with Divine 
Significance 
  
From late antiquity to the middle of the seventeenth century, a large number of 
Europe’s educated elite, influenced not only by the ambiguities in the Judeo-Christian 
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tradition but also by certain Greco-Roman beliefs about nature, were convinced that the 
existence of congenital deformity could reveal something about divine will. The most 
important of these thinkers were Augustine and Isidore of Seville, both of whom 
described congenital deformity as natural components of the divine order, albeit with 
important symbolic significance. Augustine was probably the single most important 
influence on medieval notions of congenital deformity.61 Augustine’s influence on 
western intellectuals hardly diminished even as the Renaissance began to reintroduce 
Europeans to classical texts. When Pierre Boaistuau discussed congenital deformity in the 
latter half of the sixteenth century in Histoires prodigieuses, for example, he directed his 
readers to Augustine’s City of God for an authoritative discussion of monstrosity.62 In the 
preface of Des monsters et prodiges, moreover, Ambroise Paré, a Renaissance surgeon 
and perhaps the most important writer on monstrosity during the Renaissance, counted 
Augustine among his most important sources.63   
When Adam and Eve sinned against God, Augustine believed, God punished their 
offspring by transforming the nature of human flesh. What once was perfect and 
immortal became subject to “the tribulation of this mortal life.”64 In conjunction with the 
inception of mortal death, God apparently created monsters as “signs” of divine power 
and providence. The Latin word monstra (“monsters”), Augustine explains in a passage 
of City of God reminiscent of Cicero, comes from the verb monstrare (“to show”) 
“because they show something by a sign.”65 God created monsters, then, “to show . . . 
that God will do what he has declared he will do with the bodies of men, and that no 
difficulty will detain him, no law of nature circumscribe him.”66 Augustine, moreover, 
asserts that monsters could not possibly contradict nature because they were integral 
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components of the natural world in light of God’s response to the Fall. “For how can 
anything done by the will of God be contrary to nature,” Augustine asks, “when the will 
of so great a creator constitutes the nature of each created thing?”67 Indeed, all portents, 
including monsters, only appear to contradict nature because they are “contrary to what is 
known of nature.”68  
Isidore of Seville built on the views of Augustine when discussing portents and 
monsters that appear to be against nature. Isidore’s description of portents and monsters, 
like Augustine’s view of monsters, also bear the influence of classical antiquity.  Indeed, 
in the following passage from Isidore, part of which bears a striking resemblance to 
Cicero’s description of portents and monsters in De Divinatione, Isidore cites Varro in 
attempting to account for portents and monsters that appear to be against nature: 
Portents, according to Varro, are those things that appear to be produced against 
nature. But they are not against nature, since they happen by the will of God, 
since nature is the will of the Creator of every created thing. For this reason, 
pagans sometimes call God nature and sometimes, God. Therefore the portent 
does not happen against nature, but against that which is known as nature . . . 
Portents and omens [ostenta], monsters and prodigies are so named because they 
appear to portend, foretell [ostendere], show [monstrare], and predict future 
things. . . .For God wishes to signify the future through faults in things that are 
born, as through dreams and oracles, by which he forewarns and signifies to 
peoples or individuals a misfortune to come.69   
 
This explanation may be “somewhat tortured,” as Daston and Park have noted, but 
nevertheless “remained standard throughout the medieval period.”70 Isidore elsewhere 
attempts to account for monstrous births in nature, dividing monsters into two categories. 
The first, portents (portenta), “are beings of transformed appearance, as, for instance, is 
said to have happened when in Umbria a woman gave birth to a serpent.”71 According to 
Isidore, God sometimes creates such monsters to be “indications of future events,” but 
“those monsters that are produced as omens do not live long – they die as soon as they 
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are born.”72  The second, “unnatural beings” (portentuosi), take “the form of a slight 
mutation, as for instance in the case of someone born with six fingers.”73 The distinction 
between Isidore’s two categories, then, was not only whether the monster died shortly 
after birth but also the degree to which the deformity differed from aesthetic and 
functional norms.74 Isidore, for example, lists several types of congenitally deformed 
people who, according to the severity of their deformities, could fit into either category, 
including dwarfs (nani), those with misshapen heads or superfluous parts of their limbs, 
those who are missing some part of their body, those whose fingers “are found joined at 
birth and fused together,” and hermaphrodites.75    
Although Daston and Park are no doubt correct that Augustine and Isidore were 
responsible for the “standard” view of portents and monstrosity in medieval Europe, 
medieval Europeans also found other ways to explain the existence of monstrosity.76 
Miller likewise has pointed out that medieval Christians attributed monstrosity to a 
variety of things in addition to the will of God. Some, for example, attributed monstrosity 
to astrological forces, sexual positions, or problems with the mother’s womb.77 Others 
relied on ideas from classical antiquity to account for monstrosity. Pseudo-Albertus, we 
have seen, agreed with Aristotle’s notion that monstrous births were “errors in nature.”78 
Still others attributed monstrosity to evil forces. According to Stiker, “Augustine would 
not be supported in all quarters,” and “monstrosity would be associated with Satan and 
his demons,” even if beliefs about Satan, demons, and monstrosity, “did not prevent 
Augustine from decisively integrating anomaly into the normal, and difference into the 
order of things.”79 Augustine and Isidore, moreover, could not prevent medieval 
Europeans from viewing monstrosity as something frightening that deviated from the 
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normal human existence. As Miller has explained, medieval Europeans referred to a 
variety of marginalized groups as “monsters,” including “demons, non-Christians, the so-
called monstrous races, freaks of nature, deformed infants, miscarried fetuses, and . . . 
women,” all of whom transgressed “the boundaries of the proper human form.”80   
During the Reformation, both Catholics and Protestants continued to follow 
Augustine and Isidore in interpreting instances of monstrous births as expressions of 
divine will. Yet as Daston and Park have noted, “the Reformation opened the floodgates 
for a deluge of prodigy literature, ranging from simple vernacular broadsides to erudite 
Latin treatises, in which monstrous births occupied pride of place.”81 Catholics, of course, 
viewed monstrous births as a condemnation of Protestantism while Protestants believed 
that such births signified God’s displeasure with Catholicism. According to Alan Bates, 
“the apparent upsurge of interest in monstrous births at the beginning of the sixteenth 
century” was not only the result of the Reformation but also the printing press, which, of 
course, played an important role in spreading the ideas of reformers such as Luther.82 
With the printing press, “it was possible to disseminate written accounts quickly enough 
and in sufficient numbers that readers could hope to go and see a monster for 
themselves.”83 The events surrounding the birth of a monstrous calf in Saxony in 1522, 
for example, demonstrate the role of the printing press in facilitating bitter exchanges 
between Catholics and Protestants.84 While the calf’s legs were deformed, “what 
particularly distinguished it was a large fold over the head and shoulders resembling a 
monk’s cowl.”85 An astrologer living in Prague, who purported to be an expert on 
monstrosity, proclaimed that the calf represented Luther whom many Catholics would 
have viewed as the most dangerous of all monsters.86 A broadside published less than a 
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month after the monstrous birth publicized the astrologer’s conclusion in esoteric 
language to the educated elite.87 The Rev. John Dobneck, also known as Cochlaeus, 
quickly published two works, one in Latin and one in German, to popularize the attack on 
Luther to laypeople.88 Luther and Melancthon responded by rapidly publishing a 
pamphlet, which appeared in 1523, interpreting the monstrous calf as well as a monstrous 
hybrid born in 1496 as an expression of God’s disapproval of the Catholic Church.89 
Melancthon delved into the divine significance of the monstrous hybrid born decades 
earlier, explaining that the ass’s head represented papal intelligence, the woman’s body 
signified papal sensuality, and the elephant’s foot was a condemnation of papal tyranny.90 
Luther delved into the meaning of the monstrous calf, proclaiming that it represented the 
shortcomings of Catholic monasticism.91    
 Subsequent Protestants likewise used instances of monstrous births against their 
adversaries, whether Catholic or otherwise. In November 1558, when Elizabeth ascended 
to the English throne, her Protestant supporters contended that “these frequent monsters” 
were a warning to Catholics.92 In 1600, a pamphlet from Colwall, England claimed that a 
woman’s monstrous birth was the result of divine wrath, stemming from her rejection of 
her husband and “incestuous copulation” with relatives.93 The Puritans, meanwhile, used 
monstrosity to attack Anne Hutchinson for her leading role in the Antinomian 
controversy of 1636-8 after Mary Dyer, her friend and follower, gave birth in 1638 to a 
stillborn daughter with severe congenital deformities.94 The deformed infant, in the words 
of Governor John Winthrop,  
was of ordinary bigness; it had a face, but no head, and the ears stood upon the 
shoulders and were like an ape’s; it had no forehead, but over the eyes four horns, 
hard and sharp; two of them were above one inch long, the other two shorter; the 
eyes standing out, and the mouth also; the nose hooked upward; all over the breast 
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and back full of sharp pricks and scales, like a thornback; the navel and all the 
belly, with the distinction of the sex, were where the back should be, and the back 
and hips before, where the belly should have been; behind, between the shoulders, 
it had two mouths, and in each of them a piece of red flesh sticking out; it had 
arms and legs as other children; but instead of toes, it had on each foot three 
claws, like a fowl, with sharp talons.95 
 
The Rev. John Cotton advised Hutchinson, Dyer, and the midwife, all of whom had been 
present during the birth, to conceal it because (1) “he saw a providence of God in it”; (2) 
“if it had been his own case, he should have desired to have had it concealed”; and (3) he 
was aware of “other monstrous births, which had been concealed, and that he thought 
God might intend only the instruction of the parents, and such other to whom it was 
known. . . .”96  The Puritans learned of the monstrous birth “on that very day Mrs. 
Hutchinson was cast out of the church for her monstrous errors, and notorious falsehoods. 
. . .”
97
 They reacted somewhat predictably by falling into a state of hysteria, exhuming 
the body of the infant to determine the extent of her monstrous features and accusing the 
midwife of being a witch.98 Luckily for Dyer, the Puritans did not execute her because of 
her allegiance to Hutchinson and her monstrous infant. Her execution would have to wait 
until 1660, when the Puritans hanged her for being a Quaker.99 The Puritans, however, 
were still eager to connect the women of the Antinomian controversy to monstrosity. In 
1638, they accused Hutchinson herself of producing monstrous offspring because of her 
monstrous ideas.100 
 The Puritans, of course, are famous for what the modern world considers their 
superstitious world view that resulted in the Salem witch trials. The Puritans, however, 
were not simply witch hunters but rather a complex community with diverse views about 
divine wrath, witches, and the natural world. The Puritans, for example, apparently did 
not always view monstrosities as terrifying. Indeed, as the Rev. John Cotton 
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demonstrated when explaining why he advised Dyer to conceal her monstrous birth, the 
Puritans could rationalize monstrous births as private affairs between God and the 
monstrosity’s parents when those parents, unlike Dyer and Hutchinson, had not 
transcended the acceptable boundaries of Puritan society.101 Some Puritans, moreover, 
could espouse both superstitious beliefs about witches and surprisingly modern views 
about the natural world. Cotton Mather, the grandson of the Rev. John Cotton, after all, 
stoked fears about devils and witches in the eighteen months between his involvement 
with the Goodwin children, Goody Glover, and the Salem witch trials.102 When his first 
child, Increase, died just three days after his birth due to a deformity of the anus, Mather 
suspected that witchcraft was to blame.103 Yet this apparently superstitious man inquired 
also into the workings of the natural world when addressing the scourge of smallpox, 
concluding that inoculation was better protection than prayers alone.104 Mather would 
have prayed when smallpox struck his community, to be sure, but in proposing to bring 
Lady Mary Wortley Montagu’s inoculation to his community, he demonstrated that his 
staunch religious beliefs had not rendered him a foe of medicine and science.   
Renaissance thinkers, as Surekha Davies has recently demonstrated, likewise 
continued to view monstrosity in accordance with the ideas of Augustine and Isidore, 
dividing monstrous births into two categories.105 The first, derived from both the classical 
and Judeo-Christian tradition, identified monstrous births as expressions of divine will, 
either in the form of a sign or warning of divine displeasure.106 According to Davies, 
able-bodied society during the Renaissance often viewed monstrosities as “signs that a 
community was practicing the traditional biblical sins, such as greed, vanity, and 
adultery, and foretold subsequent punishment through natural catastrophes such as floods 
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or plagues.”107 Infants born with severe congenital deformities, then, could expect some 
people in their communities to recoil in fear and trembling at the thought of their very 
existence. Such a marginalized existence, of course, would have been psychologically 
difficult for those unfortunate enough to have been born with severe deformities, at least 
if their parents and communities had allowed them to survive long enough to contemplate 
their sorry lot in life. The second category of monstrous births during the Renaissance 
viewed congenital deformity as a deviation from nature, what the Greeks had referred to 
as a birth “contrary to nature.”108 By the late sixteenth century, Renaissance thinkers 
increasingly explored what monstrosity could reveal about nature and God’s plan for 
human beings, a trend that would later accelerate during the Scientific Revolution and the 
Enlightenment.109  
These two categories are plainly evident in the works of major Renaissance 
thinkers who addressed congenital deformity. Ambroise Paré’s Des monstres et prodiges 
(1573), which Janis L. Pallister has called “the book on ‘monsters’” during the sixteenth 
century,  approaches the topic of monstrosity by blending traditional, Judeo-Christian 
superstitions with a type of reasoning, heavily influenced by classical authors,  that would 
become popular among natural philosophers during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries.110 The mix between superstition and natural philosophy is so strong in Des 
monstres et prodiges, in fact, that Jurgis Baltrušaitis once called it a combination of “‘the 
fantastic realism of the image makers’” with “‘the awakening of a realistic mind.’”111 Yet 
Paré’s basic understanding of monstrosity did not constitute a rejection of Augustine’s 
and Isidore of Seville’s views of congenital deformity. Indeed, the first sentence of Paré’s 
preface to Des monstres et prodiges comes close to restating the authoritative conclusion 
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of Augustine’s City of God: “Monsters are things that appear outside the course of nature 
(and most often are signs of some misfortune to come) like an infant born with one arm, 
another who will have two heads, and other members outside of the ordinary.”112 In 
explaining what types of congenital deformities transformed people into monsters, 
moreover, Paré did not differ greatly from Isidore of Seville:  
The mutilated are those who are blind, one-eyed, hunchbacks, lame, or 
[those] having  six digits on the hand or on the foot, or less than five, or 
joints locked together, or arms too short, or a nose that is too deep-set like 
those having squished noses, or those having thick and overturned lips, or 
a closure of the genital part of girls because of the hymen, or supernatural 
flesh, or those who are hermaphrodites or those having some spots, warts, 
or  cysts, or another thing against nature.113  
 
Still, however, Paré’s amalgamation of Judeo-Christian superstition with more natural 
explanations for congenital deformity is apparent in the first chapter of Des monstres et 
prodiges, which enumerates the major causes of monstrosity and provides the basic 
structure for the work’s subsequent chapters: (1)” the glory of god”; (2) “His ire”; (3) 
“too much semen”; (4) “too little quantity [of semen]”; (5) “the imagination”; (6) “the 
narrowness and smallness of the uterus”; (7) “the indecent position of the mother, such 
as, when pregnant, she has sat too long with her legs crossed or [sat with her legs] pulled 
up against the stomach”; (8) “by a fall, or a blow given to the stomach of a pregnant 
woman”; (9) “by hereditary or accidental diseases”; (10) “by rottenness or corruption of 
the semen”; (11) “by mixture or blending of semen”; (12) “by the trickery of . . . 
beggars”; and (13) “by demons and devils.”114  
Montaigne, another prominent humanist of the French Renaissance, examined 
monstrosity between 1578 and 1580, around the time that new editions of Paré’s Des 
monstres et prodiges were appearing.115 In “Of a Monstrous Child,” Montaigne claims to 
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have seen “a child that two men and a nurse, who said they were the father, uncle, and 
aunt, were leading about to get a penny or so from showing him, because of his 
strangeness.”116 According to Montaigne, below the  
child’s breast he was fastened and stuck to another child without a head, and with 
his spinal canal stopped up, the rest of his body being entire. For indeed one arm 
was shorter, but it had been broken by accident at their birth. They were joined 
face to face, and as if a smaller child were trying to embrace a bigger one around 
the neck. The juncture and the space where they held together was only four 
fingers’ breadth or thereabouts, so that if you turned the imperfect child over and 
up, you saw the other’s navel below; thus the connection was in between the 
nipples and the navel. The navel of the imperfect child could not be seen, but all 
the rest of his belly could. In this way all of this imperfect child that was not 
attached, as the arms, buttocks, thighs, and legs, remained hanging and dangling 
on the other and might reach halfway down his legs. The nurse also told us that he 
urinated from both places. Moreover, the limbs of the other were nourished and 
living and in the same condition as his own, except that they were smaller and 
thinner.117 
 
Montaigne acknowledges that the boy’s monstrosity was so unique and baffling that “I 
leave it to the doctors to discuss it.”118 Yet Montaigne understood that many people 
during his day were accustomed to viewing congenital deformity as a sign. “This double 
body and these several limbs, connected with a single head,” Montaigne surmises, “might 
well furnish a favorable prognostic to the king that he will maintain under the union of 
his laws these various parts and factions of our state.”119 Cicero’s skepticism in De 
Divinatione, however, had a profound impact on Montaigne. Indeed, Montaigne twice 
cites De Divinatione in order to warn his readers about the pitfalls of attempting to 
ascertain, through divination, the divine purpose behind instances of monstrous births.120 
The better approach, Montaigne argues, is to understand that “[w]hat we call monsters 
are not so to God, who sees in the immensity of his work the infinity of forms that he has 
comprised in it. . . . We call contrary to nature what happens contrary to custom; nothing 
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is anything but according to nature, whatever it may be. Let this universal and natural 
reason drive out of us the error and astonishment that novelty brings us.”121 
 Sir Francis Bacon’s recognition in 1620 that monstrosity might reveal some 
secrets of nature, marks a transition from Renaissance ideas about monstrosity to the 
understanding of monstrosity that would develop in the latter half of the seventeenth 
century as well as the eighteenth century. As Daston and Park have pointed out, Bacon 
observed that “‘a compilation, or particular natural history, must be made of all monsters 
and prodigious births of nature; of every thing, in short, which is new, rare, and unusual 
in nature. This should be done with a rigorous selection, so as to be worthy of credit.’”122 
As Europe’s educated elite became acquainted with his empiricist views and his 
observations about monstrous births, it was perhaps only a matter of time before a new 
type of understanding of monstrosity would emerge in Europe. Over the course of the 
next two hundred years, natural philosophers would indeed begin to explore monstrosity 
in a manner that Bacon would deem “worthy of credit.”       
 If Monataigne’s “Of a Monstrous Child” demonstrates that the crux of 
Augustine’s view of congenital deformity continued to thrive among elites in the late 
sixteenth century, Pierre Bayle’s “Antoinette Bourignon,” an article in his renowned 
Dictionnaire historique et critique, suggests that the killing of congenitally deformed 
infants, despite the general reluctance of Christians to practice infanticide, continued to 
find support among some Europeans in the first half of the seventeenth century. 
According to Bayle, Antoinette Bourigon, a Catholic born in Lisle in 1616 who would 
eventually gain notoriety for her mysticism, was “so ugly that her family deliberated for 
some days if it would not be appropriate to suffocate her as a monster.”123 As time went 
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on, however, “her deformity diminished, and they decided not to take this course of 
action.”124 Bourignon survived, then, because her deformity was mild enough, in the eyes 
of her family, for her to retain just enough humanity to make her life worthwhile. If 
Bourignon’s deformity had not diminished or, even worse, had been more serious, her 
family may well have decided not only that she would be better off dead but also that 
they would be better off not having to care for her. Diminished labor capacity, then, was 
not only the consideration when determining whether to kill a congenitally deformed 
infant. 
  The precarious early years of Bourignon’s life, then, suggest that people with 
severe congenital deformities continued to suffer near-unimaginable levels of stigma and 
discrimination in the first half of the seventeenth century on account of their deformities 
despite the writings of Augustine, Isidore, Paré, and Montaigne. People with congenital 
deformities so severe that able-bodied people called them monsters may have fared better 
in Christian societies than the hermaphrodites of ancient Rome, but they still would have 
recognized that there was little place for them in normal, able-bodied society. Augustine 
himself had been well aware that many able-bodied people would continue to view the 
congenitally deformed as pariahs because their bodies deviated so greatly from the able-
bodied norm. He observes in City of God, for instance, that a person “who cannot 
comprehend the whole is offended by the deformity of one of the parts, since he is 
ignorant as to what it corresponds and how it should be classified.”125 Augustine believed 
that such people lacked a proper understanding of God and the natural world that He 
created. Indeed, Augustine warns Christians not to question whether God demonstrates 
“rational intelligence” when creating infants with severe congenital deformities, 
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reminding them that “He whose works no one justly finds fault with knows what He has 
done.”126  It is difficult, of course, to ascertain the extent to which this warning had any 
effect on ordinary people. Augustine’s ideas about monstrosity, after all, may have 
remained concealed from the masses because so few of them could understand Latin or 
read even their own vernaculars. Indeed, the intellectual and spiritual disconnect between 
elites and the masses might explain how western culture during this period could produce 
what modern observers would consider reasonable approaches to congenital deformity in 
the works of such elites as Augustine, Isidore of Seville, Ambroise Paré, and Montaigne, 
while simultaneously creating enough fear and hostility with respect to monstrous births 
that the parents of congenitally deformed infants sometimes pondered whether to kill 
their own children. To make matters more complex, even members of the educated elite 
often attributed certain types of deformity to divine will.  This was particularly true in 
times of intense crisis, as when Catholics sparred with Luther and Melancthon over the 
significance of the monstrous calf and when the third, fourth, and fifth editions of 
Histoires prodigieuses, which, according to Daston and Park, “appeared between 1575 
and 1582, at the height of the French wars of religion,” omitted the natural explanations 
for deformity that Boaistuau and Claude Tesserant had included in the first and second 
editions, contending, instead, that “all monsters were prodigies sent directly by God to 
admonish Christians to ‘repentance and penitence.’”127 
Stigma and Discrimination Associated with Various Categories of Disabled People 
Those with less severe congenital deformities and those with non-congenital 
disabilities that occurred early enough that their childhoods resembled the lives of the 
congenitally deformed continued to experience a considerable amount of stigma and 
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discrimination on account of their disabilities from the fourth century to the seventeenth 
century, albeit not to the same extent as those deemed monstrosities. Didymus, born in 
Alexandria in the early fourth century C.E., was one such person who could not entirely 
integrate into able-bodied society despite becoming one of the most important figures in 
early Christianity. Didymus became blind when he was still a young child but 
nevertheless managed to excel at “grammar, arithmetic, music, logic, rhetoric, geometry, 
and astronomy, which,” William Hanks Levy once noted, “were in those days considered 
to comprehend the whole cycle of human learning.”128 He was so intelligent and well 
respected that he became the head of the renowned Catechetical School of Alexandria, 
where he taught Jerome, Rufinus, Palladius, and Isidore.129 He may not be as well known 
as his pupils today, in large part because of his ill-advised embrace of Origen, but he was 
a major figure in the early history of the Church.130   
 Didymus, however, was still a blind person living in a sighted world that could 
not fully understand the experience of blindness. His interactions with Anthony, the most 
important ascetic in the early Church, demonstrate this disconnect between the blind and 
the sighted. When Anthony reportedly asked Didymus if he suffered emotionally on 
account of his blindness, Didymus responded truthfully that he did. Anthony, not one to 
mince words or withhold judgment about experiences that he could not possibly 
comprehend, rebuked Didymus by essentially questioning his piety. In particular, he 
castigated Didymus, telling him that such an esteemed Christian should not feel 
melancholy simply because he had a physical affliction common both to animals and 
human beings.131 In particular, he proclaimed, “‘I marvel that a wise man should mourn 
his loss of what ants and flies and gnats have, and should not rejoice in his possession of 
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that which saints and apostles alone have deserved.’”132 In a sense, Anthony’s 
understanding of disability and the natural world that God created was not so different 
from Augustine’s later discussion of congenital deformity in the City of God. Both 
Anthony and Augustine believed that physical misfortune was part of the divine order. 
Yet Anthony’s cavalier attitude in dismissing the real heartache that Didymus 
acknowledged feeling on account of his blindness makes Anthony a far less sympathetic 
figure than Augustine. Indeed, we can only imagine how Didymus must have felt at 
having his piety questioned by a man who sought to prove his own piety by voluntarily 
removing himself from the world when Didymus’ blindness had, through no choice of his 
own, deprived him of so many experiences that constitute the normal human experience.   
The Christian tradition likewise continued to exclude the congenitally deformed, 
including hunchbacks, from its fold. In the medieval French fable Des Tres Boçus (The 
Three Hunchbacks), for example, we see the figure of the hunchback, like Homer’s 
Thersites, as the paragon of ugliness: 
A humpback lived there in the town. 
An uglier wretch could not be found. 
His head was almost half his height. 
Nature must have worked all night 
To fashion him exactly wrong, 
For no two parts seemed to belong 
Together all was ugliness.   
His head was big, his scalp a mess;  
His neck was short, his shoulders wide— 
They hugged his ears on either side. 
I’d be a fool to waste the day  
Trying and failing to convey 
His ugliness.133 
 
The considerable wealth that the hunchback had amassed through usury and collecting 
rents, however, suggest that fortune had not been as unkind to him as nature.134 The 
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hunchback has become so wealthy, in fact, that he is able to procure a bride so beautiful 
that he feels it necessary to seclude her from the rest of the world lest she seek love in the 
arms of another.135  
One day, however, three hunchback minstrels come to the hunchback’s residence 
so as to enjoy a Christmas meal among their own kind: 
. . . one Christmas afternoon 
There came to him to ask a boon 
Beneath the landing where he rested 
Three hunchback minstrels who requested 
That they might share his Christmas meal, 
For nowhere else could these three feel 
So comfortable; here they might find 
Festivity with their own kind, 
Because he had a back like theirs.136 
 
Despite the hunchback’s obsessive attempts to prevent anyone from entering his home 
lest they see his beautiful bride, he cannot refuse entry to his fellow hunchbacks. Instead, 
he provides them with a lavish meal.137 
Before they leave, the hunchback warns them not to return, demonstrating that his 
feelings of solidarity with the other hunchbacks do not immunize them from his jealous 
paranoia. The hunchbacks, however, unwisely fail to heed his warning and return to the 
house to play for his wife at her behest. When her husband returns, as one might expect, 
she frantically searches for a means of concealing the minstrels. Just as the situation 
appears hopeless, she notices three chests, one for each minstrel. When her husband 
enters the room, he sits with his wife for a short time, eventually leaving the house 
without seeing any sign of the minstrels. Yet when she attempts to let the minstrels out of 
their chests, she discovers to her horror, that each of them has suffocated.138 
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She then devises a clever plan in order to dispose of the bodies. She hides two of 
the minstrels under her bed, leaving one out in the open, and offers a porter thirty pounds 
to throw “this corpse” into the nearby river for her. The porter agrees, takes the body to 
the river, and returns to collect his bounty.139 The wife, meanwhile, pulls one of the other 
minstrels from underneath the bed, apparently placing it where the first corpse lay before 
the porter threw it into the river. When the man returns for his money, she pretends that 
he has not done his job: 
Elated now, the man returned: 
“Pay me,” he told her, “what I’ve earned. 
Your dwarf is carried off and sunk. 
—“Sir Dolt,” she said, “you must be drunk. 
You can’t pull the wool over my eyes. 
The dwarf’s not taken. Here he lies. 
You stopped at the street, emptied the sack, 
Then brought back both sack and hunchback back. 
Look over there if you think I’m lying.140 
 
The exasperated man grabs the corpse and throws it into the river. Once again, however, 
he returns to find a hunchback corpse.141 The porter, enraged that the corpse keeps 
returning, throws the corpse of the third hunchback minstrel it into the river, this time 
warning it to stay submerged: 
“Go back to Hell, you wretched stiff! 
I’ve carried you so much that if  
You venture here again, you’ll rue  
The moment I catch sight of you.”142 
 
When he returns to collect his money, however, he sees the hunchback husband. 
Believing that the corpse, now a living hunchback, has returned once again, the porter 
decides to make sure that the corpse never returns: 
“What Mr. Hunchback! Back again? 
Who would believe it? By St. Nick, 
This hunchback takes me for a hick! 
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Crossing my path again was crazy. 
You think I’m recreant or lazy?” 
He lifted up the pestle, charged, 
Hit the lord’s head, which was too large, 
And gave it such a mighty clout, 
The blood and brains came pouring out, 
There on the step the hunchback died. 
The porter put the corpse inside 
The sack, securely tied the top, 
Then off he ran and didn’t stop 
Till he had dumped the fourth hunchback 
Off the bridge, still in the sack 
Because he feared the corpse might swim 
Back to the bank and follow him.143  
 
Once the porter returns, she gladly pays him the thirty pounds, reveling in the fact that 
her ugly, deformed husband is dead: 
Whatever pay the man demanded. 
Thirty pounds, no less, she handed 
Over to him and still could feel 
She had the better of the deal. 
And when she paid him, she agreed 
He’d done good work, for he had freed  
Her from her lord, that ugly dwarf.144 
 
 There are two important aspects of De Tres Boçus that are especially important 
for our understanding of deformity in the Middle Ages. First, it provides evidence that at 
least some able-bodied people during the Middle Ages, like their classical counterparts, 
viewed hunchbacks as excessively ugly simply because of their deformities. Second, it 
suggests that able-bodied people viewed hunchbacks as such aberrations of nature that 
Durand, the fable’s author, apparently believed that his audience would find it plausible 
that a person could look upon three different hunchback corpses and one living 
hunchback and see not four separate people but merely one hump. Indeed, implicit in 
Durand’s fable is that there was a tendency among the able-bodied, at least in medieval 
 183 
 
France, to notice once thing and one thing alone in their interactions with hunchbacks: 
their deformities.  
 Shakespeare likewise expressed negative attitudes about the deformed, linking 
moral shortcomings with physical deformity. In The Taming of the Shrew, for instance, 
Petruchio informs Kate that he had heard rumors not only that she was “rough, and coy, 
and sullen” but also physically disabled.145 The implication of Petruchio’s comments are 
clear: he expected to find a wretched creature whose bodily imperfections matched her 
character flaws. When Petruchio learns that Kate is actually a good person, in fact, he 
feels compelled to address her physical condition: 
 Why does the world report that Kate doth limp? 
 O sland’rous world! Kate the hazel-twig 
 Is straight and slender, and as brown in hue 
 As hazel nuts, and sweeter than the kernels. 
 O, let me see thee walk. Thou dost not halt.146   
 
Shakespeare is even more explicit in connecting physical deformity to moral failings in 
Richard III. In the beginning of the play, the Earl of Gloucester, the future Richard III, 
famously attributes his wicked nature to his physical deformities: 
But I, that am not shaped for sportive tricks, 
Nor made to court an amorous looking-glass; 
I, that am rudely stamp'd, and want love's majesty 
To strut before a wanton ambling nymph; 
I, that am curtail'd of this fair proportion, 
Cheated of feature by dissembling nature, 
Deformed, unfinish'd, sent before my time 
Into this breathing world, scarce half made up, 
And that so lamely and unfashionable 
That dogs bark at me as I halt by them; 
Why, I, in this weak piping time of peace, 
Have no delight to pass away the time, 
Unless to spy my shadow in the sun 
And descant on mine own deformity: 
And therefore, since I cannot prove a lover, 
To entertain these fair well-spoken days, 
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I am determined to prove a villain 
And hate the idle pleasures of these days.147 
 
We see here a man so unable to deal with his deformities and the stigma and 
discrimination that he experiences on account of those deformities that he chooses to 
reject the able-bodied world and unleash his hate on those who have wronged him. We 
can only guess, of course, how many people in Shakespeare’s own day attributed the 
character flaws of actual disabled people to their disabilities. 
Kings and queens during this period, like Roman emperors before them, used 
dwarfs to entertain their courts as royal playthings and to act as servants, thereby 
upholding the tradition of viewing dwarfs as something less than human.148 The Bayeux 
Tapestry, for example, depicts Turold’s groom as a dwarf with two horses.149 King Louis 
XII entertained his court with a dwarf named Triboulet, the name that Victor Hugo would 
later give to the deformed, court fool in Le roi s’amuse.150 King Henry VIII kept Will 
Sommers, a dwarf who became famous, in part, for playing jokes on prominent members 
of the king’s court, including Cardinal Wolsey.151 Catherine de Medici, one of the more 
fashionable women of the sixteenth century, amused herself by keeping multiple dwarfs 
at her court.152 She even arranged a marriage between two dwarfs in the hope that they 
would produce dwarf offspring, a feat that the Electress of Brandenburg would likewise 
attempt a short time later.153 The efforts of both women, however, proved futile as neither 
couple proved capable of reproducing.154 Charles V of Spain kept his own dwarf, 
Cornelius of Lithuania, at his court.155 Archibald Armstrong, the dwarf jester of James I 
of England, became famous for his numerous quarrels with others at court, many of 
which he instigated.156     
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Christian Solutions to the Disability Problem 
Christian Charity not a Complete Rupture with Classical Antiquity 
 During this period, as in classical antiquity, people addressed the disability 
problem in a variety of ways. Disabled people themselves, of course, continued to search 
for cures for their own disabilities. Because medicine still had not advanced enough to 
offer any realistic methods of curing most disabilities, as Metzler has observed, many 
disabled people would have viewed miraculous healing as their only real hope of finding 
a cure.157 There is little historical evidence, however, to suggest that Christians from the 
fourth century to the seventeenth century viewed miraculous healing, or prayers to God 
pleading for miraculous healing, to be a solution to the disability problem at the societal 
level. Christians appear, instead, to have viewed miraculous healing to be an important 
aspect of God’s plan for the world that He created. When God healed a person, then, it 
was not divine recognition that He had erred in creating a world where disabled people 
lived marginal existences but merely a demonstration of God’s plan to edify, or perhaps 
to instruct, the faithful, as is evident when Jesus cures the blind man in the Book of 
John.158   
 Able-bodied people did, however, recognize the important role of charity in 
ameliorating the problem of so many disabled people living in abject poverty. Stiker 
views the martyrdom of Zotikos, who lived in Constantinople during the reigns of 
Constantine and his sons, as a rupture between the world of classical antiquity and the 
Christian system of charity that would develop the Middle Ages.159 Indeed, Stiker claims 
that the vitae of Zotikos constitute “the exact antithesis of Greco-Roman practice. . . .”160 
Stiker points to the legend that Zotikos had defied Constantine by constructing a 
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leprosarium even though the emperor had ordered lepers to be banished or drowned.161 
For Stiker, “Constantine shows that he belongs to the world of antiquity and its practice 
of exposure, the fatal exclusion,” while “Zotikos does the opposite.”162 Although, 
according to legend, Constantine did not execute Zotikos for this transgression, Zotikos 
met his end during the reign of Constantine’s successor, whose daughter had contracted 
leprosy.163 When Zotikos came to her aid, his reward for rebelling against the practices of 
classical antiquity was martyrdom, which, according to Stiker, represents “the passage 
from one mental world to another . . . .”164 There are, however, serious problems with 
Stiker’s argument. The three vitae of Zotikos, as Timothy Miller and Crislip have 
recently pointed out, contain numerous fabrications.165 Constantine never contracted 
leprosy or ordered the execution of lepers to prevent them from spreading their affliction 
to healthy people.166 Nor do any sources, contemporary or otherwise, support the legend 
that Zotikos suffered martyrdom for attempting to help a leprous woman belonging to the 
imperial family.167 
 For Stiker, however, it matters little whether Constantine and Constantius ever 
actually dealt with leprosy in their personal lives or whether Constantius executed 
Zotikos for his refusal to respect the practices of classical antiquity. Indeed, Stiker rightly 
contends that “[w]hether the person who is celebrated is the historical one or not, and 
whether the account of his life is completely legendary or not are of no importance in this 
context.”168 What matters, he seems to argue, is that the vitae of Zotikos represent a new, 
more humane way of dealing with the disability problem and that Zotikos’s purported 
martyrdom is indicative of a very real clash between the classical world views of 
Constantine and Constantius, which, in Stiker’s view, supported the killing of 
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congenitally deformed infants to protect the able-bodied community, and the Christian 
world view of Zotikos, which required the faithful to show compassion to disabled 
people. The problem for Stiker, here, is that people in classical antiquity, as discussed in 
the previous chapter, did not address the disability problem solely by killing congenitally 
deformed infants. Nor were all able-bodied people in classical antiquity opposed to 
providing meaningful charity to the disabled. Athens, after all, created a system that 
provided disability pensions to disabled people who were sufficiently poor, while Seneca 
the Elder expressed what must have been the view of many Romans that it was a moral 
imperative to give alms to young disabled beggars, even if some Romans would have 
concluded that such wretched children would be better off dead.169 Accordingly, even if 
Zotikos had procured a leprosarium to save lepers from mass execution or, at the very 
least, later Christians assumed that the vitae of Zotikos were historically accurate, the 
martyrdom of Zotikos itself would not support Stiker’s claim of a rupture between 
classical antiquity and the Christian system of charity that would develop from the fourth 
century through the Middle Ages. The ways in which able-bodied society dealt with the 
disability problem during classical antiquity and the discourse that accompanied such 
efforts, notwithstanding Spartan practices and the requirements of the Twelve Tables, 
were far less draconian than Stiker assumes. It stands to reason, then, that the advent of 
Christian charity did not mark an absolute rupture with classical antiquity by establishing 
what Colin Jones has called a “charitable imperative.”170 
This does not mean, of course, that Christian charity had little impact on the 
disabled. Stiker is certainly correct that the systematic practice of exposing infants with 
congenital deformities found little support among Christians. John Boswell, for instance, 
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notes in The Kindness of Strangers that Christian opposition to the killing of congenitally 
deformed infants, such as Gregory of Tours’ description of a “Frankish mother of a 
severely deformed child, indicat[ing] that it was inconceivable that mothers should kill 
even deformed children,” marked a significant departure from classical antiquity, when 
many able-bodied people viewed infanticide as a viable solution to the disability 
problem.171 It is simply unfair to the able-bodied people of classical antiquity, however, 
to attribute to Christianity the invention of the idea that there was a moral imperative to 
help disabled people, even if Christianity inculcated the importance of providing alms to 
disabled people to a far greater degree than we ordinarily see in classical antiquity. 
Indeed, it is perhaps a better approach to view Christianity’s “charitable imperative” with 
respect to disabled people as an embrace of the moral impetus behind classical antiquity’s 
more humane solutions to the disability problem and a concomitant rejection of the 
systematic infanticide of Sparta, unquestionably classical antiquity’s most brutal solution 
to the disability problem.172 
Yet even if Stiker is too quick to find a rupture between the practices of classical 
antiquity and Christendom, he rightly asserts that some fourth-century Christians did take 
steps to help at least some disabled people by establishing charitable institutions in 
accordance with the tenets of the Christian faith. Basil of Caesarea, who, according to 
Crislip, “is traditionally regarded as the founder of the first hospital,” envisioned his 
fourth-century institution, called the Basileias after its founder, as “a place for the 
nourishment for the poor.”173 Crislip “surmises” that both the elderly and disabled, who 
would have comprised a class of people “who were physically incapable of providing for 
themselves,” must have found shelter within the Basileias.174 Most elderly and disabled 
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people, Crislip argues, would have been unable to survive without receiving some kind of 
alms, whether through a system of begging or institutional care, if their families were 
unable or unwilling to care for them, “usually owing to the financial burden of 
unproductive members.”175 Crislip acknowledges, however, that it is not until the later 
Byzantine period that we see a hospital—the hospital of St. Paul in Constantinople—that 
included housing expressly set aside for the “blind, crippled, aged, and disabled.”176 
 We do know that Basil offered direct assistance to lepers, one of the most 
marginalized groups of disabled people in the history of the West, by establishing a leper 
colony at his Basileias, where lepers “were housed and fed, indefinitely; their illness was 
treated, their bodies cared for, although they had no hope of recovery.”177 Gregory of 
Nazianzus praised Basil’s hospital, proclaiming that it surpassed even the “walls of 
Babylon,” the Pyramids, and the Colossus in grandeur and importance because it was 
“the most wonderful of all, the short road to salvation, the easiest ascent to heaven.”178 
Gregory was particularly impressed with Basil’s concern for lepers. Basil’s hospital, 
Gregory contended, put an end to “‘that terrible and piteous spectacle of men who are 
living corpses, the greater part of whose limbs have mortified, driven away from their 
cities and homes and public places and fountains, aye, and from their own dearest ones, 
recognizable by their names rather than by their features. . . .’”179 
Christian Charity and the Disabled: Almsgiving and Institutional Care 
Christian hegemony in the West resulted in what amounted to Christian solutions 
to the disability problem from late antiquity well into the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. According to Stiker, the Christian view of charity resulted primarily in 
almsgiving and institutionalized care.180 Although some people today might associate 
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traditional, Christian almsgiving with wretched beggars looking for largesse in public 
places, Stiker rightly points out that alms were not merely coins “that one slid into the 
beggar’s hand” but also large donations to establish “foundations and legacies.”181 
Hospices “attached to and run by a monastery, bishopric, or a lord,” meanwhile, provided 
institutionalized care to some types of poor people in Europe, albeit in the form of 
“accommodation and little else.”182 These hospices, Stiker assumes, must have housed at 
least some disabled people.183 In some ways, then, the institutionalized care of disabled 
people in Europe after late antiquity at times may have resembled the institutionalized 
care of the fourth-century Basileias, where the disabled poor may also have lived 
alongside the able-bodied poor. Yet not all disabled people were always welcome in 
hospices. Indeed, Stiker points out that hospices always excluded lepers who had their 
own institutions, sometimes excluded paralytics, and frequently excluded “the lame, one-
armed, and blind.”184 Hospices provided basic custodial services and little else for people 
expected to recover in time. Their role was not ordinarily to provide long-term 
institutional care for the incurable disabled population.185    
Disability studies, of course, had not progressed enough by the 1980s to enable 
Stiker to answer every question about disability from late antiquity to the seventeenth 
century. He questions, for instance, whether medieval Europeans distinguished between 
the disabled poor and the non-disabled poor.186 As more disability scholars have 
uncovered pertinent texts and have written their own works on disability history, it has 
become apparent that Europeans did indeed distinguish, at least to some extent, between 
the disabled poor and non-disabled poor. Mark P. O’Tool, for instance, has recently 
observed that medieval French farce distinguished between some groups of the disabled 
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poor and the non-disabled poor by replicating the “image of quarrelsome and sexually 
grotesque blind beggars. . . .”187  
Yet the extent to which European societies treated the disabled poor differently 
from the non-disabled poor remains difficult to judge. English law, at least by the late 
fourteenth century, did make such a distinction. In 1388, the English Parliament enacted a 
statute, called the 12th Richard II, which distinguished between beggars and “beggars 
impotent to serve,” requiring the latter to “abide in the cities and towns where they be 
dwelling at the time of the proclamation of this statute” or, in some cases, to return “to 
the towns where they were born. . . .”188  In Paris in 1449, meanwhile, two men and a 
woman stood trial for cruelly kidnapping children “in order to blind and mutilate them 
and send them into the streets as beggars,” a scheme that would have made the monster in 
Seneca the Elder’s Mendici Debilitati proud.189 The entire plot, of course, hinged upon 
the belief of the perpetrators that disabled children would likely receive more alms 
through begging than able-bodied, adult beggars. In 1553, a committee of twenty-four 
notable inhabitants of London returned to the idea of the “impotent poor” when it divided 
the poor into three degrees: (1) the “poor by impotency,” (2) the “poor by casualty,” and 
(3) the “thriftless poor.” The committee further divided the “poor by impotency” into 
three subgroups: (a) the “fatherless poor man’s child,” (b) the “aged, blind and lame,” 
and (c) the “diseased person by leprosy, dropsy, etc.”190   
Even by the end of the seventeenth century, when some able-bodied societies, as 
we shall see, were attempting to reduce begging by providing certain disabled people 
with institutional care, or, as some would say, by thrusting institutional care upon them, 
we continue to see a distinction between disabled beggars and able-bodied beggars. In 
 192 
 
1693, the author of Proposals for improving able beggars to the best advantage 
distinguished between both types of beggars in proposing a draconian law designed to 
eradicate able-bodied begging. In that text, the author views “able ide People” as extreme 
dangers to the community, particularly those who choose to become “able beggars,” 
thereby unjustly taking resources from other able-bodied people industrious enough to 
labor for their own bread.191 Because efforts to confine such able beggars to workhouses 
had failed in the author’s estimation, lawmakers needed to enact a new law that would 
empower any person “to seize Beggars of whatsoever Sex or Age, wherever they shall 
find them actually begging” and to treat them virtually as slaves.192 The underlying 
assumption of the proposed law, of course, was that it would be unjust to punish disabled 
beggars, even those disposed to idleness, with what amounted to slavery when their 
disabilities afforded them far fewer labor opportunities than able-bodied beggars. Indeed, 
able-bodied beggars had nothing to blame, in the eyes of many Europeans, but their own 
idleness. Until more disability scholars conduct research into the disabled poor and non-
disabled poor before 1388, however, it is difficult to inquire into attitudes about able 
beggars and disabled beggars in earlier periods.   
There is less confusion about Christian institutions specifically designed for 
particular groups of disabled people. There is admittedly some debate among disability 
historians about whether the history of lepers and the leprosaria, where lepers received 
institutional care, are relevant to the field of disability studies. Metzler, for instance, 
unlike Stiker and Herbert C. Covey, excludes leprosy from her work on disability in the 
high Middle Ages because “it falls into a category of its own, with its own symbolism, 
meaning and aetiology.”193 Metzler is certainly correct, of course, that medieval 
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Christians represented lepers as something unique even when compared to other types of 
people with physical disabilities. Yet there are many groups that scholars today include in 
the study of disability history whom able-bodied people have historically viewed as sui 
generis in at least some respects. Prominent thinkers from classical antiquity to the 
nineteenth century, after all, compared the deaf to animals because of their inability to 
speak and to comprehend what people were saying, while rabbinic Judaism compared 
them to mentally disabled and intoxicated people. Today, moreover, disability scholars 
such as Lennard Davis debate whether sign language, which deaf people and their 
associates developed over the millennia to compensate for their inability to hear and to 
speak, is such a significant aspect of deaf culture that deaf people, as deaf activists often 
contend, form a group separate from disabled people even as most disability historians 
recognize that the history of deafness is inextricably intertwined with the history of 
disability.194 Lepers, in my view, are similar to the deaf in that some aspects of leper 
culture were so unique that disability historians must not assume that lepers and other 
disabled people, either during the Middle Ages or later periods, shared identical 
experiences with respect to the experience of disability.  
Yet to decline to study the ways in which able-bodied society treated lepers 
because their disabilities originated from a contagious disease, albeit one with great 
cultural and symbolic significance, rather than through congenital deformity, warfare, or 
accident would raise at least two serious problems. First, it would run the risk of 
overemphasizing the differences between disability in a general sense and disability 
caused by disease in the pre-modern mind, a distinction that is probably more indicative 
of how modern observers familiar with the germ theory of disease conceptualize 
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disability and disease. Later in her monograph, in fact, Metzler again comes dangerously 
close to applying modern theories about disability to the Middle Ages when she criticizes 
the work Ronald Finucane because it “blurs those distinctions, which modern theorists 
would make, between ‘disability’ and ‘illness’ . . . .”195 It is understandable, of course, 
that a disability scholar such as Metzler would want to examine disability rather than 
illness or disease in the Middle Ages. Metzler is even on solid ground in asserting that 
“making distinctions between ‘disability’ and ‘illness’ is one of the cornerstones of 
disability theories.”196 That does not mean, however, that medieval Europeans, as 
Finucane rightly recognizes, distinguished between disability and illness in accordance 
with modern, theoretical frameworks. Indeed, medieval historians who tackle the subject 
of disability, like all disability historians, must remain ever vigilant not to apply modern 
theories about disability to their historical subjects. With respect to leprosy and other 
diseases and illnesses that can result in permanent, physical disability in the pre-modern 
West, this means recognizing that able-bodied observers made far fewer distinctions 
between the various types of physical affliction that can befall human beings than we 
ordinarily find in the modern world. Second, the disabilities of Alexander Pope, one of 
the most important disabled figures in the history of the West, were likely the result of 
tuberculosis rather than congenital deformity, accident, or warfare.197 It would make little 
sense, then, to exclude discussions of leprosy from works of disability history simply 
because able-bodied society reacted to leprosy in a manner that differed from its reactions 
to physical disabilities caused by other types of infectious diseases such as tuberculosis. 
In any event, the decision of Europeans to deal with the problem of leprosy by providing 
them with institutional care does provide historians with important insights about 
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Christendom’s attempt to deal with the larger disability problem, even if the only insight 
is that able-bodied society treated lepers differently from other groups of disabled people, 
in part, because it socially constructed leprosy in a manner that differed from the ways in 
which it socially constructed other disabilities.  
Whatever consensus disability scholars ultimately fashion with respect to the 
controversy about whether to include lepers and their leprosaria in discussions of 
disability in the pre-modern West, there is no debate about whether the blind residents of 
hospices created specifically for blind people are relevant to the history of the disabled. 
There are, however, considerable gaps in our knowledge about the precise nature of the 
earliest of these hospices. As Wheatley has recently observed, William the Conqueror 
may have founded hospices for the blind in the eleventh century, even if, as Wheatley 
himself acknowledges, Brigitte Gauthier could find evidence of only two of the four 
hospices attributed to the famed Norman.198 For some time, moreover, popular tradition 
obscured the history of hospices for the blind in France, attributing Louis IX’s founding 
of the Quinze-Vingts, an institution for the Parisian blind, to his desire to accommodate 
blinded crusaders. Modern scholarship, however, has demonstrated that that tradition was 
simply the venerable institution’s colorful, foundation myth.199 Yet even modern scholars 
have perpetuated some misconceptions about the Quinze-Vingts. As O’Tool has pointed 
out, some studies have “left the impression that the residents of the Quinze-Vingts were 
simply poor blind beggars, rather than working members of the community” when the 
residents were, in fact, “drawn almost exclusively from the lower and middling levels of 
the medieval Parisian bourgeoisie.”200 O’Tool attributes the shortcomings of previous 
studies to “disability creep,” a discursive phenomenon that reduces the lives of disabled 
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people “to presumed ideas about disability, denies the agency they had in the process of 
identity formation, and effaces the importance of other elements of their characters.”201 
O’Tool convincingly argues that his study demonstrates the “usefulness of setting aside, 
at least temporarily, our preoccupation with disability when analyzing people with 
disabilities so that we do not forget that the identities of people with disabilities are 
multivalent and not solely dependent upon their disabilities.”202 Indeed, disability 
historians must always remain mindful not to reduce the lives of the disabled to their 
experiences with the stigma and discrimination associated with disability, even if such 
experiences have a profound impact on identity formation in any age. 
In any event, the founding of the Quinze-Vingts along with the accommodations 
and privileges provided to its blind residents reveal important aspects of the medieval 
view of begging and institutional care. Louis IX founded the hospice in Paris in 1256, 
just two years before he “expelled beggars from the city, ostensibly because of their 
perceived dishonesty and unruliness.”203 According to Wheatley, “[a]nxieties about able-
bodied beggars tricking unwitting almsgivers would have contributed to Louis’ 
motivation to establish the hospice, whose residents wore institutional uniforms 
identifying them as fully licensed, genuinely disabled members of the royally sanctioned 
institution.”204 Pope Clement VI granted them “the privilege of begging at churches both 
within and outside of Paris” in 1265, a privilege “confirmed by three successive popes 
and the Council of Trent.”205 Zina Weygand has pointed out, moreover, that the founding 
of the Quinze-Vingts was “part of a broad movement that culminated in the thirteenth 
century, when numerous hospitals, hospices [hotels-Dieu], and monastic hospitals 
[maisons-Dieu] opened just about everywhere in the cities and countryside.”206 This 
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movement produced not only the Quinze-Vingts but also numerous “confraternities of the 
blind [avuegleries].”207 What we see here, then, is once again the distinction between 
disabled beggars and able-bodied beggars, this time in the form of the blind beggar 
worthy of alms contrasted by the able-bodied beggar worthy of exile. What we also see, 
according to Weygand, is the beginning of the state’s involvement in providing aid to the 
disabled. According to Weygand, “by supporting the congregation of the blind poor in 
Paris, Saint Louis demonstrated, for the first time in the history of the French kingdom, 
the responsibility the institution of the monarchy had for disabled people, and he paved 
the way for the state to take on a social problem previously abandoned to the Church or 
to individual generosity.”208 
For the next several centuries after the founding of the Quinze-Vingts, able-
bodied society would become increasingly concerned about the problems associated with 
disabled begging. Wheatley, of course, sees the entire medieval system as one that 
potentially did view disabled beggars as dangerous and in need of social control. We 
have already have seen how medieval French farce, contributed to the notion that 
disabled beggars could be dangerous by replicating the “image of quarrelsome and 
sexually grotesque blind beggars. . . .”209 If the purveyors of Christian alms, as Wheatley 
argues, conditioned their beneficence to such disabled beggars becoming “worthy,” then 
Christian charity, at least in some circumstances, may indeed have acted as a powerful 
form of social control.210 By the seventeenth century, at any rate, fears about disabled 
beggars would contribute to what Foucault famously called “the great confinement,” 
which, even if it was not as “great” as Foucault imagined, did attempt to reduce disabled 
begging by increasing the number of institutions that could accommodate or, as Foucault 
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would argue, confine some groups of disabled people. Indeed, the desire to rid urban 
areas of disabled beggars, as discussed in the next chapter, played a pivotal role in Louis 
XIV’s decision to construct the Hôtel des Invalides for his disabled veterans in the 
seventeenth century. 
Conclusion 
Christian hegemony had a profound impact on both the idea that there was 
something significant about the existence of congenital deformity and the idea that there 
was a disability problem, even if Christianity did not mark a rupture with classical 
antiquity as Stiker has posited. Indeed, various classical ideas about disability continued 
to proliferate with the advent of Christian hegemony, particularly the idea that there was 
divine significance to monstrosities and the idea, expressed by both the Athenians and the 
elder Seneca, that there was a moral imperative to render assistance to the disabled. The 
various categories for disabled people that had exacerbated the stigma and discrimination 
experienced by disabled people likewise continued to proliferate in the Christian world 
from late antiquity to the seventeenth century. Stiker rightly points out, however, that it is 
difficult to analyze ideas about disability from late antiquity to the middle of the 
seventeenth century without a firm understanding of how both the Hebrew Bible and the 
Christian New Testament reflected not only negative stereotypes about disability but also 
the notion that the devout had an obligation to aid the disabled. Stiker is also on solid 
ground when contending that Christianity (1) discouraged the killing of children with 
severe congenital deformities, despite the survival of the practice well into the 
seventeenth century and (2) created a system that relied on both almsgiving and 
institutional care to address the disability problem. Many of these Christian ideas would 
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persist from the middle of the seventeenth century to the French Revolution, of course, 
even as westerners constructed a new mechanistic world view and looked for new, more 
effective ways of addressing the disability problem.
____________________________________ 
1
 Edward Wheatley, Stumbling Blocks Before the Blind: Medieval Constructions of a Disability (Ann 
Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2010), 13. Wheatley has concluded that a proper understanding 
of what he calls the “religious model of disability,” is an essential prerequisite to understanding the 
complexities of disability discourse in medieval Europe. See ibid., 9-19. He likewise believes that one of 
the things that separates classical antiquity from the Middle Ages was a “kind of unified discursive system” 
embodied by “orthodox Christian teaching. . . .” Ibid., 13. 
2
 Irina Metzler, Disability in Medieval Europe: Thinking About Physical Impairment During the High 
Middle Ages, c. 1100-1400 (London: Routledge, 2006), 69; Lorraine Daston and Katharine Park, Wonders 
and the Order of Nature, 1150-1750 (New York: Zone Books, 2001), 50. 
3
 Daston and Park, Wonders and the Order of Nature, 112-3. 
4
 Sarah Alison Miller, Medieval Monstrosity and the Female Body (New York: Routledge, 2010), 55-6, 86-
87; Monica Green, “From ‘Diseases of Women’ to ‘Secrets of Women’: The Transformation of 
Gynecological Literature in the Later Middle Ages,” The Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies 
30(1) (Winter 2000), 5-39:14-5. 
5
 Sarah Alison Miller, Medieval Monstrosity and the Female Body, 86-7. 
6
 Daston and Park, Wonders and the Order of Nature, 49. 
7
 Ibid., 126. 
8
 See Lorraine Daston and Katharine Park, “Unnatural Conceptions: The Study of Monsters in Sixteenth- 
and Seventeenth-Century France and England,” Past and Present, no. 92 (August 1981): 26. 
9
 Andrew T. Crislip, From Monastery to Hospital: Christian Monasticism and the Transformation of 
Health Care in Late Antiquity (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2005), 115-6. 
10
 Stiker Henri-Jacques Stiker, A History of Disability, trans., William Sayers (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1999), 77; see also Wheatley, Stumbling Blocks Before the Blind, 13. 
11
 Crislip, From Monastery to Hospital, 116. 
12
 Wheatley, Stumbling Blocks Before the Blind, 13. 
13
 Ibid., 14. 
14
 Ibid. 
15
 See Stiker, A History of Disability, 77; Wheatley, Stumbling Blocks Before the Blind, 13.  
16
 See Stiker, A History of Disability, 23. 
17
 See ibid., 23. 
18
 Ibid., 39. 
19
 Wheatley has likewise concluded that a proper understanding of what he calls the “religious model of 
disability,” is an essential prerequisite to understanding the complexities of disability discourse in medieval 
Europe. See Wheatley, Stumbling Blocks Before the Blind, 9-19. He believes that one of the things that 
separates classical antiquity from the Middle Ages was a “kind of unified discursive system” embodied by 
“orthodox Christian teaching. . . .” Ibid., 13. 
20
 Stiker, A History of Disability, 29; Judith Z. Abrams, Judaism and Disability (Washington, D.C.: 
Gallaudet University Press, 1998), 42-5, 69. 
21
 Stiker, A History of Disability, 24-9; Abrams, Judaism and Disability, 23-7. 
22
 Leviticus 21:16-23; see also Leviticus 22:4 (prohibiting Aaron’s offspring who contract leprosy to eat of 
the sacred donations until they are clean). Abrams points out that deafness, mental illness, and mental 
disability are not included here “perhaps because they were not considered readily visible defects.” Those 
disabilities, however, became important under the rabbinic system, which developed after the destruction of 
the Second Temple. Abrams, Judaism and Disability, 9, 23. 
 
 200 
 
____________________________________ 
 
23
 Leviticus 22:21-22. According to Abrams, the Mishnah “recognizes the link between the sacrificial 
animals and the priests, and the role blemishes play in their disqualification from the cult.” Abrams, 
Judaism and Disability, 28. 
24
 M.Bekorot 7:1, as quoted by Abrams, Judaism and Disability, 28. Abrams points out that the Mishnah’s 
proscriptions were only theoretical because “the cult did not operate during the era of the Mishnah.” 
Indeed, Abrams explains that “a priest offering a blessing in a synagogue is treated much more leniently.” 
Abrams, Judaism and Disability, 28. 
25
 Abrams, Judaism and Disability, 28. 
26
 Ibid., 29. 
27
 Metzler, Disability in Medieval Europe, 40-1. She likewise surmises that the Apostolic Constitutions, 
from either the fourth or fifth century, may have discouraged “people who had an impairment prior to 
applying for the priesthood from doing so,” but may have allowed priests to continue to serve if they 
“became impaired after they had become” priests. She does point out, however, that individual disabled 
people may have been able to obtain dispensations to allow them to serve as priests. Ibid., 40. 
28
 2 Samuel 5:6. 
29
 2 Samuel 5:8. 
30
 2 Samuel 9:11-13. David may simply have hated blind and lame Jebusties rather than all blind and lame 
people with the notable exception of Mephibosheth. 
31
 For examples of the relationship between divine will and misfortune in both the Hebrew Bible and the 
New Testament, see Genesis 38:7; Exodus 20:5, 34:7; Leviticus 26:14-39, Numbers 5:12-31, 12:1-16, 
14:18, 14:36-37, 16:46-50, 25:1-9; Deuteronomy 4:3, 5:9, 28:22, 28:27-29, 28:34, 28:35, 28:61, 32:23-27, 
32:39, Joshua 23:16, 24:5, 24:20; Judges 2:11-15, 9:56-57, 1 Samuel 5:6-7, 5:8-12, 25:38-39; 2 Samuel 
3:29-30, 3:39, 12:14-19; 1 Kings 14:6-14; 2 Kings 5:25-27, 6:18-20, 8:1, 15:5, 19:35, 22:16-17; 1 
Chronicles 13:9-11; 2 Chronicles 13:20 20:35-37, 21:12-19,  26:19-21; Job 4:1-11, 8:4-7, 11:1-20, 15:20-
35, 18:1-21, 20:1-29, 34:11, 34:31-32; Psalms 10:15, 12:5-7, 37:1-40, 37:17, 64:7, 68:2, 75:7-10, 78:30-31, 
89:30-33, 106:13-15, 106:29, 119:18-20, 141:5-7, 145:20; Proverbs 2:16-18; 3:33, 5:22-23, 6:33, 10:3, 
11:21, 12:21, 13:21, 14:11, 14:32, 15:6, 15:10, 19:16, 24:10-12, 29:1; Ecclesiastes 2:26; Isaiah 1:5-6, 1:27-
28, 2:9-22, 3:8-11, 3:24, 5:7-17, 59:18, 65:7, 65:13-15; Jeremiah 5:3, 5:6, 6:6, 6:11-12, 6:15, 6:19, 8:12, 
9:9, 9:11, 11:22-23, 14:12, 14:16, 15:2-4, 16:4, 19:8-9, 21:9, 24:10, 27:8, 28:16-17, 30:12-15, 33:6, 33:11, 
34:17, 40:2-3, 42:15-17, 42:21-22, 45:11-13, 44:12-14, 46:25; Lamentations 1:22; Ezekiel 7:3-4, 7:15-27, 
9:5-6, 14:12-20, 18:4, 18:5-9, 26:3, 26:21, 33:13; Daniel 6:21-22; Hosea 5:11-15, 8:13, 9:11-12, 12:2-3; 
Micah 4:2-5; Nahum 3:5-10; Malachi 1:4, 4:1-3; Matthew 18:23-35; Luke 13:1-5, 19:41-44, 19:20-28; 
John 3:36, 15:1-7; Acts 3:23, 5:1-10, 13:6-12, 22:6-11; Romans 1:18-32, 2:6-10, 12:19; 1 Thessalonians 
2:16; 2 Thessalonians 1:6-10; Jude 6-7, 14-15; Revelation 12:7-9, 16:1-21. 
32
 Deuteronomy 28:27-29. 
33
 While David was walking on his roof, he saw Bathsheba bathing. Although she was the wife of his 
faithful soldier, Uriah, David sent messengers to bring Bathsheba to him, and they lay together. Shortly 
thereafter, she informed David that she was pregnant. David ordered Uriah to lay with Bathsheba so that it 
would appear that Uriah was the father of the child. Uriah, however, refused, informing David that he 
would not enjoy the company of his wife while his fellow soldiers were on a military campaign. David then 
ordered Joab to place Uriah at the vanguard of the hardest fighting. When Uriah met the enemy, David 
ordered Joab to withdraw his troops, abandoning Uriah to his fate. (2 Samuel 11:1-17). David thus effected 
the murder of Uriah so as to hide his affair. 
34
 2 Samuel 12:14-15. 
35
 2 Samuel 12:16-18. 
36
 Exodus 20:5, 34:7; Numbers 14:18; Deuteronomy 5:9. 
37
 See The New Oxford Annotated Bible, new revised standard version., eds., Bruce M. Metzger and Roland 
E. Murphy, New Standard Rev. Ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 960. 
38
 Jeremiah 32:18. 
39
 Ezekiel 18:20. For a brief description of Ezekiel, see The New Oxford Annotated Bible, 1057. 
40
 John 9:1-2. 
 
 201 
 
____________________________________ 
 
41
 John 9:3. 
42
 Job 2:4-7. God gives Satan power over Job provided that Satan spares Job’s life. Job 2:6. 
43
 Job 2:6. 
44
 Luke 14-15. 
45
 Luke 13:11-17. 
46
 Luke 13:11-13. 
47
 Job 1:1. 
48
 Job 1:8, 2:3. 
49
 Job 2:4-7. 
50
 Job 4:7, 8:4-6, 11:1-11, 15:20-35, 18:1-21, 34:10-12, 36:1-23. Job answers his friends, “I also could talk 
as you do, if you were in my place; I could join words against you, and shake my head at you.” Job 16:4. 
“Those at ease have contempt for misfortune.” Job 12:5. 
51
 Ecclesiastes 8:14. 
52
 John 9:3. 
53
 Leviticus 19:14.    
54
 Deuteronomy 27:18. 
55
 Job 29:11-17. 
56
 Mark 10:46-52; see also Luke 18:35-43. In Matthew, Jesus heals two blind beggars rather than one. 
Mark: 20:29-34. 
57
 Psalms 43:1. He also desires healing so that he might travel to Jerusalem. Psalms 43:3. 
58
 Stiker, A History of Disability, 25; see also Abrams, Judaism and Disability, 45-9. 
59
 Stiker, A History of Disability, 23, Abrams, Judaism and Disability, 15. 
60
 For ambiguities in the Jewish tradition, see Abrams, Judaism and Disability, 69. 
61
 See, e.g., Jean Céard, La nature et les prodiges: l’insolite au XVIe siècle, en France (Geneva: Librairie 
Droz, 1977), 31, 43-48, 418-20. 
62
 Pierre Boaistuau, Histoire prodigieuses, 1561 edition (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 2010 [1561]), 447-50. 
63
 Ambroise Paré, Des monstres et prodiges (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1971), 3.     
64
 Augustine, The City of God, trans., William Green (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995 [1972], 
48-9 (August.C.D.22.8). 
65
 Ibid., 56-7 (August.C.D.22.8); see also Cicero, De Divinatione, vol. 20, 28 vols., trans., William 
Armistead Falconer (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996 [1923]), 324-5 (Cic.Div.1.93). 
66
 Augustine, City of God, 58-9 (August.C.D..22.8).  
67
 Ibid. 50-1 (August.C.D..22.8).  
68
 Ibid. (August.C.D..22.8).  
69
 Isidore of Seville, Etymologiarum sive originum libri XX, 11.3.1-4, ed., W.M. Lindsay, 2 vols. (Oxford 
Clarendon Press, 1911), as quoted by Lorraine Daston and Katharine Park, Wonders and the Order of 
Nature 1150-1750 (New York: Zone Books, 2001),  50. 
70
 Daston and Park, Wonders and the Order of Nature, 50. 
71
 Isidore of Seville, The Etymologies of Isidore of Seville, trans., Stephen A. Barney, W.J. Lewis, J.A. 
Beach, Oliver  Berghof. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 244. 
72
 Ibid. 
73
 Ibid. 
74
 Compare the differences between Isidore’s portents and portentuosi (“unnatural beings”) with Paré’s 
distinction between monsters and portents. For Paré, monsters were “things that appear outside the course 
of nature (and most often are signs of some misfortune to come) like an infant born with one arm. . . .” He 
defines portents, by contrast, as “things that occur completely against nature, like woman who gives birth to 
a serpent, or a dog. . . .” Ambroise Paré, Des monstres et prodiges, 3. 
75
 Isidore of Seville, The Etymologies of Isidore of Seville, 244. He goes on to discuss monstrous races in 
various parts of the world.  XI.12-39, p. 244-6. For a brief discussion of Isidore’s classification of 
monstrosity, see David Williams, Deformed Discourse: The Function of the Monster in Medieval Thought 
and Literature (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1996), 107. 
 
 202 
 
____________________________________ 
 
76
 Daston and Park, Wonders and the Order of Nature, 1150-1750 (New York: Zone Books, 2001), 50. For 
more on the importance of Augustine and Isidore for the medieval understanding of monstrosity, see 
Daston and Park, “Unnatural Conceptions: The Study of Monsters in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century 
France and England,” 23. 
77
 See Miller, Medieval Monstrosity and the Female Body, 86 
78
 See ibid. 
79
 Stiker, A History of Disability,  76. 
80
 Miller, Medieval Monstrosity and the Female Body, 1, 2. 
81
 Daston and Park, “Unnatural Conceptions: The Study of Monsters in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century 
France and England,” 25-6. 
82
 Alan W. Bates, Emblematic Monsters: Unnatural Conceptions and Deformed Births in Early Modern 
Europe (Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi, 2005), 15. 
83
 Ibid. 
84
 Bates agrees that the printing press facilitated a war for the hearts of Catholic and Protestant believers. 
See ibid. 
85
 Preserved Smith, “The Mooncalf,” Modern Philology 11, no.3 (January 1914): 355. For more on Luther, 
Melancthon and the monstrous calf, see Daston and Park, “Unnatural Conceptions: The Study of Monsters 
in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century France and England,” 26. 
86
 See Smith, “The Mooncalf,” 355. 
87
 Ibid. 
88
 Ibid., 356. Other Catholics likewise spread word of the astrologer’s conclusion to the masses. Smith, 356. 
89
 Ibid. The monstrous hybrid had the body of a woman, the head of an ass, the foot of an elephant, the fin 
of a fish, and a dragon’s head as a tail. Ibid. For more on Luther and Melanchthon, see Julie Crawford, 
Marvelous Protestantism: Monstrous Births in Post-Reformation England (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2005), 27-34. 
90
 Smith, “The Mooncalf,” 357. 
91
 Crawford, Marvelous Protestantism, 27.  
92
 A special grace, as quoted by Crawford, Marvelous Protestantism, 38. 
93
 Robert Hole, “Incest, Consanguinity, and a Monstrous Birth in Rural England, January 1600,” Social 
History  25, no. 2 (May 2000): 183-6. 
94John Winthrop, A Short Story of the rise, reign, and ruin of the Antinomians, Familists and Libertines 
(Ralph Smith, 1644), 43. For background on the Antinomian controversy as it pertains to Mary Dyer, see 
Anne G. Miles, “From Monster to Martyr: Re-Presenting Mary Dyer,” in Early American Literature 31, no. 
1 (2001): 1-30.  
95
 John Winthrop, The Journal of John Winthrop, ed. Richard S. Dunn et al. (Cambridge: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 1996), 254; see also John Winthrop, A Short Story of the rise, reign, and 
ruin of the Antinomians, Familists and Libertines, 44. 
96
 Winthrop, The Journal of John Winthrop, 354. 
97
 John Winthrop, A Short Story of the rise, reign, and ruin of the Antinomians, Familists and Libertines, 
44. 
98
 Winthrop, The Journal of John Winthrop, 255. 
99
 Miles, “From Monster to Martyr: Re-Presenting Mary Dyer,” 7. 
100
 Ibid., 3-4. 
101
 See Winthrop, The Journal of John Winthrop, 354. 
102
 Kenneth Silverman, The Life and Times of Cotton Mather (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 
1970), 87-8. 
103
 Ibid., 123. Mercy Short had earlier warned Mather that devils were out to get him. Ibid., 122-3. 
104
 See ibid., 336-8, 343-4 . 
105
 Davies identifies three categories of monsters under the following three headings: (1) “monsters as signs 
of divine pleasure”; (2) “ monstrous births and the order of nature”; and (3) “monstrous people at the ends 
of the earth.”  Surekha Davies, “The Unlucky, the Bad and the Ugly: Categories of Monstrosity from the 
 
 203 
 
____________________________________ 
 
Renaissance to the Enlightenment,” in The Ashgate Research Companion to Monsters and the Monstrous, 
ed., Asa Simon Mittman and Peter J. Dendle (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012), 52-71. Although monsters thought 
to inhabit distant regions of the globe, often strange hybrids of beasts and human beings, are outside the 
scope of this dissertation, Surekha rightly points out that scholars should keep in mind that all three 
categories are somewhat related. According to Surekha, “[a]lthough a particular text might appear to deal 
with one type of monster, its author would have been aware of the other types and, in some cases, drew on 
these traditions, or referred explicitly to their monsters.” Ibid., 51.  
106
 It is probable that superstitious beliefs, which almost certainly predated classical antiquity and the 
Hebrew Bible, played an important role in perpetuating the perceived connection between congenital 
deformity and divine will. 
107
 Davies, “The Unlucky, the Bad and the Ugly: Categories of Monstrosity from the Renaissance to the 
Enlightenment,” 52. 
108
 Ibid., 52-8. 
109
 See Daston and Park, Wonders and the Order of Nature,  189-91. 
110
 Janis L. Pallister, Introduction to Ambroise Paré, On Monsters and Marvels, trans. Janis L. Pallister 
(Chicago: University of Chicago, 1982), xvi. Pallister argues that Des monstres et prodiges is the most 
important book on monstrosity during the Renaissance because “it, perhaps better than any other, presents a 
synthesis of views and theories on this and other subjects, while at the same time illuminating one of the 
richest, albeit roughly-hewn, minds of sixteenth-century Europe.” Ibid., xvi. Paré, however, faced 
accusations that he borrowed so much from other authors that he essentially plagiarized Des monstres et 
prodiges. See, e.g., Jean Céard, Introduction to Ambroise Paré,  Des monstres et prodiges, xix. Paré himself 
includes among his sources Pierre Boistauau’s Histoires prodigieuses as well as Claude Tesserant, Saint 
Paul, Saint Augustine, Esdras the Prophet, Hippocrates, Galen, Empedocles, Aristotle, Pliny, and 
Lycosthenes. Ambroise Paré,  Des monstres et prodiges, 3.     
111
 Baltrušaitis, as quoted in Janis L. Pallister, Introduction to Ambroise Paré, On Monsters and Marvels, 
xxiii 
112
 Ambroise Paré, Des monstres et prodiges, 3 (emphasis added). 
113
 Ibid. 
114
 Ibid., 4.  I collated my translation with Janis L. Pallister’s translation. See On Monsters and Marvels, 4.  
In chapter 20, Paré uses the word “gueux” (beggars) rather than “belistres” (rascals), suggesting that Paré 
used the words somewhat interchangeably.  See Paré, Des monstres et prodiges, 4, 69. Yet Paré is not 
condemning ordinary beggars here but rather beggars who pretended to have some type of affliction to 
increase the effectiveness of their begging. See, e.g., ibid., 69-79. Among the several different types of 
physical affliction that, according to Paré, beggars would pretend to suffer from are deafness, muteness, 
and lameness. Ibid., 74.   
115
 For the timeline for Paré’s Des monstres et prodiges and Montaigne’s essay “Of a Monstrous Child,” 
see Janis L. Pallister, Introduction to Ambroise Paré, On Monsters and Marvels, xxiii; Montaigne, The 
Complete Works of Montaigne: Essays, Travel Journey, Letters, trans., Donald M. Frame. (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1957), xxiii. 
116
 Montaigne, The Complete Works of Montaigne, 538. 
117
 Ibid., 538-9. 
118
 Ibid., 538. 
119
 Ibid., 539. 
120
 Ibid. 
121
 Ibid. 
122
 Daston and Park, “Unnatural Conceptions: The Study of Monsters in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-
Century France and England,” 20.  
123
 Pierre Bayle, “Antoinette Bourignon,” in Dictionnaire historique et critique Vol. 1, Fifth edition 
(Amsterdam, Leyde, La Haye, Utrecht, 1740), 646. 
124
 Ibid. 
125
 Augustine, The City of God, 45. (Agust.C.D.16.8) 
 
 204 
 
____________________________________ 
 
126
 Ibid. 
127
 Daston and Park, Wonders and the Order of Nature, 189, quoting Histoire prodigieuses, vol. 6 (Jean de 
Marconville), 110-14. Claud Tesserant produced the second edition. See Daston and Park, Wonders and the 
Order of Nature, 189. 
128
 William Hanks Levy, Blindness and the blind, or, A treatise on the science of typhology (London: 
Chapman and Hall, 1872), 185. Levy was the director of the Association for Promoting the General 
Welfare of the Blind. It is from Rufinus, a pupil of Didymus, that we learn that Didymus became blind 
before beginning his primary education. Richard A. Layton, Didymus the Blind and His Circle in Late-
Antique Alexandria: Virtue and Narrative in Biblical Scholarship (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
2004),14. 
129
 Levy, Blindness and the blind, 185. 
130
 For Didymus and Origen, see ibid., 186. Diderot pointed to Didymus, Eusebius the Asiastic and Nicaise 
of Mechlin as important Christian thinkers who rose to prominence despite their blindness. Denis Diderot, 
Letter on the Blind for the Use of Those Who See, Margaret Jourdain trans. and ed. (Chicago: The Open 
Court Publishing Co., 1916), 108. 
131
 See Layton, Didymus the Blind and His Circle in Late-Antique Alexandria 21; Levy, Blindness and the 
blind, 185-6. 
132
 Layton, Didymus the Blind and His Circle in Late-Antique Alexandria,  21. 
133
 Des Tres Boçus (The Three Hunchbacks), in Cuckolds, Clerics, & Countrymen: Medieval French 
Fabliaux, trans., John DuVal (Fayetteville: The University of Arkansas Press, 1982), 36-7 (lines 27-39).  
134
 Ibid., 37 (40-44). 
135
 Ibid., 36-7  (16-17, 54-58). 
136
 Ibid., 37 (59-69). 
137
 Ibid., 37-38 (68-80). 
138
 Ibid., 38-39.  (112-131). 
139
 Ibid., 39 (132-147). 
140
 Ibid., 40  (169-176). 
141
 Ibid. (196-204). 
142
 Ibid., 41  (220-223). 
143
 Ibid., 41-2  (251-267). 
144
 Ibid., 42  (276-282). 
145
 William Shakespeare, The Taming of the Shrew, 2.1.1093. 
146
 Ibid., 2.1.1102-1106.  Seconds later, Petruchio marvels at her “princely gait.” Ibid., 2.1.1109. 
147
 William Shakespeare, Richard III, 1.1. 
148
 Herbert C. Covey, Social Perceptions of People with Disabilities in History (Springfield: Charles C. 
Thomas Publisher, 1998), 80-1. 
149
 Ibid., 81. 
150
 Ibid. 
151
 Ibid. 
152
 See ibid. 
153
 Armand Marie Leroi, Mutants: On the Form, Varieties and Errors of the Human Body (London: 
HarperCollinsPublishers, 2003), 170. 
154
 Ibid. 
155
 Covey, Social Perceptions of People with Disabilities in History, 81. 
156
 Ibid. 
157
 See Metzler, Disability in Medieval Europe,  69. 
158
 John 9:1-17. Metzler has compiled an appendix of medieval miracle narratives that demonstrate the 
importance of divine healing during the Middle Ages.  See Metzler, Disability in Medieval Europe, 191-
259. These narratives typically evince a desire to glorify God and the saints who purportedly possessed 
healing powers. They do not suggest that divine healing as a supernatural attempt to address the problem of 
caring for disabled members of a community.  
 
 205 
 
____________________________________ 
 
159
 Stiker, A History of Disability, 74. Stiker also views the martyrdom of Zotikos as a rupture between 
Jewish antiquity and Christianity. Ibid.  For Stiker, Zotikos represents a rejection of “the system of Jewish 
prohibitions” and the embrace of Christ’s view of the poor and disabled.  Ibid., 75-6. It is not clear, 
however, this fictional account of Zotikos represents any such rupture. In any case, the crux of Stiker’s 
argument with respect to Zotikos is the rejection of the classical worldview in favor of the Christian 
worldview. And it is that argument that I have decided to address in my own discussion of Christian 
charity. 
160
 Ibid., 75. Stiker refers only to one text, but he would almost certainly agree that each of the vitae 
constitutes “the antithesis of Greco-Roman practice.”   
161
 Ibid., 74. 
162
 Ibid.. 
163
 The legend is so complicated and rooted in mystery that modern scholars have sometimes been unable 
to keep track of who is supposed to be who in this legend. Stiker, for example, claims that it was the 
daughter of Constans who contracted leprosy. Ibid. Miller, by contrast, identifies her as the daughter of 
Constantius II.  Timothy S. Miller, The Orphans of Byzantium: Child Welfare in the Christian Empire 
(Washington D.C.: The Catholic University Press of America, 2003), 53. Crislip, for his part, agrees with 
Miller that it was the daughter of Constantius II who supposedly contracted leprosy, but claims that it was 
Constantius, not Constantine, who ordered the banishment or killing of all lepers. Crislip, From Monastery 
to Hospital, 193 n.74.     
164
 Stiker, A History of Disability, 74. Stiker refers to the poor leprous woman, condemned to die by her 
own father, as the “symbol of the passage from one mental world to another,” but Stiker is really arguing 
here that Zotikos’s drive to help her regardless of the consequences is what marks such a radical rupture 
between classical antiquity and Christianity. See ibid. 
165
 Miller, The Orphans of Byzantium, 53-4. Miller, 53. See also Crislip, From Monastery to Hospital, 193 
n.74.     
166
 See Miller, The Orphans of Byzantium, 54. 
167
 See ibid., 54; Crislip, From Monastery to Hospital, 193 n.74. 
168
 Stiker, A History of Disability, 74. 
169
 Lysias, trans., W.R.M. Lamb (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988 [1930]), 520-1; Seneca the 
Elder, Controversiae, vol. 2, trans., M. Winderbottom (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), 424-5 
(Lys.24.4; Sen.Con.10.4.4). 
170
 Colin Jones, The Charitable Imperative: Hospitals and Nursing in Ancient Regime and Revolutionary 
France (London: Routledge, 1989), 1-22. 
171
 John Boswell, The Kindness of Strangers (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), 212. Boswell discusses 
deformity, abandonment, and infanticide elsewhere in the book. See ibid., 89 n 132, 161 & n.79. 
172
 Disabled people have long recognized the precarious existence of deformed infants in Sparta. William 
Hay, the hunchback member of Parliament during the eighteenth century, proclaimed in Deformity: an 
essay, that he would have been killed had he been born in Sparta. William Hay, Deformity: an essay 
(London: 1755), 5-6. 
173
 Crislip, From Monastery to Hospital, 102. 
174
 Ibid., 115-6. 
175
 Ibid., 115. Crislip does not actually refer to begging as a possible means of survival for the elderly and 
disabled. He does, however, identify begging as a survival strategy for lepers.  I include begging here 
because Crislip almost certainly would agree that the elderly and the disabled, like lepers, would have 
resorted to begging for sustenance in the absence of institutional care. 
176
 Ibid., 116. 
177
 Ibid., 113-4. 
178
 Gregory of Nazianzus, Or. 43.63, as quoted by Crislip, From Monastery to Hospital, 114. 
179
 Ibid., 115. 
180
 Stiker, a History of Disability, 77-8; see also Wheatley, Stumbling Blocks Before the Blind, 13. 
181
 Stiker, A History of Disability,  77. 
 
 206 
 
____________________________________ 
 
182
 Ibid. 
183
 Ibid., 78. 
184
 Ibid., 79. 
185
 Stiker contends that it was the incurable nature of disability that resulted in the exclusion of “the lame, 
one-armed, and blind” from hospices. Ibid. 
186
 Ibid., 66. 
187
 Mark P. O’Tool, “Disability and the Suppression of Historical Identity: Rediscovering the Professional 
Backgrounds of the Blind Residents of the Hôpital des Quinze-Vingts,” in Joshua R, Eyler, ed., Disability 
in the Middle Ages: Reconsiderations and Reverberations  (Burlington: Ashgate, 2010), 11, citing Gustave 
Cohen, “La scèce de l’aveugle et de son valet dans le theater du moyen âge,” Romania: Recueil trimestriel 
des langues et des litteratures Romanes, 41 (1912):346-72; Cohen, “Le theme de l’aveugle et du 
paralytique dans la litteratures français,” in Mélanges offert à Emile Picot par ses amis et ses élèves (Paris 
1913), 393-404; Jean Dufournet, “L’aveugle au Moyen Age,” in Dufournet, trans. and ed., Le Garçon et 
l’aveugle: jeu du XIIIe siècle,edité par Mario Roques (Paris 1989), 49-84. 
188
 Karl de Schweinitz, England’s Road to Social Security: From the Statute of Laborers in 1349 to the 
Beveridge Report of 1942 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1943), 8. In 1349, England III 
had issued a proclamation forbidding anyone, “upon  the . . . pain of imprisonment,” from giving alms to 
beggars. 
189
 Wheatley, Stumbling Blocks Before the Blind, 61. Wheatley does not connect this example of mutilation 
to Seneca the Elder’s earlier account of such a scheme that I discuss in the previous chapter. 
190
 Sidney Webb and Beatrice Webb, English Poor Law History, Part I: The Old Poor Law (London: Frank 
Cass and Co., 1963 [1927]), 49. 
191
 See Proposals for improving able beggars to the best advantage (National Library of Scotland, 1693), 1-
3. 
192
 Ibid., 2. 
193
 Metzler, Disability in Medieval Europe, 5-6. Metlzer argues that she is contradicting “many medical 
historians” in claiming that medieval Europeans viewed leprosy as a type of disease rather than as a type of 
disability. Metzler, 1. For Covey’s view of leprosy, see Covey, Social Perceptions of People with 
Disabilities in History, 99. 
194
 See Lennard Davis, Enforcing Normalcy, xiv-v. 
195
 Metzler, Disability in Medieval Europe ,126. I omitted the rest of the sentence because that portion of 
the sentence is somewhat difficult to understand without the rest of the paragraph for context. 
196
 Metzler, Disability in Medieval Europe, 127. 
197
 See Maynard Mack, Pope: A Life (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 153-6;  Helen Deutsch, 
Resemblance and Disgrace: Alexander Pope and the Deformation of Culture (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1996), 1. 
198
 Wheatley, Stumbling Blocks Before the Blind,  42, citing Brigitte Gauthier, “Les ‘aveugleries’ 
médiévales (XIème-XVème siècles, Cahiers d’histoire (Lyon) 29 (2-3), 1984: 99-100.  
199
 .  For a discussion of the legendary founding of the Quinze-Vingts, see Wheatley, Stumbling Blocks 
Before the Blind, 42-3, 49-54. 
200
 O’Tool, “Disability and the Suppression of Historical Identity: Rediscovering the Professional 
Backgrounds of the Blind Residents of the Hôpital des Quinze-Vingts,” 12.  
201
 Ibid., 11. 
202
 Ibid., 23-4. 
203
 Wheatley, Stumbling Blocks Before the Blind, 44. 
204
 Ibid. 
205
 Ibid. 
206
 Zina Weygand, The Blind in French Society from the Middle Ages to the Century of Louis Braille, trans., 
Emily-Jane Cohen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 17-8. 
207
 Ibid., 18. 
208
 Ibid., 23. 
 
 207 
 
____________________________________ 
 
209
 O’Tool, “Disability and the Suppression of Historical Identity: Rediscovering the Professional 
Backgrounds of the Blind Residents of the Hôpital des Quinze-Vingts,”11, citing Gustave Cohen, “La 
scèce de l’aveugle et de son valet dans le theater du moyen âge,” Romania: Recueil trimestriel des langues 
et des littératures Romanes, 41 (1912):346-72; Cohen, “Le thème de l’aveugle et du paralytique dans la 
littératures français,” in Mélanges offert à Emile Picot par ses amis et ses élèves (Paris 1913), 393-404; 
Jean Dufournet, “L’aveugle au Moyen Age,” in Dufournet, trans. and ed., Le Garçon et l’aveugle: jeu du 
XIIIe siècle,edité par Mario Roques (Paris 1989), 49-84. 
210
 Wheatley, Stumbling Blocks Before the Blind, 14. 
 208 
 
Chapter 6: The Significance of Monsters and the Efficacy of Almsgiving Reexamined in 
the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries 
 
 During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the evolution of ideas about 
congenital deformity and the disability problem embarked on a new phase. The 
developments of this period, however, are not indicative of a linear progression toward a 
more rational understanding of the natural world.  Katharine Daston and Lorraine Park 
posited such a linear view of progress with respect to congenital deformity in their 1981 
article “Unnatural Conceptions: The Study of Monsters in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-
Century France and England.”1 In that article, they argued that ideas about monstrosity 
passed through three successive stages during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 
Shortly after 1500, they claimed, Europeans tended to associate monsters with other 
natural phenomena such as “earthquakes, floods, volcanic eruptions, celestial apparitions, 
and rains of blood, stones and other miscellanea.”2 Most Europeans, they maintained, 
viewed such phenomena as “divine prodigies, and popular interest in them was sparked 
and fuelled by the religious conflicts of the Reformation.”3 According to Daston and 
Park, however, Europeans increasingly began to cast aside their superstitious beliefs 
about monstrosities, viewing them “more and more as natural wonders—signs of nature’s 
fertility rather than God’s wrath.”4  By the end of the seventeenth century, they argued, 
monsters “had been integrated into the medical disciplines of comparative anatomy and 
embryology.”5 Ideas about monstrosity for Daston and Park in 1981, then, had undergone 
a clear evolution “from monsters as prodigies to monsters as examples of medical 
pathology. . . .”6 Daston and Park even went so far as to contend that although nearly 
everyone during the Reformation believed that monstrous births were divine prodigies, 
“only the most popular forms of literature—ballads, broadsides and the occasional 
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religious pamphlet—treated monsters in this way” by the end of the seventeenth century.7 
Not only the “professional scientist of 1700” but also “the educated layman, full of 
Baconian enthusiasm,” they asserted, viewed “religious associations with monsters” as 
“merely another manifestation of popular ignorance and superstition, fostering uncritical 
wonder rather than sober investigation of natural causes.”8  
When Daston and Park returned to the issue of monstrosity in their 2001 book, 
Wonders and the Order of Nature, 1150-1750, however, they abandoned their notion of 
“three successive stages,” explaining that they now “see three separate complexes of 
interpretations of associated emotions—horror, pleasure, and repugnance—which 
overlapped and coexisted during much of the early modern period.”9 In that work, they 
rightly conclude that “[l]ike everything else having to do with wonders, these complexes 
cannot be detached from the particular audiences, historical circumstances, and cultural 
meanings that shaped and nourished each of them.”10  In rejecting the idea of linear 
progress with respect to the “naturalization” of monstrosity, Daston and Park now hold 
the much more tenable position that some medieval writers, notably Albertus Magnus, 
ascertained natural causes for congenital deformity while “examples of monsters read as 
divine signs or enjoyed lusus naturae [as sports of nature] can be found until the late 
seventeenth century.”11 The idea that there was some type of supernatural significance to 
congenital deformity, moreover, did not perish in the seventeenth century, even in highly 
educated circles. Indeed, Alexander Pope’s eighteenth-century enemies among the 
educated elite gleefully attributed his deformities to divine wrath.   
It is certainly the case that a number of highly influential thinkers, inspired by the 
ideas of the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment, began to ponder the 
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implications of congenital deformity in new ways when fashioning a mechanical 
understanding of the natural world.12 Many of them even followed some of the greatest 
thinkers of classical antiquity in recognizing that it might be possible to uncover some of 
nature’s most elusive secrets by pondering the existence of congenital deformity. The 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however, did not extirpate supernatural 
explanations for monstrous births or produce a consensus among philosophers with 
respect to the significance of such births. Indeed, the conflux of traditional, Christian 
beliefs with respect to congenital deformity, the remnants of classical ideas about 
deformity, and the new beliefs and practices of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
led to remarkably complex ideas about the significance of congenital deformity.  
The various categories that had been evolving since classical antiquity to 
differentiate the congenitally deformed or disabled body from the ideal healthy body, 
meanwhile, continued to stigmatize congenital deformity and disability. The precise ways 
in which people utilized these categories during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
however, often depended on whether they continued to subscribe to the traditional, 
Christian view of nature and congenital deformity or to the emerging mechanical view. 
Those thinkers who rejected the notion that monstrous births were divine signs or 
manifestations of divine wrath as superstitious nonsense may have seen themselves as 
more humane in their treatment of congenitally deformed people, but they also 
contributed quite often to the stigma and discrimination accompanying deformity. Indeed, 
philosophical discussions of congenital deformity, albeit in the context of attempting to 
understand natural phenomena, reinforced the idea that congenitally deformed people 
were fundamentally inferior to able-bodied people. Simon Dickie and Roger Lund, in 
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fact, have suggested that the idea that congenitally deformed people were “sports of 
nature” may have contributed to the idea that “human deformity constitutes a legitimate 
object of ridicule. . . .”13 Indeed, English jestbooks in the middle of the eighteenth century 
routinely mocked “cripples, dwarves, and hunchbacks.”14   
Just as it would be misleading to attribute to the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries an absolute paradigm shift with respect to ideas about congenital deformity, so 
too would it be problematic to view the new ways of addressing the disability problem 
that arose during this period as indicative of a linear progression on the path to modernity 
as religious charity waned and the state increasingly assumed control over assistance to 
the disabled. Although the state did become increasingly involved in the daily lives of 
disabled people from the seventeenth century onwards, religious charity did not suddenly 
disappear as the state grew in power. Indeed, people from a variety of different 
backgrounds were involved in the creation of new ways to address the disability problem. 
A growing number social elites, including nobles, the clergy, and philosophers, were 
beginning to realize that traditional, Christian charity was not adequately addressing the 
needs of the disabled. Accordingly, both state and private philanthropists began to 
experiment with new models of helping the disabled, in part, to address the perceived 
shortcomings of Christianity’s charitable mission. Yet these efforts generally did not 
constitute a rejection of Christianity or its charitable mission. Some of the most important 
private philanthropists to address the disability problem, most notably Abbé Charles-
Michel de l’Epée, were members of the clergy. Many people who experimented with new 
ways of helping the disabled and yet were not members of the clergy, moreover, likely 
would have believed that they were carrying out their duties as righteous Christians. It 
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would be a mistake, therefore, to assume that Christian responses to the disability 
problem suddenly disappeared during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Nor did 
these new models extirpate negative stereotypes associated with efforts to provide 
assistance to the disabled that permeated both classical and traditional, Christian solutions 
to the disability problem. Indeed, new efforts to provide aid to the disabled often 
stigmatized disability in the same manner that Greco-Roman and Christian charity had 
stigmatized it; by constantly proclaiming, however rightly, that large numbers of disabled 
people needed help in order to thrive, and sometimes even to survive, in an able-bodied 
world that was often hostile to them, the discourse accompanying those new efforts often 
reinforced the idea that disabled people were inferior to their able-bodied counterparts. 
Congenital Deformity: The Mechanical World View, the Problem of Theodicy, and 
the Challenge from Radical Philosophers 
 
The second major turning point in the development of ideas about nature arose, 
according to Collingwood, between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as an 
antithesis to the earlier Greek view. “The central point of this antithesis,” Collingwood 
argues, “was the denial that the world of nature, the world studied by physical science, is 
an organism, and the assertion that it is devoid both of intelligence and life. It is therefore 
incapable of ordering its own movements in a rational manner, and indeed incapable of 
moving itself at all.”15 The movements observed in nature, then, “are imposed upon it 
from without, and their regularity is due to ‘laws of nature’ likewise imposed from 
without.”16 Accordingly, the natural world is not an organism but a machine, “a machine 
in the literal and proper sense of the word, an arrangement of bodily parts designed and 
put together and set going for a definite purpose by an intelligent mind outside itself.”17 
The thinkers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries thus agreed with the general 
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Greek view that the order of nature was “an expression of intelligence,” although they 
rejected the Greek idea that this intelligence was “nature’s own intelligence,” arguing 
instead that it was the intelligence of “the divine creator and ruler of nature.”18 According 
to Collingwood, the development of what he calls the Renaissance view of nature in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries rested upon two assumptions.  First, “it is based on 
the Christian idea of a creative and omnipotent God.”19 Second, “it is based on the human 
experience of designing and constructing machines.”20 Indeed, “[e]veryone understood 
the nature of a machine, and the experience of making and using such things had become 
part of the general consciousness of European man. It was an easy step to the proposition: 
as a clockmaker or millwright is to a clock or mill, so is God to Nature.”21 
Although the mechanistic view of nature, as Collingwood notes, began with 
Copernicus, Telesio, and Bruno in the sixteenth century, it was during the seventeenth 
century that congenital deformity would become an important topic of philosophical 
debate.22 The previous chapter noted Bacon’s recognition in 1620 that natural 
philosophers could glean important information about nature from studying 
monstrosities. Three developments over the course of the next 150 years would 
demonstrate Bacon’s perspicacity, as inquiries into congenital deformity would provide 
new insights into the nature of things. First, René Descartes’ inquiry into what a man 
born blind “sees” to understand the sense of sight and light would have a profound 
impact on how subsequent philosophers, most notably Diderot, used congenital deformity 
to explore the natural world. Second, a number of thinkers influenced by the emerging 
mechanical world view looked to congenital deformity when exploring the problem of 
theodicy, i.e., why God permits evil to exist if He is both perfectly good and omnipotent. 
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Third, radical philosophers during the eighteenth century built upon the ideas of 
Epicurus, Lucretius, Spinoza, and Hobbes to challenge the Christian and Deist 
understanding of nature and congenital deformity. 
The Mechanical View of Nature and “the Man Born Blind” 
It is well known that René Descartes, as Peter Dear has explained, argued that 
“the universe is composed of nothing but those things that mathematical magnitudes are 
suitable for describing, and that causal explanations for all observed phenomena can be 
provided from mechanical principles that fitted such a universe.”23 Although Descartes’ 
“two-substance doctrine of mind and matter” enabled him to assert that “body is one 
substance and mind is another,” he maintained that each substance “works independently 
of the other according to its own laws,” even if God unifies them via the pineal gland.24 
The human body, then, was a divinely created machine like other phenomena of the 
natural world. This idea would have a profound impact on how subsequent thinkers 
would view congenital deformity. 
It was not only Descartes’ understanding of the human body as a machine, 
however, that makes him such an important figure for the history of ideas about disability 
but also his recognition that it was possible to use examples of congenital deformity to 
test mechanical principles. It was a series of scientific advancements during the early 
seventeenth century that provided Descartes with the impetus to examine congenital 
deformity when looking at the natural world.  The invention of the telescope and 
microscope around 1600, as Marjolein Degenaar has explained, raised a number of 
important questions about optics.25 Shortly thereafter, Johannes Kepler not only 
“demonstrated that the eye’s crystalline body is not light-sensitive, but a lens,” but also 
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“discovered that the images of objects formed on the retina by the way of the lens are 
reversed and flat, a revelation that confronted him (and scientists after him) with the 
question of why we see objects the right way up and at a distance.”26 For Descartes and 
his contemporaries, then, optics was a major issue of intellectual curiosity. When 
Descartes decided to explore systematically the complexities of optics, he astutely 
recognized that one of the best ways to understand the human machine is to examine how 
it operates when it has defective parts.27 Such inquires would flourish during the 
Enlightenment, Degenaar notes, as philosophers recognized that those “lacking one or 
other of the senses were . . . interesting from the point of view of theories of knowledge 
because it was thought that they could serve to demonstrate what types of knowledge we 
possess thanks to the various distinct senses.”28 Indeed, Enlightenment thinkers went so 
far as to conclude from their inquiries that “the blind, the deaf and the lame were also . . . 
curious creatures since—according to some—they were thought to possess not only 
another capacity for acquiring knowledge but also different beliefs, morals and 
aesthetics.”29 
At the beginning of his first discourse on optics, Descartes uses the example of 
people born blind to gain a better understanding of the sense of sight.30 Descartes’ 
method with respect to the blind was not entirely new. Cicero, after all, had proposed 
using both the blind and the deaf to determine whether divination was a real phenomenon 
or merely subterfuge, suggesting that one had only to find a blind or deaf person who 
could see or hear through actual powers of divination to answer once and for all whether 
divination was possible.31 The difference between Descartes and Cicero, of course, is that 
Descartes looked at blindness to explore natural phenomena while Cicero sought to use 
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blindness and deafness to test supernatural phenomena. In any event, when raising the 
issue of blindness in his first discourse on optics, Descartes points out that people born 
blind are so accustomed to perceiving objects with their hands and sticks that “one might 
almost say that they see with their hands, or that their stick is the organ of some sixth 
sense given to them in place of sight.”32 He then argues that our eyes perceive light, 
through the medium of air, “in the same manner that the movement or resistance of the 
bodies that this blind man encounters is transmitted to this hand through the medium of 
his stick.”33 For Descartes, then, our perceptions of different colors are no different from 
the way in which the blind man notes differences between “trees, rocks, water and similar 
things through the medium of his stick. . . .”34 A comparison of the eye to the “sixth 
sense” of the blind was so fruitful for inquiries into how eyesight operates, Descartes 
believed, that it would finally answer the question of “the origin of the action that causes 
the sensation of a sight,” a question that had  long puzzled philosophers.35 “For, just as 
our blind man can sense the bodies which are around him,” Descartes argues, “not only 
through the action of these bodies when they move against his stick, but also through that 
of his hand, when they are only resisting it, so we must affirm that the objects of sight can 
be felt, not only by means of the action which, being in them, tends toward the eyes, but 
also by means of that which, being in the eyes, tends toward them.”36   
In 1688, William Molyneux, an Irish philosopher whose wife became blind 
during their first year of marriage, went beyond the Cartesian inquiry into blindness in 
attempting to determine whether a person born blind could possibly comprehend the 
sense of sight, a question that had puzzled a few notable intellectuals since at least the 
first century B.C.E. Cicero, for example, came close to providing one potential answer to 
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the question. In De Divinatione, for instance, Cicero notes that his friend Cratippus was 
accustomed to proclaiming that “if it is not possible for the function or task of sight to 
exist without the eyes, and although sometimes the eyes are not able to perform their 
usual function, a person who, even if only once, has used his eyes so as to see things as 
they really are can henceforth perceive the sense of sight as it really is.”37 Although 
Cicero does not indicate that either he or Cratippus ever expressly wondered whether a 
person born blind could understand what vision is, the implications of Cratippus’ 
argument are clear: a person born blind likely could not comprehend what it means to 
see.38 Molyneux, likely influenced by his wife’s blindness as well as his interest in optics, 
probed much more deeply into the issue, asking in a letter to John Locke whether a “Man 
Born Blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to distinguish between a Cube and a 
Sphere” would be able to distinguish those shapes if he could suddenly see.39 Both Locke 
and Molyneux, Locke explains in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 
concluded that “the Blind Man, at first sight, would not be able with certainty to say, 
which was the Globe, which the Cube, whilst he only saw them; though he could 
unerringly name them by his touch. . . .”40 The problem has proven to be so captivating, 
Degenaar has observed, that [t]hose who have attempted to solve it include not only such 
philosophers as Locke, Berkely, Reid, Leibniz, Voltaire, La Mettrie, Condillac and 
Diderot but also such psychologists as Johannes Müller, Hermann Helmholtz, and 
William James.”41 
Congenital Deformity and the Problem of Theodicy 
Leibniz and Pope went beyond Descartes, Molyneux, and Locke, discussing 
congenital deformity not only as a means of exploring how the human body operates, but 
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also as a way of addressing the existence of evil in light of the emerging mechanistic 
understanding of the universe. The impetus for Leibniz’s and Pope’s observations about 
congenital deformity and the natural world was Remark D of Pierre Bayle’s article 
“Manicheans” in his Dictionnaire historique et critique, published in 1697.42 In that 
article, Bayle uses the Manichean belief in both a good and evil principle to examine the 
problem of theodicy. The problem itself was not the product of the new, mechanical 
understanding of the universe, but rather one that had perplexed Christians for well over a 
millennium. Lactantius, for example, had raised the question in chapter thirteen of Wrath 
of God but, as Voltaire noted in his Dictionnaire Philosophique, could offer only a weak 
response, arguing that although God had wished there to be evil, he had “given us 
wisdom with which to acquire the good.”43 For the skeptic Bayle, such explanations 
would not suffice. Indeed, Bayle concludes in “Manicheans” that “reason is too feeble” to 
reconcile God’s supreme goodness and omnipotence with the existence of both moral and 
physical evil.44 Revelation and faith alone, Bayle asserts, support the traditional, 
Christian understanding of the existence of evil.45 
 In his Theodicy, Leibniz decided to prove Bayle wrong by demonstrating that it 
was possible not only to reconcile reason with faith but also “to place reason at the 
service of faith” in resolving the problem of theodicy.46 In that work, famously ridiculed 
later by Voltaire, Leibniz acknowledges that there is both moral and physical evil in the 
world, but contends that God had to create such evil to form a perfect world. Leibniz first 
asserts that God had a variety of worlds from which to choose: “for this existing world 
being contingent and an infinity of other worlds being equally possible . . . the cause of 
the world must needs have had regard or reference to all these possible worlds in order to 
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fix upon one of them.”47 Leibniz next argues that God, in his supreme and infinite 
wisdom and goodness, “cannot but have chosen the best.”48  “For as a lesser evil is a kind 
of good,” Leibniz reasons, “even so a lesser good is a kind of evil if it stands in the way 
of a greater good; and there would be something to correct in the actions of God if it were 
possible to do better.”49 Accordingly, Leibniz posits that since God had an infinite 
number of worlds from which to choose, and the perfectly good God could not have 
chosen any world but the best, it follows that this is the best of all possible worlds. 50 
 Leibniz recognizes that congenital deformity could pose some problems for his 
optimistic understanding of physical evil, noting that the problem of physical evil “has 
difficulties in common with that of the origin of metaphysical evil, examples whereof are 
furnished by monstrosities and other apparent irregularities of the universe.”51 Yet as 
Daston and Park have explained, Leibniz believed that “monsters exemplified the 
pleasure nature took in variety akin to the pleasure cultivators of tulips and carnations 
took in unusual colors and shapes.”52 Indeed, Leibniz’s view of monstrosity resembles 
Augustine’s claim in De Diversis Quaestionibus that “[a]ll things would never have been, 
had all things been equal.”53 Leibniz, however, was a firm believer in mechanical order, 
contending that “one must believe that even sufferings and monstrosities are part of 
order.”54 In perhaps the most important passage of the Theodicy to discuss congenital 
deformity, Leibniz proclaims that “it is well to bear in mind not only that it was better to 
admit these defects and these monstrosities than to violate general rules, as Father 
Malebranche sometimes argues, but also that these very monstrosities are in the rules, 
and are in conformity with general acts of will, though we be not capable of discerning 
this conformity.”55 Malebranche, of course, was significantly deformed himself.56  
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The challenge to the Christian resolution to the problem of theodicy that lurked 
beneath the surface of this claim, the challenge that Diderot would raise in his Letter on 
the Blind, was Leibniz’s inability to explain why, in creating a mechanical order, God 
concluded that it was necessary to create congenital deformity as part of the best of all 
possible worlds. Indeed, as Voltaire would later quip, such a system “undermines the 
Christian religion from its foundations, and explains nothing at all.”57 Augustine, by 
contrast, had avoided this problem in the City of God by contending that although human 
beings could not ascertain how congenital deformity operates in nature, it is relatively 
easy to understand at least one reason why God creates monsters. Because human beings 
sometimes needed portents to understand God’s will, Augustine believed, God had 
created congenital deformity, at least in part, in order to engage in symbolic 
communication with His intellectual and spiritual inferiors. Nevertheless, Leibniz 
apparently believed that his explanation of congenital deformity and other types of 
physical evil was sufficient. Indeed, Leibniz maintained that the existence of physical evil 
is “less troublesome to explain” than the existence of moral evil.58 Yet by the middle of 
the eighteenth century, as the works of Voltaire, Maupertuis, Diderot, La Mettrie, Hume, 
and d’Holbach would demonstrate, it was becoming increasingly obvious to some of 
Europe’s educated elite that congenital deformity did indeed pose serious problems for 
the Christian view of the natural world.  
In the interim, however, Alexander Pope, the hunchbacked and crippled poet, 
expressed his own optimistic understanding of deformity and the natural world in his 
anonymous Essay on Man, which popularized many of Leibniz’s ideas.59 In that poem, 
Pope agrees with Leibniz that a supremely good God could choose only the best: 
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Of Systems possible, if ’tis confessed 
That Wisdom infinite must form the best.60 
   
Pope further follows Leibniz in concluding that we must live in the best of all possible 
worlds because God would choose only the best: 
All nature is but art, unknown to thee; 
All chance, direction, which thou canst not see; 
All discord, harmony, not understood; 
All partial evil, universal good. 
And, spite of pride, in erring reason’s spite, 
One truth is clear, “Whatever is, is right.”61 
   
Pope even compares deformity to different ranks in the great chain of being, arguing that 
God could not have produced the perfect, harmonious whole without creating such 
physical imperfections: 
Is the great chain of being, that draws all to agree,  
And drawn supports, upheld by God, or thee? 
Presumptuous Man! the reason wouldst thou find, 
Why form’d so weak, so little, and so blind? 
First, if thou canst, the harder reason guess, 
Why formed no weaker, blinder, and no less? 
Ask of thy mother earth, why oaks are made 
Taller or stronger than the weeds they shade? 
Or ask of yonder argent fields above, 
Why JOVE’s Satellites are less than JOVE?62 
 
Yet Pope’s severe deformities, likely resulting from tuberculosis of the bone, or Pott’s 
disease, which he contracted at age twelve, no doubt enabled him to understand even 
better than Leibniz the substantial challenge deformity posed for Leibniz’s optimism.63 
The problems that Leibniz had addressed in the abstract in his Theodicy, Pope had 
personally experienced throughout his life. Indeed, like all deformed people who ponder 
the problem of evil, Pope did not simply have to address why God must afflict some 
people with physical deformity as part of His divine plan, but rather why God had 
physically afflicted him.  
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Pope’s views on theodicy, of course, may have had nothing to do with his 
deformities. Indeed, it is not simply unfair but also misleading to reduce every belief that 
Pope ever could have held to his deformities. Plenty of Pope’s able-bodied 
contemporaries, after all, agreed with the general contours of Leibniz’s view of theodicy. 
As prominent Pope scholars Maynard Mack and Helen Deutsch have noted, however, 
Pope’s deformities had such an impact on him that he routinely incorporated his 
experiences with deformity into his works.64 In the First Epistle of the First Book of 
Horace, Imitated, Pope expressly refers to his weakness, poor eyesight, and small stature:  
Weak tho’ I am of limb, and short of sight,  
Far from a Lynx, and not a Giant quite, 
I’ll do what MEAD and CHESELDEN advise, 
To keep these limbs, and to preserve these eyes.65 
 
Accordingly, when Pope referred to the “weak,” “little,” and “blind” when discussing the 
great chain of being in his Essay on Man in language that parallels his description of 
himself in the First Epistle on the First Book of Horace, Imitated, Pope was almost 
certainly drawing on his own experiences with deformity. When addressing disabled 
people later in the poem, moreover, he may likewise have drawn from his own 
experiences with deformity as he attempted to “vindicate the ways of God to man.”66 
Pope, for instance, contends that deformed people should not complain that God has 
unfairly afflicted them, but rather should submit willingly to His design: 
 Cease then, nor order imperfection name: 
Our proper bliss depends on what we blame.  
Know thy own point: this kind, this due degree 
Of blindness, weakness, Heav’n bestows on thee. 
Submit. In this or any other sphere, 
Secure to be as blest as thou canst bear.67 
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In the second epistle of his Essay on Man, Pope even encourages deformed people to 
rejoice at their role in God’s plan: 
 Whate’er the passion—knowledge, fame, or pelf, 
Not one will change his neighbor with himself. 
The learn’d is happy nature to explore, 
The fool is happy that he knows no more; 
The rich is happy in the plenty giv’n, 
The poor contents him with the care of heav’n. 
See the blind beggar dance, the cripple sing, 
The sot a hero, the lunatic a king—68 
 
Pope, of course, is not suggesting, as the aesthetic Anthony did to the blind Didymus in 
the fourth century B.C.E., that physically deformed people should not feel anguish on 
account of their deformities. Pope himself suffered terribly because of his own 
deformities, famously proclaiming in his Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot, 
The Muse but served to ease some friend, not wife,  
To help me through this long disease, my life.69 
    
Pope, then, simply believed that physically deformed people should not turn that anguish 
into anger and resentment against God because, Pope believed, God does only what is 
necessary to produce the greatest good. The congenitally deformed, then, should 
understand that their deformities are simply part of God’s grand, benevolent design.  
 Voltaire, who considered himself one of Pope’s close friends, likewise pondered 
congenital deformity when attempting to resolve the problem of theodicy. Indeed, 
congenital deformity seems to have played an important role in his ultimate rejection of 
the optimism of Leibniz and Pope. Voltaire was not always a foe of optimism, at least 
with respect to its non-metaphysical aspects.70 In the twenty-fifth letter of the Lettres 
philosophiques, published the year after Pope’s Essay on Man, Voltaire even seemed to 
espouse a type of optimism. As Richard Brooks explains, he echoed Leibniz and Pope in 
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contending that “man is but a link in a great chain of being and that the wise man can 
lead a happy life within the limitations of his nature and function in the grand universe.”71 
He further believed that “some of the things that Pascal considered unjust and anomalous 
in man were actually necessary for the continuance and betterment of humanity.”72 In 
1739, a year after Jean Pierre de Crousaz published his Commentaire sur la traduction en 
vers de M. Abbé Du Resnel, de l’Essai de M. Pope sur l’homme, which criticized Pope 
for suggesting that both physical and moral imperfections were part of one great system, 
one great chain of being, “so exactly link’d one to another, that no single part can be 
displaced without leaving the rest unsupported, and endangering the overthrow of the 
creation,” Voltaire continued to express views similar to Leibniz and Pope. In that year, 
after discussing Leibniz and Christian Wolff, Leibniz’s protégé, with Frederick the Great, 
Voltaire published a collected edition of his six Discours en vers sur l’homme, which 
emulates much of Pope’s Essay on Man: 
Let us be well content with destiny 
As short-lived as we, as short-sited are we; 
Not to search in vain what our master can be 
What our world could be and ought to be 
…. 
Time long enough for all to profit 
Who works and thinks to hear the limit 
…. 
And knowing that here below, pure bliss 
Human nature never permits.73 
 
 Voltaire’s brush with optimism, however, was short-lived. In Micromégas (1752), 
for instance, Voltaire no longer sees Leibniz as “le grand Leibnitz” as he does in the 
Discours en vers sur l’homme,74 but rather satirizes portions of the Theodicy. Because of 
its skeptical pessimism and harsh treatment of Leibniz, Brooks has gone so far as to 
contend that Micromégas “may be considered as a preface to both the Poème sur le 
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désastre de Lisbonne and Candide.”75  Indeed, by 1752, Voltaire had embarked upon a 
new intellectual period in his life, simply awaiting the proper catalyst to become a 
champion of pessimism. On November 1, 1755, Voltaire found his catalyst when an 
earthquake demolished much of Lisbon, perhaps the fourth largest city in Europe at the 
time.76 According to one estimate, only 3,000 of Lisbon’s 20,000 homes were still 
habitable.77 In addition, an estimated 40,000 to 60,000 people died in Portugal and North 
Africa.78 
 Late in 1755, Voltaire expressed his growing pessimism by publishing his Poëme 
sur le désastre de Lisbonne, ou examen de cet axiome: Tout est bien. The first four lines 
offer a sharp challenge to philosophical optimism:  
Miserable mortals! O deplorable land! 
Of all the curses, dreadful assemblage! 
Of needless pains, eternal discussion . . .  
Mistaken philosophers, who cry, all is well—79 
 
Towards the end of the poem, moreover, Voltaire makes his rejection of Leibniz and 
Pope complete, proclaiming his allegiance to Bayle whom Voltaire now refers to as 
“grand”: 
I abandon Plato, I reject Epicurus; 
Bayle knows more than they in every respect; he I am going to consult: 
The scales by hand, Bayle teaches us to doubt; 
Quite wise, quite grand, to be pure without a system, 
He destroys the whole lot, and struggles with himself.80 
  
Voltaire’s assault on optimism, of course, was far from finished. Voltaire thought long 
and hard about the implications of the earthquake when preparing Candide, his magnum 
opus on optimism.  
The Lisbon earthquake, however, was not the only type of misfortune that 
influenced Voltaire’s thinking during this dark period in his life. Indeed, Voltaire’s 
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correspondence demonstrates that congenital deformity also played an important role in 
his rejection of optimism. Only a few months after the Lisbon Earthquake, on February 
18, 1756, Voltaire wrote a letter to Elie Bertrand, the head priest at the French church of 
Bern and frequent confidant of Voltaire during this period,81 using Pope’s hunchback as 
evidence against optimism. In the letter, Voltaire pretends to converse with the now-dead 
Pope, asking rhetorically, “But my poor Pope, my poor hunchback, whom I have known, 
whom I have loved, who told you that God was not able to form you without hunch! You 
mock the tale of the apple. It is still, speaking humanly, and always setting aside the 
sacred, it is still more reasonable than the optimism of Leibniz; it provides a reason why 
you are a hunchback, ill, and a little malicious.”82   
There was nothing particularly novel in Voltaire’s remarks about the Fall with 
respect to congenital deformity. Adherents to the Judeo-Christian tradition had long 
mused over the specific ways in which the Fall had infused human existence with 
suffering. Voltaire, moreover, was almost certainly familiar with Bayle’s commentary on 
Antoinette Bourignon, the seventeenth-century mystic with a facial deformity, who had 
proclaimed that the Fall had destroyed the perfect state of human nature and had given 
way not only to suffering and imperfections but also to at least one type of monstrosity: 
the monstrous division of humanity into two separate sexes. In “Adam,” a chapter from 
his Dictionnaire historique et critique, Bayle had reproduced some of the “strange” 
beliefs of Antoinette Bourignon, including the idea that Adam had exhibited the 
“‘principles of both sexes’” before the Fall.83 She criticized men for believing that “‘they 
were created as they are at present,” when, in fact, “sin disfigured the work of God in 
them, and instead of men, who they should be, they have become monsters in nature, 
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divided into two imperfect sexes, unable to reproduce by themselves, as trees and plants 
reproduce. . . .’”84  When Voltaire mentioned Pope’s deformity vis-à-vis the Fall in the 
letter to Bertrand, then, he was almost certainly applying existing concepts about the Fall, 
suffering, and deformity to his hunchback friend. 
In any event, Voltaire understood that Pope’s life represented a struggle between 
the notion of the Fall and Leibniz’s optimism. Pope’s enemies, after all, had responded to 
the irascible Pope’s wit not only by rejecting his arguments but, as Kierkegaard’s 
enemies would do just over a century later, by mocking his deformities. Unlike 
Kierkegaard’s attackers, however, Pope’s detractors, as we shall see, proclaimed that God 
had punished Pope with deformity for his moral shortcomings. As Voltaire recognized, 
then, Pope had personal reasons for embracing Leibniz’s optimism over more pessimistic 
understandings of the Fall and divine punishment. Whereas Pope was nothing but a 
cursed outcast under some interpretations of the Fall, the system of Leibniz made him a 
necessary component of the best of all possible worlds, one whose lot it was to suffer for 
the “universal good.” Pope found comfort in believing that there was some benevolent 
purpose to his deformities. For Voltaire, however, the comfort of Leibniz’s optimism was 
illusory because it was impossible to accept the notion that God had to afflict some 
people, including Pope, with deformities in order to create the best of all possible worlds. 
Upon proper reflection, in fact, Leibniz’s optimism would do more psychological harm 
than good as the afflicted realized that all was most certainly not for the best. As Voltaire 
proclaims in his letter to Bertrand immediately after discussing the relationship between 
Pope’s deformities and his popularization of Leibniz, “We need a God who speaks to 
mankind. Optimism is despair.”85 
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Congenital Deformity and the Radical Challenge to both the Christian and Deist World 
Views 
 
Eighteenth-century radicals, including Maupertuis, Diderot, La Mettrie, 
d’Holbach, and Hume went far beyond Descartes, Bayle, Leibniz, Pope, and Voltaire in 
exploring the implications of the mechanical universe. The radicals agreed that congenital 
deformity presented scientists and philosophers with a means of better understanding 
nature but they were much more receptive to the ideas of Epicurus, Lucretius, Spinoza, 
and, especially for Hume, Hobbes. It is often difficult, however, to determine the extent 
to which those ideas influenced radical beliefs. Radicals had to be extremely careful 
when espousing materialist and atheistic ideas because doing so could have dire 
consequences, as the execution of Franciscus van den Eden, Spinoza’s Latin teacher, as 
well as the imprisonment of Diderot would demonstrate. Accordingly, even when 
radicals criticized Spinoza, they may have been attempting furtively to popularize his 
ideas. Maupertuis, for example, famously rebuked Diderot for criticizing Maupertuis’ 
ideas in his Pensées sur l’interprétation de la nature (1753), suggesting that Diderot was, 
in fact, secretly advocating the dangerous ideas that he purported to condemn.86 Before 
responding to Diderot, Maupertuis quotes Diderot’s purported criticism verbatim: “‘It is 
here that we are surprised that the author has not perceived the terrible consequences of 
his hypothesis; or that, if he has perceived the consequences, that he did not abandon the 
hypothesis.’”87 Maupertuis, knowing full well that nearly every major thinker in France 
would have been aware that Diderot could never again publish his true thoughts after his 
infamous imprisonment, sardonically responds, “If one were not certain of the religion of 
the author, . . ., one might suspect that his design was not to destroy the hypothesis, but to 
delineate these consequences that he calls terrible.”88 Yet despite the reluctance of some 
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radicals to share their most dangerous ideas with a world that would have persecuted 
them for those ideas, there is ample historical evidence that some of the most prominent 
radicals of the eighteenth century explored congenital deformity not only to understand 
the workings of the mechanical universe but also, as we shall see, to build upon the 
materialist ideas of Epicurus, Lucretius, Spinoza, and Hobbes so as to construct proto-
evolutionary theories that challenged not only the dominant Christian world view but also 
the world view of the Deists and their belief in design.  
In Vénus Physique (The Earthly Venus) (1743), Maupertuis discusses congenital 
deformity at great length in addressing the reproductive processes of animals, including 
human beings. In some ways, he follows the lead of Louis Lemery and Jacques-Bénigne 
Winslow, who engaged in a series of debates in the Mémoires de l’Académie des 
Sciences concerning the cause of monsters.89 Maupertuis, however, was not so interested 
in the causes of congenital deformity, particularly Lemery’s and Winslow’s theological 
arguments, but rather what the study of monsters could reveal about reproduction. In 
particular, he uses examples of monstrosity in Vénus Physique to argue against 
performationist ovism and animalculism, the two prevailing theories of Maupertuis’ day, 
arguing instead that both females and males contribute parts to the fetus.90 According to 
Maupertuis, fluids from each parent, combining far more particles than are necessary for 
reproduction, mix together to form the fetus. For Maupertuis, monsters by default, 
congenitally deformed people who lacked a particular body part, and monsters by excess, 
congenitally deformed people who had a superfluous body part, two types of monsters 
that Isidore of Seville had likewise recognized, were the result of a combination of either 
too few or too many particles.91 
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Maupertuis likewise explores monstrosity in advancing a proto-evolutionary 
theory.  Maupertuis begins his argument by pointing out that new species can arise either 
through chance or art. According to Maupertuis, new breeds of dogs, pigeons, and 
canaries begin as individual freaks or monstrosities.92 People skilled at perpetuating these 
anomalies can use their art to perpetuate these anomalies for several generations, thus 
creating a new species.93 He next argues that the same principles apply to human beings, 
pointing out that nature, by chance, produces “the cross-eyed, the lame, the gouty, and 
the tubercular.”94 Maupertuis, however, in language that not only echoes Empedocles and 
Lucretius but also comes close to the theories of evolutionary psychologists today, 
suggests that the tendency of human beings to consider congenital deformities 
unattractive creates a barrier to the proliferation of such deformed people. Indeed, 
Maupertuis proclaims that “wise nature, because of the disgust she has inspired for those 
defects, has not desired that they be continued. Consequently beauty is more apt to be 
hereditary. The slim waist and the leg that we admire are the achievements of many 
generations which have applied themselves to form them.”95   
Diderot addressed congenital deformity, both blindness and deafness and 
dumbness, not only to explore how vision and hearing contribute to language and 
knowledge but also to espouse materialistic and proto-evolutionary ideas. In his Essai sur 
les aveugles à l’usage de ceux qui voient (Letter on the Blind for the Use of Those Who 
See) (1749), Diderot follows the lead of Descartes, Molyneux, and Locke in exploring the 
relationship between sight and knowledge. Yet by the time Diderot addressed 
Molyneux’s problem in 1749, he had to address a major development that seemed to have 
already answered it. In 1728, the English surgeon William Cheselden shocked the West 
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when he published an account in the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, 
which explained how he had surgically repaired a thirteen-year-old boy’s cataracts that 
had made him essentially blind either from birth or an early age.96 Diderot, then, had to 
take into account Cheselden’s surgery when attempting to answer Molyneux’s problem.   
In 1746, just three years before Diderot published his Letter on the Blind, Étienne 
Bonnot, Abbé de Condillac, who for a time formed an intellectual and fraternal 
triumvirate with Diderot and Rousseau, felt it necessary to address Cheselden’s surgery 
when expressing his disagreement with Molyneux and Locke.97  In his Letter on the 
Origin of Human Knowledge (1746), Condillac argues that “this blind man has formed 
some ideas of depth, size, etc. in reflecting on the sensations he experiences when he 
touches some bodies.”98 If the man born blind were suddenly to gain the power of his 
sight, however, he could not immediately enjoy the spectacle of “the admirable mixture 
of light and color.”99 Indeed, “through reflection alone” he is able to enjoy this 
“treasure.”100 As he reflects on what he sees, Condillac contends, the “man born blind 
will distinguish the globe from the cube by sight since he will recognize the same ideas 
that he made for himself by touch.”101 Condillac does acknowledge, however, that his 
hypothesis seems untenable in light of Voltaire’s account of Cheselden’s cataract surgery 
and ensuing observations of the struggles that his patient experienced in attempting to 
make sense of the images that he was able to see for the first time.102 To salvage his 
hypothesis, Condillac adopts an approach similar to La Mettrie in his Natural History of 
the Soul (1745), arguing, first, that the patient’s eyes were likely too weak at first to make 
out images well enough to reflect upon them and, second, that those who observed the 
patient were so intent on proving the veracity of Molyneux’s and Locke’s original answer 
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to Molyneux’s problem that they did not even think of other potential reasons for the 
patient’s initial struggles.103 Condillac did substantially revise his views in his Treatise on 
the Sensations (1754), but not before his friend Diderot published his own influential 
Letter on the Blind.104 
Diderot astutely recognized that if he were to add anything meaningful to the 
debate over Molyneux’s problem, he would need to discuss the concepts of blindness, 
sight, and knowledge with an intelligent and educated blind person.105 Indeed, before 
offering his own answer to Molyneux’s problem in his Letter on the Blind, Diderot 
explains in great detail how his face-to-face interactions with “the Puisaux man who was 
born blind” had provided him with important insights into the relationship between vision 
and knowledge.106 Diderot introduces his readers to the blind man of Puisaux in language 
that closely parallels Descartes, explaining that the “blind man’s only knowledge of 
objects is by touch. He knows by hearing other men say so that they know objects by 
sight as he knows them by touch; at any rate that is the only idea he can form of the 
process.”107 As Diderot continues, however, it becomes clear that his friendship with the 
unnamed but brilliant blind man has indeed provided him with an understanding of 
blindness that will enable him to go well beyond not only Descartes but also Molyneux, 
Locke, and Condillac.  The blind man, Diderot explains, “knows that we cannot see our 
own face though we can touch it. Sight, he therefore concludes, is a kind of touch which 
extends to distant objects and is not applied to our face. Touch gives him an idea only in 
relief.”108 The blind man thus describes mirrors as instruments that place “‘things in relief 
at a distance from themselves, when properly placed with regard to it. It is like my hand, 
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which, to feel an object, I must not put on one side of it.’”109 “Had Descartes been born 
blind,” Diderot jokes, “he might, I think, have hugged himself for such a definition.”110 
When Diderot finally proffers an answer to Molyneux’s problem, it becomes 
evident how much Diderot has learned from his blind friend. Diderot agrees with 
Condillac that Cheselden’s cataract operations and subsequent observations had not 
proven anything because a patient’s eyes would necessarily require some time to adjust in 
order to function properly after such a surgery.111 Any experiment designed to solve 
Molyneux’s problem, then, would need to allocate sufficient time for the connection 
between the eyes and brain to work properly. Yet even if an experiment took such 
precautions, it would be of little use if it observed only one blind test subject. Indeed, 
Diderot astutely recognizes, perhaps through his interactions with his blind friend, that 
blind people, like sighted people, have different intellectual capabilities that would 
impact their ability to distinguish objects by touch and by sight. Accordingly, the answer 
to Molyneux’s problem should not address what would happen to the man born blind if 
he could suddenly see but rather what would happen to a variety of different congenitally 
blind people if they were to gain the ability to see. 
Diderot examines four different classes of blind people in search of an adequate 
answer to Molyneux’s problem. If surgeons were to perform cataract operations on the 
first class of blind people, “dullards without education and knowledge,” images would 
soon form clearly in their eyes.112 These patients, however, “being unaccustomed to any 
kind of reasoning and not knowing anything of sensation or idea, would be unable to 
compare the sensations they had received by touch with those they now receive by sight. . 
. .”
113
 The second class of blind people, a group that apparently exhibits more intelligence 
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and education than the class of dullards, “by comparing the forms they see with the 
bodies that had previously made an impression upon their  hands, and mentally applying 
touch to distant objects, would describe one body as a square, and another as a circle 
without well knowing why, their comparison of the ideas they have acquired by sight not 
being sufficiently distinct in their minds to convince their judgment.”114 The third class of 
subject, the metaphysician, would be able to “reason as if he had seen these bodies all his 
life; and after comparing the ideas acquired by sight with those acquired by touch he 
would declare as confidently as you or I: ‘I am very much inclined to think that this is the 
body which I have always called a circle, and that again what I named a square, but will 
not assert it to be really so.’” Indeed, the blind metaphysician would be more concerned 
with metaphysical questions with respect to tactile “being” versus optical “being.”115 The 
final class of test subject, a blind geometrician with the abilities of Cicero’s friend 
Diodotus or Nicholas Saunderson, the blind mathematician elected to Sir Isaac Newton’s 
famous Lucasian Chair of Mathematics at Cambridge in 1711 and author of the Elements 
of Algebra, would be able to discern by sight the same geometric properties that he had 
learned by touch. 116 According to Diderot, the blind geometrician would explain his 
confidence in distinguishing a square from a circle as follows: 
Those to whom I demonstrated the properties of the circle and the square had not 
their hands on my abacus, and did not touch the threads which I had stretched to 
outline my figures, and yet they understood me; they therefore did not see a 
square when I felt a circle, otherwise we should have been at cross-purposes; I 
should have been outlining one figure and demonstrating the properties of another 
. . . but as they all understood me, all men see alike: what they saw as a square, I 
see as a square; what they saw as a circle, I see as a circle. So this is what I have 
always called a square and that is what I have always called a circle.117     
 
Diderot bolsters his argument by pointing to Saunderson’s prodigious intellect, 
concluding that “[i]t is certain . . . that Saunderson would have been assured of his not 
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being mistaken in the judgment he had just given of the circle and the square, and that 
there are cases when the reasoning and experience of others are of value in elucidating 
the relation of sight to touch, and in teaching what a thing is to the eye, it is likewise to 
the touch.”118 
If Diderot had limited his discussion of blindness to his interactions with the blind 
man of Puisaux and Molyneux’s problem, then his letter would have been merely another 
contribution, albeit an important one, to the long-standing discourse regarding blindness 
that Descartes had initiated. Diderot’s radical, Epicurean and Spinozist proclivities, 
however, would not permit him to broach the subject of blindness without exploring how 
it validated his materialist, proto-evolutionary ideas. Indeed, Diderot uses the example of 
Saunderson in the Letter on the Blind to launch an assault not only on religion but on the 
idea of design. It does seem, at first glance, as if Diderot has introduced Saunderson to 
delineate further his ideas regarding blindness and knowledge. Diderot, for example, 
explains how the historical Saunderson was so mathematically gifted that he could lecture 
on the properties of light, color, and optics to sighted people at the University of 
Cambridge.119 Diderot also uses Saunderson to argue that a blind person’s sense of touch 
can be superior to the sense of sight in some cases, pointing out that Saunderson once 
detected counterfeit coins that had fooled a sighted connoisseur.120  
This is not to say, of course, that Diderot’s preliminary discussion lacks the 
genius that characterizes other parts of the Letter on the Blind. In defending the efficacy 
of the sense of touch, Diderot’s keen intellect is on full display as he comes close to 
identifying what modern disability scholars such as Lennard Davis view as a distinct 
relationship between disability and the socially constructed world in which we live. 
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Indeed, Diderot surmises that a culture comprised wholly of blind people “might have 
sculptors and put statues to the same use as among us to perpetuate the memory of great 
deeds, and of great persons dear to them: and in my opinion feeling such statues would 
give them a keener pleasure than we have in seeing them.”121 Diderot thus recognizes 
something ignored by the old axiom that the blear-eyed man would become king in the 
land of the blind. What the thinking behind the axiom fails to realize is that blind people 
themselves would have built the kingdom of the blind to meet the needs of the blind, 
thereby removing many obstacles that blind people encounter vis-à-vis the sighted. Such 
a kingdom, for example, would teach people to read through characters in relief rather 
than by sight. The blear-eyed man, then, would have to learn to read in relief if he wanted 
to read at all. The blind inhabitants of the kingdom, moreover, never would have needed 
to invent ways of producing artificial light inside of buildings. The blear-eyed man would 
thus find little benefit to his eyesight when meeting with his blind counterparts indoors 
because those blind people, merely by socially constructing a society for their own kind, 
would have shrouded the interiors of their buildings in darkness. The blear-eyed man 
might ultimately become king in the land of the blind, of course, but a land socially 
constructed for the blind would not make the task as easy as many sighted people assume.    
 Diderot, however, suddenly transforms his Cartesian discussion of blindness and 
epistemology into a materialistic and proto-evolutionary polemic by introducing a 
fictitious dialogue between a dying Saunderson and a minister named Gervase Holmes, 
which Diderot represents as an actual conversation that he has translated from English 
into French.122 The conversation occurs when Holmes comes to Saunderson’s deathbed, 
where the two begin to debate the existence of God.123 Saunderson confounds Holmes by 
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suggesting that the supposed marvels of the universe are simply chimeras that provide 
sighted people with a false sense of hope in design, pointing out that such marvels prove 
nothing to the blind. When Holmes attempts to prove the existence of God by pointing to 
the “marvels of nature,” Saunderson retorts, “Ah, sir . . . don’t talk to me of this 
magnificent spectacle, which it has never been my lot to enjoy. I have been condemned to 
spend my life in darkness, and you cite wonders quite outside of my understanding, and 
which are only evidence for you and for those who see as you do. If you want to make me 
believe in God you must make me touch Him.”124   
Realizing that his arguments are not persuading Saunderson, Holmes appeals to 
the authority of great thinkers, pointing out that Newton, Leibniz, and Samuel Clarke 
believed in both design and God. Yet just as Cicero rejects his brother Quintus’ reliance 
on Chrysippus, Diogenes, and Antipater to prove both the existence of gods and 
divination in De Divinatione,125 Saunderson remains unmoved. Instead of embracing the 
possibility that there might be a God, Saunderson proposes a counter theory of the origin 
of the universe—the perspective of a blind materialist. Diderot’s Saunderson, reflecting 
the impact of Lucretius and Spinoza on Diderot’s thought, rejects design in favor of a 
type of transformism, a proto-evolutionary theory, which, as Arthur O. Lovejoy pointed 
out in 1909, predated Darwin by a considerable degree.126 Matter, Saunderson contends, 
evolved from chaos to shapeless beings to the higher beings that exist today through a 
mysterious type of generation in which some beings were able to perpetuate themselves 
while others, which we call monstrosities, were not.  “I may ask you,” Saunderson 
begins, “who told you that in the first instances of the formation of animals some were 
not headless and others footless? I might affirm that such an one had no stomach, another 
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no intestines, that some which seemed to deserve a long duration from their possession of 
a stomach, palate, and teeth, came to an end owing to some defect in the heart or 
lungs.”127 Over the millennia, the monstrosities tended to disappear, as the only beings 
able to survive were those “whose mechanism was not defective in any important 
particular and who were able to support and perpetuate themselves.” 128  Directing this 
proto-evolutionary process was not some divine intellect or rational design but simply 
chance. Diderot’s Saunderson, in fact, argues that humans, along with many now-extinct 
monstrosities, would have disappeared long ago if “the first man” had had “his larynx 
closed, or had lacked suitable food, or had been defective in the organs of generation, or 
had failed to find a mate, or had propagated in another species. . . .”129  Indeed, what we 
call human beings “would have remained perhaps for ever hidden among the number of 
mere possibilities.”130 For Saunderson, then, the apparent order of the universe is an 
illusion, which is incompatible with the existence of congenital deformity. “If shapeless 
creatures had never existed,” Saunderson proclaims, “you would not fail to assert that 
none will ever appear, and that I am throwing myself headlong into chimerical fancies, 
but the order is not even now so perfect as to exclude the occasional appearance of 
monstrosities.”131    
Once Diderot’s Saunderson explains his view that human beings came into 
existence through chance rather than divine providence or rational design, he concludes 
his scathing rebuttal to Holmes by espousing the reflections of a blind materialist on the 
question of theodicy. Immediately after explaining his theory regarding transformism, 
Saunderson, for dramatic effect, turns to face Holmes and says, “Look at me, Mr. 
Holmes, I have no eyes. What have we done, you and I, to God, that one of us has this 
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organ while the other has not?”132 The people in the room, when confronted with the 
“marvels” of God from the perspective of a blind man, begin to understand his painful 
perspective on the purported order of the universe. “Saunderson uttered these words in 
such a sincere and heartfelt tone,” Diderot claims, “that the clergyman and the rest of the 
company could not remain insensible to his suffering, and began to weep bitterly.”133 The 
French authorities, of course, unlike Holmes and the imaginary group assembled at 
Saunderson’s deathbed, found no redeeming qualities to Diderot’s tale, and Diderot 
found himself imprisoned because of the impious nature of the Letter on the Blind.    
In his Letter on the Deaf and Dumb for the Use of Those Who Hear and Speak 
(1751), the now-free Diderot returned to his inquiries into the relationship between 
sensory disabilities and epistemology, examining people born deaf and mute to test his 
theories regarding the construction of language.134  The central figure in the Letter on the 
Deaf and Dumb is Diderot’s intelligent, deaf-mute friend who, according to Diderot, was 
able to communicate through “expressive gestures.”135 Diderot uses the example of his 
friend, the deaf-mute equivalent to the blind man of Puisaux in the Letter on the Blind, to 
examine the deaf-mute perspective on both language and the hearing world that often 
excludes the deaf and dumb.136  
At points in the Essai sur les sourds et muets à l’usage de ceux qui entendent et 
qui parlent (Letter on the Deaf and Dumb for the Use of Those Who Hear and Speak), 
which Diderot calls an “imitation” of the Letter on the Blind,137 Diderot approaches the 
brilliance of his prior letter in three ways. First, whereas the blind man of Puisaux had 
once explained to Diderot the fascinating blind perspective on mirrors, Diderot notes that 
his deaf-mute friend exhibited similarly interesting reactions to a machine that, according 
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to its inventor, could perform sonatas by representing them visually in color.138 
According to Diderot, his deaf-mute friend thought that the machine’s inventor was also 
deaf and dumb and that the colors represented letters of the alphabet.139 He further 
believed that musical instruments must be a means of conveying words to the hearing 
because he had seen instruments have the same effect on people as words.140 Upon seeing 
the sonata machine, then, the deaf man believed that he could finally understand what 
music was and why it had an emotional impact on people.141 Second, Diderot understands 
that deaf-mutes must experience difficulties in attempting to understand spoken language, 
arguing that it is nearly impossible to describe to a person born deaf-mute “indefinite 
portions of quantity, number, space, or time, or to make him grasp any abstract idea. One 
can never be sure that he realises the difference in tense between I made, I have made, I 
was making, and I should have made.”142  Third, Diderot recognizes that deaf-mute 
perspectives on language may provide insights into not only how early humans originally 
constructed language but also why inversions have “crept into language.”143 Diderot, 
however, wisely avoids any temptation to add to the intellectual gravitas of the Letter on 
the Deaf and Dumb by expanding on the radical ideas expressed in the Letter on the 
Blind. If Diderot had created a deaf-mute equivalent to Saunderson to challenge further 
both the Christian and Deist world views, after all, there is no telling how the French 
authorities would have reacted or what would have become of Diderot’s and Jean Le 
Rond d’Alembert’s Encyclopédie, which began to appear in 1751, the same year that 
Diderot published the Letter on the Deaf and Dumb.  
La Mettrie, a contemporary of Diderot’s and a fellow materialist, likewise 
believed that natural philosophers could begin to unlock the secrets of nature by inquiring 
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into various aspects of congenital deformity. In the final chapter of Histoire naturelle de 
l’ame (Natural History of the Soul) (1745), for example, La Mettrie uses examples of 
congenital deformity to support his argument that ideas come from the senses. His 
account of Cheselden’s cataract surgery and ruminations on Molyneux’s problem, as we 
have seen, are similar to Condillac’s later discussion of the topic in his Letter on the 
Origin of Human Knowledge (1746).144 La Mettrie, realizing that other types of 
disabilities could offer additional insights into the relationship between the senses and 
knowledge, also discusses, as he would do later in L’Homme machine (Man  a Machine) 
(1748), an excerpt from Bernard le Bovier de Fontenelle’s Histoire de l’Académie Royale 
des Sciences, which describes the curious case of a boy born deaf and dumb from 
Chartres who, after living many years as a deaf-mute, “‘suddenly began to speak to the 
great astonishment of everyone in the town.’”145 According to Fontenelle, the former 
deaf-mute understood so little of the world around him that he led a “‘purely animalistic 
life, completely occupied by objects both sensible and present, and the few ideas that he 
had received from his eyes.’”146 Fontenelle did recognize, however, that it was not his 
disability that had left the former deaf-mute in an animalistic state but rather his social 
isolation. Indeed, Fontenelle concluded that “‘[t]his was not the mental state with which 
he was naturally born, but rather the mind of a man deprived of interaction with others. . .  
.’”
147
 La Mettrie cites Fontenelle’s account to support his notion that ideas come from the 
senses, arguing that the former deaf-mute “had only those ideas that he received from the 
eyes; for it follows that if he had been blind, he would have been without ideas.”148    
In 1750, just a short time after Diderot published his Letter on the Blind, La 
Mettrie published his Système d’Èpicure, which followed Lucretius and Diderot in 
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exploring the existence of congenital deformity in an attempt to understand matter, 
motion, and chance. In that work, La Mettrie surmises that “the first generations” of 
living organisms “must have been extremely imperfect. Here, the esophagus would have 
been missing; there, the stomach, the vulva, the intestines etc. It is evident that the only 
animals that would have been able to live, to survive, and to perpetuate their species 
would have been those who were . . . provided with all of the parts necessary for 
generation. . . .”  Meanwhile, “those who had been deprived of some part of an absolute 
necessity died, either shortly after birth or at least without reproducing.”149 La Mettrie 
illustrates how such a deformity would prevent reproduction according to the Epicurean 
system by discussing the plight of a congenitally deformed woman who lacked all of her 
female organs. The unfortunate woman who, according to Mary Efrosini Gregory, was 
“just as tragic as Diderot’s Saunderson,” held out hope that doctors could help her.150 
According to La Mettrie, however, Doctors had to abandon their plan to create a vulva 
for her. In the end, the deformity that had already deprived her of the ability to procreate 
resulted in the annulment of her marriage of ten years.151   
David Hume was not as interested in exploring what the existence of congenital 
deformity could reveal about the natural world as Maupertuis, Diderot, and La Mettrie, 
but he did use monstrosity to attack religious modes of thought. In the first section of his 
Natural History of Religion (1757), Hume criticizes superstitious interpretations of 
monstrous births. “A monstrous birth,” Hume points out, “excites [a person’s] curiosity, 
and is deemed a prodigy. It alarms him from its novelty; and immediately sets him a 
trembling, and sacrificing, and praying.”152 Yet “an animal compleat in all its limbs and 
organs, is to him an ordinary spectacle, and produces no religious opinion or 
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affection.”153 For Hume, fear and trembling in the face of monstrous births, like all 
superstitious anxieties with respect to the body, arise from the inability of the “ignorant 
multitude” to understand “unknown causes,” which result in the human condition of 
“perpetual suspense betwixt life and death, health and sickness, plenty and want.”154 If 
the multitude, however, could “anatomize nature, according to the most probable, at least 
the most intelligible philosophy, they would find, that these causes are nothing but the 
particular fabric and structure of the minute parts of their own bodies and of external 
objects; and that, by a regular and constant machinery, all the events are produced, about 
which so many are concerned.”155  
In 1770, Paul Henri Thiry, baron d’Holbach anonymously published his Système 
de la nature, ou Des loix du monde physique et du monde moral, a radical work that not 
only proffered a mechanistic understanding of nature steeped in materialism but also 
defended atheism. As one might expect from a radical materialist, D’Holbach begins his 
work by castigating the superstitious for failing to realize that “nature, devoid of both 
kindness and malice, follows only necessary and immutable laws in producing and 
destroying various beings. . . .”156 Among the most important of these laws for 
D’Holbach was the notion that “[t]he universe, that vast collection of all that exists, offers 
us only matter and motion. . . .”157 Because D’Holbach, along with other materialists, 
rejected the idea that intelligence or design governed matter in motion, he attributes 
congenital deformity to various combinations of matter in accordance with nature’s 
necessary and immutable laws.158 “There can be neither monsters nor prodigies, neither 
marvels nor miracles, in nature,” D’Holbach asserts. “Those that we call monsters are 
combinations with which our eyes are not at all familiarized, but which are not any less 
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the necessary effects [of natural causes]. Those that we name prodigies, marvels, and 
supernatural effects are natural phenomena of which, because of our ignorance, we 
understand neither their principles nor their way of working. . . .”159 D’Holbach, never 
one to hold back his attacks on superstition, further contends that human beings have not 
allowed their ignorance to get in the way of attempting to find some deeper meaning 
behind such natural phenomena. Lacking any knowledge about the “true causes” of 
natural phenomena, D’Holbach proclaims, “we foolishly attributed them to fictitious 
causes, which, along with the idea of order, exist only in ourselves [i.e., in our own 
minds].”160  
The Persistence of Religious and Superstitious Beliefs about Congenital Deformity  
When looking at what philosophers from Descartes to D’Holbach wrote about 
congenital deformity, it is sometimes tempting, as Daston and Park have noted, to discern 
an incremental triumph of reason and science over superstition in the West beginning in 
the seventeenth century and continuing during the Enlightenment.161 There is a tendency 
to view the mechanistic world view of Descartes, Pope, Leibniz, and Voltaire as merely 
the first step in laying the groundwork for the eventual triumph of the modern scientific 
world view. The materialistic ideas of eighteenth-century radicals, according to such an 
interpretation of disability history, would constitute yet another important step in the 
inevitable triumph of modern science because nineteenth- and twentieth-century science 
seemingly validated so many of the radicals’ claims about matter, motion, and chance. 
The vast majority of people during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however, 
would have perceived no such triumph of materialism over either the traditional, 
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Christian world view or the Deist world view, the latter of which served as a sort of 
middle position between Christianity and materialism.  
Even the radicals, who wanted more than anyone for the Enlightenment to spread 
throughout the West, recognized that it was impossible to eradicate superstitious ideas 
from the masses. In his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, for instance, Hume 
observes that “civilized people” are less likely than “ignorant and barbarous” people to 
believe in prodigies and other supernatural explanations of the natural world because “as 
we advance nearer the enlightened ages, we soon learn, that there is nothing mysterious 
or supernatural in the case, but that all proceeds from the usual propensity of mankind 
towards the marvelous. . . .”162  He points out, however, that although the inclination to 
believe in such superstition “may at intervals receive a check from sense and learning, it 
can never be thoroughly extirpated from human nature.”163 Even today, the persistence of 
superstitious beliefs about the causes of congenital deformity, despite the clear 
connection between genetics and congenital deformity, demonstrates that Hume’s claim 
has considerable merit even for the modern world.  
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when the modern scientific 
world view scarcely seemed imaginable, superstitious beliefs were almost certainly more 
prevalent. Indeed, most ordinary people during this period were almost certainly unaware 
of the philosophical debates about matter, motion, chance, and design, and many of them 
no doubt continued to believe in various prodigies, including portentous monsters. After a 
comet appeared on November 14, 1680, and then again on December 24 of the same 
year, widespread panic famously gripped Europe. It was not only the common people 
who were terrified, but also members of the educated elite. Thomas Bartholini, for 
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example, a Danish doctor who died in early December, 1680, held that comets caused 
congenital deformity, a notion that Maupertuis later declared shameful to find in the mind 
of a learned doctor.164 Bayle, perplexed by the extent of the panic, wrote his famous 
Various Thoughts on the Occasion of a Comet as a response.165  In that work, Bayle 
criticizes not only superstitious beliefs regarding comets but also irrational fears that 
congenital deformity could be a portent of some impending disaster. In arguing that no 
one should be distressed when the wicked prosper, for example, Bayle alludes to the still 
extant “superstitious man,” who, “judging falsely that a monster presages something 
fatal, proceeds from his error to a criminal sacrifice.”166 In his Enquiry Concerning 
Human Understanding, published in 1690, John Locke, as Lund has recently explained, 
likewise suggested that some of his contemporaries continued to kill monstrous births 
because of their imperfect shape, albeit he was quick to point out that to do so would 
likely constitute murder because it is impossible to tell if a monstrous birth has a rational 
soul shortly after birth.167 It is impossible to know for certain if the superstitious masses 
of this period killed their congenitally deformed infants as did the superstitious masses of 
earlier epochs. All that is certain is that Europe’s educated elite perceived that such 
superstition continued to result in infanticide among the unenlightened segments of the 
European population.    
   Even if there were no triumph of materialism over Christianity and Deism with 
respect to congenital deformity during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a 
consensus about congenital deformity and the natural world was beginning to emerge 
among both moderate and radical philsophers. Radicals such as Maupertuis, Diderot, La 
Mettrie, Hume, and D’Holbach agreed with moderates such as Descartes, Leibniz, Pope, 
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and Voltaire that the natural world was governed by mechanistic laws and that the study 
of congenital deformity could play an important role in uncovering the secrets of those 
laws. Georges Louis Leclerc, comte de Buffon, for instance, recognized that he could test 
some of his theories by pondering some aspects of congenital deformity. When Buffon 
returned to the idea of the fixity of species in his article “De la dégénération des 
animaux” in 1766, he acknowledged that at least some monstrosities were naturally 
recurring phenomena caused by certain peculiarities of the natural world. According to 
Buffon, the “mule, which is always regarded as a contaminated production, as a monster 
composed of two natures, and which, for this reason, is judged incapable of reproducing 
itself or of producing descendants . . . is not really infertile, and its sterility depends only 
on certain external and peculiar circumstances.”168 This is obviously a far cry from the 
radical ideas of Maupertuis, Diderot, La Mettrie, Hume, and D’Holbach, but Buffon’s 
observations portended that even mainstream philosophers and scientists would continue 
to ponder what secrets of nature lurked behind the existence of congenital deformity.  
This does not mean, however, that the new ideas about congenital deformity that 
began to emerge during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries marked a complete 
rejection of earlier ideas about deformity. Instead, people with congenital deformities 
continued to endure the same types of stigma and discrimination as their classical, 
medieval, Renaissance, and Reformation counterparts. We have little evidence about how 
the “superstitious” masses treated people with congenital deformities other than anecdotal 
or overly generalized accounts of congenital deformity and infanticide, written by 
members of the educated elite about the masses that they abhorred. Bayle, for example, 
says a great deal in Various Thoughts on the Occasion of a Comet about the 
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“superstitious man” who kills congenitally deformed infants, but we hear nothing from 
the superstitious man himself about his own beliefs.169   
There is ample evidence, however, of the tendency even among the educated elite 
of this period to play on traditional fears and animosities about deformity to inflict 
emotional pain on deformed adversaries. Pope’s enemies, for instance, repeatedly 
suggested that his deformities were the result of divine wrath. In 1716, John Dennis 
launched a brutal attack on Pope in A True Character of Mr. Pope in the Flying Post.170 
In that work, Dennis claims that Pope was “one, whom God and Nature have mark’d for 
want of Common Honesty, and his own Contemptible Rhimes for want of Common 
Sense.”171 Elsewhere in The True Character, Dennis is even more explicit in connecting 
Pope to the Judeo-Christian notion that impairment is a curse or divine punishment: “’Tis 
the mark of God and Nature upon him, as a Creature not of our Original, nor our Species.  
And they who have refus’d to take this Warning which God and Nature have given them, 
and have in spight of it, by a senseless presumption, ventur’d to be familiar with him, 
have severely suffered for it, by his Perfidiousness.172 Dennis goes on to say that while he 
had heard rumors that Pope had claimed that human beings are the descendants neither of 
Adam nor the Devil, “’tis certain at least, that his Original is not from Adam, but from the 
Devil By his constant and malicious Lying, and by that Angel Face and Form of his, ’tis 
plain that he wants nothing but Horns and Tail, to be the exact Resemblance, both in 
Shape and Mind, of his Infernal Father.”173 In 1733, Pope’s former intimate friend, Lady 
Mary Wortley Montagu, along with Lord John Hervey, published Verses Address’d to the 
Imitator of the First Satire of the Second Book of Horace. By a Lady, a scathing rebuttal 
against Pope for his own vicious attacks against her in his First satire on the second book 
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of Horace, Imitated.  Lady Mary follows Dennis’ lead in attributing Pope’s deformities to 
God, proclaiming, 
It was the Equity of righteous Heav’n, 
That such a Soul to such a Form was giv’n; 
And shews the Uniformity of Fate, 
That one so odious, shou’d be born to hate. 
When God created Thee, one would believe, 
He said the same as to the Snake to Eve; 
To human Race Antipathy declare, 
’Twixt them and Thee be everlasting War. 174 
 
Lady Mary concludes by comparing Pope’s hunchback to the mark of Cain: 
But as thou hate’st, be hated by Mankind, 
And with the Emblem of thy crooked Mind, 
Mark’d on thy back, like Cain, by God’s own hand; 
Wander like him, accursed through the Land.175    
 
Stigma and Discrimination Associated with Categories of Disabled People 
Not all abuse directed at disabled people during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, of course, relied on superstitious connections between deformity and God but 
rather on categories used to group disabled people together. As Mack has observed, “by 
the time [Pope] began to be known as a successful poet he was already established in his 
own mind and in the minds of others as a dwarf and a cripple.”176 Pope’s enemies 
callously utilized these categories to ridicule Pope. In 1729, the anonymous Pope 
Alexander’s Supremacy and Infallibility Examin’d; and the Errors and Infallibility 
examin’d; And the Errors of Scriblerus and his Man William Detected. With the Effigies 
of his Holiness and his Prime Minister contained a poem, the “Martiniad,” which 
compares Pope to a weak and harmless insect: 
Meagre and wan, and Steeple-crown’d, 
His Visage long, and Shoulders round. 
His crippled Corps, two Spindle Pegs 
Support, instead of Human Legs; 
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His Shrivel’d Skin, dusky Grain, 
A Cricket’s Voice, and Monkey’s Brain.177 
 
The authors make it clear in footnotes that they have compared the weak and little Pope 
to a cricket because “[t]his is an Animal famous for the Smallness of his Voice and 
Legs.”178 Another of Pope’s enemies, as Mack has noted, once called him “a little 
Aesopic sort of animal in his own cropt Hair, and Dress agreeable to the Forest he came 
from.”179 John Dennis, Pope’s nemesis, repeatedly used the word “little” to mock Pope. 
In his True Character of Mr. Pope, he calls Pope a “little Monster.”180 In the preface to 
Remarks on Mr. Pope’s Rape of the lock. In several letters to a friend. With a preface, 
occasion’d by the late Treatise on the profund, and the Dunciad and Remarks upon 
several passages in the preliminaries to the Dunciad, Dennis mockingly refers to Pope as 
a “little Gentleman” multiple times.181 In one instance, Dennis proclaims that he had 
published his “Remarks on the Translation of Homer, on Windsor Forest, and on the 
Temple of Fame . . . to hold a Glass to this little Gentleman, and to cure him of his vain 
and wretched Conceitedness, by giving him a View of his Ignorance, his Folly, and his 
natural Impotence, the undoubted Causes of so many Errors and so many 
Imperfections.”182   
Pope attempted to make light of these attacks by writing two epistles for The 
Guardian, purportedly explaining the foundation of a “Club of Little Men,” a fictional 
club that would enable little men to find solace among one another by shunning the 
ordinary, tall world. In the first epistle, Pope alludes to the prejudice and discrimination 
that little people experience when discussing the reasons for forming a “Club of Little 
Men”: 
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I remember a Saying of yours concerning Persons in low Circumstances of 
Stature, that their Littleness would hardly be taken Notice of, if they did not 
manifest a Consciousness of it themselves in all their Behaviour. Indeed, the 
Observation that no Man is Ridiculous for being what he is, but only in the 
Affectation of being something more, is equally true in regard to the Mind and 
Body. 
 I question not but it will be pleasing to you to hear, that a Sett of us have 
formed a Society, who are sworn to Dare to be Short, and boldly bear out the 
Dignity of Littleness under the Noses of those Enormous Engrossers of Manhood, 
those Hyperbolical Monsters of the Species, the tall Fellows that overlook us.183  
 
In the second epistle, Pope discusses the club’s president, Dick Distick, a thinly disguised 
rendition of Pope himself, describing Distick in language reminiscent of the taunts that 
the real Pope endured throughout his life. According to Pope, the club has elected Dick 
Distick 
not only as he is the shortest of us all, but because he has entertain’d so just a 
Sense of the Stature, as to go generally in Black that he may appear Less. Nay, to 
that Perfection is he arrived, that he stoops as he walks. The Figure of the Man is 
odd enough; he is a lively little Creature, with long Arms and Legs: A spider is no 
ill Emblem of him.  He has been taken at a Distance for a small Windmill. But 
indeed what principally moved us in his Favour was his Talent in Poetry, for he 
hath promised to undertake a long Work in short Verse to celebrate the Heroes of 
our Size. He has entertained so great a Respect for our Statius, on the Score of 
that Line, 
Major in exiguo regnabat corpore virtus [Great virtue reigned in the little body], 
that he once designed to translate the whole Thebaid for the sake of little Tydeus. 
 
Despite the playful tone of these two epistles, Pope agonized over the abuse that 
he endured on account of his deformities. In a letter to John Caryll, written on January 
25, 1710/11, for example, Pope demonstrates the profound pain that he had experienced 
throughout his life when ridiculed by able-bodied people, writing, that he appeared in his 
own mind’s eye not as “the great Alexander Mr Caryll is so civil to, but the little 
Alexander the women laugh at.”184 In a letter to Lady Mary before they became bitter 
enemies, Pope further demonstrates his belief that an able-bodied woman in Europe could 
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never accept him as a lover on account of his deformities, dreaming of a trip to India 
where he might finally find acceptance:  
I tremble for you the more because (whether you’ll believe it or not) I am capable 
myself of following one I lov’d, not only to Constantinople, but to those parts of 
India, where they tell us the Women like the Ugliest fellows, as the most 
admirable productions of nature, and look upon Deformities as the Signatures of 
divine Favour.185 
 
For Pope, India represented a place, unlike England, where socially constructed ideas 
about deformity would apotheosize deformed people rather than denigrate and ostracize 
them. In the European world in which he lived, by contrast, Pope knew that a romantic 
relationship with Lady Mary would amount to an amorous relationship between “the fair 
Princess and her Dwarf.”186 Pope understood, moreover, that women with deformities, at 
least in the West, likewise suffered from the able-bodied notion that their deformities 
made them sexually unappealing. Indeed, according to Lund, Pope edited, “or at least 
reviewed,” William Wycherley’s Miscellany Poems, in which Wycherley, in language 
reminiscent of Lucretius, contends that a woman’s hunchback is a blessing because it will 
ensure that she forever remains a virgin: 
Because your Crooked Back does lie so high, 
That to your Belly, there’s no coming nigh,  
Which, as your Back’s more low, more high does lie; 
You then all Breast, all Shoulders, and all Head, 
To be Love’s Term or Limit may be said, 
By which our Love-Proceedings are forbidden; 
You, because Saddled, never will be Ridden.187 
 
Pope understood well, then, that many able-bodied people viewed his deformed body as 
well as the deformed bodies of his fellow hunchbacks as too unattractive, if not 
disgusting, for them to even consider them sexual beings. 
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 Pope may even have internalized some of the negative stereotypes about 
hunchbacks being wicked and devious, envisioning himself as a type of villain. Gotthold 
Ephraim Lessing relies on such stereotypes in Laocoon: An Essay upon the Limits of 
Painting and Poetry, arguing that Shakespeare’s Richard III is a far more disgusting and 
horrifying villain than Shakespeare’s King Lear because Shakespeare depicts Richard III 
as a hunchback. According to Lessing, when King Lear speaks, “I hear a devil speaking, 
but in the form of an angel of light,” whereas when Richard III speaks, “I hear a devil and 
see a devil, in a shape which only the devil should wear.”188 In a letter to Henry 
Cromwell, Pope, no doubt familiar with such characterizations of hunchbacks, compares 
his own deformed body to the Devil when discussing his encounter with a “Sick Woman” 
on a stagecoach:  
I ventur’d to prescribe her some Fruit (which I happen’d to have in the Coach) 
which being forbidden by Her damn’d Doctors, she had the more Inclination to. 
In short, I tempted, and she Eat; nor was I more like the Devil, than she like Eve.  
Having the good Success of the foresaid Gentleman before my eyes, I put on the 
Gallantry of the old Serpent, & in spite of my Evil Forme, accosted her with all 
the Gayety I was master of; which had so good Effect, that in less than an hour 
she grew pleasant, her Colour return’d, & she was pleas’d to say, my Prescription 
had wrought an Immediate Cure.  In a Word, I had the pleasantest Journey 
imaginable, so that now, as once of yore, by means of the forbidden Fruit, the 
Devil got into Paradise. . . .189   
 
Despite this braggadocio in response to such repugnant views about hunchbacks, Pope is 
once again simply trying to make the best of a terrible situation. Indeed, in a more serious 
letter, Pope laments that he could never marry a beautiful, able-bodied woman because 
only a devil could perform such a dead: 
Here, at my Lord Harcourt’s, I see a Creature nearer an Angel than a Woman, (tho 
a Woman be very near as good as an Angel) I think you have formerly heard me 
mention Mrs Jennings as a Credit to the Maker of Angels. She is a relation of his 
Lordships, and he gravely proposed her to me for a Wife, being tender of her 
interests & knowing (what is a Shame to Providence) that she is less indebted to 
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Fortune than I.  I told him his Lordship could never have thought of such a thing 
but for his misfortune of being blind, and that I never cou’d till I was so: But that, 
as matters now were, I did not care to force so fine a woman to give the finishing 
stroke to all my deformities, by the last mark of a Beast, horns.190 
 
We can never know for certain whether Pope truly believed that it would be a wicked 
deed for him to use his fame to find a beautiful, able-bodied bride. Yet the fact that he 
would even question whether it would be wrong for a hunchback to marry an able-bodied 
woman demonstrates the extent to which negative stereotypes about hunchbacks troubled 
him. 
Diderot’s letters on the blind and deaf-mutes likewise demonstrate the extent to 
which negative stereotypes permeated discussions of blindness and deafness during this 
period. In those letters, Diderot expresses various negative stereotypes about the blind 
and deaf-mutes, some he attributes to others and some he attributes to his own 
shortsighted prejudices.  In his Letter on the Blind, for example, he explains how the 
blind man of Puisaux once expressed his profound isolation from the sighted world to a 
magistrate. After getting into some trouble, including an altercation with his brother, the 
blind man found himself before the magistrate, who threatened to throw him “in the 
bottom of a deep hole.”191 Undaunted, the blind man responded, “Ahh, sir . . . I have 
lived in such a place for twenty-five years.”192 Diderot interrupts the narrative at this 
point to inject his own interpretation of the blind man’s recrimination: “We [the sighted] 
leave life as an enchanted spectacle; the blind leave it as a dungeon (un cachot): if we 
have to live with more pleasure than he, admit that he has considerably less regret in 
dying.”193 Diderot here uses cachot as a double entendre. The darkness of a dungeon 
corresponds to the blind man’s lack of sight, while the isolation of a prison cell 
corresponds to the ways in which the sighted world excludes the blind.  Diderot explains, 
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for instance, that the blind man, now a husband and father, wakes up around four in the 
afternoon “because, as you know, the day begins for him when it finishes for us.”194  This 
is not, as one might expect, because sunlight has no impact on the ability of blind people 
to move about in the world, thus enabling them to sleep whenever they choose. Indeed, 
both the blind man’s wife and son sleep at normal hours, which would force him to adopt 
the sleeping patterns of the sighted world if he wanted to spend time with his family. Yet 
Diderot tells us that the blind man chooses to live apart from his wife and son because “at 
midnight, nothing disturbs him, and he is not inconvenient to anyone.”195  The blind man 
has grown so weary of being treated as a burden by the sighted world that he has 
absconded even from his own family in order to avoid the discomfort of having to be 
reminded constantly of what an inconvenience he is to others. 
In one of the more astonishing examples of negative stereotypes expressed in the 
Letter on the Blind, Diderot himself claims that the blind can feel little pity for the 
sufferings of others because they cannot see those who suffer.196 In his Adittions to the 
Letter on the Blind, however, Diderot expresses regret for having made such a ridiculous 
observation, explaining how Mélanie de Salignac, the niece Sophie Volland, Diderot’s 
longtime mistress, taught him the folly of being so presumptuous about the moral 
shortcomings of the blind.197 De Salignac, Diderot remembers, scolded him for his attack 
on the blind, informing him that while she could not see the sufferings of others, she 
could hear cries of anguish far more intensely than Diderot and other sighted people. 
When, according to Diderot, he attempted to defend himself by pointing out that “some 
suffer in silence,” she responded, “I believe . .  . that I would soon perceive them and that 
I would sympathize with them more.”198 Diderot concedes defeat, thus acknowledging 
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the unfortunate propensity of sighted people, including Diderot himself, one of the most 
well-respected philosophes of his own day, to allow prejudices to distort their views 
about the blind. 
Although Diderot does not delve as deeply into the effects of negative stereotypes 
on deaf-mutes in his Essai sur les sourds et muets à l’usage de ceux qui entendent et qui 
parlent as he does with respect to the blind in Essai sur les aveugles, he does suggest that 
one of the biggest obstacles facing deaf-mutes is the tendency of hearing and speaking 
people to dismiss their language and intelligence as primitive. Fontenelle supported this 
negative view of the blind when ascribing animal-like intelligence to the deaf-mute from 
Chartres who purportedly gained the ability to hear and speak later in life.199 Although 
Fontenelle recognized that it was society who had deprived him of the opportunity to 
develop his mental faculties, it did not change the fact that social isolation, at least 
according to Fontenelle, had left him a mere shell of a man. According to La Mettrie, 
moreover, the social isolation had damaged the mind of the deaf-mute from Chartres to 
such an extent that he was intellectually on par with a mentally disabled man who lacked 
the capacity to understand “moral ideas.” Indeed, although La Mettrie claims in the 
Natural History of the Soul that there was nothing “deaf” about the man without “moral 
ideas” except for his “mind,” he concludes that the story about the mentally disabled man 
was a “duplicate” of the tale of the deaf-mute from Chartres.200 Diderot was intimately 
aware that this type of prejudice and discrimination haunted the deaf-mute community. 
His friend Condillac, after all, had initially concluded that language d’action (language of 
action) was a primitive protolanguage. It was not until the 1770s, likely because of his 
association with Epée, that Condillac changed his view.201
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Diderot thus seeks to demonstrate the true intellectual capability of deaf-mutes in 
his Letter on the Deaf and Dumb, proclaiming, for example, that his deaf-mute friend “is 
not lacking in mental ability and has expressive gestures.”202 Diderot even provides an 
interesting anecdote to demonstrate his friend’s intelligence. Diderot remembers one 
occasion when he was playing chess in front of a group of spectators, including his deaf-
mute friend. When it appeared that Diderot could not win, the deaf man, “thinking that 
the game was lost, . . . closed his eyes, bowed his head, and let his arms fall, signs by 
which he announced that he held me as checkmated or dead.”203  After the spectators saw 
the deaf man’s gestures, they began to talk about Diderot’s situation, and devised a way 
for him to prevail.  When Diderot attempted to gloat, the deaf man rebuked him, 
“pointing his finger at all of the spectators, one after another, while, at the same time, 
making a small movement of his arms that came and went in the direction of the door and 
tables, responding to me that it had been little to my merit to have escaped the 
predicament. . . .”204  Diderot and the spectators learned from this encounter not to 
underestimate the intelligence of deaf-mutes.  
Epée’s attempts to provide deaf-mutes with meaningful educational opportunities 
were likely more effective than Diderot’s philosophical arguments at dispelling negative 
stereotypes about deaf-mutes and their intellectual capabilities. When, for example, the 
playwright Jean-Nicolas Bouilly wrote L’Abbé L’Épée, comedie historique, en cinq actes 
et en prose (The Abbé L’Épée, a Historic Comedy, in Five Acts and in Prose ) in 1799, 
he portrayed the deaf-mute Jules, one of the primary characters of the play as an 
intelligent person despite his disability. Jules, like Diderot’s friend in the Letter on the 
Deaf and Dumb, communicated with the other actors on stage through various gestures. 
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For instance, when Bouilly introduces Jules, whom everyone mistakes for a person 
named Theodore, Jules “uses rapid signs to announce that he recognizes the house of his 
parents” in an attempt to explain his true identity.205 As the title of the play suggests, it is 
unlikely that such a play could have been imaginable without Epée’s groundbreaking 
efforts to educate the deaf and dumb and popularize their intellectual capabilities.    
Dwarfs continued to be sports both of nature and kings and queens during this 
period. In Laurence Sterne’s A Sentimental Journey Through France and Italy, for 
instance, Yorick refers to wretched dwarfs as sports of nature.206  Although the popularity 
of dwarfs as court jesters diminished in some areas during the first half of the seventeenth 
century, notably in France where the last court dwarf, Balthazar Simon, died in 1662, 
many monarchs continued to bring dwarfs to their courts throughout the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries.207 In 1710, Peter the Great held a grand wedding for his favorite 
dwarf, Valakof, to the dwarf of Princess Prescovie Theodorovna, in which 72 dwarfs of 
both sexes served in the bridal party.208  
Joseph Boruwlaski, a dwarf born to a poor Polish family in 1739, eventually 
traveled throughout Europe visiting various courts.209 In Vienna in 1754, Marie-Theresa 
was amazed at his short stature, while Prince Kauntiz, who met Boruwlaski in Munich, 
offered him a pension for life.210 The Comte de Treffan took notes for his article “Nain” 
in the Encyclopédie when Boruwlaski met with the Stanislaus while the latter was exiled 
in Lunéville.211 When Boruwlaski later fell in love with Isalina Borboutin and asked the 
Polish king for a pension to support her, he received both a pension and a title, 
demonstrating that some court dwarfs, despite being the victims of able-bodied 
exploitation and sometimes derision, could become far wealthier on account of their 
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congenital deformities than most commoners during this period.212  Yet Boruwlaski never 
lost sight of the fact that able-bodied society did not ordinarily consider dwarfs to be 
equal to people of normal stature. “It is so uncommon,” he begins his memoirs, “to find 
reason and sentiment, with noble and delicate affections, in a man whom nature, as it 
were, could not make up, and who in size has the appearance of a child, that, persuaded 
nobody would even take the trouble to cast an eye upon these Memoirs, I began to 
commit to paper some of the principal events of my life . . . for my own use. . . .”213  In 
the end, he decided that his life was interesting enough to leave a written record of it, 
even if only to entertain those who were interested in nature’s shortcomings. Indeed, 
Boruwlaski proclaims that his memoirs could “be interesting only to those who delight in 
following nature through all her different ways, who are wont to look upon beings of my 
stature as upon abortive half-grown individuals, kept far beneath other men, both in body 
and mind. . . .”214   
It was perhaps in matters of love that Boruwlaski felt the most rejected by able-
bodied society. When he professed his love for Isalina, for example, “she only found the 
scene ridiculous. Indeed, Joujou, said she, you are a child, and I cannot but laugh at your 
extravagance.”215 When he tried to explain to her that he “did not love her as a child, and 
would not be loved like a child,” Isalina “burst into laughter, told me I knew not what I 
said, and left the apartment.”216 Isalina’s initial response to Boruwlaski, then, was similar 
to Lady Mary’s response to Pope when he professed his love for her, albeit Isalina 
ultimately agreed to become Boruwlaski’s wife, while Pope and Lady Mary became 
bitter enemies.217 In the meantime, Boruwlaski, like Pope, fell into a deep depression as 
he lamented his sorry lot in life: “O! that Nature had doomed me, by my stature, never to 
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pass the narrow circle of childhood!”218 In particular, Boruwlaski wondered why nature 
did not keep his mind in a childlike state so that he might be spared the agony of having 
the thoughts and passions of a man in the body of a child.219 He even questioned whether 
nature had deliberately given him an adult mind so as to torture him: “By liberally 
bestowing on me what she allows to others as a gift of Heaven, had she in view my 
torment and misery?—She is not a step-mother; she cannot be so cruel only to me.”220 
The State and Private Philanthropists Offer New Solutions to the Disability Problem 
 As in ancient Athens, whose disability pensions for disabled veterans likely 
evolved into a system that provided pensions to all sufficiently poor disabled Athenians, 
the problem of supporting disabled veterans played a pivotal role in the advent of new 
ways of dealing with the seventeenth-century disability problem. Before the mid-
seventeenth century, some disabled veterans who could no longer serve on active duty, 
flooded into towns and cities to beg for sustenance while others sought refuge in 
monasteries. Yet not all disabled veterans were helpless beggars who lived entirely at the 
mercy of others. Many disabled veterans were perfectly capable of banding together to 
terrorize the countryside if they felt that able-bodied society was no longer meeting their 
needs. With the massive increase in the size of standing armies and the alarming number 
of casualties associated with them in conflicts such as the Thirty Years’ War, disabled 
veterans were becoming so numerous that able-bodied people felt under constant siege 
from throngs of begging veterans or, even worse as in France, marauding bands of 
disabled veterans who sought to enrich themselves at the expense of defenseless, able-
bodied civilians. To deal with this perceived menace, the French sought to house disabled 
veterans in the Hôtel des Invalides, where they could peacefully live out the remainder of 
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their days without bothering the able-bodied community. The English later emulated the 
French and created their own military hospitals for disabled veterans. It is highly unlikely 
that these efforts, which constitute part of what Foucault called the “great confinement,” 
would have confined enough disabled veterans to eradicate completely the problem of 
begging and marauding veterans because European states did not yet have the resources 
to build enough hospitals to accommodate every veteran.    
In seventeenth-century France, there were two distinct categories of disabled 
veterans:  the invalides (the truly disabled) and the estropiés encore valides (battle-
scarred but viable soldiers).221  Invalides generally had only two options available to 
them.  First, they could seek accommodations at certain monasteries obliged to care for 
the laity under le droit d’oblat (the law of the oblate).222  Veterans, however, likely 
bristled under monastic discipline to which they were unaccustomed.223 Likewise, the 
monasteries were probably discomfited by caring for the moines laies, or lay monks, 
whom many monks would have viewed as alien and perhaps even blasphemous.224  
Second, they could attempt to survive by begging and petty theft.225  Initially, the 
estropiés encore valides experienced the same bleak opportunities as the invalides. The 
estropiés encore valides, however, were still technically fit-for-service, even if the 
military abandoned them to the wretched existence of church ward or beggar. In 1644, 
the government decided both to palliate the begging problem in the cities and to find, in 
theory at least, some military use for the estropiés encore valides by sending them to 
garrison the frontiers.226 In practice, however, the estropiés encore valides lived 
sedentary existences in the frontiers and thus served little military purpose.227 Their 
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expulsion and deployment, then, amounted merely to the removal of an undesirable 
element from city slums.228     
    The frontier deployment may have ameliorated the begging problem in the 
cities, but it unleashed on the countryside dangerous throngs of army veterans, who, of 
course, could not be controlled as easily as they had been in the cities.229 The government 
obviously needed to find a way to withdraw the army veterans from the countryside 
without thrusting them back into the city slums. After signing the Treaty of Pyrenees in 
1659, which ended the conflict between France and Spain that had begun during the 
Thirty Years’ War, Louis XIV began to muse intently over building an institution to 
provide both medical care and housing for seriously wounded—both the invalides and 
estropiés encore valides—and aging veterans.230   
The impetus for what would become the Hôtel des Invalides in Paris, then, was 
twofold. First, Louis and his advisors hoped to control disabled veterans, an undesirable 
and potentially dangerous element of society, by placing them in a grand institution, just 
as they established, by decree, the Hôpital Général of Paris (1656) and other general 
hospitals throughout France (1662) to confine other groups of people perceived to be 
dangerous, including the destitute and disabled non-veterans.231 Indeed, Louis desired to 
confine the dangerous estropiés encore valides in one Parisian location so that they could 
no longer burden the countryside.  Concomitantly, the Hôtel des Invalides served also to 
confine the invalides who, although not as dangerous as the estropiés encore valides, 
certainly would not have been a welcomed sight in the city slums. Louis’ intention of 
controlling both the estropiés encore valides and the invalides, may explain, at least in 
part, why the former head of the military police, served as the first director of the Hôtel 
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des Invalides.232  Scholars must be careful, however, not to overstate the intention to 
control the estropiés encore valides. In 1690, after all, in response to overcrowding at the 
Hôtel des Invalides, the government encouraged the least disabled and infirm (le plus 
valides) to join new detached companies, compagnies détachées d’invalides, which 
functioned, once again, as sedentary guard units in forts, chateaus, and garrisons.233  
The second reason behind the creation of the Hôtel des Invalides, one often 
forgotten by today’s disability scholarship because of its embrace of Foucault and his 
concept of the great confinement, was a sincere attempt to provide necessary care for 
aging and disabled veterans.234 Louis’ vast expenditures on the Hôtel des Invalides’ 
construction, as well as his enormous level of emotional investment in the project, 
demonstrate that Louis’ claims of wanting to help his disabled veterans were not, as some 
Foucauldian scholars might conclude, merely attempts to conceal his true intentions but 
rather indicative of a genuine attempt to provide not only adequate, but exceptional, care 
for his veterans. For Louis, aging and disabled veterans were unquestionably among the 
most deserving of what has come to be known as the “deserving poor.”235  
The idea for a hospital for aging and disabled veterans was not new. There were 
plans to construct such a hospital in the reigns of Henry III, Henry IV, and Louis XIII, all 
of which amounted to nothing.236 Unlike his predecessors, however, Louis XIV had both 
the resources and the resolve to see the project through to its completion. On February 
24, 1670, Louis issued an ordinance providing that half of the funds coming from 
religious and lay pensions would be used for the construction of a hospital that would 
accommodate disabled veterans.237 Several additional ordinances followed until Louis 
finally realized his dream, which he called “the greatest idea of his reign.”238 In October 
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1674, Louis personally welcomed the first lodgers to the still-under-construction 
hospital.239 
Evidence of Louis’ genuine care for the Invalides’ veterans is plentiful. When the 
Invalides’ governor asked him for a portrait, Louis promised “that he [would] always take 
a lively interest in the conservation of such a precious institution.”240 His actions during 
and after his visit, moreover, suggest that it was not an empty promise. While at the 
Invalides, Louis distributed largess to any veteran whom he encountered.241 He further 
ordered that the “poor widows” of the diseased veterans receive 30,000 livres from the 
Invalides’ coffers.242 Louis even gave the Invalides’ governor 6,000 livres from his own 
funds “for distribution to the soldiers” and ordered a doubling of the veterans’ pocket-
money for the month of June.243 Marie Antoinette, for her part, later emulated Louis’ 
generosity to veterans and their families, distributing largess and expressing particular 
concern about the “poor daughters of the invalides.”244    
Disabled veterans in England, like disabled veterans in France, traditionally 
resided in monasteries.245 According to Captain C.G.T. Dean, who lived in the Royal 
Hospital Chelsea as Captain of the Invalids for twenty years and served as Adjutant for 
ten years before authoring the definitive history of the hospital in 1950, when King Henry 
VIII suppressed monasteries, he disfurnished “‘the realm of places to send maimed 
soldiers to.”246 Queen Mary I attempted to help the plight of these veterans, ordering in 
her will the construction of “a convenient howse within nye the Suburbs of the Citie of 
London…for the relefe and helpe of pore and old soldiers.”247  Her proposed hostel, 
overseen by three priests, would have housed between twenty and thirty pensioners.248 
Queen Elizabeth I, however, did not heed her sister’s wishes.249 
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The primary solution to the disabled veteran problem in England appears to have 
been to facilitate their capacity to beg. Although vagrancy laws prohibited most ordinary 
people from begging on city streets, disabled veterans received “begging passeportes,” 
which permitted them to eek out an existence.250 Some English notables did attempt to 
use the resources of the state and private philanthropy to alleviate the suffering of 
disabled veterans.  In 1593, individual Peers and Members of Parliament donated money 
for their care.251  Later that year, Parliament enacted the Statute for Maimed Soldiers to 
aid veterans who had “adventured their lives or lost their limbs in the service of Her 
Majesty and the State.”252 To receive relief, veterans had to apply to county treasurers in 
which they were born or had resided for at least three years.253 The maximum pension 
was £10 per year for ordinary soldiers and £20 for officers.254 The legislation, however, 
proved ineffective in providing meaningful support for disabled veterans.255 Unlike the 
Poor Law or anti-vagrancy legislation, the statute divested veterans of their pensions if 
authorities caught them begging like “common rogues.”256  It was no surprise, then, that 
“stypenders,” frequently supplicated the Queen for help or that the Commons, in 1601, 
once again had to donate money to disabled soldiers in London.257 The situation was so 
bleak that Francis Quarles, in the reign of King James I, composed the following epigram 
highlighting the misery of disabled veterans: 
Our God and soldiers we alike adore, 
  When at the brink of ruin, not before, 
After deliverance both alike requited, 
 Our God forgotten and our soldiers slighted.258 
 
For the next sixty years, English notables searched in vain for a way to deal 
adequately with the disabled veteran problem. John Evelyn, one of four commissioners 
appointed at the outbreak of the Dutch War in 1664 to oversee the sick, wounded, and 
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prisoners of war, ultimately concluded that England required a new military hospital. He 
took as a model for his new hospital the Soldaatenhuis at Amsterdam, a hospital founded 
in 1587 for 51 “lame and decrepit soldiers,” which had greatly impressed him as a young 
man.259 After converting a barn at Gravesend into a hospital with thirty beds,260  Evelyn 
drew up plans for an infirmary for 400 to 500 men.261 Samuel Pepys, Clerk of the Acts to 
the Navy Board, brought the plan to the attention of Charles II.262  Evelyn’s diary records 
his proposal to Charles: 
I had another gracious reception by his Majesty, who call’d me into his bed-
chamber, to lay before and describe to him my project for an Infirmarie, which I 
read to him who, with great approbation, recommended it to his R. Highness [the 
Duke of York, Lord High Admiral].”263    
 
Evelyn subsequently secured the Duke of York’s approval, selected a site at Chatham, 
and made preliminary estimates.264 Unfortunately, however, the Navy was in financial 
distress and was thus unable to finance the project.  According to Dean, Charles himself 
declined to contribute to Evelyn’s hospital possibly because Charles had already spent 
£34,000 on the sick, wounded, and prisoners of war.265  
Charles did realize, however, that wounded soldiers were not receiving adequate 
care and, during the last year of the war, asked bishops to provide details of the statutes, 
government, property, revenue, and number of lodgers and various hospitals and 
almshouses within their dioceses. He further ordered that maimed soldiers were to 
receive priority for vacancies in existing institutions, an order that he repeated four years 
later.266 Not surprisingly, these measures did little to end the veteran crisis. In June 1666, 
for example, when the military was seeking recruits, an anonymous writer complained to 
the King: “[I]f your Majesty did but hear the slits and scofes that is mad; for saie the 
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people, be a soldier, noe, we have presedents daily in the streets, we will fight no more, 
for when the wars is over we are slited like dogs.”267 
When France began to construct the Hôtel des Invalides in 1670, Charles was no 
doubt under considerable pressure to establish a similar institution for English veterans. 
His eldest illegitimate son, the Duke of Monmouth, visited the Invalides in 1672 and 
again in 1677 when he was Captain-General.268 Three months after this second visit, he 
wrote to the Marquis de Louvois, the Minister of War, who was primarily responsible for 
the undertaking: “It pleases you well that I beg you once more to make available to me 
the plan for the Hôtel des Invalides drawn on the model with all of its faces, because the 
King will be pleased to see it.”269 Relations between England and France soon became 
strained, however, and Monmouth seems not to have received the plans.270   
  Nevertheless, Charles never forgot the stories that his son had told him about the 
Invalides and desired to build a similar institution in London.271 According to Dan 
Cruickshank, an English equivalent of the Invalides offered an intriguing solution. If 
Charles were to construct a similar institution in London, he would not only solve the 
pressing problem of providing adequate care and housing for old and disabled veterans 
but also create a majestic architectural ornament to his reign.272 Such a glorious 
institution, moreover, would, in Dan Cruickshank’s words, serve as “a conspicuous act of 
benevolence” that “would encourage enlistment in his army and promote loyalty to the 
King among his soldiers.”273   
 By 1675, Charles must have felt even more pressure to build a hospital in London 
when the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, Duke of Ormonde, proposed to build a military 
hospital at Kilmainham, just outside of Dublin.274 When construction for the hospital at 
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Kilmainham began in 1680, the pressure seemingly intensified.275 In early September 
1681, the Earl of Longford, who had laid the foundation stone at Kilmainham in 1680 
and was a member of its Standing Committee, arrived in England and had three long 
audiences with the King.276 As Cruickshank has observed, how to apply the lessons of 
Kilmainham to a similar establishment in London must have been the topic of their 
meetings.277 Indeed, after the last meeting on September 6, 1681, Charles referred 
Longford to the Treasury to discuss the mechanics of the proposal.278 Less than two 
weeks later, the project became tangible when the King apparently instructed Stephen 
Fox to oversee the effort to build a military hospital in London.  Indeed, on September 
14, Evelyn, who had long been a proponent of building hospitals for veterans, recorded in 
his diary how he 
Din’d with Sir Stephen Fox who propos’d to me the purchasing of Chelsey 
College, which his Majesty had some time since given to our Society, and would 
now purchase it againe to build an Hospital or Infirmary for Souldiers there, in 
which he desired my assistance as one of the Council of the R. Society.279 
 
In Evelyn, Fox found a kindred spirit with respect to finding a solution to the suffering of 
England’s veterans. At Fox’s funeral, Rev. Richard Eyre, Canon of Sarum explained that 
Fox desperately wanted to find a way to help disabled veterans so that they could live out 
their days without having to resort to begging.  Fox, Eyre explained,    
was the first projector of the noble design of Chelsea Hospital, and contributed to 
the expense of it above £13,000; and his Motive to it I know from his own Words, 
he said, “he could not bear to see the Common Soldiers who had spent their 
Strength in our Service to beg at our Doors,” and therefore did what he could to 
remove such a Scandal to the Kingdom.280 
 
 Preparations were soon underway for the hospital, and on December 7, 1681, a 
royal warrant appointed the Paymaster-General, Fox’s nephew Nicholas Johnson, as 
Treasurer for a hospital “for the reliefe of such souldiers as are or shall be old, lame, or 
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infirme in ye service of the Crown.”281 On January 11, 1682, Sir Christopher Wren, the 
eventual architect of both the Royal Hospital Chelsea and the Royal Hospital for Seamen 
at Greenwich,  reported to the Council of the Royal Society that, subject to ratification, 
Fox had  agreed to purchase the Chelsea property for £1,300, £200 below the  Council’s 
asking price.282 In February 1692, the Royal Hospital Chelsea welcomed its first 
pensioners.283    
The Royal Hospital Chelsea, like the Hôtel des Invalides, housed only veterans of 
the land army.284 England’s navy, however, was much more important to England than 
the French navy was to France, and England thus needed a naval equivalent to the Royal 
Hospital Chelsea.  Otherwise, England would have had to acknowledge that while it 
provided adequate care for its army veterans, it was content to allow its navy veterans to 
languish in misery even though they were no less important for safeguarding the realm. 
In 1687, James II took the first step in establishing a hospital for seamen by donating his 
house at Greenwich “to be fitted for the service of impotent sea commanders and 
others.”285   
It was Queen Mary II, however, who would become the primary force behind the 
effort to construct the Greenwich hospital.286 In 1691, she “signified her pleasure to the 
Treasury Lords that the house at Greenwich shall be converted and employed as a 
hospital for seamen.”287 The Queen’s exhortations went largely unheeded until the 
English sustained heavy casualties in the naval victory over the French at La Hogue in 
May 1692.288 In October of that year, the Commissioners of the Treasury learned that 
Queen Mary and King William III had granted “the ‘house’ at Greenwich to be a hospital 
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for seamen,”289 to house the sick and wounded until a permanent institution was in 
place.290   
In December 1694, Queen Mary died in a smallpox epidemic, but her desire to 
build a hospital for seamen lived on.291 Indeed, King William, respecting his wife’s 
wishes, issued a Royal Warrant in both of their names, backdating it to October 25, the 
last quarter-day of the legal year. The warrant expressed the Queen’s intent to grant the 
land on which to build a hospital 
for the reliefe and support of Seamen serving on board the Shipps or Vessells 
belonging to the Navy Royall who by reason of Age, Wounds or other  disabilities 
shall be uncapable of further Service at Sea and be unable to maintain themselves. 
And for the sustentation of the Widows and the Maintenance and Education of the 
Children of Seamen happening to be slain or disabled in such service and also for 
the further reliefe and Encouragement of Seamen and Improvement of 
Navigation.292 
 
Sir Christopher Wren’s eventual design for the Royal Hospital for Seamen at Greenwich 
was far more magnificent than his design for the Royal Hospital Chelsea, thus coming 
closer to displaying the grandeur of the Hôtel des Invalides.293 The hospital’s 
magnificence, in part, was the result of the peculiar juxtaposition of the hospital and the 
Queen’s House, which required Wren to design twin domes to the left and the right of the 
Queen’s House.294   
 In 1748, Frederick the Great likewise decided to build a military hospital, the 
Invalidenhaus in Berlin, for Prussian soldiers based on the model of the Hôtel des 
Invalides. Frederick the Great emulated King Louis XIV in professing philanthropic 
motives for building the military hospital, proclaiming that “‘[i]ngratitude is an ugly vice 
in private life; when princes or states lack thankfulness it is abominable.’”295 At Frederick 
the Great’s behest, those disabled veterans lucky enough to find lodging at the 
 271 
 
Invalidenhaus received free housing, medical care, coal, and uniforms in return for 
wearing military uniforms in public and participating in Sunday church parades.296 It 
remained an important institution in Germany until 1938, when most of the lodgers were 
removed to separate houses despite their protests.297 In 1944, the allies destroyed 
Frederick the Great’s Invalidenhaus during the bombing of Berlin, and the Berlin Wall 
eventually stretched across the Invalidenhaus’ old graveyard.298 
The disability problem during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, of course, 
extended beyond the question of what to do with disabled veterans. Cheselden’s report of 
his successful cataract surgery in 1728, which played such a prominent role in the 
philosophical debates of the eighteenth century, offered a revolutionary new solution to 
the disability problem: the ability of doctors and surgeons to use their medical expertise 
to cure certain disabilities.299 Surgical cures remained extremely rare during this period, 
of course, but Cheselden’s surgery demonstrated the potential capacity of medicine not 
only to make the individual lives of disabled people better but to ameliorate the disability 
problem by reducing the number of disabled people. Yet because Cheselden’s surgical 
procedure could cure only a tiny portion of the blind population, and obviously offered 
no help whatsoever to the deaf and dumb, the disability problem with respect to people 
with sensory disabilities remained nearly as strong as ever.  
By the middle of the eighteenth century, an increasing number of elites, including 
philosophers, members of the clergy, and private philanthropists, began to recognize the 
very real plight of the blind and the deaf and dumb, who continued to live in abject 
poverty and misery despite the Christian tradition of almsgiving. They searched for a new 
model of dealing with the disability problem that would do more than simply feed and 
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house them. The most effective method of helping people with sensory disabilities, these 
able-bodied would-be benefactors believed, would be to provide them with enough 
education that they could fend for themselves.300 Although most people today remember 
Diderot’s Letter on the Blind because of its attack on religion and promulgation of a 
proto-evolutionary theory influenced heavily by Lucretius, both the Letter on the Blind 
and its follow-up, Additions to the Letter on the Blind (1782 or 1783), discuss the 
importance of educating the blind in great detail as a way of counteracting the systematic 
exclusion of blind people from the sighted world. In the Letter on the Blind, Diderot first 
extols the virtues of educating the blind when discussing the blind man of Puisaux, who 
received a stellar education, apparently because he was the son of an “acclaimed 
professor of philosophy at the University of Paris.”301 Diderot’s blind friend, moreover, 
enjoyed the fruits of his father’s wealth and notoriety, which permitted him to interact 
with the educated elite. According to Diderot, he “is a man who is not lacking in good 
sense; whom a lot of people know; who knows a little chemistry, and who has followed 
with some success the botany lessons at the Jardin du Roi.”302 In addition, the blind man 
apparently evinced at least some degree of literacy. Indeed, Diderot recalls one occasion 
when he went to visit his friend one evening and found him “busy teaching his son to 
read with characters in relief.”303 
The blind man’s education, Diderot further informs us, enabled him to see himself 
as the intellectual equal of sighted people. When, for example, the blind man had to go 
before a magistrate on one occasion, he did not present himself as an inferior creature but 
“as a fellow human being.”304 In some regards, the blind man even believed that his life 
experiences gave him distinct advantages over his sighted friends.  The blind man, 
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Diderot notes, “would find himself very much someone to pity, having been deprived of 
the same advantages that we have, and that he would have been tempted to regard us as 
having superior intelligence, if he had not felt a hundred times how much we yielded to 
him in other respects.”305 Diderot recalls how he and his friends were shocked that the 
blind man valued “himself as much or perhaps more than we who see.”306 After 
discussing the issue for a moment, however, they understood the blind man’s point of 
view, acknowledging that “we [sighted people] have a fierce tendency to overrate our 
qualities and to overlook our defects. . . .”307 
Diderot uses the remarkable life of Saunderson to inculcate further to his fellow 
intellectuals the importance of educating the blind. Diderot explains in great detail the 
numerical system that Saunderson developed and the device with which Saunderson 
performed mathematical equations and depicted geometric shapes, even if John 
Gascoigne has recently pointed out that Diderot’s description of Saunderson’s device was 
“somewhat inaccurate.”308 In essence, Saunderson created a numerical precursor to 
braille, which Louis Braille later invented to depict letters, numbers, and musical notes. 
The device enabled Saunderson to arrange the numbers in such a way that there was “no 
arithmetic operation that he was not able to execute.”309 Just as Diderot uses Saunderson 
to provide an Epicurean interpretation of the natural world elsewhere in the Letter on the 
Blind, Diderot utilizes Saunderson at this point in the letter to make a strong case for 
providing formal education to the blind, proclaiming, “What advantage would it have 
been for Saunderson to have found a tangible arithmetical system completely prepared 
when he was five years old, rather than having to have devised one at the age of twenty-
five!”310 When he finally does launch his attack on superstitious ideas, which, for 
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Diderot, included the belief in design, Diderot alludes to the education of the blind when 
expressing one of his more well-known arguments. Near the beginning of the deathbed 
conversation between Saunderson and Holmes, Saunderson remembers what a spectacle 
he had been during his life, explaining that people from all over England visited him 
because they simply “could not conceive how I could work at geometry. . . .”311 
Saunderson accounts for their amazement by pointing to the human tendency, when we 
“think a certain phenomenon beyond human power,” to “cry out at once: ‘’Tis the 
handiwork of a god’; our vanity will stick at nothing less.”312 After finishing his rebuke 
of the sighted for assuming something divine in his academic achievements, Saunderson 
shifts to a general rebuke of humanity for attributing natural phenomena to supernatural 
forces, driving the point home by referring to the fable of the elephant and tortoise 
popularized originally by Locke and Shaftesbury and more recently by Stephen Hawking, 
who, like Saunderson, became the Lucasian Chair of Mathematics at Cambridge despite 
his severe disabilities: 
Why can we not season our talk with a little less pride and a little more 
philosophy? If nature offers us a knotty problem, let us leave it for what it is, 
without calling in to cut it the hand of a being who immediately becomes a fresh 
knot and harder to untie than the first. Ask an Indian how the earth hangs 
suspended in mid-air, and he will tell you that it is carried on the back of an 
elephant; and what carries the elephant? A tortoise. And the tortoise? You pity the 
Indian, and one might say to yourself as to him: “My good friend M. Holmes, 
confess your ignorance and drop the elephant and the tortoise.”313  
 
Diderot believed so strongly that socially constructed biases had negatively 
impacted people with sensory disabilities that he firmly believed that it was possible to 
educate a person who was not only blind but also deaf and dumb. Indeed, he suggests in 
the Letter on the Blind, over forty years before the birth of Victorine Morrisseau, a 
Parisian girl who became the first deaf and blind person to receive a formal education,314 
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that it would be possible to educate even a deaf, blind, and mute person and that it is only 
our misguided prejudices regarding the abilities of such people that cause them to 
languish in almost total isolation. In Diderot’s view, it is able-bodied society that has 
isolated them not the darkness, silence, and muteness associated with their physical 
disabilities. In particular, Diderot points out that the sighted and hearing world has 
created means of communicating both through sight and sound but has refused to do so 
with respect to touch, even though “the sense of touch has its own manner of speaking 
and of obtaining responses.”315 Diderot thus suggests that if people who were deaf, blind, 
and mute were taught from childhood a means of speaking through touch that was “fixed, 
constant, and uniform,” they might be able to “acquire ideas.”316  
 In Additions to the Letter on the Blind, Diderot returns once again to the 
importance of educating the blind when discussing his interactions with de Salignac, the 
niece of Diderot’s longtime mistress.317 According to Diderot, de Salignac received an 
extraordinary education and demonstrated a brilliant mind before dying at the age of 
twenty-two. De Salignac, Diderot explains, “had learned to read with cut-out 
characters,”318 had read a book that Perault had created specifically for her,319 and was 
able to write by using a pin to prick holes in sheets of paper.320 In addition, she had 
learned “music through characters in relief,” as well as “the elements of astronomy, 
algebra, and geometry.”321 She had even learned geography by studying maps that 
Diderot described as having “parallels and meridians made out of brass, boundaries of 
kingdoms and provinces distinguished by embroidery, in yarn, silk and wool of bigger 
and smaller sizes, rivers, both big and small, and mountains by heads of pins of greater 
and lesser thickness, and cities of various sizes by unequal drops of wax.”322 
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 De Salignac’s education and perspicacious nature enabled her to make several 
observations that impressed Diderot. On one occasion, Diderot says that he asked her a 
question related to the properties of a prism, which Saunderson had answered by 
imagining a series of adjoined pyramids. Diderot asked her to imagine a point in the 
center of a cube. Next, he told her to draw a straight line to the corners. He then asked her 
how she would divide the cube.  Despite her young age, de Salignac responded 
immediately, “in six equal pyramids . . . each having the same sides, the base of the cube 
and half of its height.”323 When Diderot asked her how she could know this, she 
responded that she saw it in her head, “the same as you.”324 Elsewhere in the letter, 
Diderot further testifies to de Salignac’s intelligence by furtively suggesting that de 
Salignac, like Saunderson, had rejected the religion of the sighted world. Diderot says, in 
a manner calculated to avoid the enmity of the authorities, “What were her religious 
opinions? I ignored them; it was a secret that she guarded out of respect for her pious 
mother.”325 In light of such displays of intelligence, it is hardly surprising that Diderot 
closes the letter by lamenting de Salignac’s death at such an early age: “With an immense 
memory and insight equal to her memory, what a path she would have made in the 
sciences, if a longer life had been accorded to her!”326 
In 1783, just after Diderot published his Additions to the Letter on the Blind, the 
Société Philanthropique of Paris founded the Institution des Jeunes Aveugles.327  The 
next year, Valentin Haüy formulated a program for educating the blind in Paris, hoping 
that the Société would support his efforts. Haüy recruited a blind student of unusual 
ability, François Lesueur, to demonstrate the effectiveness of his methods. The Société 
was so impressed it they decided to back Haüy, who opened his school in 1785.328 
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Although, as Gordon Phillips has pointed out, there is no direct connection between 
Diderot and Haüy’s school for the blind,329 it is likely that Diderot’s Letter on the Blind 
would have had at least some impact on a philanthropist such as Haüy who devoted his 
entire life to educating the blind.330 Diderot’s Letter on the Blind, after all, was no 
obscure document. The letter was such a sensation in Paris that Voltaire almost 
immediately wrote to Diderot asking to make his acquaintance, while its attack on 
religion contributed to Diderot’s infamous arrest and imprisonment along with other 
perceived “atheists, Jansenists, pornographers or abusers of the King.”331 Haüy, at any 
rate, shares many of Diderot’s concerns regarding the blind and even discusses the 
isolation of blind people in language similar to Diderot’s. While Diderot compares the 
existence of a blind person to life in a “dungeon” (cachot) in the Letter on the Blind, 
Haüy laments the plight of the blind beggars whose begging simply prolongs “the 
obscurity of a dungeon (cachot), their unfortunate existence” in his Letter on the 
Education of the Blind.332     
 In any event, Haüy, like Diderot, learned a great deal about educating the blind by 
looking at the famous life of Saunderson and by interacting with blind elites who 
managed to become educated despite the lack of formal educational opportunities for the 
blind. Haüy, for instance, modeled much of his curriculum not only Saunderson but also 
on Hermann Weissenberg and Maria Theresa von Paradis. Haüy was especially indebted 
to Maria Theresa von Paradis, the blind singer, pianist, and composer from Austria for 
whom Mozart may have composed his K. 456 piano concerto.333 Haüy studied with von 
Paradis in 1785 while she was in Paris to give a series of concerts. During their time 
together, he learned that von Paradis “used a tangible print of perforations made by pins; 
 278 
 
and also operated a small portable press enabling her to write letters.”334 Von Paradis, 
then, like Lesueur, helped Haüy create many of the techniques that he used to educate 
blind students in his school.  
Despite Haüy’s interest in the education of blind elites, he also desired to provide 
ordinary blind people with educational opportunities. In his Letter on the Education of the 
Blind, Haüy discusses the anomalous nature of blind geniuses, such as Saunderson, 
Lesueur, and von Paradis, pointing out that “some [blind people], full of insight, have 
enriched their memory of the productions of the human mind, and have partaken in the 
charms of a conversation or of a lecture at which they were present, of knowledge that 
was impossible for them to gather for themselves, in the precious warehouses where they 
had been enclosed.”335 Other blind people are extraordinary, in Haüy’s view, not because 
of their intellects but because of prodigious technical skills that enable them to excel as 
artists or skilled artisans.336  For Haüy, these remarkable blind people are merely 
“prodigies, who are the product of a tenacious industriousness, and seem reserved only 
for a small number of those so privileged among them.”337  Haüy thus believed that 
educators of the blind must find a place in their educational curriculum for ordinary blind 
people. It is ordinary blind people, after all, the “brothers” of the blind geniuses, who are 
“abandoned to an idleness from which, they believe, they will never be able to escape, 
dead to society the very moment they are born to it; and the majority of them, victims at 
all times of the deprivation of sight and of fortune, have only a share of the difficult and 
sad recourse of begging. . . .”338 
 Haüy sought to develop a curriculum that could accommodate both blind 
prodigies and ordinary blind people, giving both the necessary skills that would enable 
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them to abandon their “dungeons” once and for all.  As Haüy explains in his Letter on the 
Education of the Blind, the purpose of his school was to develop “principles and tools” 
that would facilitate the education of those who “were performing only with effort, and 
others who appear [entirely] unable to perform.”339 What Haüy achieved for blind people 
likely surprised even him. From its inception in 1785, his school would play an important 
role in transforming the lives of blind people throughout the West.    
Although most people today point to Epée’s Parisian school for the deaf as the 
birthplace of deaf education in France, there were earlier figures interested in educating 
the deaf. Indeed, if there was any “founder” of deaf education in France during the 
eighteenth century, it was Etienne de Fay, born deaf in 1669 to noble parents and sent to 
the Abbey of Saint-Jean d’Amiens at the age of five.340 According to the eighteenth-
century Jesuit Father André, it was at the abbey that de Fay learned not only to read and 
write but also “arithmetic, Euclidean geometry, mechanics, drawing, architecture, holy 
and profane history, especially of France.”341 In addition, de Fay taught deaf children a 
system of signs at the abbey. In the middle of the eighteenth century, however, the center 
of deaf education shifted to Paris. In 1746, when de Fay was in his seventies, the parents 
of Azy d’Etavigny, de Fay’s most famous pupil who studied at the abbey for seven years, 
decided that their son could receive a better education by studying under Jacob Rodrigues 
Periere in Paris.342 Periere was a Portuguese Jew whose deaf sister inspired him to 
become a leading figure in deaf education. His family had fled Portugal during the 
Portuguese Inquisition and eventually settled in Paris, where he began his work on 
educating the deaf.343 In 1749, just three years after d’Etavigny arrived in Paris to study 
Periere’s techniques and the same year that Diderot published his Letter on the Blind, 
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Periere argued before the French Academy of Science in Paris that it was possible to 
teach deaf people to speak.344 
 As Periere perfected his methods of educating the deaf in Paris, Diderot returned 
to his work on the senses and knowledge after his three-month imprisonment, publishing 
his Letter on the Deaf and Dumb in 1751. Although, once again, there is no direct 
connection between Diderot and Epée’s school for the deaf, Anne Quartararo has noted 
that the ideas of both Diderot and his close friend Condillac “helped to shape certain 
images of deaf people that later informed the literate, hearing public.”345 Epée’s school, 
then, existed in an intellectual and cultural climate that Diderot and Condillac helped to 
create. Both Diderot and Condillac continued to remain interested in sensory disabilities 
long after the 1740s and 1750s. Indeed, Diderot published his Additions to the Letter on 
the Blind in the 1780s, and Condillac, as Quartararo explains, likely reconsidered his 
initial dismissal of the language d’action (language of action) as a primitive 
protolanguage, in part, because of his association with Epée during the 1770s.346 After 
attending a number of Epée’s demonstrations with deaf students, during which he “saw 
first-hand how gestural language functioned in relationship to written language,” 
Condillac concluded that the language d’action was far more intricate and expressive 
than he had originally thought.347 
In any event, Epée began to educate the deaf in 1755, just four years after the 
publication of Diderot’s Letter on the Deaf and Dumb. Epée, like Haüy with respect to 
the blind, was concerned not only with deaf people with extraordinary capabilities but 
also ordinary deaf people. As Quartararo explains, Epée was determined to prove that 
“deaf people could lead productive lives and earn their daily bread, if only they had 
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access to schooling.”348 He also attempted to demonstrate to French elites that it was the 
prejudices of the hearing and speaking world that oppressed deaf people, not their 
physical disabilities. In The True Method of Educating the Deaf and Mute, Confirmed by 
Long Experience (1784), for example, Epée echoes Fontenelle’s report of the deaf man 
from Chartres who suddenly gained the power to speak one day, arguing that deaf people, 
“though similar to ourselves, are reduced, as it were, to the condition of animals so long 
as no attempts are made to rescue them from the darkness.”349 He further argues that it is 
“an absolute obligation to make every effort to bring about their release from these 
shadows.”350 To promote these educational aspirations, Epée held frequent 
demonstrations at his Parisian home on the rue des Moulins, where, Quartararo explains, 
he “made the case for the ‘improvement of humanity’ with a European elite that was 
encouraged to believe that even the most unfortunate of human beings could be lifted 
from their misery and isolation.”351 
Conclusion 
 During the latter half of the seventeenth century and the eighteenth century, a 
period that encompasses much of the Scientific Revolution as well as the Enlightenment, 
a new view of nature developed, one that conceptualized nature as a machine created by 
an intelligent being rather than a living, rational being itself. Many of the most important 
figures of the Scientific Revolution and Enlightenment looked to congenital deformity 
when attempting to unlock the secrets of the emerging mechanistic world view. The 
majority position, as in classical antiquity, was that the mechanistic universe was the 
creation of a divine being, even if such knowledge still left questions about the problem 
of theodicy. The minority position of the Epicureans, however, would reemerge during 
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the eighteenth century to challenge the Christian and Deist faith in design, surmising that 
the diversity of the natural world was the product of chance. These debates would 
continue after the French Revolution, of course, but Charles Darwin’s theory of natural 
selection would finally give scientific credibility to the longstanding beliefs of 
materialists with Epicurean proclivities. The ancient categories for disabled people, 
meanwhile, continued to heap stigma and discrimination on disabled people and 
influence debates about the emerging mechanistic world view, particularly with respect to 
the idea that disabled people were inferior to their able-bodied counterparts. 
 Some people, moreover, began to realize that traditional, Christian solutions to the 
disability problem, namely Church-directed almsgiving and institutional care, were not 
adequately addressing the needs of the disabled. Indeed, both state and private 
philanthropists began to offer new types of aid to the disabled. Louis XIV created the 
Hôtel des Invalides to provide institutional care for disabled veterans, while 
simultaneously preventing his veterans from bothering the able-bodied community. 
Others, including the English and the Prussians, would ultimately emulate Louis’ 
achievement, constructing their own military hospitals. Epée and Haüy, meanwhile, 
revolutionized assistance to the deaf and dumb and blind by setting up schools to educate 
them. After the French Revolution, the West would develop new solutions to the 
disability problem to address the rapidly changing world of the long nineteenth century.
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Chapter 7: New Ideas about Monstrosity and the Search for Modern Solutions to the 
Disability Problem in the Long Nineteenth Century 
 
 The period from the beginning of the French Revolution in 1789 to the 
aftermath of World War I mark yet another important transition in the evolution of ideas 
about disability. Naturalists and scientists continued to ponder the existence of congenital 
deformity in order to understand the secrets of the natural world, culminating in Charles 
Darwin’s theory of natural selection, which identified monstrosities as mutations 
indicative of progressive processes that facilitated the evolution of species through 
natural selection. Yet as naturalists and scientists increasingly embraced Darwin’s views 
of natural selection, they became less interested in determining what the existence of 
congenital deformity could reveal about nature and more interested in fashioning 
experiments to uncover hereditary laws, which, coupled with environmental factors, were 
responsible for producing those living beings long considered monsters in the western 
tradition. 
 A number of important developments, meanwhile, including the French 
Revolution, the Industrial Revolution, the growth of capitalism, the increasing power of 
the medical profession, the rise of the modern nation-state, and the unprecedented 
industrial carnage of World War I, added new dimensions to the disability problem. The 
trend was toward increasing state intervention to address the many problems associated 
with disability. Yet religious and private philanthropy remained an integral part of 
western efforts to provide meaningful and assistance to the disabled. Indeed, the West 
addressed its disability problem during this period essentially by adopting a hybrid 
system—comprised of state, religious, and private actors—to dole out aid to the disabled, 
whether it was in the form of education, public assistance, or medical care. These efforts, 
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however, often amounted to new forms of social control. The most ironic new approach 
to the disability problem was the birth of the eugenics movement, which, in part, 
combined Darwin’s ideas about mutations and the evolution of species with concepts 
prevalent in animal husbandry and horticulture in an attempt to decrease the number of 
burdensome people with congenital deformities. For millennia, the bodies of congenitally 
deformed people had provided westerners with tantalizing clues about the secrets of 
nature. Now that naturalists and scientists were on the brink of finally unlocking many of 
those secrets, the congenitally deformed became victims of a scientific discourse that 
sought to eradicate their aberrant bodies, which, in the view of eugenicists, placed an 
undue burden on able-bodied society.  
The Enigma of Congenital Deformity Finally Solved? 
 According to Collingwood, the third view of nature, the modern view, which 
followed both the Greek view of nature and the mechanical view of nature, first began “to 
find expression towards the end of the eighteenth century, and ever since then has been 
gathering weight and establishing itself more securely down to the present day.”1 That 
view “is based on the analogy between the processes of the natural world as studied by 
natural scientists and the vicissitudes of human affairs as studied by historians.”2 
According to Collingwood, this modern view of nature “could only have arisen from a 
widespread familiarity with historical studies, and in particular with historical studies of 
the kind which placed the conception of process, change, development in the centre of 
their picture and recognized it as the fundamental category of historical thought.”3 This 
understanding of history, which first appeared about the middle of the eighteenth century, 
became important for natural science over the next “half-century,” as “the idea of 
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progress became (as in Erasmus Darwin, Zoonomia, 1794-8 and Lamarck, Philsophie 
zoologigique, 1809) the idea which in another half-century was to become as famous as 
that of evolution.”4  
Collingwood understood, of course, that it is sometimes difficult to view the 
evolution of the idea of nature in a perfectly linear manner. He notes, for example that the 
“Democritean atomism which we know from Epicurus and Lucretius,” became “a 
fossilized relic of ancient Greek physics, anachronistically surviving in an alien 
environment, the evolutionary science of the nineteenth century.”5 So, too, did the 
Empedoclean and Epicurean understanding of matter, motion, chance, and monstrosity. 
Indeed, it was the atomism of Leucippus and Democritus as well as the Empedoclean and 
Epicurean understanding of monstrosity that would combine with late-eighteenth-century 
notions of progress to create a new view of monstrosity. 
 It was Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural 
Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life, published in 
1859, that would ultimately change how the educated elite viewed monstrosity. Yet there 
were a number of thinkers who likewise played a pivotal role in the new, scientific view 
of monstrosity that would emerge in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The study of 
monstrosity had become so popular by the nineteenth century that Darwin referred to it as 
the “doctrine of monsters.”6 There was thus a large contingent of naturalists and scientists 
ready to apply Darwin’s theories to their own work on monstrosity. Darwin, moreover, 
had finally provided materialists with a viable alternative to the notion that monstrosity 
was a necessary component of God’s design. Indeed, as Collingwood has observed, 
“materialism was from first to last an aspiration rather than an achievement. Its God was 
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always a miracle-working God whose mysterious ways were past our finding out.”7 
Materialists had always hoped that “with the advance of science we should find them out 
some day; so the scientific credit of materialism was maintained by drawing very large 
cheques in its own favour on assets not yet to hand.”8 For materialists, then, Darwin’s 
theory of natural selection served as a long-awaited confirmation of the idea that matter, 
motion, and chance rather than design were responsible for the existence of congenital 
deformity.    
 The existence of monstrosities had provided Erasmus Darwin, grandfather of 
Charles Darwin, with intriguing clues about the mysteries of the evolution of species. In 
Zoonomia, Darwin argues that “when we enumerate the great changes produced in the 
species of animals before their nativity; these are such as resemble the form or colour of 
their parents, which have been altered by . . . cultivation or accidents . . ., and are thus 
continued to their posterity.”9  Some evolutionary change, Darwin surmises, likely occurs 
through “changes produced probably by the exuberance of nourishment supplied to the 
fetus, as in monstrous births with additional limbs; many of these enormities of shape are 
propagated, and continued as a variety at least, if not as a new species of animal.”10 
Darwin then discusses specific examples of monstrosities that both he and Buffon had 
personally observed as well as other monstrosities that were well known during the late 
eighteenth century: 
I have seen a breed of cats with an additional claw on every foot; of poultry also 
with an additional claw, and with wings to their feet; and of others without rumps. 
Mr. Buffon mentions a breed of dogs without tails, which are common at Rome 
and Naples, which he supposed to have been produced by a custom long 
established by cutting their tails close off. There are many kinds of pigeons, 
admired for their peculiarities, which are monsters thus produced and 
propagated.11 
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By pondering the existence monstrosities, along with other natural phenomena, Darwin 
was able to fashion a theory of evolution which likely influenced his grandson’s thinking 
about monstrosities, mutation, and the origin of species in at least some respects.12 “From 
. . . meditating on the great similarity of the structure of the warm-blooded animals,” 
Darwin begins,   
and at the same time of the great changes they undergo both before and after their 
nativity; and by considering in how minute a portion of time many of the changes 
of animals above described have been produced; would it be too bold to imagine, 
that in the great length of time, since the earth began to exist, perhaps millions of 
ages before the commencement of the history of mankind, would it be too bold to 
imagine, that all warm-blooded animals have arisen from one living filament, 
which THE GREAT FIRST CAUSE endued with animality, with the power of 
acquiring new parts, attended with new propensities, directed by irritations, 
sensations, volitions, and associations; and thus possessing the faculty of 
continuing to improve by its own inherent activity, and of delivering down those 
improvements by generation to its posterity, world without end!13  
 
 In France, meanwhile, naturalists such as Étienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, 
appointed to study vertebrates at the Jardin des Plantes while his associate Jean-Baptiste 
Lamarck was in charge of studying invertebrates, and his son, Isidore Geoffroy Saint-
Hilaire, examined monstrosity to understand the natural world.14 In Principes de 
philosophie zooloigique (1830), for instance, Étienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire concluded 
that “monsters, which have long been regarded as strange whims of nature, are only 
beings in which the regular development of certain [body] parts has been stopped. . . .”15 
For Saint-Hilaire, then, “man considered in his embryonic state, in the bosom of his 
mother, passes successively through all of the degrees of evolution of inferior animal 
species: his organization, in his successive phases, comes closer to the organization of the 
worm, of the fish, and of the bird.”16 Saint-Hilaire’s understanding of congenital 
deformity, of course, would have done little to erase the stigma and discrimination 
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associated with monstrosity. Saint-Hilaire, after all, was asserting that people with severe 
congenital deformities were, by definition, inferior to able-bodied people because they 
exhibited characteristics of inferior animals. Yet Saint-Hilaire’s ideas about congenital 
deformity, and the ease with which the educated elite of Europe were able to gain access 
to his work, demonstrated that the assault on superstitious beliefs about the connection 
between congenital deformity and the divine, which had featured so prominently in the 
disputes between Alexander Pope and his adversaries, was far from finished.17 In 
addition, even though few people ultimately agreed with the specifics of his hypothesis 
with respect to congenital deformity and human development, his conclusion that those 
with severe congenital deformities were inferior to the able-bodied norm was, for a 
medical and scientific establishment intent on curing those with physical ailments, as 
close as possible to axiomatic. 
Charles Darwin likewise explored the implications of congenital deformity when 
fashioning his theory of evolution by means of natural selection. Darwin proclaimed in 
his shorthand notebook from the first half of 1838, over twenty years before the 
publication of his On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the 
Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life (1859), that “[t]he doctrine of 
monsters is preeminently worthy of study on the idea of those parts most easily 
monstrified, which last produced —insane men in civilized countries—this is well worthy 
of investigation.”18 Darwin’s understanding of the “doctrine of monsters” was 
remarkably similar to the earlier observations of Isidore of Seville and Maupertuis in its 
division of monstrosity into four categories:  “(1) From praeternatural situation of parts 
(2) addition of parts, (3) deficiency of parts (4) combined addition & deficiency of parts, 
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as in Hermaphrodites. . . .”19 As one might expect, Darwin did not explore monstrosity or 
categorize the various types of monstrosity for the sake of his own curiosity but rather to 
explore the extent to which monstrosities were indicative of biological processes that 
made the evolution of species possible. In one of his notebooks, for instance, he noted the 
relationship between congenital deformity and other inherited, physical characteristics, 
pondering “[t]he case of all blue eyed cats . . . being deaf curious case of correlation of 
imperfect structure.”20  
Monstrosity was so important to Darwin’s understanding of natural selection that 
it featured prominently in the first chapter of On the Origin of Species. Indeed, 
monstrosity was Darwin’s starting point for explaining how species could change over 
time.  Darwin notes in the second paragraph of his most monumental work, for example, 
that “Geoffroy St. Hilaire’s experiments show that unnatural treatment of the embryo 
causes monstrosities; and monstrosities cannot be separated by any clear line of 
distinction from mere variations.”21 Darwin likewise discusses monstrosity when 
attempting to understand the “laws governing inheritance,” which in 1859 remained 
“quite unknown.”22 He observes that breeders had long-manipulated monstrosities to 
create new breeds, suggesting that breeders had facilitated the development of cats with 
blue eyes that were “invariably deaf” by attempting to create blue-eyed cats. The cats’ 
deafness, Darwin concludes, was the result of the “mysterious laws of the correlation of 
growth,” which make it impossible to promote the perpetuation of a primary monstrosity 
without promoting the perpetuation of a secondary monstrosity.23 
 By the end of his career, Darwin had concluded that it was no longer appropriate 
to use the term “monstrosity,” preferring instead to use the term “mutation.” In The Life 
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of Erasmus Darwin,” Darwin explains his view of his grandfather’s observations about 
monstrosity and the evolution of species: “So changes in form do occur in nature. 
[Erasmus] Darwin notes the crucial point that monstrosities—or mutations as we should 
say—may be inherited. . . .”24 Here we see monstrosity transformed; monstrosities are no 
longer curious byproducts of the mysterious laws of nature but rather examples, albeit 
extreme ones, of mutations that play a role in the evolution of species through natural 
selection. Yet despite Charles Darwin’s interest in congenital deformity, he did not 
believe that species evolve through substantial mutations that he had previously called 
monstrosities. Instead, Darwin contended that the evolution of species occurs in nature 
primarily through gradual variations, which, in the words of Elof Axel Carlson, provided 
“the raw material on which natural selection acted.”25 For Darwin, then, monstrosities 
were merely extraordinary anomalies that deviated from the ordinary nature of things to 
such an extent that they usually could not play a significant role in evolution.26 In On the 
Origin of Species, for example, Darwin concludes that “sporting plants,” monstrous 
plants with “a single bud or offset, which suddenly assumes a new and sometimes very 
different character from that of the rest of the plant,” are “extremely rare under nature.”27 
 As increasing numbers of the educated elite embraced the major premises of 
Darwinism, naturalists and scientists continued with their efforts to understand the 
precise processes by which the evolution of species occurs. In Materials for the Study of 
Variation (1894), the geneticist William Bateson rejected Darwin’s claim that evolution 
occurs primarily through gradual, continuous variation. Bateson argued, instead, that 
discontinuous variation—a variation caused by a sudden and abrupt mutation that 
significantly alters an organism—was primarily responsible for the evolution of species.28 
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Bateson, as one might expect, relied heavily on examples of monstrosity in delineating 
his views of discontinuous variation. In chapter 24 of Materials for the Study of 
Variation, titled “Double Monsters,” Bateson uses examples of “double and triple 
‘monstrosity,’” which could be “found in any work on general teratology,” to explain his 
conception of meristic variations, congenital deformities characterized by superfluous 
body parts or missing body part such as an infant born with too many or too few digits.29   
The rediscovery of Gregor Johann Mendel’s work on heredity by Jugo de Vries, 
Carl Correns, and Erich von Tschermak at the end of the nineteenth century not only 
offered critical support to Bateson’s challenge to the Darwinian concept of gradual, 
continuous variation but also marked the beginning of modern genetics. The rediscovery 
of Mendel was so important to naturalists that it resulted in the development of two 
opposing groups. The first, led by Bateson, de Vries, and their pro-Mendelian supporters, 
argued that the evolution of species was the result of discontinuous rather than gradual, 
continuous variations. The second, called the “biometric school” and led by Sir Francis 
Galton, Darwin’s half-cousin, Karl Peterson, and W.F.R. Weldon, continued to argue in 
favor of evolution through more gradual, continuous variations even though they rejected 
many of Darwin’s own ideas.30 Because Bateson, de Vries, and their supporters attributed 
the evolution of species primarily to discontinuous variation, they were more likely to 
view monstrosity as having evolutionary significance. Yet this does not mean that the 
biometric school ignored the importance of monstrosity. Indeed, the biometric school 
viewed congenital deformities as anomalies indicative of the biological processes behind 
evolutionary change rather than the means by which that change occurs. 
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As the supporters of Mendelian genetics and the biometric school waged a 
polemical war about the role of mutation and natural selection in the evolution of species, 
scientists were learning that it was becoming difficult to delve further into the secrets of 
nature’s laws simply by pondering the existence of congenital deformity. Most scientists, 
whether they supported Bateson and de Vries or the biometric school, agreed that 
congenital deformity was indicative of hereditary laws, even if those laws remained only 
partially understood. What was becoming increasingly important to scientists in the early 
decades of the twentieth century was to uncover those hereditary laws through 
experimentation. Thomas Hunt Morgan, for instance, famously experimented with fruit 
flies to discover the role of mutation in heredity. Although he initially believed that he 
had found a “mutating period,” he recognized through further experimentation that 
Edmund Beecher Wilson had been correct in proposing that the X chromosome results in 
sex-limited inheritance.31 Subsequent scientists, some of whom had been Morgan’s 
students, embraced the laboratory as the proper place for studying the precise ways in 
which mutations occur and replicate. Even experiments that focused more on observing 
and thinking about the peculiarities of monstrosity rather on learning about the 
relationship between genes and congenital deformity were becoming less popular among 
some scientists. As the pediatrician and geneticist Barton Childs once explained, there 
were two ways to study infants “with congenital deformities. One was teratology,” the 
study of monstrosities, “which consisted in taking something out of every bottle on the 
shelf and giving it to some poor pregnant rat and then observing what happened to her 
fetuses. That seemed to me about as gross as hitting someone over the head with a 
sledgehammer and devoid altogether of scientific elegance.”32 Childs preferred a second 
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approach, looking “at family aggregations of cases [to] see whether one could learn 
something about genes and what they might be doing in these disorders.”33 Debates about 
the precise ways in which evolutionary change occurs, of course, would continue 
throughout the twentieth century. Yet in the age of experimentation, the laboratory, and 
genetics, the mere act of pondering congenital deformity so as to uncover the secrets of 
nature was fast becoming a relic of a bygone era.34  
Revolutionary Solutions to the Disability Problem 
From the late eighteenth century to the early twentieth century, a number of 
important developments, including the French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution, the 
growth of capitalism, the rise of the modern nation-state, the increasing power of the 
medical profession, World War I, and the advent of the eugenics movement, impacted 
how able-bodied society viewed the disability problem.  The five most important 
developments for disabled people, in my view, were (1) debates about whether 
republicanism required new ways of addressing the disability problem; (2) efforts to 
provide public assistance to disabled people to address a wide range of problems 
associated with the Industrial Revolution and the growth of capitalism; (3) the 
medicalization of disability; (4) total war; and (5) the rise of the eugenics movement.  
The French Revolution and Disabled Veterans 
It is tempting to look to World War I as the crucial event that forced able-bodied 
society to think about what to do about the problem of reintegrating disabled veterans 
back into its fold. Yet the political landscape of the French Revolution, as Isser Woloch 
has demonstrated in The French Veteran from the Revolution to the Restoration, likewise 
presented an opportunity for France to reexamine its treatment of disabled veterans. 
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Disability scholars, however, should not assume that the French Revolution was wholly 
an able-bodied affair, which ultimately resulted in important, albeit unilateral, changes 
for disabled veterans. Indeed, disabled veterans themselves would play an important role 
in the overthrow of the old regime.  
Although it has become commonplace in the modern world to view the storming 
of the Bastille by armed Parisians on the afternoon of July 14, 1789 as a symbolic 
“triumph over despotism,” few today are aware of the important role that the disabled 
veterans of the Hôtel des Invalides played in the events of that fateful day. Even fewer 
are aware of how the Invalides’ lodgers as well as a company of invalides detachés 
indirectly facilitated the storming of the Bastille. Their French contemporaries, however, 
were certainly aware of their actions. As Paris edged ever-closer to armed insurrection, 
Baron de Basenval, commander of the troops quartered at the Champ de Mars to suppress 
Parisian mobs, and Governor Sombreuil became concerned that the cache of 
approximately 30,000 rifles at the Invalides might fall into dangerous hands.35  On July 
13, Sombreuil “thought that he would have the firing mechanisms removed from the 
rifles; but in six hours the twenty invalides who were set to that task had only disarmed 
twenty rifles.”36 Besenval considered this a calculated act of resistance, noting that there 
was “a seditious spirit that reigned in that institution.”37  According to Basenval, for 
example, “a one-legged man who was not distrusted was discovered introducing packets 
of licentious and mutinous chansons into the Hôtel.”38 Basenval, in fact, recalled that 
“one could not count on the invalides; and if the cannoneers were given the order to load 
their pieces, they would have turned them against the governor’s apartment.”39  
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On the morning of July 14, an enormous Parisian crowd gathered around the 
Invalides, demanding rifles. The invalides detachés manning the cannons on the 
Invalides’ ramparts, encouraged by other invalides, indicated their unwillingness to fire 
on the crowd by extinguishing their matches.40 Sombreuil thus had no choice but to 
capitulate and hand the rifles over to the crowd.41 According to Basenval and other 
witnesses, “the generals agreed thenceforth that it was impossible to bring Paris to 
heel.”42 Jacques Godechot has thus concluded that “‘after the invasion of the Invalides 
and the clear proof that the troops could not act, the victory of the Parisian insurrection 
was assured, and the capture of the Bastille might well be considered as a symbolic 
episode which made little difference to the situation.’”43  
As the French Revolution progressed, France had to determine how it could best 
take care of disabled veterans not only within the Hôtel des Invalides but also disabled 
pensioners who resided elsewhere. The Republic had to determine whether the Invalides, 
once a crowning achievement of King Louis XIV, the paragon of royal absolutism, was 
still an effective way of dealing with the problem of providing adequate assistance to 
disabled veterans now that royal authority was dissolving. Politicians likewise had to 
determine whether the existing disability pension system would sufficiently compensate 
disabled veterans for their sacrifices for the nascent Republic. In February 1791, a 
majority of the National Assembly’s military committee, headed by Dubois-Crancé, 
issued a report that recommended abolishing the Invalides.44 A fierce debate thus began 
as abolitionists desperately tried to persuade the Assembly that invalides would be better 
off without the venerable institution while supporters of the Invalides vigorously came to 
its defense. 
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Dubois-Crancé’s report mentioned the administration’s abuses, of course, but as 
Woloch has ably demonstrated, the proffered reasons went well beyond administrative 
abuses. Indeed, Dubois-Crancé and his supporters proffered two main arguments for 
abolition. First, they argued that the finances saved by abolishing the Hôtel des Invalides 
would, in the end, actually benefit the invalides.45 Dubois-Crancé, however, somehow 
had to distinguish his plan from Saint-Germain’s prior expulsion of over 1,000 invalides, 
a tremendously unpopular act. Dubois-Crancé’s proposal, in fact, had the potential of 
being even more popular because it would have expelled all of the invalides. He 
attempted to distinguish his plan from Saint-Germain’s infamous expulsion by pointing 
out that pensions under Saint-Germain were meager whereas Dubois-Crancé’s proposed 
pensions were exorbitant. In addition, in a facet of his plan that was likewise reminiscent 
of Saint-Germain, Dubois-Crancé further proposed the establishment of one small 
veterans hospice in each of the nation’s thirty-six gouvernements to provide lodging for 
the totally disabled or caducs.46 
The Invalides’ supporters were quick to react to this first argument in favor of 
abolition. The two principal defenders—the moderate Clermont-Tonnerre and the 
reactionary Abbé Maury—argued that the government should reform the abuses in the 
Invalides’ organization, give the invalides a choice whether to stay or leave, and raise 
pensions to the high levels proposed by Dubois-Crancé.47 They provided a litany of 
reasons for their proposals. Clermont-Tonnerre reminded his colleagues of the debt that 
France owed to its invalides and contended that Dubois-Crancé’s plan could not hope to 
repay it: “What do we owe the invalides? We owe them honor, comfort, special 
attentions, a family. None of that is provided by the modest sum of 227 livres.”48 
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Clermont-Tonnerre, moreover, noted that the Invalides, surrounded by “national 
treasures” in the nation’s capital, was a “temple whose ornaments continually recall [for 
the invalide] his past exploits.”49 That temple, Cleremont-Tonnerre argued, could foster a 
sense of camaraderie among the invalides that no pension could possibly replicate.50 The 
defenders further warned that pensions had been unreliable in the past whereas the 
Invalides would remain a bulwark against the suffering of invalides even in times of 
crisis.51 Abbé Maury proclaimed, “Public institutions which have a clear useful purpose 
will develop and improve continually, while assistance which is given individually and in 
obscurity will diminish and gradually dry up.”52 The defenders likewise raised alarms 
about the proposed hospices. According to one deputy, expressing the typical French 
abhorrence of hospices, Dubois-Crancé’s hospice plan “would mean relegating the 
invalides to refuges of contagion.”53   
The defenders of the Invalides, however, were far from optimistic about the 
character of the invalides for whom they lobbied. Indeed, demonstrating appalling levels 
of paternalism, the defenders further argued that the Hôtel des Invalides was necessary to 
protect the invalides from themselves and, concomitantly, to protect France from begging 
invalides. Clermont-Tonnerre proclaimed that the invalides’ “past deeds have earned 
them a subsistence which their future imprudence must not be permitted to jeopardize.”54 
If a pensioner ran through his pension too quickly, the defenders feared, he would “go 
begging for the rest of the time since he can’t be expected to enter a department hospice 
while still in good health.”55 The defenders, then, feared a return to the deplorable 
situation that had initially led King Louis XIV to garrison the estropiés encore valides in 
the frontiers in the first place, which, of course, ended in a perceived disaster.56  
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The second way in which the abolitionists attempted to win support for their plan 
was to appeal to republican sympathies by equating abolition with antiroyalism.57  Even 
if the Hôtel des Invalides helped its invalides, Beauharnais proclaimed, a free people 
must “establish public institutions on solid foundations different from those of despotism 
. . . . Our institution must be completely different.”58 Dubois-Crancé, moreover, long 
before the advent of social control theory, argued that in establishing the Invalides, the 
monarchy forced the invalides into “absolute dependence in a military regime that is so 
harsh for old age.”59 The Invalides, according to Dubois-Crancé, was not the benevolent 
institution that its defenders made it out to be but rather “nothing more than a prison.”60 
Menou even argued that any institution in the capital would be deleterious to the moral 
and physical well-being of the invalides. Indeed, if the invalides remained in Paris, they 
would be unable to avoid “dissipat[ing] in its excesses,” for that was one of the 
“inevitable disadvantages of large cities.”61  
As the National Assembly prepared to vote on the fate of the institution, Emmery, 
a moderate on the military committee, joined the defenders of the Hôtel des Invalides.62  
Realizing that the abolitionists could not hope to win without Emmery’s support, Dubois-
Crancé suggested that the Assembly take a poll of the invalides to ascertain their position 
before voting on the matter. The Assembly, however, voted down his motion and, on 
March 24, 1791, adopted Emmery’s proposal that gave the invalides the choice whether 
to remain at the Invalides or to leave. In addition, the defenders of the Invalides enacted 
the committee’s recommended larger pensions that were supposed to be compensation 
for the Invalides’ abolition. The vote, then, represented a total victory for those invalides 
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who wanted the freedom to choose what lifestyle fit them best.63 The inaugural volume of 
the Feuille Villageoise reported on the monumental vote: 
The National Assembly has decreed that the Hôtel des Invalides—that respectable 
monument—will continue to receive disabled or wounded soldiers who wish to 
retire there. An adequate stipend will be accorded to those who prefer to live 
among their families…. 
 All the galleries of the Assembly were filled with invalides who silently 
followed a debate so important to them and who, at the end of the session, 
signified their respectful approbation. That venerable cortege, that attentive 
silence, that unanimous submission of old soldiers constituted an imposing 
spectacle.64 
 
The radical republicans were disappointed that they had not prevailed and hoped 
that a mass exodus of invalides, particularly republican invalides, would prove that their 
position had been correct.65  Their hopes, however, were dashed when the exodus proved 
to be much smaller than they had hoped. Of the 2,900 invalides living at the Hôtel des 
Invalides in June 1791, just over 1,600 left the institution and accepted pensions.66 
Perhaps most disappointing to the republicans was the fact that the decision to leave did 
not necessarily reflect partisan views. The well-known radical Jacobin Jean-Baptiste 
Cordier, for example, chose to stay.67 
Now that the Assembly had provided meaningful assistance to the invalides 
detachés, it turned to the more difficult question of the invalides retirés dans les 
departments, who had once been eligible for the Hôtel des Invalides but who, for a 
variety of reasons, had been forced to accept “modest stipends” and to retire to the 
provinces instead.68 This group of invalides, in fact, had been the intended beneficiaries 
of Dubois-Crancé’s plan to abolish the Invalides in the first place.69 When the invalides 
retires heard that the military committee was proposing legislation that would 
marginalize their status as invalides, they made impassioned pleas to the committee to 
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reconsider.70 The committee conceded and even proposed to increase their pensions 
significantly.71 The invalides retires, moreover, received highest priority for lodging at 
the Hôtel des Invalides and its special pensions.72 The invalides retires had proven quite 
capable of navigating through the representative process to protect their own interests. 
Politicians, moreover, had shown a true commitment to providing meaningful assistance 
to the invalides retires.  
The French Revolution and the Schools for the Deaf and Blind 
Just as the French Revolution raised questions about how a republic could best 
tend to the needs of its disabled veterans, the Revolution likewise presented the French 
with an opportunity to reassess the extent to which the state should assist, if not replace, 
churches and private philanthropists as providers of aid to some groups of disabled 
people. When Abbé Charles-Michel de l’Epée died on December 23, 1789, just months 
after the French Revolution, the revolutionary authorities had to determine how best to 
provide for their care in the absence of their famous benefactor. Jérôme-Marie Champion 
de Cicé, the Keeper of the Seals, who had headed a delegation from the National 
Assembly to be present in Epée’s final hours, made a solemn promise to Epée: “Die in 
peace; the Nation now adopts your children.”73 A few days later, deputies of the 
Commune of Paris expressed before the National Assembly a desire to establish an 
institute “for the needy orphans that the death of Abbé de l’Epée has left without 
support.”74 Between January and March 1790, candidates vied to succeed Epée. On April 
6, 1790, Abbé Roch-Ambroise Cucurron Sicard, a grammarian who had learned a great 
deal about educating the deaf from Epée, became director of the Institute for the Deaf and 
Dumb in Paris.75  As he and other advocates for the deaf waited to see how the French 
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Revolution would impact efforts to educate the deaf, he attempted to convince 
revolutionary authorities to support his methods over Epée’s because they were more 
compatible with written French.76 Before the National Assembly could act on Jérôme-
Marie Champion de Cicé’s promise to the recently deceased Epée, however, it had to 
determine whether it should also provide state funds for the education of the blind. 
The connection between Epée’s deaf students and Haüy’s blind students was 
obvious to some French observers after Epée’s death, when Haüy’s blind students 
performed at a funeral ceremony at Saint-Etienne-du-Mont, a church in Paris, on 
February 23, 1790. Three days later, the Journal de la Municipalité et des Districts noted 
that the audience “was moved by an emotional double scene: to one side the deaf and 
mute. . ., to the other, the blind children who expressed the public’s grief with lugubrious, 
moving music.”77  The journal, moreover, praised Haüy for his efforts to do for the blind 
what Epée had done for deaf-mutes.78 What was not so apparent at this time, Zina 
Weygand has explained, was that the National Assembly would soon make the 
connection between the deaf-mutes and the blind more concrete by consolidating, at least 
for a short time, efforts to educate deaf-mutes with efforts to educate the blind in Paris.79  
On March 25, 1790, three days after Haüy, his blind students, and several 
members of the Philanthropic Society, marched to the Church of Saint-Jacques-l’Hôpital, 
Haüy’s blind students performed before deputies of the National Assembly and 
representatives of the Paris Commune at the Hôtel de Ville.80 Jean-Denis Avisse, an 
accomplished blind student, presented a petition on behalf of his fellow students, which 
called for the nationalization of the Institute for Blind Youth.81 Meanwhile, Armand-
Joseph de Béthune-Charost, president of the Philanthropic Society, which financially 
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supported the Institute for Blind Youth, alerted La Rouchefoucauld-Liancourt and the 
Committee on Mendicancy of the society’s financial troubles after its subscriptions had 
plummeted in the wake of the French Revolution.82 According to Weygand, he likely 
alerted them to the Institute for Blind Youth at this time, which was putting a significant 
strain on the society’s budget.83 For French philanthropists and advocates of the blind, the 
Committee on Mendicancy had the power and resources to offer meaningful assistance to 
the blind, whereas Edmund Burke denigrated the committee as evidence not only that the 
French Revolution had created an economic catastrophe in France but also that the 
National Assembly was taking unprecedented, foolish steps to help the French poor.84 On 
August 24, 1790, Sicard likewise appeared with a delegation of his deaf students before 
the National Assembly. Jean Massieu, one of Sicard’s talented students, emulated Jean-
Denis Avisse in presenting a petition to nationalize Epée’s former school.85  
 The Committee on Mendicancy produced reports on establishing institutes for 
deaf-mutes and the blind the next year. On July 21, 1791, Pierre-Louis Prieur, one of the 
four members of the committee, presented a “Report on the Establishment of the Institute 
for the Congenitally Deaf” as well as a proposed decree for the project.86 On September 
28, 1791, Jean-Baptiste Massieu, another member of the Committee on Mendicancy, 
presented a “Report on the Establishment of the Blind on its Unification with that of the 
Deaf and Dumb” along with a proposed decree.87 The unification of efforts to educate 
both deaf-mutes and the blind reflected the French Revolution’s belief in the importance 
of fraternité.88 The deaf-mutes and the blind would prove that there was no obstacle too 
great for republican fraternité to overcome. Massieu noted in his report that “nature has 
raised a barrier between the faculties of the deaf-mute and those of the congenitally blind 
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that at first seems insurmountable.”89 He argued, however, that “if the blind person can 
express [his idea] before the deaf-mute’s eyes, and if the deaf-mute can, for his part, trace 
or express palpable signs that represent the idea that the former inspired, then it is true 
that the deaf-mute can understand the blind person and the blind person the deaf-mute.”90  
 The eventual establishment of a joint institute at the Celestines, a convent 
appropriated by the Republic, as Weygand has suggested, may have been a utopian 
fantasy destined to fail.91 Article 5 of Massieu’s decree forced Haüy, the “principal 
teacher” of the blind, to consult with Sicard, the “principal teacher” of the deaf-mutes, 
before appointing personnel to teach and oversee blind students, while Sicard did not 
have to consult Haüy when making appointments with respect to his deaf-mutes.92 In 
addition, article 6 of Massieu’s decree made the existing bursar overseeing deaf-mutes 
the bursar over both the deaf-mutes and the blind, which again placed Haüy and other 
advocates for the blind in an inferior position vis-à-vis Sicard and his supporters.93 By 
1792, Weygand has demonstrated, “the cohabitation became truly poisoned by the 
dissension between Haüy and Sicard. . . .”94 By April 1794, the attempt to educate deaf-
mutes and the blind in a combined institute had failed, as the deaf-mutes left for what had 
been the seminary of Saint-Magloir.95 
The goals and methodology of the new combined institute may have altered the 
lives of deaf-mute and blind students even more drastically than the merger of the 
institutes for deaf-mutes and the blind. The National Assembly, Weygand explains, 
hoped that the combined institute would one day be able to “provide for itself” by 
teaching students various trades.96 Yet the new combined institute would constitute a 
Foucauldian nightmare, where hearing and sighted instructors would subject their deaf-
 316 
 
mute and blind students to constant surveillance and discipline so as to forge them into 
worthwhile citizens and workers. In Weygand’s estimation, the new institute pursued “a 
process of social control where students from the laboring classes were invited to become 
honest workers, subject to the laws of their superiors and capable of one day fending for 
themselves.”97 Article 6 of Massieu’s decree specified that [t]he bursar will never allow a 
student to remain idle. He will inform the headmaster of student carelessness if he has 
reason to be dissatisfied or of reasons he may have to praise them, so as to bring some 
around and give others a sign of his satisfaction.”98 Article 7, moreover, stipulated that 
“[t]he bursar will be the one to directly inspect all work. He will not only oversee the 
students in employed in the workshops but even the inspectors or foremen. They will 
answer to him, each day. . ., and the bursar will answer to the headmaster of each 
institute, who will answer to the administration.”99 The regulations that implemented the 
decrees of July 21 and September 28 likewise contributed to the surveillance of the deaf-
mutes and the blind. Title 3, article 13, required all dormitories to “be lit at night. The 
tutor-supervisors’ beds will be placed at either end of the boys’ dormitory, and the 
mistress-governesses will also sleep in the girl’s dormitory. The shop foremen and 
mistress-governesses will abide by this same article in the dormitories of the blind.”100 
Title 2, article 3, moreover, provided that “[t]he tutor-supervisors of the boys, and the 
mistress-governesses of the girls (in the case of the deaf) will never leave the students 
alone, neither day nor night. . . . The inspectors or shop foremen and the mistress-
governesses will do the same with the blind.”101 The authors of the regulations 
establishing the joint institute, Weygand has rightly concluded, thus “realized the ideal of 
panopticism without having had to spend money on a particular architectural layout.”102 
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The Industrial Revolution and Capitalism 
If the French Revolution provided the French with the opportunity to discuss what 
able-bodied society should do about some aspects of the disability problem, the Industrial 
Revolution demonstrated the weaknesses of the traditional system of providing aid to the 
disabled. As the Industrial Revolution transformed the western economies, some states 
determined that they could best deal with the disability problem by expanding charitable 
functions traditionally carried out by the Church and private philanthropists. Large 
numbers of disabled people, after all, had remained in desperate need of help under the 
traditional system. With the advent of capitalism and the rise of the modern nation-state, 
there was the distinct possibility that the problem could escalate if governments did not 
step in to provide assistance directly to disabled people.103 This does not mean, however, 
that every government intended to provide this assistance in lieu of aid from churches and 
private philanthropists. Instead, the welfare systems that would develop in the West 
would generally rely on government assistance as well as any aid that churches or private 
philanthropists could offer. 
Although it is difficult to generalize about western forms of state assistance for 
disabled people because, as disability scholar Robert Drake has noted, there were 
substantial differences between state welfare programs in countries or regions such as 
Scandinavia, Britain, the United States, Canada, and Australia,104 there were some 
similarities among the various welfare systems. In the West, there has long been a 
tradition of the “deserving” and “undeserving” poor.105 The deserving poor, including 
widows, orphans, and the disabled, have been considered poor through no fault of their 
own while the undeserving poor are supposedly able-bodied vagabonds too lazy to work 
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like everyone else. As discussed in the second chapter, Christians always had considered 
it part of their mission to provide aid to various types of the deserving poor, including the 
disabled. When governments began to perform some of the charitable functions 
traditionally exercised by the Church, they often incorporated the traditional distinction 
between deserving and undeserving poor into their own welfare systems. Indeed, 
governments attempted to ensure that able-bodied people did not wrongly appropriate aid 
intended for the disabled. The two safeguards commonly used to prevent this type of 
fraud are the same type of safeguards employed by the ancient Athenians: a requirement 
that the claimant be sufficiently poor and a requirement that the claimant be sufficiently 
disabled.106 The intent of the first type of provision is to prevent wealthy people who 
happen to be disabled from taking precious resources needed by disabled people who are 
not financially secure, while the second type of provision seeks to prevent able-bodied 
people from pretending to be disabled in order to defraud the state out of payments.  
A comparison between the two safeguards of the Athenian disability pension and 
the two modern safeguards for modern welfare programs for disabled people reveals how 
the modern world was impacting the growth of state assistance to disabled people. It was 
relatively easy for the Athenians to enforce the first safeguard. In Lysias’ speech in 
defense of the lame man’s pension, for example, the pensioner suggests that the Council 
is personally aware of his finances because so many of its members know him 
personally.107 In the nineteenth century, government bureaucrats would not have been as 
familiar with each individual claimant because modern governments were not confined to 
one relatively small city. Yet bureaucrats obviously could access financial records and 
even interview local members of the community to determine if a claimant was hiding 
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money somewhere. As Garland has noted, the Athenians would have encountered far 
more difficulty in enforcing the second safeguard. Indeed, it was no easy task in classical 
antiquity to determine whether a prospective disability pensioner was truly disabled 
because medicine in antiquity did not provide physicians with enough expertise to make 
such determinations.108 Still, however, Athens was small enough that some members of 
the Council, at least in some cases, may have been personally aware of a person’s 
disability. Eventually, of course, the medical profession would advance to such an extent 
that doctors could conduct medical examinations on behalf of the state and be reasonably 
certain that they would be able to detect those who intended to defraud the state out of 
payments intended for disabled people. Indeed, as doctors perfected their art throughout 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, they were on their way to becoming 
important gatekeepers of welfare programs for disabled people in the West.109 
The Medicalization of Disability 
The medical profession during the nineteenth century, as Henri-Jacques Stiker has 
observed, became increasingly able to offer treatments for various disabilities.110 The 
public understandably grew ever more trusting of medicine, especially as scientists and 
doctors began to unlock many of the secrets of health and disease.111 As the prestige of 
the medical profession increased, doctors were able to convince large portions of the 
public that medicine was an effective means of addressing some problems associated 
with large numbers of disabled people living in able-bodied societies. In the process, 
doctors medicalized disability by combining both able-bodied norms and able-bodied 
prejudices about disabled people with their specialized medical knowledge. “The 
nineteenth century,” Stiker argues, “was a great era for orthopedics. Straightening out 
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physically and straightening up behaviorally are put in the same semantic field, a 
normative one. Educate and rehabilitate, mind and body: draw upward, toward 
correctness. Correct is another keyword that forges a link between medicine and 
pedagogy.”112 Drake agrees, contending that “[t]he project of medicine has been to treat, 
ameliorate, or ‘normalize’ disabled people according to prevailing understandings of 
physiological and cognitive norms.”113 In the latter half of the twentieth century, of 
course, disabled people would begin to challenge the medical model of disability by 
employing counter-discursive strategies, through which disabled activists attempted to 
regain some measure of independence from their medical overlords by creating a new 
definition of “disability.” Before that social awakening, however, disabled people were 
limited in their responses to domineering doctors who claimed to know everything that 
disabled people should have been doing with their bodies and their lives.   
Disability and Total War 
Developments associated with the French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution, 
and the growing power of the medical profession in the West would ultimately have a 
profound impact on disabled veterans and how able-bodied society attempted to 
reintegrate them into its fold. Perhaps the most significant development was the use of 
new military technology, particularly gunpowder, which not only increased the 
destructive capabilities of European armies and navies, but also made it easier for the 
emerging nation-states of Europe to create massive standing armies. During the 
seventeenth century, the ease with which musketeers could be trained, compared to 
archers and cavalry, enabled monarchs to create armies that dwarfed medieval armies. 
While the armies involved in the Hundred Years’ War were extremely small by modern 
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standards, by the 1630s, the leading states had nearly 150,000 soldiers.114 By the end of 
the century, a century marred by the devastation wrought by the Thirty Years’ War, the 
French army contained 400,000 soldiers.115  This increase in the size of armies, and the 
alacrity with which monarchs sent them to battle, resulted in significantly more disabled 
veterans than wars in previous epochs.  Improvements in the medical profession, 
moreover, exacerbated the problem by ensuring that an increasing number of soldiers 
would survive the horrific wounds inflicted upon them by the instruments of modern 
warfare. The increase in disabled veterans, as one might expect, overburdened military 
hospitals and disability pension systems.   
In the early twentieth century, the ever-increasing destructive capacity of military 
technology, one of the most important legacies of the Industrial Revolution, combined 
with the power of mass politics and nationalism, two of the most important legacies of 
the French Revolution, to create a new type of warfare—total war—that would rock the 
foundations of Western Civilization.116 Convinced that modern warfare would be decided 
by quick, decisive campaigns as in the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1), Europeans entered 
into a system of alliances and prepared for the next decisive war. War would eventually 
erupt in the summer of 1914 after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 
Sarajevo, but it would not be the war that most anticipated. Europeans were so unaware 
of the dangers of modern warfare that they merrily marched off to face their foes, 
confident that the fighting would be over by Christmas.117 What was actually in store for 
them, however, was a nightmare of a war that would forever change the lives of 
Europeans, especially disabled veterans.  
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While it is true, as James M. Diehl has pointed out, that problems associated with 
veterans after major wars are “universal and of universal significance,” and “include 
compensation for war-related disabilities, reentry into the labor market, pensions for 
professional soldiers, and the reintegration into society of late-returning prisoners of 
war,” the carnage of World War I was far greater than previous wars, leaving 9.5 million 
soldiers dead and another 8 million permanently disabled. 118 In Britain alone, there were 
over 750,000 permanently disabled veterans, while there were 1.5 million in Germany.119 
The nations that found themselves embroiled on the battlefields of World War I, then, 
had to confront unprecedented problems in attempting to provide adequate medical care 
for their disabled veterans. Each postwar nation had to find a way to provide enough 
hospital beds to accommodate the staggering number of veterans who returned home 
disabled. In the minds of many disabled veterans, the doctors who saved their lives and 
treated them in hospitals, could nevertheless compound their miseries. “Doctors,” Robert 
Weldon Whalen has observed, “dominated the lives of war victims. They not only 
prescribed the disabled soldiers’ treatment; they also decided whether an injury was war-
related, which, of course, determined whether a man could get a pension.”120 
Accordingly, the relationship between doctors and disabled veterans, characterized by a 
staggering sense of lost autonomy in the minds of the latter, mirrored the relationship 
between doctors and other types of disabled people. To make matters worse, disabled 
veterans not only were in the beginning stages of coming to grips with the horrors of 
industrialized warfare from their hospital beds, but also had to face the fear of attempting 
to reintegrate into an able-bodied society that often held disabled people in contempt. 
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Disabled veterans had good reason to fear the daunting task of attempting to 
reintegrate into able-bodied society. The sheer number of disabled veterans returning 
home from the war put an enormous strain on the reintegration efforts of postwar 
governments. Each nation had to devise its own methods of achieving reintegration in 
accordance with its own cultural norms. In Britain, for example, as Deborah Cohen has 
demonstrated, “civil servants in the new ministry charged with their care sought to limit 
the state’s obligations toward disabled veterans.”121 Indeed, just as the construction of the 
Royal Hospital Chelsea relied heavily on donations from private philanthropists, the 
reintegration of disabled veterans in Britain in the wake of World War I “proceeded 
primarily through voluntary and philanthropic efforts,” including “most initiatives for the 
long-term treatment or rehabilitation of wounded servicemen, from the country’s largest 
artificial limb-fitting center at Roehampton to the comprehensive program for war 
blinded administered through St. Dunstan’s Hostel.”122 Voluntary efforts and 
philanthropy likewise played an important role in money raised to construct the Star and 
Garter Home for Disabled Sailors and Soldiers, the Roehampton Hospital, the War Seal 
Mansions, [and] Lord Roberts Memorial Workshops,” even though these efforts, 
according to Cohen, were “insufficient to care for the majority of disabled men. . . .”123 
Postwar British governments, both Labour and Conservative, were quick to rely on the 
goodwill of private actors. The Ministry of Pensions and the Exchequer, for example, 
proved eager to shift responsibility for finding employment for disabled veterans to the 
private sector. Sir Robert Horne, chancellor of the Exchequer under Lloyd George, 
defended the refusal to provide more aid to disabled veterans on the ground that “‘so far 
as the grievance of these men is that they cannot find employment, their case is not 
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different at the present time from that of an unprecedented number of other men and 
women, who do not draw pensions from the State.’”124 For Horne, it did not matter that 
these British soldiers had become disabled fighting for Britain; their service simply did 
not entitle them to preferential treatment in the labor market. 
Postwar Germany, by contrast, ultimately attempted to use the resources of the 
state to achieve reintegration. During the war itself, as Diehl has demonstrated, Germany 
had “no comprehensive system for the war-disabled.”125 When Germany attempted to 
rely on existing “nineteenth-century institutions” to provide aid to disabled veterans, it 
found itself overwhelmed by the number of people who needed assistance.126 
Accordingly, disabled veterans in Germany had to rely on “semiofficial and voluntary 
organizations” for assistance until the state could create a more effective system.127 By 
the time of the Weimar Republic, the state had established such a system, with “state 
officials embrac[ing] the rehabilitation of the disabled as, in the words of the Republic’s 
first president, Weimar’s ‘foremost duty.’”128  
Germans still had to decide, however, whether some nineteenth-century 
institutions, particularly the Invalidenhaus, could continue to thrive in the new Germany. 
In some ways, this process mirrored the introspection of the French, who wondered after 
the French Revolution whether the Hôtel des Invalides was compatible with 
republicanism. Yet the French engaged in this process of introspection voluntarily, with 
politicians on both the Left and Right engaging in the debate about what to do with les 
Invalides. For the Germans, the inquiry was not voluntary but rather a condition of the 
hated Treaty of Versailles, which removed the Invalidenhaus from the control of the army 
more than 170 years after its creation and placed it under the control of the Labor 
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Ministry.129 Although General von Seeckt, as Cohen has pointed out, questioned whether 
a republican institution could care adequately for officers, the Labor Ministry retained 
control over the Invalidenhaus after it gained the support of the Minister of Finance.130 
The army ultimately agreed to relinquish control of the venerable hospital, urging the 
civilian authorities not to change the institution.131 
The Labor Ministry, however, decided to transform Frederick the Great’s military 
hospital into “a proud symbol of republican war victims’ care.”132 It forcibly retired the 
eighty-year-old General Lieutenant von Gergemann as commandant and replaced him 
with a civilian, who promptly evicted twenty widows and adult children who had no legal 
justification for living at the hospital.133 The Labor Ministry also abolished preferential 
treatment for officers and other well-connected veterans, declaring that apartments would 
be available only to veterans who had sustained severe disabilities during the Great War 
and also had a wife or other female family member who could provide them with daily 
care.134 The governing principle behind the new Invalidenhaus was independence and the 
notion that even severely disabled veterans could lead productive lives rather than the 
militarism of the imperial Invalidenhaus, which had required disabled veterans to dress in 
military uniforms and participate in parades.135 The Invalidenhaus was now more of a 
place where severely disabled men could find housing for themselves and their families 
while they endeavored to return to the workforce.136 
In addition to settling the issue of the Invalidenhaus, at least for the time being, 
the Weimar Republic attempted to reintegrate disabled veterans throughout Germany by 
helping them to find and to retain meaningful employment. This help, in part, came in the 
form of government programs intended to give disabled veterans the ability to lead 
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productive lives despite their disabilities.137 The Law of the Severely Disabled of 1920, 
meanwhile, offered some protection to disabled veterans against layoffs and 
unemployment.138 For those disabled veterans who had sustained such serious wounds 
that they were unable to work, of course, the state provided pensions adequate enough to 
permit them to live at home with their families. Some disabled veterans, moreover, eked 
out an existence by begging on the streets, just as disabled people have done throughout 
the history of the West.139 Yet these were exceptions to the Weimar Republic’s position 
that disabled veterans should be encouraged to return to work so that they could live as 
independently as impossible, just as disabled veterans continue to beg in modern nations 
despite social welfare programs for their well-being. 
The Eugenics Movement and the Will to Eradicate the Congenitally Deformed 
The rise of the eugenics movement was perhaps the most ironic development in 
the history of the evolution of ideas about disability. Because of scientific advances 
during the nineteenth century, thinking about nature vis-à-vis congenital deformity gave 
way to using knowledge about genetics and congenital deformity to address the disability 
problem. During the first half of the nineteenth century, as we have seen, naturalists 
continued to explore congenital deformity so as to learn more about the natural world, 
just as Empedocles had done over two millennia earlier. Yet as large numbers of 
Westerners accepted either the Darwinian notion of evolution by means of natural 
selection or Lamarckism—with its erroneous belief in the heritability of acquired 
characteristics—scientific discourse about congenital deformity experienced a radical 
change.140 Some scientists in the latter half of the nineteenth century began to argue that 
they could use genetics, combined with techniques perfected in animal husbandry and 
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horticulture, to improve both the physical and mental health of human beings. People 
with congenital deformities, who for millennia had inspired thinkers, including Charles 
Darwin himself, to challenge the idea that the natural world was the product of rationality 
or design would thus become victims of the scientific discourse of the eugenics 
movement that viewed congenitally deformed people as degenerates and threats to 
healthy, able-bodied society. 
The study of eugenics originated with Sir Francis Galton, Charles Darwin’s half-
cousin, who feared that society “appears likely to be drudged into degeneracy by 
demands that exceeds its powers.”141 In particular, Galton argued that several factors 
place “a steady check in an old civilization upon the fertility of the abler classes,” while 
“the improvident and unambitious are those who chiefly keep up the breed.”142 Although 
his own sister had a curvature of the spine that limited her daily activities, Galton viewed 
people with congenital deformities as particularly dangerous to society, arguing that in 
the “best form of civilization . . . the weak could find a welcome and a refuge in celibate 
monasteries or sisterhoods. . . .”143 These monasteries and convents had to be celibate, the 
historian of science Daniel Kevles has noted, in order to ensure that the genetically 
unworthy “would be unable to propagate their kind.”144 From its inception, then, the 
eugenics movement reinforced efforts to institutionalize disabled people as a means of 
dealing with the disability problem. The drive to institutionalize disabled people might 
have continued to gain momentum in the nineteenth century and the first half of the 
twentieth century without the advent of eugenics, but there is no question that eugenic 
ideas influenced many able-bodied people who viewed institutionalization, along with 
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eugenic practices associated with institutionalization, as a sort of panacea for the 
disability problem.145   
By the 1920s and 1930s, support for eugenic policies had increased throughout 
the West, leading to compulsory sterilization laws both in the United States and 
Europe.146 In 1927, the United States Supreme Court famously upheld the compulsory 
sterilization of Carrie Buck, “a feeble minded woman” committed to a Virginia 
institution who, in turn, was “the daughter of a feeble minded mother in the same 
institution, and the mother of an illegitimate feeble minded child.”147 In 1924, Virginia 
had passed legislation, which provided that “the health of the patient and the welfare of 
society may be promoted in certain cases by the sterilization of mental defectives. . . .”148 
The idea behind the law was that unsterilized “mental defectives,” if released, “would 
become a menace, but, if incapable of procreating, might be discharged with safety and 
become self-supporting with benefit to themselves and to society. . . .”149 The famed 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., writing for the Court, concluded that “[i]t is better for all the 
world if, instead of waiting to execute the degenerate offspring for crime or to let them 
starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from 
continuing their kind. The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough 
to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes.”150 Holmes supported his reasoning with one of the 
most chilling proclamations in the history of disability discourse: “Three generations of 
imbeciles is enough.”151 The legacy of Buck v. Bell, as one might expect, was a nightmare 
for those whom able-bodied society deemed feebleminded. According to Philip Reilly, 
the decision ushered in a “triumphant period for those who embraced hereditarian hopes 
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for social progress,” as more states passed sterilization laws and more disabled people 
found themselves sterilized against their will.152  
In 1933, Germany went even further than the eugenicists in American state 
legislatures, enacting a compulsory sterilization law “with respect to all people, 
institutionalized or not, who suffered from allegedly hereditary disabilities, including 
feeblemindedness, schizophrenia, epilepsy, blindness, severe drug or alcohol addiction, 
and physical deformities that seriously interfered with locomotion or were grossly 
offensive.”153 The Germans sterilized roughly 225,000 people over the next three years, 
half of whom they classified as feebleminded.154 The Nazis later justified the murder of 
thousands of disabled Germans in the Nazi T-4 medical killing program, an important 
precursor to the Holocaust, by appealing, in part, to the eugenic benefits of ridding the 
fatherland of so many degenerates.155  
  The T-4 program, as Robert J. Lifton has noted, was not simply the product of the 
Nazi desire to protect the regime and the German people from the perpetuation of 
imperfect genes and the allocation of precious resources to people with serious mental 
and physical defects.156 Before the rise of the Nazis, to be sure, the most influential 
German works promoting the medical killing of certain types of people justified such 
draconian practices by pointing the benefits of ridding the state of burdensome people. In 
1895, for example, Adolf Jost published The Right to Die, in which he argued that the 
state must have the ability to kill certain types of people in order to keep it strong.157 
Warfare, he argued, amounted to the sacrifice of thousands of people for the benefit of 
the state.158 He also supported medical killing, however, by claiming that it was 
compassionate to kill the incurably ill.159 When the jurist Karl Binding and the 
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psychiatrist Alfred Hoche published The Permission to Destroy Life Unworthy of Life 
(Die Freigabe der Vernichtung lebensunwerten Lebens) in 1920, they likewise argued 
that disabled people were dangerous to the state.160 Before Germany’s defeat, Hoche had 
opposed medical killing, rejecting it in a 1917 article. Shortly thereafter, however, his son 
died in the war, and, according to Lifton, “was said to have been deeply affected by both 
his personal loss and the German defeat.”161 Indeed, Lifton explains that Hoche, “[l]ike 
many Germans[,] . . . felt himself experiencing the darkest of times, and the book was an 
expression of personal mission and a call to national revitalization.”162 Yet Binding and 
Hoche also justified medical killing by proclaiming that it was “purely a healing 
treatment” and a “healing work.”163 In his section of the book, Hoche claimed that “such 
a policy of killing was compassionate and consistent with medical ethics,” pointing “to 
situations in which doctors were obliged to destroy life. . . .”164  Hoche even went beyond 
contending that mentally disabled and physically deformed people were better off dead, 
arguing that such people were, in fact, “already dead.”165 
Binding and Hoche, Lifton observes, “reflected the general German mood during 
the period following the First World War.”166 They later became such an important 
influence on Nazi eugenics that Lifton has called them “the prophets of direct medical 
killing.”167 Indeed, as the Nazi regime progressed, “there was an increasing discussion of 
the possibility of mercy killings, of the Hoche concept of the ‘mentally dead,’ and of the 
enormous economic drain on German society caused by the large number of . . . impaired 
people.”168 One mathematics text, for example, asked students to determine how many 
loans the state could provide for newly married couples with the money it spends on “‘the 
crippled, the criminal, and the insane.’”169 The Nazis, however, apparently realized that 
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they might not find sufficient support for the medical killing of such people simply on the 
grounds that it was economically beneficial to the state. Indeed, in the 1941 Nazi 
propaganda film, I Accuse (Ich klage an), which grew out of Karl Brandt’s suggestion 
that there needed to be a film that would increase German support for a “euthanasia” 
program, a woman with multiple sclerosis begs her physician husband to kill her so that 
she will not have to suffer a horrible death. The film advocated for such mercy killings 
only with the consent of the patient. The true message of the highly influential film, 
however, is, as Lifton notes, “more or less subliminal—a reference, in the midst of 
ostensibly thoughtful discussion, that an exception to that voluntary principle should be 
made for the mentally ill, where the ‘state must take over the responsibility.’”170 The T-4 
program itself, of course, was not a voluntary “euthanasia” program but the systematic 
murder of defective people against their will.171 
Conclusion 
 After the French Revolution, the study of monstrosity continued to be an 
important aspect of scientific inquiry into the nature of things. Charles Darwin’s theory of 
natural selection, however, would fundamentally alter how the educated elite viewed 
monstrosity. Indeed, Darwin demonstrated that what people once called monstrosities 
were better conceptualized as mutations indicative of progressive processes that have 
resulted in the evolution of species through natural selection. Subsequent scientists would 
gradually turn away from merely pondering the existence of congenital deformity when 
attempting to unlock nature’s secrets, preferring, instead, to conduct experiments to 
explore the precise ways in which hereditary laws and environmental factors result in 
mutations.  
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 A number of important developments, including the French Revolution, the 
Industrial Revolution, the growth of capitalism, the increasing power of the medical 
profession, the rise of the modern nation-state, and the unprecedented industrial 
devastation of World War I, and the rise of the eugenics movement caused the West to 
reconsider how to address its disability problem. The birth of republicanism resulted in 
debates about whether institutions such as the Hôtel des Invalides and separate schools 
for deaf-mutes and the blind were compatible with a republic. The Hôtel des Invalides, to 
the chagrin of radical republicans, survived the republican challenge, while the grand 
mission of the combined school for deaf-mutes and the blind—to demonstrate how 
republican fraternité could overcome communication barriers that had once rendered 
such joint schooling impossible—resulted in abject failure. The continuing plight of 
disabled people with the advent of industrialization and capitalism, moreover, required 
states to consider providing public assistance to those disabled people in need. The 
medicalization of disability during the nineteenth century would alter the experience of 
disability by placing disabled people under the guidance of all-knowing doctors. The 
unprecedented number of disabled veterans who returned home from World War I, 
meanwhile, resulted in efforts to find meaningful ways to assist them. The eugenics 
movement, perhaps the most ironic development in the history of disability, would 
combine Darwin’s ideas about mutation and natural selection to address the disability 
problem by combining scientific and medical expertise with techniques perfected in 
animal husbandry and horticulture to eradicate the unfit from the gene pool. These 
developments, however, did not result in a rejection of religious and private aid to the 
disabled. Indeed, the long nineteenth century, notwithstanding the efforts of eugenicists, 
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resulted in a hybrid system, where state, religious, and private actors all sought to offer 
various types of assistance to disabled people, all the while creating new forms of social 
control with which to keep the disability problem in check. 
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Chapter 8: The Emergence of a New Type of Disability Discourse in the Long Nineteenth 
Century 
 
The long nineteenth century marked the genesis of a new type of disability 
discourse, which Lennard Davis sees as so important for the modern experience of 
disability. Yet this discourse was not simply the product of modernity. The old categories 
of monsters, hunchbacks, cripples, the blind, the deaf and dumb, and dwarfs continued to 
heap stigma and discrimination on the disabled, while the emerging disability discourse 
of the long nineteenth century increasingly juxtaposed those categories with observations 
about the rapidly changing world, including how to deal with the disability problem. The 
result was a hybrid disability discourse that utilized both pre-modern and modern ideas 
about disability in categorizing the disabled. This hybrid disability discourse is evident in 
many of the literary depictions of disabled people during the long nineteenth century as 
well as in the histories and personal narratives of some disabled people.  
Monsters in the Age of Science 
Lord Byron, who had some type of congenital deformity similar to club foot and 
was thus personally acquainted with how able-bodied society treated the disabled in the 
first half of the nineteenth century, understood that congenitally deformed people still had 
to endure comparisons to monsters in his lifetime.1 The Deformed Transformed, an 
unfinished play on which Byron was still working when he died, begins with a callous 
mother calling her hunchback son Arnold, in language that has long plagued people with 
congenital deformities, a “monstrous sport of nature.”2 
A much more famous example of the use of “monster” in reference to congenital 
deformity came in 1831, just seven years after Byron’s death, when Victor Hugo 
published Notre-Dame de Paris: 1482, translated into English as The Hunchback of 
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Notre Dame, in which Hugo repeatedly depicts Quasimodo as a monster. Hugo, in fact, 
calls Quasimodo a monster in explaining how he came to Notre-Dame. Jehanne, one of 
the four old women staring at the abandoned Quasimodo in shock and horror, says, “The 
foundling, as they call it, is a regular monster of abomination.”3 Agnès la Herme, 
likewise views Quasimodo as a monster and expresses pity for the wet nurses who would 
have to suckle him: “Oh good gracious . . . I pity those poor nurses in the Foundling 
Hospital at the end of the lane, as you go down to the river, just next door to his lordship 
the bishop, if this little monster [monstre] is given to them to suckle. I’d rather nurse a 
vampire.”4 At this point in the novel, Hugo interjects as the narrator with his observation 
that there was no other way to describe Quasimodo: 
In fact, “this little monster [monstre]” (for we ourselves should find it hard to 
describe him otherwise) was no new-born baby. He was a very bony and very 
uneasy little bundle, tied up in a linen bag marked with the monogram of M. 
Guillaume Chartier, then Bishop of Paris, with a head protruding from one end. 
This head was a most misshapen thing; there was nothing to see of it but a shock 
of red hair, an eye, a mouth, and teeth. The eye wept, the mouth shrieked, and the 
teeth seemed only waiting for a chance to bite.5 
 
Later in the novel, Hugo reinforces Quasimodo’s monstrous nature when 
describing the symbiosis between Quasimodo and his beloved bell by calling it both 
“monstrueuse” and a “monstre”: 
All at once the frenzy of the bell seized him; his look became strange; he waited 
for the passing of the bell as a spider lies in wait for a fly, and flung himself 
headlong upon it.  Then, suspended above the gulf, launched upon the tremendous 
vibration of the bell, he grasped the brazen monster [monstre] by its ears, clasped 
it with his knees, spurred it with his heels, doubling the fury of the peal with the 
whole force and weight of his body.  As the tower shook, he shouted and gnashed 
his teeth, his red hair stood erect, his chest labored like a blacksmith’s bellows, 
his eye flashed fire, the monstrous [monstrueuse] steed neighed and planted under 
him; and then the big bell of Notre-Dame and Quasimodo ceased to exist . . . .6 
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Quasimodo and his bell become “a dream, a whirlwind, a tempest; a vertigo astride of 
uproar, a spirit clinging to a winged crupper; a strange centaur, half man, half bell; a sort 
of horrid Astolpho, borne aloft by a prodigious hippogriff of living bronze.”7 
Quasimodo’s symbiosis with his monstrous bell ultimately reinforces his own monstrous 
nature, as the creature that results from the union of Quasimodo and bell is more 
monstrous than either of its constituent parts; Quasimodo is now monstrous in both body 
and spirit: 
Sometimes the terrified spectator saw an odd dwarf [un nain bizarre] on the 
extreme pinnacle of one of the towers, climbing, creeping writhing, crawling on 
all fours, descending head-first into the abyss, leaping from one projection to 
another, and diving deep into the maw of some sculptured gorgon: it was 
Quasimodo hunting for crows’ nests. Sometimes a visitor stumbled over a sort of 
living nightmare, crouching and scowling in a dark corner of the church; it was 
Quasimodo absorbed in thought.  Sometimes an enormous head and bundle of ill-
adjusted limbs might be seen swaying frantically to and fro from a rope’s end 
under a belfry: it was Quasimodo ringing the Vespers or the Angelus. Often by 
night a hideous form was seen wandering along the frail, delicately wrought 
railing which crowns the towers and runs around the top of the chancel: it was 
still the hunchback of Notre-Dame.8   
 
Quasimodo’s monstrosity has increased through his symbiosis with the bell to such an 
extent that Parisians living in the vicinity of Notre-Dame begin to view the cathedral 
itself as a type of monster: 
Then, so the neighbors said, the whole church took on a fantastic, supernatural, 
horrible air, —eyes and mouths opened wide here and there; the dogs and dragons 
and griffins of stone which watch day and night, with outstretched necks and 
gaping jaws, around the monstrous [monstrueuse] cathedral, barked loudly. And if 
it were a Christmas night, while the big bell, which seemed uttering its death-
rattle, called the faithful to attend the solemn midnight mass, the gloomy façade 
assumed such an aspect that it seemed as if the great door was devouring the 
crowd while the rose-window looked on. And all this was due to Quasimodo. 
Egypt would have taken him for the god of the temple; the Middle Ages held him 
to be its demon: he was its soul.9    
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In light of this passage, the English title of the novel, The Hunchback of Notre Dame, 
might be more appropriate than Hugo’s original title in French, Notre-Dame de Paris: 
1482. To refer to Notre Dame in the title without reference to its hunchback was, in the 
context of Hugo’s novel, to identify the monstrous body—the fifteenth-century 
cathedral—but not its monstrous soul. 
Hugo’s fictional account of the “monster” Quasimodo would soon find a real life 
counterpart in the person of Joseph Merrick, more commonly known as either the 
Elephant Man, whose “monstrous” nature was as legendary in his own lifetime as 
today.10 Merrick’s contemporaries, however, did not simply consider him to be a hideous 
monster. Instead, the life of Merrick demonstrates how modern disability discourse could 
perpetuate the old categories for particular groups of disabled people while, at the same 
time, exploring new solutions to the disability problem. Indeed, Merrick was not only the 
Elephant Man, a freak “exhibited as a grotesque monster at circuses, fairs, and wherever 
else a penny might be turned,” but also one of London’s most famous hospital patients.11   
  Sir Frederick Treves, the London surgeon who rescued Joseph Merrick from 
hopeless indigence in 1886 after the authorities in both England and Brussels forbade his 
“performances,”12 repeatedly refers to Merrick’s monstrous nature in his memoirs, 
written several years after Merrick’s death. This dehumanization, in fact, may help to 
explain how Treves, after spending several years in close contact with Joseph Merrick, 
could have misremembered his name as John.13  Early in his memoirs, Treves indirectly 
compares Merrick to a monster when reminiscing about Merrick’s arrival at the hospital 
by pointing out that Merrick’s only possessions, save his clothes and some books, were 
his “monstrous cap and cloak,”14 monstrous, of course, because of the disgusting creature 
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that they concealed.15 Treves, moreover, observes that Merrick could never realize his 
dream of becoming a dandy because, in part, the deformity of Merrick’s mouth “rendered 
an ordinary toothbrush to no avail, and as his monstrous lips could not hold a cigarette 
the cigarette-case was a mockery.”16 Treves also refers to Merrick as monstrous when 
explaining how he and hospital staff managed to sneak Merrick into a box at the Drury 
Lane Theatre so that he could enjoy a popular pantomime: “All went well, and no one 
saw a figure, more monstrous than any on the stage, mount the staircase or cross the 
corridor.”17 Treves further writes that he had desperately wanted Merrick “to become a 
human being” by making acquaintances with men and, especially, women “who would 
treat him as a normal and intelligent young man and not as a monster of deformity.”18   
Treves’ particular emphasis on introducing Merrick to women may have stemmed 
from Merrick’s early interaction with his nurses, especially a “regrettable incident” that 
occurred upon Merrick’s arrival at the hospital. A nurse, having been instructed to bring 
Merrick some food but not informed about his appearance, entered Merrick’s room and 
“saw on the bed, propped up by white pillows, a monstrous figure as hideous as an Indian 
idol.”19 Demonstrating an appalling lack of restraint and callous disregard for Merrick’s 
feelings, she promptly dropped her tray and fled in terror, shrieking as she exited the 
door.20  Subsequent nurses did not flee from Merrick at least, but they did tend to him 
perfunctorily, “acting rather as automata than women.”21  Because Merrick could 
perceive that “their service was purely official,” they “did not help him to feel that he was 
one of their kind.”22 Indeed, their behavior, although they did not realize it, “made him 
aware that the gulf of separation was immeasurable.”23 Treves thus asked Leila Maturin, 
a “young and pretty widow,” to enter Merrick’s room, smile at him, and shake his hand.24 
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After she had done so, Merrick broke down in near-uncontrollable sobs. Later, Merrick 
explained to Treves that he had broken down because this was the first time that a woman 
had ever smiled at him and shook his hand.25   
Luckily for Merrick, as his fame spread throughout London because of newspaper 
coverage, he had the opportunity to interact with many other women. As Treves 
remembers, Merrick “must have been visited by almost every lady of note in the social 
world.  They were all good enough to welcome him with a smile and to shake hands with 
him.”26  Merrick was now acquainted with “duchesses and countesses and other ladies of 
high degree,” who “brought him presents, made his room bright with ornaments and 
pictures, and, what pleased him more than all, supplied him with books.”27  Even 
Alexandra, Princess of Wales, the Queen, and the Queen Mother, visited him at the 
hospital, entering his room with a smile and shaking “him warmly by the hand.”28 
According to Treves, none of Alexandra’s deeds “ever caused such happiness as she 
brought to Merrick’s room when she sat by his chair and talked to him as to a person she 
was glad to see.”29 After their initial meeting, Alexandra visited Merrick many times and 
sent him a Christmas card each year in her own handwriting.30 On one occasion, she sent 
him a signed photograph of herself, which Merrick regarded as a “sacred object,” hardly 
allowing Treves to touch it. Not surprisingly, other eminent women emulated Alexandra 
by sending their own photographs “to this delighted creature who had been all his life 
despised and rejected of men.”31 It was so common for kind-hearted women to send gifts 
to Merrick, in fact, that his “mantelpiece and table became so covered with photographs 
of handsome ladies, with dainty knick-knacks and pretty trifles that they may almost have 
befitted the apartment of an Adonis-like actor or of a famous tenor.”32  
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Few women, however, were able to interact with Merrick with cordiality. Shortly 
before Merrick’s death, Lady Knightley “offered Merrick a holiday home in a cottage on 
her estate,” which led to a lamentable encounter with a woman as timorous as the nurse 
who dropped her tray when she had seen Merrick. Upon entering the holiday cottage, the 
housewife, who, like the nurse, “had not been made clearly aware of the unfortunate 
man’s appearance,” threw “her apron over her head” and “fled, gasping, to the fields.” 
She later explained that “such a guest was beyond her powers of endurance for, when she 
saw him, she was ‘that took’ as to be in danger of being permanently ‘all of a tremble.’”33 
Merrick’s life, then, did not differ in some respects from people with serious 
congenital deformities in previous epochs. Able-bodied people considered Merrick, as 
able-bodied people had long considered monstrosities before him, as less than human. 
There were, of course, some kind people who took pity on him, just as some people in the 
pre-modern world had attempted to provide assistance to the congenitally deformed in 
earlier times. Yet Merrick’s life also reveals tremendous changes in how able-bodied 
people treated such monstrosities. For millennia, some congenitally deformed people 
supported themselves financially by being freaks and entertainers. In the end, however, 
Merrick died in a hospital as a patient rather than as a circus freak, even if Merrick might 
have wondered whether, under the prying eyes of inquisitive doctors, he had become 
simply another type of spectacle for a more educated audience. Yet one wonders, despite 
Foucauldian notions of the modern power imbalances between doctors and disabled 
patients, whether Merrick, toward the end of his life, would have believed that Treves, his 
famous doctor, had exacerbated or ameliorated the isolation that he had long expressed in 
a poem based on Isaac Watts’ “False Greatness”: 
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‘Tis true my form is something odd, 
But blaming me is blaming God; 
Could I create myself anew 
I would not fail in pleasing you. 
 
If I could reach from pole to pole 
Or grasp the ocean with a span, 
I would be measured by the soul; 
The mind’s standard of the man.34 
 
Hunchbacks: “Martyrdom in the Age of Reason”? 
Hunchbacks, when they were not identified as monsters, cripples, or dwarfs, 
likewise continued to comprise a distinct category in the nineteenth century. Arnold, the 
hunchback in Byron’s The Deformed Transformed, represents Byron’s views—
influenced by his own struggle to live as a deformed person in an able-bodied world—
about the stigma and discrimination that hunchbacks experienced in their interactions 
with able-bodied society. In the beginning of the play, Arnold begs his mother to look 
past his deformity, and his mother responds by comparing him to several inhuman 
creatures before informing him that she does not even consider such a deformed creature 
her son: 
Bertha:  Out, hunchback! 
Arnold:  I was born so, Mother! 
 
Bertha:  Out,  
Thou incubus! Thou nightmare!  Of seven sons, 
The sole abortion! 
 
Arnold: Would that I had been so,  
And never seen the light! 
 
Bertha: I would so, too! 
But as though hast—hence, hence—and do thy best!  
That back of thine may bear its burthen; ‘tis  
More high, if not so broad as that of others. 
 
Arnold: It bears its burthen; —but, my heart! Will it 
 347 
 
Sustain that which you lay upon it, Mother? 
I love, or, at the least, I loved you: nothing 
Save You, in nature, can love aught like me. 
You nursed me—do not kill me!   
 
Bertha: Yes—I nursed thee, 
Because thou wert my first born, and I knew not 
If there would be another unlike thee. . . . 
 
It is at this point that Arnold’s mother calls him a “monstrous sport of Nature,” after 
which she commands him to “gather wood.” Before he goes to fetch the wood, the 
exchange between the two demonstrates that his mother will never love him as she does 
her other children. 
Arnold: Speak to me kindly. Though my brothers are 
So beautiful and lusty, and as free 
As the free chase they follow, do not spurn me: 
Our milk has been the same. 
 
Bertha: As is the hedgehog’s 
Which sucks at midnight from the wholesome dam 
Of the young bull, until the milkmaid finds 
The nipple next day sore and udder dry. 
Call not thy brothers brethren! Call me not 
Mother; for if I brought thee forth, it was 
As foolish hens at times hatch vipers, by 
Sitting upon strange eggs.  Out, urchin, out.35 
 
When his mother leaves, Arnold begins to cut the wood for her until he cuts his hand. As 
he stares at his own blood, he begins to brood over the degree to which the able-bodied 
people reject him on account of his deformity: 
My labour for the day is over now. 
Accursed be this blood that flows so fast; 
For double curses will be my meed now 
At home.—What home? I have no home, no kin, 
No kind—not made like other creatures, or 
To share their sports or pleasures.36 
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Arnold is so upset with the able-bodied world that he comes close to echoing Richard, 
Duke of Gloucester, in Shakespeare’s Richard III when he wishes that he could somehow 
get even with them: 
 Oh that each drop which falls to earth 
 Would rise a snake to sting them, as they have stung me! 
 Or that the devil, to whom they liken me, 
 Would aid his likeness! If must partake 
 His form, why not his power?37  
 
Arnold makes it clear, moreover, that he is angry at able-bodied people not because he is 
deformed and they are not but because of how they, particularly his mother, treat him. 
Indeed, he says that his wrath would dissipate if only his mother would treat him more 
kindly: 
For one kind word 
From her who bore me would still reconcile me 
Even to this hateful aspect.38  
 
 As Arnold agonizes over his treatment at the hands of a cruel world, he walks over to a 
spring, sees his ugly reflection, and decides to end his life: 
They are right; and Nature’s mirror shows me  
What she hath made me.  I will not look on it 
Again, and scarce dare think on’t. Hideous wretch 
That I am! The very waters mock me with  
My horrid shadow—like a demon placed  
Deep in the fountain to scare back the cattle 
From drinking therein.  [He pauses] 
 
And should I live on, 
A burden to the earth, myself, and shame 
Unto what brought me unto life?  Thou blood,  
Which flowest so freely from a scratch, let me 
Try if thou will not in a fuller stream 
Pour forth my woes for ever with thyself 
On earth, to which I will restore at once 
This hateful compound of her atoms, and 
Resolve back to her elements, and take 
The shape of any vile reptile save myself, 
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And make a world for myriads of new worms! 
This knife! now let me prove if it will sever 
This wither’d slip of nature’s nightshade—my 
Vile form—from the creation, as it hath 
The green bough from the forest.39 
 
As Arnold sets the knife on the ground with the knife pointing upwards, he offers one last 
lament over his unfortunate existence: 
Now ‘t is set, 
And I can fall upon it. Yet one glance 
On the fair day, which sees no foul thing like 
Myself, and the sweet sun, which warm’d me, but 
In vain.  The birds—how joyously they sing! 
So let them, for I would not be lamented: 
But let their merriest notes be Arnold’s knell; 
The fallen leaves my monument; the murmur  
Of the near fountain my sole elegy. 
Now, knife, stand firmly, as I fain would fall!40 
 
Just before Arnold kills himself, however, “a tall black” stranger materializes out of the 
spring.   When Arnold says that the stranger’s approach resembles that of “the demon,” 
the man responds that it is not he but Arnold, who, on account of his deformity, 
resembles the devil: 
Unless you keep company 
With him (and you seem scarce used to such high 
Society) you can’t tell how he approaches; 
And for his aspect, look upon the fountain, 
And then on me, and judge which of us twain 
Look likest what the boors believe to be  
Their cloven-footed terror.41 
 
The stranger offers to transform Arnold into an able-bodied man in return for his soul. 
When Arnold agrees to the deal, thus becoming a sort of deformed incarnation of Faust, 
the stranger conjures up several phantoms representing various conquerors, generals, and 
philosophers of antiquity, instructing Arnold to choose one as his new form. After 
rejecting the forms of Julius Caesar, Alcibiades, Socrates, Marc Antony, and Demetrius 
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Poliocetes, Arnold ultimately settles on the form of Achilles.42 The stranger, however, 
informs Arnold that just as he has assumed the form of Achilles someone else must 
assume his former hunchback form. When Arnold decides that the stranger should 
assume the form, the stranger responds that he will forever be at Arnold’s side as a 
haunting reminder of what he once was: 
 Stranger: In a few moments 
 I will be as you were, and you shall see  
Yourself for ever by you, as your shadow. 
 
Arnold: I would be spared this. 
 
Stranger: But it cannot be. 
What! Shrink already, being what you are, 
From seeing what you were?43 
 
Unfortunately, Byron did not live long enough to finish his play, and thus we can rely 
only on second-hand information about how Byron would have concluded it. 
Nevertheless, The Deformed Transformed, even in its unfinished state, offers a 
remarkable look at the psyche of a deformed poet who always felt a sense of exclusion 
from the able-bodied world because of his disability. The Deformed Transformed, after 
all, parallels Byron’s own life in at least one crucial respect. As Byron’s associate 
Thomas Moore once explained, Bertha’s harsh treatment of Arnold in The Deformed 
Transformed was an autobiographical indictment of Byron’s own mother.44  When 
Arnold laments the cold words of his mother, then, we get a glimpse of how Byron 
viewed his own mother and his own struggles with the stigma accompanying deformity.45    
 James Sheridan Knowles’ most well-known work, The Hunchback (1832), begins 
with a group of disrespectful able-bodied people mocking Walter, a hunchback. After the 
Earl of Rochdale dies, Walter, his elderly agent, comes to find to the presumptive heir. 
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When Walter, the true heir, arrives, he tells the group to pay their respects to the dead 
before celebrating the presumptive heir’s good fortune. A man named Gaylove promptly 
responds by calling Walter a knave and mocking his deformity.  Walter responds to the 
hateful words by challenging him to a duel: 
Walter: Reflect’st thou on my shape? 
Thou art a villain! 
 
Gaylove: Ha! 
 
Walter: A coward, too! 
Draw! (Drawing his sword) 
 
Gaylove: Only mark him! how he struts about! 
How laughs his straight sword at his noble back.46 
 
Sir Thomas Clifford, finding little humor in Gaylove’s behavior, intervenes. Walter, 
however, is angry about Clifford’s attempt to save him and complains bitterly about his 
treatment by able-bodied people: 
Walter: How know you me for Master Walter?  By 
My hunchback, Eh! –my stilts of legs and arms, 
The fashion more of ape’s, than man’s? Aha! 
So you have heard them too—their savage gibes 
As I pass on,—“There goes my Lord!” aha! 
God made me, Sir, as well as them and you. 
 ’Sdeath! I demand you, unhand me, Sir.47   
 
Clifford remains calm, however, and saves Walter’s life by convincing him that the group 
is “not worth your wrath.”48 Yet even after the danger has passed, Walter demonstrates 
how self-conscious he is about his deformity by asking Clifford in a more subdued 
manner whether knew his name because of his deformity: 
Walter: I pray you, now, 
How did you learn my name? Guess’d I not right?  
Was’t not my comely hunch that taught it you? 
 
Clifford: I own it.49  
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Much to Walter’s delight, however, Clifford tells Walter that his good character has 
obscured his deformity: 
But when I heard it said 
That Master Walter was a worthy man, 
Whose word would pass on ’change, soon as his bond; 
A liberal man—for schemes of public good 
That sets down tens, where others units write; 
A charitable man—the good he does, 
That’s told of, not the half: I never more  
Could see the hunch of Master Walter’s back.50 
 
Walter is so pleased with both Clifford’s words and deeds that he decides to repay 
Clifford’s kindness by helping him procure a wife, saying, “You’ll bless the day you 
serv’d the Hunchback, Sir!”51  Walter introduces Clifford to Julia, and the two become 
engaged.52   
The life of Søren Kierkegaard, the Danish philosopher and first existentialist,53 
reveals that the stigmatization and discrimination of hunchbacks that permeates Byron’s 
The Deformed Transformed and Knowles’ The Hunchback were not mere literary 
inventions. His life also reveals, however, how print capitalism was creating new media 
through which able-bodied people could mock the disabled. Kierkegaard was a 
hunchback and cripple who had extremely thin and weak legs. Kierkegaard’s physical 
disabilities may have been congenital birth defects, which could have manifested as late 
as puberty.54 When Kierkegaard was born, after all, his father was fifty-six and his 
mother was forty-five, which would have significantly increased the chances of 
congenital birth defects.55 In addition, some have suggested that the Kierkegaard family 
may have had a genetic predisposition to congenital birth defects. Kierkegaard’s second 
cousin, Hans Peter Kierkegaard, was born with severe congenital defects.56 In the words 
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of Hans Brøcher, Hans Peter was “wholly handicapped, wholly paralyzed on the one side, 
and a complete cripple.”57 Some of Kierkegaard’s associates, however, may have 
attributed his disabilities to an accident. Henriette Lund, Kierkegaard’s niece,58 
speculated that Kierkegaard’s hunchback could have resulted from a childhood back 
injury that he sustained after falling from a tree while vacationing in Buddinge Mark, a 
village north of Copenhagen.59 In any case, whatever the cause of Kierkegaard’s 
hunchback and thin legs, Kierkegaard’s journals suggest that his disabilities were 
prevalent, at least in inchoate form, by childhood or early adolescence. As Kierkegaard 
lamented in one journal entry, “[t]o be a strong and healthy person who could take part in 
everything, who had physical strength and a carefree spirit—oh how often in earlier years 
I have wished that for myself.  In my youth my agony was frightful.”60  
Kierkegaard’s journals demonstrate the profound pain and humiliation that he 
experienced on account of his disabilities. Yet Kierkegaard’s journals cannot be taken as 
an absolute, authoritative source for Kierkegaard’s feelings on any subject, let alone how 
he coped with being Copenhagen’s eccentric hunchback. It is quite possible that the real 
Kierkegaard, the person that Kierkegaard tried to obscure from the readers of his journal 
entries, suffered even more intensely in private. Indeed, in one of his more famous 
journal entries, Kierkegaard wrote, “After my death, this is my consolation: No one will 
be able to find in my papers one single bit of information about what has really filled my 
life; they will not find the inscription deep within me which explains everything, which 
often makes what the world would call bagatelles into events of enormous importance to 
me, but which I, too, view as insignificant when I remove the secret note that explains 
everything.”61 Nevertheless, Kierkegaard’s journals unquestionably give us a great deal 
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of insight into the life experiences of a nineteenth-century hunchback who, like 
Alexander Pope 100 years earlier, participated in the able-bodied public sphere and paid a 
heavy emotional price for doing so.    
Although Kierkegaard struggled his entire life to fit into able-bodied society, his 
suffering took a disastrous turn in 1846 when the Danish tabloid The Corsair began to 
lampoon his disabilities. Kierkegaard’s enemies, as Pope’s enemies had likewise done to 
him, ushered in a new period in Kierkegaard’s already difficult life by transforming his 
private anguish into public spectacle. Print capitalism, however, had transformed the 
medium through which Kierkegaard’s detractors could attack him. Whereas Pope’s 
enemies had to publish works intended for a highly sophisticated audience to attack the 
famous poet’s character, The Corsair mocked Kierkegaard through a series of jejune 
caricatures that even the most uneducated members of society could understand and 
enjoy. One caricature depicts Kierkegaard as a “bent-over little fellow spraddled across a 
young woman’s shoulders.”62 Another features Kierkegaard on horseback, “where he sat 
as crooked as the Devil, wearing a top hat, looking totally out of balance.”63 In another, 
Kierkegaard is making his way through the doorway to The Corsair’s offices, and then 
back out, “impotent and bedraggled, with all his deformities.”64 
It is no exaggeration to say that in The Corsair’s caricatures, Kierkegaard’s 
lopsided body was laid bare for all of Denmark to contemn and ridicule. Indeed, as a 
result of these attacks, Kierkegaard was scarcely able to embark on his beloved 
peregrinations around Copenhagen without being assaulted by throngs of jeering 
miscreants. Kierkegaard bitterly complained that he was “deprived of ordinary human 
rights, was abused with indignities every day,” and considered himself a “wretched 
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plaything for the amusement even of schoolchildren.”65 But it was not only 
schoolchildren that scorned him. Kierkegaard complained that “[e]very butcher boy 
believes that he is almost entitled to insult me on orders issued by The Corsair; the young 
university students grin and giggle and are happy that a prominent person is trampled 
down; the professors are envious and secretly sympathize with the attacks, repeating 
them, though of course they add that it is a shame.”66 The abuse was so bad that even 
Kierkegaard’s nephew, Troels Frederick Lund, avoided him. One day, Troels 
remembered, he saw Kierkegaard on the street and ran to say hello when he “heard some 
passerby say something mocking about him and saw a couple of people on the other side 
of the street stop, turn around to look at him, and laugh. His one trouser leg really was 
shorter than the other,” a common joke about Kierkegaard that proliferated because of 
The Corsair’s caricatures, “and I could now see for myself that he was odd-looking. I 
instinctively stopped, was embarrassed, and suddenly remembered that I had to go down 
another street.” 67  
As Joakim Garff, Kierkegaard’s authoritative biographer has noted, Kierkegaard 
“again and again attempted to escape from his humiliation by making light of the matter,” 
once again demonstrating the affinities between the life experiences of Pope and 
Kierkegaard.68 In one entry, for example, Kierkegaard writes, “I am accustomed to terrors 
other than the childish one of being drawn with . . . alarmingly thin legs of a less-than-
obscure philosopher.”69 In another, Kierkegaard proclaims, “I commit myself to writing a 
much different sort of witty articles about myself and my legs than [Aron] Goldschmidt 
[editor of The Corsair] is capable of.”70  In yet another entry, one that Kierkegaard 
repeatedly rewrote, Kierkegaard points out that  
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Petrarch believed he would be immortalized by his Latin writings, and it was his 
erotic poetry that did it. Fate treats me even more ironically. Despite all my 
diligence and my efforts, I have not been able to fathom what it was the times 
required—and yet it was so close at hand. It is inconceivable that I did not 
discover it by myself, that someone else had to say it:  It was my trousers. . . . 
Were they red with a green stripe or green with a red stripe!71  
 
Other journal entries demonstrate the extraordinary suffering Kierkegaard 
endured because of his disabilities, particularly after The Corsair’s sustained attack 
against him. Shortly before his death, Kierkegaard writes in one entry, “They have all 
laughed at me, some good-naturedly, some maliciously—in brief in the most various of 
ways, but all have laughed.”72 In another journal entry, Kierkegaard lashes out at 
Goldschmidt, The Corsair’s Jewish editor, in an embittered anti-Semitic diatribe.  “The 
Corsair,” Kierkegaard proclaims,  
is of course a Jewish rebellion against the Christians (the opposite of a pogrom) 
and against other Jews if they will not accept The Corsair’s notion of respect. . . . 
Because, look over there in the cellar entrance, there he sits, the idea of The 
Corsair, the dominator, he himself the enforcer, the bookkeeper, the cellarman, 
the vagabond prince, the userer Jew or whatever you want to call him…. So let us 
get these talents out into the open and see what they can do.  Let them write on 
the same terms on which other authors write; one on one, using their real names 
without hiding in the cellar—then I will fritter away even more hours on a 
polemic of this sort.73   
 
In many respects, this “polemic” is not unlike the sophomoric caricatures in which The 
Corsair had lampooned Kierkegaard’s deformities; indeed, just as The Corsair had 
attempted, and largely succeeded, in publicly humiliating Kierkegaard by appealing to 
the public’s proclivity to ridicule the disabled, so too did Kierkegaard intend to appeal to 
the public’s anti-Semitism to discredit and humiliate The Corsair’s editor. Goldschmidt, 
after all, was well known in Denmark for struggling to live as a Jew in a Christian 
society. At a Danish nationalist gathering in 1844, after being provoked by a converted 
Jew, he shouted from the podium, “I am a Jew. What am I doing among you?”74 A year 
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later, he wrote A Jew, under the pseudonym Adolf Meyer, which was fairly successful, 
even appearing in an English translation.75 In A Jew, which Kierkegaard read soon after 
its publication, the main character encounters a great deal of discrimination from 
Christian society and ultimately becomes a usurer. The Corsair, then, was not the only 
combatant in the Corsair affair that could exploit its enemy’s insecurities in order to win 
an argument, albeit Kierkegaard, unlike The Corsair, ultimately decided not to publish 
his acrimonious attacks.  
The unpublished attacks against Goldschmidt did not end there. In a journal entry 
entitled “The Squint-Eyed Hunchback,” Kierkegaard constructs an elaborate tale, which, 
as Garff has noted, first appears to be about Kierkegaard because it contains so many 
autobiographical parallels but soon dissolves into another attack on Goldschmidt.76 The 
opening paragraph of “The Squint-Eyed Hunchback,” offers an unmistakable glimpse 
into Kierkegaard’s feelings about struggling to live as a disabled person in an able-bodied 
world and, in particular, the pain and humiliation that resulted from the Corsair affair. 
“Many years ago in the city of F.,” Kierkegaard begins his journal entry,  
there lived a man who was known by everyone, though only very few had seen 
him because he almost never left his home…. He was slight of build, squint-eyed 
and hunchbacked, and he viewed squint-eyed and hunchbacked people as the only 
truly unhappy people, and himself as the unhappiest of all. Because, said he, if I 
had merely been squint-eyed, I could go out in the evening and no one would see 
it, but then I am also hunchbacked. He hated all people and had sympathy only 
with those who were either hunchbacked or squint-eyed or both, but only those 
who refused to bear their fate patiently, loving God and men—because he viewed 
that as cowardice.  He had been engaged, but he broke it off because of the taunts 
he thought he heard.77   
 
In that opening paragraph, there are at least three observations about the squint-eyed 
hunchback that seem, to some extent, to have been autobiographical. First, The Corsair’s 
malicious attacks had isolated Kierkegaard greatly from Copenhagen society, albeit not to 
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the extent of the squint-eyed hunchback’s isolation. Although Kierkegaard continued to 
associate with many friends and acquaintances after the Corsair affair, he clearly felt that 
something had changed. “The least thing I do, even if I merely pay a visit to someone,” 
Kierkegaard complained, “is mendaciously distorted and repeated everywhere. If The 
Corsair learns of it, it prints it, and it is read by the entire population.”78 According to 
Kierkegaard, any man he visited would find himself in such an embarrassing situation 
that he “almost becomes angry with me.”79 Kierkegaard concluded that he would 
ultimately “have to withdraw and associate only with people I don’t like, for it’s almost a 
sin to associate with the others.”80 Second, even before The Corsair’s attacks, 
Kierkegaard had experienced excruciating depression over his disabilities. Accordingly, 
while Kierkegaard may not have agreed with the squint-eyed hunchback that the only 
truly unhappy people are squint-eyed and hunchbacked people, Kierkegaard certainly 
would have agreed that hunchbacks experience far more melancholy than the average, 
able-bodied person. Third, like the squint-eyed hunchback, Kierkegaard’s exhibited 
considerable sympathy for disabled people through his relationship with his severely 
deformed second cousin, Hans Peter Kierkegaard.  Kierkegaard, who was well known for 
keeping visitors “a flight of stairs away,” gave Hans Peter special permission to visit him 
at any hour of the day.81 When asked what the two disabled cousins discussed, Hans 
Peter responded, “Mostly . . . things pertaining to the Kingdom of God.  He is so 
unspeakably loving and understands me so well. . . .”82 In a letter to Hans, Kierkegaard 
demonstrated that love and understanding. “Above all,” he instructs his cousin,  
never forget the duty of loving yourself.  Do not let the fact that you have in a 
way been set apart from life, that you have been hindered from taking an active 
part in it, and that in the eyes of the dim-witted and busy world, you are 
superfluous—above all, do not let this deprive you of your notion of yourself, as 
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if, in the eyes of all-knowing Governance, your life, if it is lived in inwardness, 
did not have just as much significance and worth as every other person’s.83   
 
Kierkegaard even attempted to provide as much physical assistance as possible to 
significantly deformed Hans, who recognized that Kierkegaard’s own disabilities made 
the task exceedingly difficult: “I am really afraid to make use of [Kierkegaard’s] arm 
when he offers it to me to help me into my carriage.”84  
It is impossible to determine whether the final sentence of the “Squint-Eyed 
Hunchback’s” introductory paragraph, which tells of a broken engagement, is likewise 
autobiographical. Kierkegaard was engaged to Regine Olsen and did break off the 
engagement after one year.85 But there is no evidence whatsoever either from 
Kierkegaard or his acquaintances that his disabilities played any role in the break-up. Nor 
did Regine herself discuss Kierkegaard’s impairments in connection with the broken 
engagement. Nevertheless, it remains an intriguing question whether the taunts that 
accompanied Kierkegaard’s disabilities may have factored into Kierkegaard’s decision to 
leave Regine. It is unimaginable that the observant Kierkegaard would not have 
perceived at least some taunts regarding his engagement with Regine. One wonders, 
however, whether Kierkegaard would have ended his engagement with Regine simply 
because his relationship offended the sensibilities of “the dim-witted and busy world.” 
Yet because neither Kierkegaard nor Regine ever attributed the broken engagement to 
Kierkegaard’s disabilities, there is simply no way of ascertaining whether there was any 
connection.86 We are left only to ponder Peter Munthe Brun’s claim that Regine once told 
him that “[f]rom what she said it was very clear that her understanding of the matter was 
that it had been a genuinely profound and personal matter for S.K. [Kierkegaard], and 
that he had suffered greatly in breaking off the engagement.”87 
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Kierkegaard’s struggle to find acceptance in able-bodied society caused 
Kierkegaard to search for some type of divine purpose behind his disabilities, just as 
Voltaire had believed that Pope had searched for a reason for his own deformities. Even 
without his disability, Kierkegaard may have felt a strong connection to Jesus Christ. The 
Kierkegaard family believed that Kierkegaard’s father had done something to bring about 
a curse upon the family by transgressing God in his youth. The family further believed 
that none of the seven Kierkegaard children would live past the age of thirty-three, the 
age of Jesus at his crucifixion, and that their father would outlive them all.88 For a time, 
the children did indeed seem destined to die in accordance with the “curse.”  Five of the 
seven children died before their father, all before their thirty-fourth birthdays.89 It is not 
surprising, therefore, that the “curse” was for Kierkegaard a sword of Damocles that 
seemed to draw closer and closer to his neck with each passing year and each tragic death 
until Kierkegaard’s father suddenly died and both Kierkegaard’s older brother and 
Kierkegaard himself subsequently reached the age of thirty-four. A journal entry on 
Kierkegaard’s thirty-fourth birthday, dated May 5, 1847, demonstrates Kierkegaard’s fear 
and trembling regarding the “curse”:  “How strange that I have turned thirty-four.  It is 
utterly inconceivable to me. I was so sure that I would die before or on this birthday that I 
could actually be tempted to suppose that the date of my birth has been erroneously 
recorded and that I will still die on my thirty-fourth.”90 
Kierkegaard’s disability, however, clearly heightened his perceived connection 
with Jesus. At times, Kierkegaard pondered whether God had granted him his genius in 
order to compensate for his less-than-human existence. Kierkegaard wrote in one journal 
entry, ”Slight, thin, and weak, denied in almost every respect the physical basis for being 
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reckoned as a whole person, comparable with others; melancholic, sick at heart, in many 
ways profoundly and internally devastated. I was granted one thing: brilliant intelligence, 
presumably so that I would not be completely defenseless.”91 At other times, Kierkegaard 
claimed that God had afflicted him with deformities in order to make him a brilliant 
philosopher and champion of Christianity. According to Kierkegaard, if “Christ now 
[returned] to the world he would perhaps not be put to death, but would be ridiculed. This 
is martyrdom in the age of reason.  In the age of feeling and passion, people were put to 
death . . . . A martyrdom of ridicule is what I have really suffered.”92 For Kierkegaard, 
just as Jesus had suffered martyrdom to save mankind, God had foreordained 
Kierkegaard’s martyrdom so that people might know the true meaning of Christianity: 
“Thus I believed myself to have been sacrificed because I understood that my sufferings 
and my torments made me resourceful in exploring the truth, which in turn could be 
beneficial to other people.”93 Kierkegaard thus sincerely believed that he “would never 
have succeeded in illuminating Christianity in the way that has been granted me, had all 
this not happened to me.”94 As Kierkegaard explained, suffering “has not made me 
unproductive,” but rather “has indeed developed my literary productivity, and yet it has 
permitted me to experience the sort of isolation without which one does not discover 
Christianity. . . . No, no, one must in fact be acquainted with it from the ground up, one 
must be educated in the school of abuse.”95   
Cripples: New Forms of Stigma and Discrimination 
 As the Corsair affair demonstrated with the hunchback and cripple Kierkegaard, 
cripples continued to comprise a category ripe with stigma and discrimination during the 
nineteenth century. Some of the literary depictions of cripples, moreover, demonstrate 
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that the growing power of doctors and scientists was beginning to affect the way in which 
able-bodied society viewed and treated cripples. In Madame Bovary, for example, 
Gustave Flaubert explores the growing intrusion of nineteenth-century doctors into the 
lives of disabled people. In that novel, Homais, an apothecary and friend of Charles 
Bovary, learns about an experimental surgery to correct club foot and convinces Charles 
to perform the operation on Hippolyte, a local stable-boy with club foot.96 Hippolyte, 
however, is understandably reluctant to submit his body to an experimental surgery and 
resists. Hippolyte does not even feel that his club foot warrants a surgery because, like 
Lord Byron, he has learned to compensate physically for his deformity. Indeed, Flaubert 
explains that Hippolyte “was constantly to be seen . . . jumping round the carts, thrusting 
his limping foot forwards. He seemed even stronger on that leg than the other. By dint of 
hard service it had acquired, as it were, moral quality of patience and energy; and when 
he was given some heavy work, he stood on it in preference to its fellow.”97 Homais, 
desperate to convince Hippolyte to agree to the surgery, attempts to use his deformity to 
shame him. Homais proclaims that the surgery is for Hippolyte’s benefit, explaining that 
whether Charles cures him “doesn’t concern me. It’s for your sake, for pure humanity! I 
should like to see you, my friend, rid of your hideous caudication, together with that 
waddling of the lumbar regions which whatever you say, must considerably interfere with 
you in the exercise of your calling.”98 Homais then tries to convince Hippolyte that being 
able-bodied will make him “more likely to please women,” a claim that makes Hippolyte 
“smile heavily.”99 Homais even challenges Hippolyte’s manhood, asking, “Aren’t you a 
man? Hang it! What would you have done if you had to go to the army, to go and fight 
beneath the standard?”100 Hippolyte continues to resist until several prominent members 
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of the town intervene and convince him to have the experimental surgery. “The poor 
fellow gave way,” Flaubert explains, “for it was like a conspiracy. Binet, who never 
interfered with people’s business, Madame Lefrançois, Artémise, the neighbors, even the 
mayor, Monsieur Tuvache—every one persuaded him, lectured him, shamed him; but 
what finally decided him was that it would cost him nothing.”101 
Flaubert uses the aftermath of the surgery to criticize doctors for being too 
cavalier with the lives of the disabled. At first, everything seems normal as Homais and 
Charles contemplate how the surgery could make them famous. Homais, in fact, issues a 
press release in which he proclaims that “[t]he novelty of the attempt, and the interest 
incident to the subject, had attracted such a concourse of persons that there was a 
veritable abstraction on the threshold of the establishment [where Charles performed the 
operation]. .  . .”102 Homais also expresses the medical spirit of the age in the press 
release, asking, “Is it not time to cry that the blind shall see, the deaf hear, and the lame 
walk?”103 With this unbridled optimism in the power of medicine to cure the disabled, 
Homais informs the public that he will keep it “informed as to the successive phases of 
this remarkable cure.”104 Soon, however, things begin to go horribly wrong as 
Hippolyte’s leg becomes infected. Canivet of Neufchâtel, a renowned surgeon, comes to 
the town to save Hippolyte’s life and learns what Charles and Homais have done to his 
patient. After concluding that he will have to amputate Hippolyte’s leg, Canivet goes to 
Homais’ shop “to rail at the asses who could have reduced such a poor man to such a 
state.”105 When he arrives at the shop, Canivet “shakes Monsieur Homais by the button of 
his coat,” berating him for his appalling disregard for Hippolyte’s well-being: “These are 
the inventions of Paris! These are the ideas of those gentry of the capital! It is like 
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strabismus, chloroform, lithotrity, a heap of monstrosities that the Government ought to 
prohibit. But they want to do the clever, and they cram you with remedies without 
troubling about the consequences. We are not so clever, not we!”106  Doctors and 
surgeons, Canivet asserts, are “practitioners; we cure people, and we should not dream of 
operating on any one who is in perfect health. Straighten club-feet! As if one could 
straighten club-feet! It is as if one wished, for example, to make a hunchback straight!”107 
In the end, Canivet amputates Hippolyte’s leg, and Hippolyte must to learn how to walk 
with a wooden prosthesis.108 
Émile Zola’s L’Assommoir, which appeared just over 20 years after Flaubert’s 
Madame Bovary, likewise shows how the stigma and discrimination associated with 
cripples were beginning to assume slightly different forms in the mid to late nineteenth 
century. The protagonist, Gervaise, is a cripple who “limped with the right leg,” 
particularly when she was tired.109 Nothing occurs in Gervaise’s face-to-face interactions 
with able-bodied people that could not have occurred in earlier epochs in the history of 
the West, which demonstrates the longevity and continuity of the various categories of 
disabled people. In the beginning of the novel, for example, when Gervaise’s lover, 
Lantier, does not come home one night, she confronts a woman who has seemingly been 
aware of Lantier’s amorous indiscretions. Gervaise accuses the woman of having seen 
Lantier the night before, calling him her husband even though they were not yet married. 
The woman responds by mocking the idea that a disabled woman such as Gervaise could 
find a husband: “Her husband! Oh that’s rich, that is! Madame’s husband! As if she could 
catch a husband with a bandy leg like hers!”110 As the novel progresses, Gervaise 
demonstrates that she has internalized such mockery, concluding that her disability has 
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indeed made her sexually undesirable. When Coupeau makes advances on Gervaise, he 
recognizes that her disability has affected her self-esteem. He tries to reassure her that her 
disability does not matter to him, telling her that “it’s hardly anything, it doesn’t show at 
all.”111 Gervaise, however, remains somewhat exasperated that an able-bodied man could 
be attracted to her: “She shook her head; she knew well it showed; she’d be bent double 
by the time she was forty. Then with a little laugh she added gently: ‘You’ve funny 
tastes, to fancy a girl who limps.’”112  
Gervaise’s interactions with Coupeau’s sister, Lorilleux, suggest that there was a 
good reason for Gervaise to fear what able-bodied people thought of her sexuality in light 
of her disability. Lorilleux and most of Lorilleux’s friends repeatedly mock Gervaise’s 
disability throughout the novel. On one occasion, Lorilleux and her friends are in the 
midst of a conversation when they pause to look at Gervaise and call her Banban, a 
pejorative term for a person with a limp: “She broke off to point at Gervaise, who was 
limping badly because of the sloping pavement. ‘Just look at her! I ask you! Banban! The 
nickname Banban ran through the group like wildfire. Laughing meanly, Lorilleux said 
that was what she should be called.”113 Madame Lerat, “never at a loss for a suggestive 
remark, calls Gervaise’s leg a ‘love pin,’ adding that lots of men liked such things, 
though she refused to explain further.”114 For Lerat, then, Gervaise could not be sexually 
attractive because she was a pretty young woman who happened to have a limp but rather 
because some men viewed her disability as a sexual fetish. 
Yet L’Assommoir also demonstrates how the rapidly changing world of the 
nineteenth century was in the process of transforming some aspects of disability 
discourse in at least three ways. First, Zola discusses Gervaise’s congenital deformity in a 
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manner that would become commonplace among eugenicists. Zola attributes Gervaise’s 
deformity to her father’s propensity to make love to her mother in a violent, drunken 
stupor: “And even her bit of a limp came from the poor woman, whom Père Macquart 
was forever beating half to death. Time and again her mother had told her about the 
nights when Macquart came home blind drunk and made love so brutally that he almost 
broke her bones, and certainly she, Gervaise, with her gammy leg, must have been started 
on one of those nights.”115 The naturalist Zola, of course, is not suggesting that the moral 
depravity of Macquart’s act has resulted in a divinely caused physical affliction, as 
Christians during the Middle Ages might have surmised, but rather that hereditary laws 
suggested by Lamarck had resulted in her deformity, just as other eugenic failings had 
contributed to the decline of other members of the Rougon-Macquart family.116 
Gervaise’s limp, then, represents a new, scientific way of viewing congenital deformity 
that was gaining momentum throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century and the 
first half of the twentieth century, albeit Lamarckism itself would soon become obsolete. 
Indeed, Gervaise’s disability is a mark of biological and behavioral shame, proof that she 
and her family are trapped in an ongoing descent into degeneracy. 
The second way in which L’Assommoir alludes to changes in disability discourse 
is the recognition among Zola’s characters that doctors and surgeons were providing new 
opportunities to solve the disability problem by surgically “curing” disabled people. 
When Gervaise and Coupeau rent a shop, Gervaise runs “back and forth between the Rue 
Neuve and the Rue de la Goutte-d’Or” throughout the day so quickly that she no longer 
appears disabled. Those who know her are so amazed by her gait that they assume that 
she must have been surgically cured of her deformity: “Watching her racing nimbly 
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along, so elated that she no longer limped, people in the neighbourhood said that she 
must have had an operation.”117 Such assumptions almost certainly would not have 
prevailed in earlier centuries, when doctors and surgeons still knew relatively little about 
the human body. As we saw in chapter 3, however, after William Cheselden developed a 
surgical cure for cataracts in the eighteenth century, people gradually began to gain faith 
in the corrective powers of doctors and surgeons. By the latter half of the nineteenth 
century, the medical profession had garnered so much power and prestige that Zola felt it 
perfectly reasonable for his characters to assume that Gervaise must have benefitted from 
surgical intervention. 
The final way in which L’assommoir addresses the new aspects of disability 
discourse in the nineteenth century is by discussing the need for the government to 
intervene to help disabled workers. At one point in the novel, Père Bru complains that he 
can no longer work because of the wear and tear of hard labor on his body. He attributes 
his sorry lot in life to the fact that he is not yet dead: “Yes, it’s my own fault. When you 
can’t work no more you should just lie down and die.”118 Lorilleux chimes in to support 
Bru, wondering “why the government doesn’t do something to help disabled workmen. I 
was reading about it in a newspaper the other day. . . .”119  Poisson, however, interjects to 
“stand up for the government,” pointing out that “[w]orkmen aren’t soldiers. . . . The 
Invalides is for soldiers . . . There’s no point asking the impossible.”120  
Friedrich Engels had previously expressed similar concerns for disabled workers 
in the industrial age, attacking the capitalist mode of production in The Condition of the 
Working Class in England by blaming factories and mills for the sorry sight of cripples 
on the streets of England. “I have seldom walked through Manchester,” Engels asserts, 
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“without seeing three or four cripples whose deformities of the spine and legs were 
exactly the same as those described by Mr. Sharp of Leeds.”121 Engels had no doubt that 
it was capitalism that was causing such disabilities, arguing that “[i]t is easy to identify 
such cripples at a glance, because their deformities are all exactly the same. They are 
knock-kneed and deformed and the spinal column is bent either forwards or sideways.”122 
Engels supported his claims by pointing both to a cripple whom he knew personally and 
accounts from “relatives of all these cripples,” who had “unanimously declared that these 
deformities were due to excessive work in the factories.”123 Implicit in Engels critique of 
capitalism’s cripples, of course, is the notion that workers could be free from this type of 
exploitation only if they came together to hasten the demise of the capitalist mode of 
production. It is easy to see, then, how Otto von Bismarck’s plan to provide workers with 
social welfare programs, including disability insurance, deprived socialists and Marxists 
of some of their most effective rhetoric against what they perceived to be the evils of 
capitalism.124 Indeed, both Lorilleux’s call for increased government intervention to 
protect disabled workers and Engels attack on capitalism suggest that the disability 
problem in the industrial age was fast becoming too great for governments to ignore.  
 If Poisson was correct that disabled veterans could expect assistance from their 
governments while disabled workers could not, the unprecedented industrial carnage of 
World War I would demonstrate that providing meaningful assistance to disabled 
veterans in the age of modern warfare would be no easy undertaking. After the war, the 
West attempted, often in vain, to come to grips with the horrors of trench warfare and a 
world populated by war-cripples in various ways. In the process of trying to make sense 
of the unprecedented carnage, literary figures often depicted the disabled as wretched 
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souls no longer fit for the lives they once knew. Mary Louise Roberts, for instance, has 
recently pointed to the fictional Olivier Mauret, a soldier who returns from the war after 
having lost an arm and an eye in Jean Dufort’s Sur la route de lumiére, to examine 
changing gender roles after World War I.125 Her discussion, however, demonstrates that 
World War I and its aftermath was as important for disability discourse as it was for 
gender discourse. Mauret’s fiancée, Roberts explains, “in whom he has placed all hope of 
happiness, is repulsed by his mutilated body. Throughout the course of the novel, she 
increasingly withdraws and finally rejects him totally.”126 Mauret learns, then, that 
disabled veterans, despite their sacrifices for their particular nation, have become 
anathemas to many people, including even some of their loved ones, on account of their 
mangled bodies.   
In Disabled, Wilfred Owen, a soldier-poet from World War I who died in combat 
shortly before the armistice and catapulted to fame posthumously for Dulce et Decorum 
Est, describes the wretched life of a veteran with multiple amputations to convey the true 
cost of modern warfare for those who have to wage it on the front lines. The poem begins 
by explaining the severity of the veteran’s injuries and how they have confined him to a 
hospital; he now wastes away the remainder of his meaningless days while listening to 
sounds of life from the world outside that no longer has a place for him: 
He sat in a wheeled chair, waiting for dark, 
And shivered in his ghastly suit of grey, 
Legless, sewn short at elbow. Through the park 
Voices of boys rang saddening like a hymn, 
Voices of play and pleasure after day, 
Till gathering sleep had mothered them from him.127 
 
As the boys depart, he pines for the days when he was able to enjoy the company of a 
woman, recognizing that he will never again have the opportunity to do so: 
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About this time Town used to swing so gay 
When glow-lamps budded in the light blue trees, 
And girls glanced lovlier as the air grew dim, — 
In the old times, before he threw away his knees. 
Now he will never feel again how slim 
Girls’ waists are, or how warm their subtle hands; 
All of them touch him like some queer disease.128  
 
Disabled ends by illuminating the bleakness of the veteran’s existence as he waits 
helplessly for someone to come and put an end to his miserable evening: 
Now, he will spend a few sick years in institutes, 
And do what things the rules consider wise, 
And take whatever pity they may dole. 
To-night he noticed how the women’s eyes 
Passed from him to the strong men that were whole. 
How cold and late it is! Why don’t they come 
And put him into bed? Why don’t they come?129 
 
Embedded in Owen’s observations about the veteran’s now-wretched life is 
Owen’s epiphany that war-cripples have lost far more than their limbs to modern warfare 
and modern medicine; in many ways, they have lost their freedom to a medical 
establishment that claims to have specialized knowledge about how war-cripples should 
live. The veteran, who enlisted to fight the Germans not because the state coerced him 
into doing so but because he chose to do go of his own free will, has become a patient 
who must do “what things the rules consider wise, / And take whatever pity they may 
dole.” No longer are the disabled controlled by the clergy who dole out alms in exchange 
for obedience to God but a by a medical apparatus that doles out treatment and kindness 
so long as patients do what doctors and nurses conclude is necessary to preserve not only 
their own bodily and psychological health but also the health and morale of society. 
Elsewhere in the poem, as Owen seemingly ponders the difference between 
nationalistic propaganda promising soldiers that the home front is behind them with every 
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fiber of its being and the reality of a homecoming with little fanfare and recognition for 
the limbs left behind on the battlefield, he directly addresses the status of the traditional 
relationship between Christian charity and the disabled in the modern age. Despite how 
eagerly the disabled veteran marched off to the war that would destroy his life, he 
received anything but a hero’s welcome home: 
Some cheered him home, but not as crowds cheer Goal. 
Only a solemn man who brought him fruits 
Thanked him; and then inquired about his soul.130 
 
Although Owen says nothing else about the “solemn man,” possibly a Christian minister, 
who came to offer fruits to the veteran, the encounter demonstrates that the rise of the 
modern nation-state did not entirely severe the old ties between Christian charity and the 
disabled. Indeed, there was still desperate need for Christian charity in the aftermath of 
World War I, even as the war lay bare the human costs associated with the unbridled 
nationalism of modern nation-states and the new medical apparatus that was taking 
shape, in part, to care for its victims.   
Erich Maria Remarque, also a veteran of World War I, likewise used the fear of 
amputation and hospitals in All Quiet on the Western Front to explore the physical and 
emotional carnage of trench warfare. After Paul Braümer carries his friend Albert Kropp 
to safety, Braümer witnesses a number of terrifying sights in the hospital, including 
“spine cases, head wounds and double amputations.”131 Braümer is horrified to see that 
many of the wounded soldiers “have their shattered limbs hanging free in the air from a 
gallows; underneath the wound a basin is placed into which drops the puss.”132 The 
surgeon’s clerk even shows Braümer “X-ray photographs of completely smashed 
hipbones, knees and shoulders.”133 The wounds are so severe that it is easy to forget “that 
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above such shattered bodies there are still human faces in which life goes its daily 
round.”134 To make matters worse, Braümer recognizes that “this is only one hospital, 
one single station; there are hundreds of thousands in Germany, hundreds of thousands in 
France, hundreds of thousands in Russia.”135   
For Remarque, military hospitals are the greatest testament to the madness that 
drove Western Civilization to the brink of collapse. Indeed, so many tragedies play out in 
military hospitals that soldiers who have been hospitalized can no longer make sense of 
the world. “How senseless,” Braümer wonders, “is everything that can ever be written, 
done, or thought, when such things are possible. It must be all lies and of no account 
when the culture of a thousand years could not prevent this stream of blood being poured 
out, these torture-chambers in their hundreds of thousands.”136 Braümer’s stay in the 
hospital has such a tremendous impact on him that he ultimately concludes that “[a] 
hospital alone shows what war is.”137 
For Remarque and his characters, returning home from the hospital as a wretched 
cripple is among the most terrifying consequences of modern warfare, particularly since 
they understand that surgeons often perform operations to make their jobs easier rather 
than to provide medically necessary treatment for their patients. Once Braümer and 
Kropp arrive at the dressing station, for instance, they fear that the surgeons will 
needlessly amputate their wounded legs. According to Braümer, “everyone knows that 
the surgeons in the dressing stations amputate on the slightest provocation” because it is 
“much simpler than complicated patching.”138 As Braümer decides to resist any attempt 
by the surgeons to chloroform him, he thinks about his friend Kemmerich, who died 
shortly after having his leg amputated.139 Kropp has even more reason to fear amputation 
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because his wound is slightly above his knee and is not responding well to treatment.  On 
one occasion, a few moments after Braümer mentions returning home, Kropp responds, 
“I’ve made up my mind . . . if they take off my leg, I’ll put an end to it. I won’t go 
through life as a cripple.”140 Braümer, of course, could say something to Kropp to let him 
know that life is still meaningful even as a cripple, but he says nothing. Instead, the two 
friends merely “lie there with [their] thoughts and wait.”141 Both Kropp and Braümer 
recognize the difficulties that await them at home if they become cripples; there is no 
reason for Braümer to pretend otherwise. Many soldiers recovering from such wounds in 
hospitals throughout Europe no doubt shared their concerns and wondered whether the 
life of a disabled veteran, a life marred by difficulties in finding both meaningful work 
and a loving wife, would be worth living or whether war-cripples truly would be better 
off dead.142  
When the surgeons eventually do take Kropp’s leg, he continues to contemplate 
suicide.  As Braümer and Kropp convalesce in the same room, Braümer contemplates 
Kropp’s declining mental state. “It is going badly with Albert,” Braümer observes. “They 
have taken him and amputated the leg. The whole leg has been taken off from the thigh. 
Now he will hardly speak any more. Once he says he will shoot himself the first time he 
can get hold of his revolver again.”143 Over time, Kropp’s physical health improves and 
Braümer thinks about what the future will hold for his friend. “Albert’s stump heals well. 
The wound is almost closed,” Braümer notes. Yet Braümer worries that Kropp “continues 
not to talk much, and is much more solemn than formerly. He often breaks off in his 
speech and stares in front of him. If he were not here with us he would have shot himself 
long ago.”144 Braümer does recognize that Kropp’s initial shock at having become an 
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amputee might subside over time. Indeed, he sees that Kropp “is over the worst of it,” 
and even “often looks on while we play skat.”145 Ultimately, it is in “an institute for 
artificial limbs,” where Kropp will likely go “in a few weeks,” that Kropp will learn 
whether he can salvage some kind of meaningful life despite his disability.146 
Braümer soon learns, however, that the battlefield is not a soldier’s only means of 
becoming a cripple. Instead, he comes to realize the extent to which some surgeons, 
confident in their surgical abilities and eager to perform experiments on soldiers who are 
powerless to stop them, will put their own interests over the health of their patients. 
When two wounded soldiers arrive at the hospital, the chief surgeon learns, to his great 
delight, that they are flat-footed. He tells the two soldiers, as Homais and Charles tell 
Hippolyte in Madame Bovary, that “we will just do a small operation, and then you will 
have perfectly sound feet.”147 When the surgeon leaves, another patient warns them to 
resist the surgery at all costs: “Don’t you let him operate on you! That is a special 
scientific stunt of the old boy’s. He goes absolutely crazy whenever he can get ahold of 
anyone to do it on.” The patient tells them that the surgery will cure them of their flat feet 
but will give them “club feet instead,” requiring them “to walk the rest of your life on 
sticks.”148  The patient reminds them that their flat feet give them no trouble in the field 
and that there is simply no reason to operate on them. “At present you can still walk,” he 
admonishes them, “but if once the old boy gets you under the knife you’ll be cripples. 
What he wants is little dogs to experiment with, so the war is a glorious time for him, as 
it is for all the surgeons.”149  Although one decides to agree to the surgery because there 
is “no telling what you’ll get if you go back out there again” and, in his opinion, it is 
“[b]etter to have a club foot than be dead,” the other decides against it.150 Yet the next 
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day, “the old man has the two hauled up and lectures and jaws at them so long that in the 
end they consent. What else could they do?—They are mere privates, and he is a big 
bug.”151 Indeed, the soldier who initially refused to consent to the surgery ultimately 
proves as unable to resist the growing power of the medical establishment as Flaubert’s 
Hippolyte. 
Deaf-Mutes and the Blind: Both Stigma and Innovation 
Deaf-mutes and the blind continued to be distinct categories of disability ripe with 
stigma and discrimination, despite the efforts of Epée, Haüy, and likeminded 
philanthropists. Sicard, Epée’s successor, employed negative stereotypes about the deaf 
that had circulated in the West since classical antiquity in order to gain support for his 
educational mission. In particular, Sicard harkened back to classical antiquity in arguing 
that education for the deaf was critical because they lacked the capacity for rational 
thought in their “natural state.”152 He contended that “a congenital deaf-mute . . . before 
some kind of education has begun . . . is a perfectly worthless being, a living automaton. . 
. .”
153
 He even argued that a deaf-mute in his or her natural state “is but an ambulant 
machine whose organization is inferior to that of animals,” proclaiming that the deaf-
mute “does not even possess that sound instinct that leads animals.154” He likewise 
belittled the capacity of the deaf to empathize with others, just as Diderot had done with 
respect to the blind in his Letter on the Blind, proclaiming that “no affection for anything 
outside himself ever enters the deaf [person’s] mind” and that, for deaf children, “virtues, 
like vices, are without reality.”155 Sicard contended, therefore, that his method of 
educating the deaf would “pacify this beast, humanize this savage,” and inculcate to deaf 
children the “rights and duties” of citizens.156 Sicard, of course, was not alone in his harsh 
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judgments about the intellectual capacity of deaf mutes. In Inquiries into Human Faculty 
and its Development, the eugenicist Galton concluded that deaf-mutes even lacked the 
capacity to understand the concept of religion, writing that religious rituals in churches 
“touched no chord in their untaught natures. . . .”157 As Epée’s successor, however, Sicard 
was a person who exercised tremendous control over efforts to educate deaf-mutes in 
France, particularly in Paris, and was thus a person whose judgments about the deaf held 
particular sway with the hearing community. 
In any event, Sicard’s observations about the deaf are so harsh to modern 
observers that some scholars in recent years, most notably Anne Quartararo, have rightly 
pointed out that Sicard seemingly disdained the very people whom he purported to 
help.158 Yet Sicard’s view of savagery, education, language, and civilization were part of 
a greater movement in Europe during the nineteenth century. As Eugen Weber famously 
demonstrated in Peasants into Frenchmen, much of Europe’s educated elite likewise 
viewed the uneducated peasantry as savages, sometimes even comparing them to 
animals.159 Many people belonging to the educated classes, moreover, believed that 
education was one of the best means of teaching peasants how to be civilized.160 
Accordingly, when Sicard attempted to raise deaf-mutes out of their “natural state” of 
inferiority by providing them with access to the language of hearing society, he was 
simply doing, albeit in an egregiously patronizing manner, what others in his class felt 
was best for other uneducated classes. This is not to argue, of course, that Sicard made no 
contributions to negative stereotypes about the deaf; to argue that a whole class of people 
lack the power of reason in their natural state is to view them as animals. Disability 
scholars, however, should recognize that Sicard did not create a wholly sui generis 
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educational model for deaf students but rather combined methods designed to educate 
deaf-mutes with an emerging model of educating other groups of internal “savages.”  
Blind people likewise had to endure the prying eyes and patronizing judgments of 
sighted people held in high regard in educated circles. In Inquiries into Human Faculty 
and its Development, for instance, in an inquiry somewhat reminiscent of Descartes, 
Molyneux, Locke, and Diderot, Galton examined whether blind people truly do have 
some kind of “compensation for the loss of their eyesight” in the form of “increased 
acuteness of other senses.”161  It was not his conclusion that blind people do not have 
such an advantage that was indicative both of negative stereotypes about the blind but 
and a fundamental misunderstanding of the experience of blindness, but rather the way in 
which he supported that conclusion. Galton, like Diderot over a century earlier, relied on 
anecdotal evidence of his personal interactions with blind people to inform his judgments 
about the mental capacities of the blind.162 According to Galton, he had met two blind 
people who claimed that blindness had heightened the sensitivity of their other senses. 
Galton was frustrated to learn that those two blind people did not want to participate in 
his sensory experiments, complaining, “I used all the persuasion I could to induce each of 
these persons to allow me to put their assertions to the test; but it was of no use. The one 
made excuses, the other positively refused.”163 Later, he wrote that they both likely had 
“the same tendency that others would have who happened to be defective in any faculty 
that their comrades possessed, to fight bravely against their disadvantage, and at the same 
time to be betrayed into some overvaunting of their capacities in other directions.”  These 
two blind people “would be a little conscious of this,” he concluded, “and would 
therefore shrink from being tested.”164 It apparently never occurred to Galton that his 
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proposed test subjects may not have wanted to be the guinea pigs of a sighted scientist 
who was skeptical of their purported abilities. 
 Perhaps the worst stereotype that plagued blind people during the long nineteenth 
century, however, was the notion that their disability made them helpless. Weygand, for 
example, describes the life of Thérèse-Jacqueline Parent, a congenitally blind woman, 
who found herself without family members to care for her. In the margins of a letter to 
the Minister of the Interior seeking her admission to the Quinze-Vignts, a municipal 
official emphasized her helplessness apparently in an attempt to bolster the request’s 
chance of success: “Since her grandmother’s death, she no longer has close relatives who 
can feed and take care of her. Let us note that it would be dangerous to leave this young 
person with no means of support to the mercy of events, especially in a city filled with 
soldiers, sailors, and an infinite number of foreigners.”165 Wealth, of course, could make 
a blind person’s existence far less precarious because wealth could afford them some 
measure of security. While poor blind people could find themselves destitute if they did 
not have family members to care for them, the wealthy could afford “enough domestics 
to provide the necessary help to ensure a well-run household. . . .”166 Yet the notion of 
helplessness remained even in these circumstances; wealth brought blind people security 
primarily because it enabled them to hire sighted servants to do what they could not do 
themselves on account of their blindness. The stereotype of the helpless blind person 
remained so strong after the French Revolution that Weygand has suggested that Sicard 
may have prevailed over Haüy in their battle for control over the combined institute for 
deaf-mutes and the blind because of prejudices about the helplessness of the blind.167 
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Negative stereotypes about the blind continued to abound in the aftermath of 
World War I. In All Quiet on the Western Front, as Braümer and Kropp convalesce, they 
encounter two blind veterans, one of whom decides that suicide is preferable to blindness. 
When the two blind soldiers arrive in their room, one actively seeks to kill himself by any 
means necessary. He is so eager to put an end to his misery, in fact, that “[t]the sisters 
never have a knife with them when they feed him; he has already snatched one from a 
sister.”168 On one occasion, “while he is being fed, the sister is called away, and leaves 
the plate with the fork on his table. He gropes for the fork, seizes it and drives it with all 
his force against his heart, then he snatches up a shoe and strikes with it against the 
handle as hard as he can.”169 He manages to drive the “blunt prongs” deep into his flesh 
and, by morning, suffers from lock-jaw.170 Now, the blind veteran, once a musician, can 
neither see nor speak. For Remarque, this is the miserable existence that awaits the 
soldier-victims of modern warfare. For blind people, however, the use of blindness to 
express the true horrors of war in the industrial age may seem to be a yet another example 
of sighted people assuming the worst about the experience of blindness.  
Although negative stereotypes about deaf-mutes and the blind could be bad 
enough during this period, most people in the hearing and sighted community would have 
considered the deaf-blind to be wretched and helpless creatures wholly unequipped for 
life. Some philanthropists, however, agreed with Diderot that educators simply needed to 
adapt their methods in order to provide such people with the advantages that an education 
could bring. Just as Sicard had depicted the deaf as “savages” in their “natural state,” 
public discussions of the two most famous deaf-blind people of the nineteenth century, 
Laura Bridgman and Helen Keller, often assumed that they were animal-like “savages” 
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who underwent a “miraculous” transformation by receiving an education.171 The 
overseers of Bridgman’s and Keller’s instruction, of course, reinforced this belief by 
disseminating information about the amazing intellectual growth of their famous pupils 
before an inquiring public.  
To some observers, Bridgman’s and Keller’s publicity might have appeared to be 
something akin to freak shows, where hearing and sighted philanthropists exploited 
Bridgman and Keller by thrusting them into the public eye, knowing that negative 
stereotypes would bolster their claims of “miraculous” intervention. Yet the people in 
charge of Boston’s Perkins Institution for the Blind when Bridgman and Keller received 
their educations there, despite the power imbalances between them and their students, 
may well have felt as trapped by the negative discourse surrounding the mental 
capabilities of the deaf and blind as Bridgman, Keller, and other students with significant 
hearing or vision problems, concluding that making Bridgman and Keller famous was the 
only way to convince an ignorant hearing and sighted community that it should not 
condemn the deaf-blind people to solitary existences. In any case, the educators 
associated with Bridgman and Keller pragmatically followed the precedents of Epée, 
Haüy, and Sicard, all of whom had successfully demonstrated the abilities of their 
students in order to gain public support for their philanthropic efforts.172 The 
demonstrations of the eighteenth century, after all, had increased public awareness of the 
intellectual capabilities of deaf-mutes and the blind. Accordingly, they may rightfully 
have concluded that it was a necessary evil to thrust Bridgman and Keller into the public 
spotlight in order to take the first steps toward enabling the deaf-blind to take their 
rightful place at the table of humanity. 
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 In 1837, more than forty years before the birth of Helen Keller, the parents of 
Laura Bridgman, who had lost her hearing, sight, sense of smell, and sense of taste after 
contracting scarlet fever as a toddler, placed their daughter in the care of Dr. Samuel 
Gridley Howe, director of Perkins Institution for the Blind in an attempt to give her the 
ability to communicate better with the world.173 Howe had been publicly displaying the 
blind since 1832 and eagerly embraced the opportunity to share Bridgman’s 
accomplishments with the world. Charles Dickens, who toured the Perkins Institution in 
1842 was so impressed with Bridgman that he devoted most of his chapter on Boston in 
his American Notes to Howe’s work and Bridgman’s abilities.174 Not surprisingly, 
Dickens’ writings on Bridgman helped to make her famous throughout Europe and the 
United States.175 
Few people today remember the remarkable life of Laura Bridgman. Helen Keller 
has long since supplanted her in the minds of Westerners as the person who demonstrated 
to the hearing and sighted public the intellectual capacities of deaf-blind people, so long 
as educational systems were willing to accommodate their unique needs. Keller’s 
contemporaries, however, were well aware of her connection to Bridgman. In 1888, the 
Perkins Institution published its fifty-sixth annual report, Helen Keller: A Second Laura 
Bridgman, written by its director, Michael Anagnos, who observed that “[i]n many 
respects, such as intellectual alertness, keenness of observation, and vivacity of 
temperament [Keller] is unquestionably the equal to Laura Bridgman.”176 In some ways, 
however, Keller outperformed Bridgman. In other ways, such as “quickness of 
perception, grasp of ideas, breadth of comprehension, insatiate thirst for solid knowledge, 
self-reliance and sweetness of disposition,” Aganos claimed, “she clearly excels her 
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prototype [Bridgman]. . . .”177 It is little surprise, then, that when Keller’s teacher, Anne 
Sullivan, came to Keller’s house the year before the Perkins Institution published 
Anagnos’ report, she brought a doll from the institution’s blind children that Keller later 
learned had been dressed by Bridgman.178 The doll, in retrospect, represented a symbolic 
passing of the torch from Bridgman to Keller, with the former dying just two years later. 
Once Sullivan began to teach Keller, of course, her famous pupil’s life began to 
parallel Bridgman’s earlier experiences in significant ways. Advocates for improving the 
education of both the blind and the deaf believed that Keller, like Bridgman, could help 
their respective causes. Anagnos used Keller’s fame to promote the agenda of the Perkins 
Institution just as Dr. Howe had relied on Bridgman’s notoriety to gain public support for 
Perkins Institution fifty years earlier.179 Alexander Graham Bell, the inventor of the 
telephone, similarly recognized that the public’s infatuation with Keller could increase 
support for efforts to provide the deaf with better educations. In 1888, he gave a New 
York newspaper Keller’s picture along with a letter that she had written to him. In 1891, 
he wrote that the public, “through her, may perhaps be led to take an interest in the more 
general subject of the Education of the Deaf.”180 Whereas Laura Bridgman counted 
Charles Dickens among her greatest admirers, moreover, Mark Twain claimed that the 
two most interesting people of the nineteenth century were Napoleon and Helen Keller.181 
As Dorothy Herrmann has recently explained, the American and European public 
apparently agreed, enthusiastically following her exploits, including pictures of her in 
newspapers reading Shakespeare.182 Indeed, Keller was so famous and articulate that she 
was able to provide the hearing and sighted world with glimpses into the complexities of 
her existence by publishing her own works.  
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The experiences that Keller shared with an inquisitive public, however, did 
reinforce some negative stereotypes about deaf-blind people. In explaining her own bleak 
existence before Anne Sullivan began to teach her, for example, Keller corroborated the 
common sentiment during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that the life of a 
deaf-blind person would necessarily be lonely, perhaps even animal-like, without an 
education.183 “Have you ever been at sea in a dense fog,” asked Keller in The Story of My 
Life,  
when it seemed as if a tangible white darkness shut you in, and the great ship, 
tense and anxious, groped her way toward the shore with plummet and sounding-
line, and you waited with beating heart for something to happen? I was like that 
ship before my education began, only I was without compass or sounding line, 
and had no way of knowing how near the harbour was.184  
 
At the same time, the deaf-blind prodigy demonstrated that people like her were every bit 
as capable of rational thought as hearing and sighted people, so long as society would 
provide them with an education. Keller, and to a lesser extent Bridgman, demonstrated 
that Diderot had been correct all along in arguing that the prejudices of the hearing and 
sighted world, particularly the refusal to refine methods to educate the deaf-blind, were 
responsible for their “animal-like” lives rather than some inherent, intellectual deficiency 
caused by their particular type of disability.     
Dwarfs: The Waning of Dwarfism as Entertainment? 
 Dwarfs, like the other categories of disability, continued to encounter a great deal 
of stigma and discrimination during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Although the 
court dwarfs, such as Joseph Boruswlaski who died in 1837, were fast disappearing, 
many dwarfs continued to find employment in freak shows and circuses through the first 
half of the twentieth century.185 The little person Charles S. Stratton, born just a year after 
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Boruswlaski’s death, found considerable fame and wealth under the stage name General 
Tom Thumb in P.T. Barnum’s traveling circus.186 He was so famous that he came out of 
retirement to help Barnum when he found himself in financial difficulty because of bad 
investments.187 Yet the question of whether able-bodied society should continue to gawk 
at deformed freaks, many of whom were little people, remained. Buffon and Geoffroy 
Saint-Hilaire had previously argued that even court dwarfs were wretched, degraded 
people.188 The same, of course, could be said of performers like Stratton and, especially, 
dwarfs in smaller freak shows who could never hope to attain the same levels of wealth 
and fame of Boruswlaski and Stratton. Freak shows gradually became an anathema to 
“civilized” society, as an increasing number of the middle class began to conclude that it 
was inhumane to allow deformed freaks to humiliate themselves for the pleasure of able-
bodied gawkers.189  
It was this turn of events that left Joseph Merrick, the Elephant Man, without any place to 
go before Treves rescued him and brought him to his hospital. By the time that Tod 
Browning, director of Dracula (1931), which starred Bela Lugosi, directed Freaks 
(1932), a failure at the box office, it was obvious that freak shows were losing some of 
their appeal. The dwarfs and other disabled people who once performed at circuses and 
freak shows almost certainly found themselves less economically secure after they could 
no longer perform. Twentieth-century observers, however, were slowly coming to the 
conclusion that they could no longer tolerate such inhumane treatment in the guise of 
entertainment. As disability scholars such as Lennard Davis have demonstrated, however, 
the “kindness” that replaced the inhumane treatment of freak shows in the twentieth 
century “ended up segregating and ostracizing” them, along with other disabled people, 
 385 
 
“through the discursivity of disability.”190 Davis and others with Foucauldian proclivities, 
however, should not conclude that the modern discursivity of disability created negative 
stereotypes about dwarfs, the quintessential “sports of nature.” Indeed, their marginalized 
existence as entertainers and court jesters throughout much of the history of the West was 
every bit as demeaning as the able-bodied “kindness” of the modern age, even if some 
dwarf entertainers managed to amass considerable wealth.  
In recent years, the resurgence of freakshows, particularly on television, 
YouTube, and other forms of multimedia, may ultimately signify a rejection of twentieth-
century values about dwarfs and freakshows. The television program Freakshow, which 
features dwarfs and other “freaks,” was so popular that AMC renewed it for a second 
season. Now that able-bodied people can gawk at freaks from the security of their own 
homes, without having to encounter the disapproving glances from those who disagree 
with such forms of entertainment, it appears that many able-bodied people seem eager to 
return to a time when freaks entertained them. Freakshow performers themselves, 
however, would likely point out that able-bodied audiences are not exploiting them but 
rather learning about a subculture that has always been associated with disability.   
Conclusion 
The long nineteenth century witnessed the creation of a new type of disability 
discourse, one that combined the ancient categories for disabled people—monsters, 
hunchbacks, cripples, the blind, the deaf and dumb, and dwarfs—with observations about 
the rapidly changing world, including ideas about congenital deformity and the disability 
problem. Indeed, the emerging disability discourse of the nineteenth century was not, as 
some might assume, the product solely of modernity but rather a combination of pre-
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modern and modern ideas about disability, practices with respect to disability, and 
categories that had long exacerbated the stigma and discrimination that disabled people 
have had to endure throughout the recorded history of the West.   
____________________________________ 
1
 According to Peter Quennell, Lord Byron had an ambulatory impairment, possibly club-foot, but it is 
“difficult to gauge the extent of his lameness; its origin and precise character have not yet been diagnosed.” 
Peter Quennell, Byron: The Years of Fame: Byron in Italy (London: Collins, 1974), 47-48. During Byron’s 
lifetime, his impairment was so famous that it was the subject of an article by H. Cameron, “The Mystery 
of Lord Byron’s Lameness,” in The Lancet, March 31, 1923. Visual depictions have not shed any light on 
his impairment. Joseph-Denis Odevaere’s 1826 painting, Lord Byron on his Death-bed, for example, has a 
sheet covering Byron’s deformed right foot.  
2
 Lord Byron, The Deformed Transformed, in The Works of Lord Byron in Verse and Prose Including his 
Letters, Journals, Etc. (Hartford: Silus Andrus & Son, 1847), 345. 
3
 Victor Hugo, The Hunchback of Notre Dame (New York: Barnes & Noble Classics, 2004), 145. “C’est un 
vrai monstre d’abomination que ce soi-disant enfant trouvé.”  Victor Hugo, Notre-Dame de Paris: 1482 in 
Notre-Dame de Paris: 1482 et Les Travailleurs de la mer, eds., Jacques Seebacher and Yves Gohin. 
Gallimard (Gallimard, 1975), 140. I have provided the original French for Quasimodo’s abandonment so as 
to give French readers a sense of monstre in a French context. 
4
 Hugo, The Hunchback of Notre Dame, 145-46.  Ah mon Dieu! s’ésciait Agnès, ces pauvres nourices qui 
sont là dans le logis des enfants trouvés qui sont là ruelle en descendant la rivière, tout à côté de 
monseigneur l’évêque, si on allait leur apporter ce petit monstre à allaiter! J’aimerais mieux donner à téter à 
un vampire.  Hugo, Notre-Dame de Paris: 1482, 140-41. 
5
 Hugo, The Hunchback of Notre Dame, 146. “En effet, ce n’était pas un nouveau-né que <<ce petit 
monstre>>. (Nous serions fort empêché nous-même de le qualifier autrement.) C’était une petite fort 
anguleuse et fort remuante, emprisonnée dans un sac de toile imprimé au chiffre de messier Guillaume 
Chartier, pour lors évêque de Paris, avec une tête qui sortait.  Cette tête était chose assez difforme. On n’y 
voyait qu’une forêt de cheveux roux, un oeil, un bouche et des dents.  Le oeil pleurait, la bouche criait, et 
les dents ne paraissaient demander qu’à mordre.”  Hugo, Notre-Dame de Paris: 1482, 141. 
6
 Hugo, The Hunchback of Notre Dame, 159. 
7
 Ibid., 159.  
8
 Ibid., 160.  It is interesting that Hugo calls Quasimodo un nain bizarre here after Henrietta la Gaultière 
refers to him as an énormité.  
9
 Ibid., 160-61. 
10
 Stanley Kauffmann, in a review of Bernard Pomerance’s play, The Elephant Man, clearly saw a 
connection between Quasimodo and Joseph Merrick. Indeed, Kauffmann approved of Pomerance’s 
decision not to use make-up for the actor portraying Merrick because it “would make Quasimodo look like 
Puck.”  Peter W. Graham and Fritz H. Oehlschlaeger, Articulating the Elephant Man: Joseph Merrick and 
His Interpreters (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 86.   
11
 See Ashley Montagu, The Elephant Man: A Study in Human Dignity (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1971), 1. 
12
 Sir Frederick Treves, The Elephant Man and Other Reminiscences (London: W. H. Allen & Co., [1923] 
1980), 11-12.  For a discussion of similar problems phénomènes experienced in France during the 
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, see Diana Snigurowicz, “The Phénomène’s Dilemma: Teratology 
and the Policing of Human Anomalies Nineteenth and Early-Twentieth-Century Paris,” in Foucault and the 
Government of Disability, ed., Shelley Tremain (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1997), 172-181. 
13
 Montagu, Pomerance, and the 1980 film, The Elephant Man, all incorrectly identified Merrick as “John” 
based on Treves’ memoir despite other memoirs that correctly remembered Joseph Merrick’s name.  In his 
memoir, Treves explains, “I learnt nothing about the Elephant Man, except that he was English, that his 
name was John Merrick and that he was twenty-one years of age.” Treves, The Elephant Man and Other 
Reminiscences, 9.  For a discussion of how Joseph Merrick became John Merrick for over 70 years based 
 
 387 
 
____________________________________ 
 
on this mistake, see Michael Howell and Peter Ford, The True History of the Elephant Man (London: 
Allison & Busby, 1980), 25-6. Howell and Ford also dispelled the notion that Merrick was merely 
fantasizing about his mother, Mary Jane Merrick, when he spoke fondly about his childhood with her. 
According to Treves, she had “basely deserted him when he was very small,” proving what a “[w]orthless 
and inhuman” mother she was. Treves, The Elephant Man and Other Reminiscences, 15.  Merrick, Treves 
maintained, had merely constructed idealized memories of her in order to deal with the pain of 
abandonment: “Mothers figured in the tales he had read and he wanted his mother to be one of those 
comfortable lullaby-singing persons who are so lovable.”  Ibid., 15. Accordingly, Treves believed that 
Merrick was merely dreaming when he observed that his deformities were unexpected in light of his 
mother’s beauty: “‘It is very strange, for, you see, mother was so beautiful.’” Ibid. Howell and Ford, 
however, demonstrated that although Merrick was seriously deformed, he was, in fact, capable of 
remembering the nearly eleven years he spent with his loving mother until she died of bronchopneumonia. 
Howell and Ford, 71. Interestingly, Merrick’s mother, Mary Jane Merrick, “was herself a cripple.” Howell 
and Ford, The True History of the Elephant Man, 55. 
14
 Treves,  The Elephant Man and Other Reminiscences, 17 
15
 Treves repeatedly calls Merrick a “creature.”  See, e.g., ibid., 7, 8, 16, 20, 21.  He also refers to him as 
disgusting. See ibid, 8. 
16
 Ibid., 22. 
17
 Ibid., 24. 
18
 Ibid., 18. 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 Ibid. According to Treves, the hospital subsequently sought out “volunteer nurses whose ministrations 
were somewhat formal and constrained.”  Ibid. 
21
 Ibid. 
22
 Ibid. 
23
 Ibid., 19. 
24
 Ibid. Howell and Ford discuss the identity of the widow. Howell and Ford, The True History of the 
Elephant Man, 141-42. 
25
 Treves, The Elephant Man and Other Reminiscences, 19. 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Ibid., 20. 
29
 Ibid. 
30
 Ibid. 
31
 Ibid. 
32
 Ibid., 21. 
33
 Ibid., 25-26. 
34
 Howell and Ford, The True History of the Elephant Man (Appendix 2), 228. Joseph Merrick recited the 
second portion of the poem in his short memoir. See Joseph Carey Merrick, “The Autobiography of Joseph 
Carey Merrick,” as reproduced in Howell and Ford, The True History of the Elephant Man (Appendix, 1), 
223-24. 
35
 Lord Byron, The Deformed Transformed, 345. 
36
 Ibid. 
37
 Ibid. 
38
 Ibid. 
39
 Ibid., 345-6. 
40
 Ibid., 346. 
41
 Ibid. 
42
 Ibid., 347-48. 
43
 Ibid., 349. 
44
 See Quennell, Byron: The Years of Fame, 50.  
 
 388 
 
____________________________________ 
 
45
 See ibid., 50-51; Daniel P. Watkins, “The Ideological Dimensions of Byron’s The Deformed 
Transformed,” in The Plays of Lord Byron: Critical Essays, ed., Robert Gleckner (Liverpool: Liverpool 
University Press, 1997), 347-48.   
46
 James Sheridan Knowles, The Hunchback: A Play in Five Acts (London: E. Moxon, 1832) 4-5. 
47
 Ibid., 6-7. 
48
 Ibid., 6. 
49
 Ibid., 7. 
50
 Ibid., 8 
51
 Ibid., 12. 
52
 The two break off their engagement, but Walter reveals his identity toward the end of the play to ensure 
that the two lovers wind up married. Ibid., 116-18.  
53
 Walter Kaufmann, Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre (New York: Meridian, 1989), 83-85.    
54
 Joseph Brown III, MD, “The Health Matter Briefly Revisited:  Epilepsy, “Hunchback,” and that tiny 
word (tubercl?),” Søren Kierkegaard Newsletter, no. 49 (August 2005). 
55
 Joakim Garff, Søren Kierkegaard: A Biography, trans., Bruce Krimmse (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2005), 7. 
56
 Søren Kierkegaard, Kierkegaard Letters and Documents, trans., Henrik Rosenmeier (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1978), xxi.  
57
 Encounters with Kierkegaard: A Life as Seen by His Contemporaries, ed. and trans., Bruce H. Kirmmse, 
trans., Virginia R. Laursen (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 244. 
58
 Garff, Søren Kierkegaard: A Biography, 298. 
59
 Ibid., 429. 
60
 Ibid. 
61
 Ibid., 100-101. 
62
 Ibid., 400. 
63
 Ibid. 
64
 Ibid. 
65
 Ibid., 414. 
66
 Ibid., 415. 
67
 Ibid., 417-8. 
68
 For Garff’s observations about Kierkegaard, see ibid., 407.  
69
 Ibid. 
70
 Ibid. 
71
 Ibid., 408. 
72
 Ibid., 417. 
73
 Ibid., 408. 
74
 Ibid., 384-5. 
75
 Ibid., 385. 
76
 Ibid., 409. 
77
 Ibid. 
78
 Ibid., 414. 
79
 Ibid. 
80
 Ibid. 
81
 Ibid., 297. 
82
 Ibid. 
83
 Ibid., 298. 
84
 Ibid., 297. 
85
 Ibid.,185-90. 
86
 Kierkegaard even claimed that Regine Olsen’s sister, Cornelia, was in love with him, further 
complicating the matter. See ibid., 189. 
87
 Encounters with Kierkegaard, 43.  
 
 389 
 
____________________________________ 
 
88
 Garff, Søren Kierkegaard: A Biography, 136-7. 
89
 Ibid., 346. 
90
 Ibid., 137. 
91
 Ibid., 431. 
92
 Ibid., 416.  Kierkegaard, in fact, had always felt that he was in some way connected to Jesus. The 
Kierkegaard family believed that Kierkegaard’s father had done something to bring about a curse upon the 
family by transgressing God in his youth.  The family believed that none of the seven Kierkegaard children 
would live past the age of thirty-three, the age of Jesus when he was crucified, and that their father would 
outlive them all.  Ibid., 136-37.  For a time, the children did indeed seem destined to die in accordance with 
the “curse.” Five of the seven children did indeed die before their father, all before their thirty-fourth 
birthdays.  Ibid., 346.  It is not surprising, therefore, that the “curse” was for Kierkegaard a sword of 
Damocles that seemed to draw closer and closer to his neck with each passing year and each tragic death 
until Kierkegaard’s father suddenly died and both Kierkegaard’s older brother and Kierkegaard himself 
subsequently reached the age of thirty-four.  A journal entry on Kierkegaard’s thirty-fourth birthday, dated 
May 5, 1847, demonstrates Kierkegaard’s fear and trembling regarding the “curse”:  “How strange that I 
have turned thirty-four.  It is utterly inconceivable to me.  I was so sure that I would die before or on this 
birthday that I could actually be tempted to suppose that the date of my birth has been erroneously recorded 
and that I will still die on my thirty-fourth.”  Ibid., 137. 
93
 Ibid., 433. 
94
 Ibid., 418. 
95
 Ibid. 
96
 Gustave Flaubert, Madame Bovary, trans., Eleanor Marx Aveling (New York: Barnes & Noble Classics, 
2005 [1856, translation 1886]), 162-3. 
97
 Ibid., 164. 
98
 Ibid., 163. 
99
 Ibid. 
100
 Ibid. 
101
 Ibid. 
102
 Ibid., 165. 
103
 Ibid. 
104
 Ibid. 
105
 Ibid., 168. 
106
 Ibid., 169. 
107
 Ibid. 
108
 Ibid., 174-5. 
109
 Émile Zola, L’Assommoir, trans., Margaret Mauldon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995 [1877]), 
13. 
110
 Ibid., 26. 
111
 Ibid., 39. 
112
 Ibid. 
113
 Ibid., 74. Madame Fauconnier castigates for mocking Gervaise, but the group pays her no attention. 
Ibid.  The first time that Lorilleux calls Gervaise Banban to her face, the term strikes “her like a blow,” and 
Coupeau, “just as offended by the nickname,” upbraids his sister for calling “other people names.”  Ibid., 
94. 
114
 Ibid., 74. 
115
 Ibid., 39. 
116
 Zola, like many in France, looked to the ideas on Lamarck rather than Darwin when attempting to 
discern the laws of heredity. See Pierre-Henri Gouyon, Jean-Pierre Henry, and Jacques Arnould, Gene 
Avatars: The Neo-Darwinian Theory of Evolution, trans., Tiiu Ojasoo (New York: Kluwer 
Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2002 [1997]), 39-41. 
117
 Zola, L’Assommoir, 125. 
 
 390 
 
____________________________________ 
 
118
 Ibid., 219. 
119
 Ibid. 
120
  Ibid., 219-20. 
121
 Friedrich Engels, The Condition of the Working Class in England, trans., W.O. Henderson and W.H. 
Chaloner, 1958 [1845], 172. 
122
 Ibid., 173. 
123
 Ibid. 
124
 For a discussion of Bismarck’s role in the creation of the welfare state, see Greg Eghigian, Making 
Security Social: Disability Insurance, and the Birth of the Social Entitlement State in Germany (Ann Arbor: 
The University of Michigan Press, 2000), 14-7.  
125
 I consider Mauret a war-cripple even though he lost an arm rather than a leg because such disabled 
veterans, as the fictional account of Mauret’s life suggests, could experience the same types of stigma and 
discrimination as disabled veterans who lost their arms. 
126
 Mary Louise Roberts, Civilization without Sexes: Reconstructing Gender in Postwar France, 1917-1927 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 42. 
127
 Wilfred Owen, Disabled, in Wilfred Owens, War Poems and Others, ed., Doming Hibberd (London: 
Chatto & Windus, 1973), 76 (lines 1-6). 
128
 Ibid., 77 (7-13). 
129
 Ibid., 78 (40-46). 
130
 Ibid. (37-39). 
131
 Erich Maria Remarque, All Quiet on the Western Front, trans., A.W. Wheen (New York: Ballantine 
Books, 1982), 262. 
132
 Ibid. 
133
 Ibid., 263. 
134
 Ibid. 
135
 Ibid. 
136
 Ibid. 
137
 Ibid. 
138
 Ibid., 242. 
139
 Ibid., 242-3. 
140
 Ibid., 242. 
141
 Ibid. 
142
 Remarque does recognize that some disabilities are more serious than others.  
143
 Ibid., 260-1. 
144
 Ibid., 268. 
145
 Ibid. 
146
 See ibid. 
147
 Ibid., 259. 
148
 Ibid. 
149
 Ibid. 
150
 Ibid., 260. 
151
 Ibid. 
152
 Roch-Ambroise-Cucurron Sicard, “Course of Instruction for a Congenitally Deaf Person,” in The Deaf 
Experience: Classics in Language and Education, ed. Harlan Lane, trans. Franklin Philip (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1984), 81-126, as quoted in Anne T. Quartararo, Deaf Identity and Social Images 
in Nineteenth-Century France (Gallaudet University Press, 2002), 15-16. 
153
 Sicard, “Discours préliminaire,” in Cours d’instructiion d’un sour-muet de naissance. . . (Paris: Le 
Clerc, Year VIII), vi-ix, xi-viv,. as quoted by Weygand, The Blind in French Society, 134. 
154
 Ibid. 
155
 Roch-Ambroise-Cucurron Sicard, “Course of Instruction for a Congenitally Deaf Person,” 86, as quoted 
in Quartararo, Deaf Identity and Social Images in Nineteenth-Century France, 16. 
 
 391 
 
____________________________________ 
 
156
  Ibid. 
157
 Francis Galton, Inquiries into Human Faculty and its Development (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1998 
[1883]), 208. 
158
 Quartararo, Deaf Identity and Social Images in Nineteenth-Century France, 14-7. 
159
 See Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural rance, 1870-1914 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1976),  4. 
160
 Ibid., 5. 
161
 Galton, Inquiries into Human Faculty and its Development, 30. 
162
 Galton also came to a similar conclusion about the mental abilities of the blind.  Diderot had argued that 
it was impossible to answer Molyneux’s question in regard to all blind people because blind people, like 
able-bodied people, display varying degrees of intellectual ability. Galton likewise suggested that it was 
impossible to access the difficulty of teaching blind people to read “by touch” because of those variations 
in ability.  He pointed Lord Hathery, a former Lord Chancellor of England, who was able to learn to read 
“by touch vary rapidly” as evidence “of the sensitivity of able men.” Ibid., 31. 
163
 Ibid. 
164
 Ibid. 
165
 Quinze Vingts: Admission Requests, Year IX-1812 and 1813-1815. Files of Thérèse-Jacqueline Parent, 
1809 and 1812, as quoted by Weygand, The Blind in French Society, 185.  
166
 Ibid. 
167
 See ibid., 134. 
168
 Remarque, All Quiet on the Western Front, 261. 
169
 Ibid. 
170
 Ibid. 
171
 For more on how the education of these girls could depict a transformation from savage to citizen, see  
Ernest Freeberg, The Education of Laura Bridgman: First Deaf and Blind Person to Learn Language 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 1-2, 14 
172
 Quartararo, Deaf Identity and Social Images in Nineteenth-Century France, 10. 15; Weygand, The Blind 
in French Society, 105-9. 
173
 Freeberg, The Education of Laura Bridgman, 1. 
174
  Ibid., 52. 
175
 Ibid.   
176
 Michael Anagnos, Helen Keller: A Second Laura Bridgman, 56th Annual Report of the Perkins 
Institution and Massachusetts School for the Blind, 1888, 10-14, as quoted in Dorothy Herrmann, Helen 
Keller: A Life (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), 63. 
177
 Ibid., 63-4.   
178
 Ibid., 34-5. 
179
 For the similarities between Anagnos and Dr. Howe vis-à-vis their famous pupils, see Herrmann, Helen 
Keller: A Life, 64-5. 
180
 Herrmann, Helen Keller: A Life, 65. 
181
 John Albert Macy, “A Supplementary Account of Helen Keller’s Life and Education,” in Helen Keller, 
The Story of My Life (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1954 [1902]), 225. 
182
 Herrmann, Helen Keller: A Life, 64. 
183
 Even scholars today refer to the “animal-like existence” of deaf-blind children in the nineteenth century.  
Herrmann, for example, has observed that the deaf-blind Tommy Stringer lived a “animal-like existence” 
before being “rescued.”  See ibid., 67.  
184
 Keller, The Story of My Life, 35. 
185
 See Robert Bogdan, Freak Show: Presenting Human Oddities for Amusement and Pleasure (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1988), vii-ix. 
186
 Jack Hunter, Freak Babylon: An Illustrated History of Teratology and Freakshows (London: The 
Glitterbooks, 2005), 15. 
187
 Ibid. 
 
 392 
 
____________________________________ 
 
188
 Armand Marie Leroi, Mutants: On the Form, Varieties and Errors of the Human Body (London: 
HarperCollinsPublishers, 2003), 170. 
189
  See Bogdan, Freak Show, ix-xi. 
190
 Lennard J. Davis, Enforcing Normalcy: Disability, Deafness, and the Body (Verso, 1995), 3. 
 393 
 
Chapter 9: Conclusion 
Disability has a history and, in many respects, it is a familiar history. The history 
of disability is inextricably intertwined with the development of Western Civilization 
because of the importance of western ideas about disability. Two ideas about disability 
have been of particular importance in the western tradition: (1) the idea that there was 
some type of significance, whether supernatural or natural, to the existence of congenital 
deformity and (2) the idea that the existence of disabled people has resulted in a disability 
problem due to their diminished labor capacity. Yet the importance of these ideas has 
been hidden from us by the able-bodied purveyors of the metanarrative. In some ways, of 
course, it is understandable that the history of disability and disabled people have been 
cast into the penumbras of history. The various categories for disabled people—monsters, 
dwarfs, hunchbacks, cripples/the lame, the blind, and the deaf and dumb—have 
reinforced negative stereotypes about disabled people from the beginning of the recorded 
history of the West, influencing not only the idea that there was something significant 
about congenital deformity and the idea that there was a disability problem, but also 
contemporary attitudes about disability. When the only experience so many able-bodied 
people today have had with disability is the constant, linguistic bombardment of these 
various categories, whether in a literal or metaphorical sense, it should come as little 
surprise that many able-bodied scholars have assumed that disability and disabled people 
could not possibly have played an important role in the history of the West. How could 
such a wretched and marginalized people, they might ask themselves, have had a history 
that was important to anyone other than the disabled themselves?  
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Yet a reexamination of the metanarrative with disability in mind reveals entirely 
new dimensions to the familiar story of the development of Western Civilization. When 
classical philosophers attempted to understand the natural world, they looked to 
congenital deformity to test their ideas. The minority view of Empedocles and the 
Epicureans with respect to congenital deformity, that chance rather than design governed 
the development of living beings, were particularly important, ultimately triumphing over 
supernatural explanations for congenital deformity, at least among the educated elite of 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The Athenian disability pension system, 
meanwhile, was one of the earliest examples of public assistance in the West. The elder 
Seneca’s observations about the problem of fraud when attempting to provide public 
assistance to the disabled would, of course, find parallels in modern debates about public 
assistance and fraud. Augustine, one of the most influential of all Christian thinkers, and 
subsequent Christians looked to congenital deformity when vindicating “the ways of God 
to Man.”1 During the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment, philosophers were 
virtually obsessed with what congenital deformity and disability might reveal about the 
natural world and the nature of human beings. Indeed, if congenital deformity and 
disability had never existed, the Scientific Revolution and Enlightenment simply could 
not have been the same. Congenital deformity and disability likewise played an important 
role in facilitating the rapid changes that wracked the West from the French Revolution 
through World War I. Charles Darwin, after all, studied monstrosity, what he later called 
mutation, when fashioning his theory of natural selection. The massive undertaking to 
provide medical care for disabled veterans and to rehabilitate them after World War I, 
meanwhile, almost certainly played a role in the expansion of state-sponsored aid to other 
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groups, both disabled and non-disabled alike, even if some war-time governments 
preferred to rely more on private and religious charity than direct public assistance.   
It is unfortunate that disabled scholars themselves, whether because of Marxist or 
post-structuralist proclivities, have bought into the idea that disability has no pre-modern 
history. In attempting to understand disability in the modern world, while simultaneously 
fighting for the civil rights of disabled people, they have unwittingly supported the 
traditional, able-bodied metanarrative that disability has no history, at least before the 
eighteenth century. Disability scholars, most notably Lennard Davis, who see a profound 
transformation in the social construction of disability with the advent of capitalism or the 
rise of the modern nation state, are not entirely incorrect. Both capitalism and the 
emergence of nation-states undoubtedly altered the relationship between disabled people 
and their able-bodied counterparts. Disability discourse during the long nineteenth 
century, in fact, differed from earlier discourse by incorporating many of the rapid 
changes that accompanied the advent of modernity. Yet these developments did not mark 
a sudden epiphany, either among the disabled or the able-bodied, that people with 
disabilities differed from the able-bodied norm. Nor did those developments mark the 
beginning of efforts to categorize and control disabled people. Indeed, many of the same 
criticisms that Foucauldian disability scholars level at nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
attempts to provide public assistance to disabled people apply also to the Athenian public 
assistance system as described by Lysias, The Constitution of Athens, and Philochorus. 
Christian hegemony and its emphasis on almsgiving and institutional care for certain 
types of disabled people, meanwhile, not only reinforced the notion that disabled people 
were helpless but also likely provided able-bodied Christians with some measure of 
 396 
 
control over the disabled. In conditioning aid to disabled people on their willingness to 
embrace Christian practices, the Church, as Edward Wheatley has argued, may indeed 
have been motivated, in part, by the desire to assert social control over the disabled, 
demonstrating that the able-bodied community, to some extent, separated the disabled 
from its fold not only before the rise of capitalism and the nation-state but even before 
Foucault’s “great confinement” of the seventeenth century.2 
The ridicule that Søren Kierkegaard experienced during the Corsair affair of the 
nineteenth century, then, may have been slightly different from the ridicule that disabled 
people such as Alexander Pope had experienced a century earlier, but there are 
unmistakable parallels between the public lives of Pope and Kierkegaard, suggesting that 
there is far more continuity in the history of disability than many disability scholars today 
assume. Indeed, disability scholars should abandon attempts to determine precisely when 
able-bodied people in the West discovered that there was something unsavory about 
congenital deformity and disability and should focus, instead, on exploring how able-
bodied people have allowed negative stereotypes about disability to impact their views of 
the disabled throughout the recorded history of the West. Accordingly, disability scholars 
should not seek to ascertain the age in which disabled people first lost their autonomy or 
experienced stigma but rather to determine the extent to which disabled people have lost 
autonomy and experienced stigma in every age.3 
____________________________________ 
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